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ABSTRACT
A LEGION OF LEGACY: TYROLEAN MILITARISM, CATHOLICISM, AND THE
HEIMWEHR MOVEMENT
by Jason Christopher Engle
December 2017

This study of the origins of the Heimwehr (Home Guard) movement offers
insight into the conditions under which such groups gained their following. As such, its
story is a valuable one that shows a society groping with the problem of a complex,
multi-faceted identity that was, at the same time, wracked with substantial economic
privation and politically polarized. The paramilitary Heimwehr movement that began in
1920 was the creation of Austria’s conservative provincial governments. It was intended
to preserve the existing social and political order—that of the hegemonic social groups of
the Habsburg Monarchy—against the growing threat of Marxist revolution, embodied by
the Social Democratic Party. The movement understood itself as the continuity of the
centuries-old, volunteer militia tradition and carried on its rituals and adopted many of its
values. In post-Habsburg Austria, the Heimwehren sought to defend their homeland not
from any army, but from an ideology—Marxism. With numerous sources—foreign and
domestic—of financial, material, and military support, the Heimwehr movement was at
the epicenter of anti-Marxism in Europe and waged an ideological war against the
Austrian Social Democratic Party.
The movement’s seemingly negative political agenda that extended beyond its
aversion toward Marxism has been depicted by historians as indicative the absence of a
iv

distinct, overarching sociopolitical outlook. The controversial and misunderstood—even
by Heimwehr members themselves—Korneuburg Oath its federal leaders published in
May 1930 outlined the agenda of the movement and, when carefully read, reveals the
guiding hand of Catholic social thought. The fact that far right circles of Austria’s
mainstream conservative parties birthed and reared the Heimwehr movement,
differentiated it from the Nazis and Italian fascism, who only later gained mainstream
support due to the desperation of the latter.
Indeed, with the recent outpouring of populist, xenophobic nationalism in the
United States and Europe, the Heimwehr movement in Austria, among other right-wing
paramilitary organizations of Europe’s “Fascist Era” serve as useful, cautionary tales for
the present political landscape.
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INTRODUCTION

The question of fascism, for better or worse, has framed the study of the
Heimwehr (Home Guard) movement.1 Historians of fascism, the First Republic, and of
the movement itself, all grappled with whether or not the Heimwehren were a fascist
movement, a “proto-facist” movement, or merely militant reactionaries. Overall, these
efforts have yielded limited fruit. As Robert Paxton has noted, many such examinations
have produced little more than fascist “bestiaries,” with each “fascist” organization
having its own entry in a “catalog of portraits…one beast after another, each portrayed
against a bit of background scenery and identified by its external signs.”2 On the whole,
such evaluations simply reiterate the fact that the Great War left Central and Eastern
Europe in shambles and exposed to revolutionary and counter-revolutionary activity
within which these fascist organizations were born. On the individual level, these
exercises are ultimately unsatisfying, as they offer only present surface-level observations
based on their place in the wider political climate of their respective state, offering little
to no insight into the social and cultural influences that shaped the groups.

1
To establish a base understanding of the Heimwehr movement and terminology surrounding it,
some explanation is in order. The Heimwehr movement refers to a confederation of provincial (or state)
paramilitary organizations, which were themselves a confederation of local paramilitary groups throughout
the province. A standardized naming convention was never established, so local and provincial groups
assumed a wide variety of names (e.g. Heimwehr, Heimatwehr, Heimatschutz, Heimatdienst,
Selbstschutzverband, etc.). The provincial organizations established several national and regional coalitions
throughout the course of the First Republic, all of which had different names. To make matters more
confusing, despite whatever specific name they designated for themselves, newspapers frequently referred
to them in generic terms, typically “Heimwehr,” “Heimatwehr,” or “Heimatschutz.” Thus, historians came
to refer to these local, provincial, and/or national confederations as the Heimwehr (or Heimwehren, the
plural of Heimwehr) or Heimwehr movement for the sake of simplicity.
2
Robert O. Paxton, “The Five Phases of Fascism,” The Journal of Modern History 70 (March
1998): 10.
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In the case of the Heimwehr movement, for which no broad consensus has been
reached among scholars, it fittingly resides in a state of limbo. Early assessments, on the
heels of the Second World War, unsurprisingly identified the Heimwehren as “fascist
formations, Austrian counterparts to Hitler's S.A.”3 Francis Ludwig Carsten clearly saw
the Heimwehr as a fascist movement when writing, in 1976, that there was “no
comprehensive history of Austrian fascist movements and the many links between them,”
added that there existed “no history of the whole Heimwehr movement, and none at all of
the Austrian National Socialist Party.” More explicitly he later explains that it was
Heimwehr leaders in Carinthia and Tyrol, in particular, who “came under the spell of
Italian Fascism.”4
It is appropriate here to note that Austrian historians writing on the Heimwehr in
the decades immediately following the World War II perpetuated the myth that Austria
was the “first victim” of Nazi aggression, which originated from the Moscow
Declarations and was spread by the Allies. The “coalition historiography,” which
remained prevalent until the mid-1970s, used the defunct Heimwehren as scape-goats for
the fall of the First Republic.5 Depicted as the instruments of the Fascist Italy and
authoritarian Hungary, the Heimwehr movement could conveniently be divorced from

3

Charles Gulick, Austria: From Habsburg to Hitler, 2 vols. (Berkley: University of California
Press, 1948), 7; See also Alfred Diamant, “Austrian Catholics and the First Republic, 1918-1934: A Study
in Anti-Democratic Thought,” The Western Political Quarterly 10 (September 1957): 609-10.
4
Francis Ludwig Carsten, Fascist Movements in Austria: From Schönerer to Hitler (London:
SAGE, 1977), 7, 167-172.
5
Julie Thorpe has pointed out that there were other facets of early Second Republic scholarship
that created politically expedient narratives, such as Adam Wandruszka’s three “Lager” (camp) model. See
Adam Wandruszka, “Österreichs politische Struktur: Die Entwicklung der Parteien und politischen
Bewegungen,” in Geschichte der Republik Österreich, ed. Heinrich Benedikt (Wien: Verlag für Geschichte
und Politik, 1954); Julie Thorpe, Pan-Germanism and the Austro-Fascist State, 1933-1938 (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2011), 8; Tim Kirk, “Dictatorship, Fascism and the Demise of Austrian
Democracy,” in Austrian Studies Today, Contemporary Austrian Studies Volume 25 (New Orleans, LA:
University of New Orleans Press, 2016), 118, 120-1.
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Austrian society at large, thereby deflecting blame from the Austrian population and the
political figures involved, who the remained active in the government of the Second
Republic. Ludwig Jedlicka, for example, would claim that the Heimwehr movement was
“the sole repository of authoritarian and fascist thought in recent Austrian history.” Two
important points are implied in this statement. First, it implies that none of these
tendencies existed within the Christian Social Party, which has been proven time and
again, to be patently false. Second, he is implying that National Socialism was an entirely
German creation, once more divorcing Austria from Nazism.6 This too, is demonstrably
untrue. The roots of National Socialism were firmly planted in the political anti-Semitism
and pan-German rhetoric of Georg von Schönerer in 1890s Vienna, not to mention the
fact that an overwhelming majority of Austrians supported Anschluss (unification) with
Hitler’s Germany.7 Its own biases (which will be addressed later) notwithstanding,
Charles Gulick’s exhaustive, two-volume history of the First Republic was correct in
vigorously asserting that numerous segments of Austrian society actively worked to
undermine the government and destroy the republic. In doing so, his foundational work
was met with “unusually harsh criticism.”8
Interpretations of the Heimwehr movement remained largely unchanged until the
1970s when a younger generation of scholars began to re-evaluate the Heimwehr
movement.9 The emergence of fascist studies, in particular, helped refine interpretations

Ludwig Jedlicka, “The Austrian Heimwehr,” Journal of Contemporary History 1 (1966): 127.
John T. Lauridsen, Nazism and the Radical Right in Austria, 1918-1934 (Copenhagen: The
Royal Library Museum Tusculanum Press, 2007), 27; See also Franziska Schneeberger, “Sozialstruktur der
Heimwehr in Österreich. Eine vergleichend-politische sozialgeschichte der Heimwehrbewegung.” (PhD
diss., University of Salzburg,1988), 48-52.
8
Lauridsen, Nazism and the Radical Right, 30.
9
See, for example, R. John Rath, “Authoritarian Austria,” in Native Fascism in the Successor
States, 1918-1945, ed. Peter F. Sugar (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1971), 30.
6
7
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of the Heimwehr movement through comparative study of radical right-wing
organizations across Europe. Bruce F. Pauley, in his comparison of the Heimwehr
movement with the Austrian Nazi Party, concludes that, though they shared similar aims
with the Austrian National Socialists in that they professed to be a non-partisan
organization dedicated to the renewal of Austria, the Heimwehren differed in that they
were “characteristically ambiguous” in their adherence to the “Führerprinzip” (leader
principle). Their program called for obedience to strong central authority, but no single
Heimwehr leader, including its federally elected leaders, Dr. Richard Steidle (Tyrol), Dr.
Walter Pfrimer (Styria), and, later, Ernst Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg (Upper
Austria), forged the ‘cult of personality’ maintained in other fascist regimes Hitler,
Mussolini, or Franco.10 Thus, as Roger Griffin concludes that the “bulk of the Heimwehr
stopped short of full-blown fascism.”11
Indeed, Stanley Payne contends that the Korneuburg Oath—the controversial
program published by the Heimwehr movement in May 1930, in which they vowed to
establish an authoritarian, corporatist state—failed to articulate “clear-cut fascism,” and
prompted division between the moderate Christian Social factions and its radical, “protofascist” bloc.12 The fact that the Oath triggered division within the movement, is less than
a ringing endorsement of fascism within a sizeable segment of the movement. Richard
Schober has contended that the Korneuburg program Steidle championed, simply
Pauley, “Fascism and the Führerprinzip: The Austrian Example,” Central European History 12
(Sept. 1979): 280.
11
Roger Griffen, The Nature of Fascism (London: Routledge, 1991), 125.
12
For interpretations of the Korneuburg Oath as an indication of the movement’s definitively
fascist nature, see Carsten, Fascist Movements, 171-2; Tim Kirk, “Fascism and Austrofascism,” in The
Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A Reassessment, Contemporary Austrian Studies 11, ed. Günter
Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Alexander Lassner (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, 2003), 16.
10
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articulated long-held positions in that it was “an openly anti-parliamentary doctrine,
informed by anti-Marxism and an affinity for fascism.”13 Harboring an “affinity for
fascism” is not the same as being a fascist movement. Payne concludes that even though
some local groups defected to the Nazis, “most clung to a steadily amorphous if
authoritarian conservatism.”14 Though the Heimwehren demonstrated general
characteristics synonymous with fascism, they lacked key hallmarks of the fascist
benchmarks—the National Fascist Party in Italy and the National Socialist German
Worker’s Party or “Nazi Party” in Germany. The genre of fascist studies, with its
comparative basis, marked the first real substantive efforts to examine the attributes of
the Heimwehr movement, bringing into question earlier historiographic interpretations.
This shift is also noticeable in studies focusing on the Heimwehr movement, as
suggestions that the Heimwehren exhibited fascist leanings replaced ham-fisted,
unsubstantiated assumptions typical of earlier, politically biased scholarship. Reinhart
Kondert, for example, defines the Heimwehr movement as “a paramilitary organization
strongly imbued with fascist tendencies and supported by Italian money.” Complicating
the picture further, he adds:
[T]he rank and file were democratically inclined whereas the leadership tried to set out in a fascist
direction. When the Heimwehren leaders publicly announced that they would follow a fascist
course (the Korneuburg oath of May 18, 1930), the majority rejected the plan and the organization
became split even further. The evidence thus suggests that fascism (especially the Italian brand)
was an unwanted import and had little chance of winning the hearts and minds of the Austrian
people.15

Richard Schober, “Aufstieg und Fall der Tiroler Heimawehr (1928-1936),” Tiroler Heimat 61
(Innsbruck: Universitätverlag Wagner, 1997): 182.
14
Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1995), 247.
15
Reinhart Kondert, “The Rise and Early History of the Austrian Heimwehr” (PhD diss., Rice
University, 1972), iv-v.
13
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According to C. Earl Edmonson, “The Heimwehr belongs in both the paramilitary and,
with some qualifications, in the fascist categories.”16 While Edmondson acknowledges
that the Heimwehr leaders claimed the movement to be one of nonpartisan renewal, as
was “typical for fascist movements throughout Europe during the interwar period,” he
stops short of calling the movement fascist.17 While the Heimwehr movement exhibited
general characteristics of contemporary “fascist” organizations in Central and Eastern
Europe, its clear connections to historic paramilitary institutions, residual features of
Habsburg military culture, and the support and direction of the leading social groups of
the Habsburg Monarchy make it difficult to place the movement neatly into the fascist
category.
Fascist theoretician, Camillo Pellizzi, was right to be skeptical about the
association of similar movements with Italian fascism. As Luca de Caprariis notes:
In his view, however, most movements which called themselves fascist, such as the
Austrian Heimwehr movement or the German Stahlhelm, were in reality conservative
groupings. By and large, they represented entrenched interests. Fascism, Italian fascism,
was radically different, strongly rooted in the popular classes and 'in its essence
revolutionary, the impulse of a people struggling for living space and international
respect'.18

While the Heimwehren, the Stahlhelm, and to a lesser extent, even the Nazi Party,
actively agitated for radical, revolutionary methods of restoring German pride and

16

C. Earl Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics 1918-1936 (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1977), 8; Konkurrenz meaning competition/rivalry between leaders/factions/organizations—
a prominent feature that Hitler nurtured within the Nazi Party.
17
Bruce F. Pauley, Hahnenschwanz und Hakenkreuz. Steirischer Heimatschutz und
österreichischer Nationalsozialismus 1918-1934 (Wien: Europa Verlag, 1972), 29.
18
Luca de Caprariis, "'Fascism for Export'? The Rise and Eclipse of the Fasci Italiani all'Estero,"
Journal of Contemporary History 35 (April 2000): 168.

6

prosperity, they were financially support by traditional, mainstream interests and
conformed their aims to maintain that support, even if only temporarily.19
The ambiguity of the Heimwehr movement’s fascist status reflects the more
fundamental challenge of simply understanding fascism was or was not. The very term
“fascism,” as Paxton notes, “has been so loosely used that some have proposed giving it
up altogether in scholarly research.”20 Payne adds that the definition of fascism
“bedeviled” even the original, Italian Fascists, adding that “[t]he term has probably been
used more by its opponents than by its proponents, the former having been responsible
for the generalization of the adjective on an international level, as early as 1923.” As a
result, fascism became synonymous with violence, brutality, and repression.21 The
numerous left-wing newspapers in Austria such as the Arbeiter-Zeitung, Der Rote Fahne,
Arbeiterwille, the Vorarlberger Wacht, and the Tagblatt, illustrate this point quite well in
their liberal application of the “fascist” moniker to the Heimwehr movement in frequent
diatribes over the speeches of its leaders, their rallies, as well as its strike-breaking
activities.22 These same newspapers, however, also condemned the Heimwehren as
“monarchists” conspiring to overthrow the republic and install a Wittelsbach (the
Bavarian royal family) king, before they were “fascists.” The ease with which one label
was replaced with another indicates that the meaning of the label did not matter so much

Paxton, “The Five Phases of Fascism,” 12-16, points out that this willingness to sacrifice
ideological integrity for the support of mainstream conservatives to have been a common, if but temporary,
phase in the development of fascist organizations.
20
Paxton, “The Five Phases of Fascism,” 9.
21
Payne, A History of Fascism, 3.
22
The earliest case of this can be found in the September 15, 1923 edition of Arbeiterwille, the
Styrian Social Democratic news organ. “Heimatschutz oder Kapitalistenschutz?” Arbeiterwille, September
15, 1923, 9.
19
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as did the intent to isolate.23 Paxton points out, “It took two generations before the Left
understood that fascism is, after all, an authentic mass popular enthusiasm and not merely
a clever mass manipulation of populist emotions by the reactionary Right or by
capitalism in crisis.”24 It is significant, therefore, that the extensive, negative depictions
of the Heimwehren in the contemporary leftist media penetrated the earliest studies of the
First Republic.25
Nevertheless, the evolution from blanket assumptions of the movement’s fascist
character to more complex and refined interpretations of the Heimwehr movement has
been a positive development. Interpretations of the movement have progressed to
recognize a more complex set of organizations more firmly planted in historically
influential institutions and social circles than other contemporary right-wing paramilitary
organizations. The term “paramilitary” here is important to recognize; the Heimwehr
movement was a confederation of paramilitary groups, not a political party. Though it
ultimately established its own political party in the form of the Heimatblock, this was
never its original intent, rather it was the product of political and economic pressures to
seek constitutional reform through legal, political channels rather than by force. Put
differently, the Heimwehr movement was a paramilitary organization that created its own
political party, not a political party that created its own protective paramilitary wing, as in

23
See, for example, “Ein Monarchistisches Landeschießen in Tirol,” Arbeiter-Zeitung, November
18, 1920, 2.
24
Paxton, “The Five Phases of Fascism,” 2-3.
25
Charles Gulick’s two-volume history of the First Republic is among the earliest and is most
clearly biased in its depiction of the Heimwehr movement. Paul R. Sweet, “Democracy and CounterRevolution in Austria,” The Journal of Modern History 22 (March, 1950): 53-4, points out the unabashedly
adversarial position Gulick takes against the Heimwehren and the conservative establishment in Austria.
Sweet also notes the extensive use of Austrian newspapers and periodicals (much of which was Social
Democratic in orientation).
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the case of the Social Democrats and the Republican Defense League (Republikanischer
Schutzbund), the Nazi Party and its “Sturmabteilung,” or SA, or Mussolini’s
“Squadrismo,” better known as “Blackshirts.”
More recent scholarship has only reiterated the continued lack of clarity around
identifying interwar right-wing governments and organizations. Tim Kirk’s recent survey
of new scholarship on the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg governments highlights this problem,
pointing to the disagreement between historians as to how best to define their regimes.26
As for the Heimwehr movement itself, whatever refinements that have been made in
understanding its relationship to fascism are still, at times, appear lost on studies where it
is only tangentially related to the topic of discussion. Janek Wasserman, in his important
examination of right-wing intellectuals in Vienna, for example, repeatedly labels the
Heimwehren as “fascist groups,” even when referencing events that occurred before the
organization had made contact with Mussolini.27 While he rightly points out the influence
of Catholic social thought in groups like the Leo Society (Leo-Gesellschaft) and Austrian
Action (Österreichische Aktion), he precludes any notion that it might have influenced
the Heimwehr movement by identifying it as merely an extension of Italian fascism. Erin
Hochman, in her comparative study of German nationalism in the Weimar and First
Republics, by contrast, acknowledges the regional and cultural peculiarities—specifically
Catholicism—that were formative in shaping the attitudes of the Heimwehren rather than
dismissing them as simply being Mussolini’s acolytes.28

Tim Kirk, “Dictatorship, Fascism and the Demise of Austrian Democracy,” 114.
Janek Wasserman, Black Vienna: The Radical Right in the Red City, 1918-1938 (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2014), 2, 49, 91, 93, 115, 128.
28
Erin R. Hochman, Imagining a Greater Germany: Republican Nationalism and the Idea of
Anschluss (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 26.
26
27
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To be sure, the question of fascism has proven as prohibitive as it has instructive
toward understanding the Heimwehren in that its often-narrow focus on how its actions
and ideology compared to similar European movements, has neglected to develop a more
comprehensive understanding of the Heimwehren in its own native setting and historical
context. The majority of scholarly examinations of the Heimwehren make sweeping,
surface-level generalizations about the movement’s overarching political designs, which
do not correlate with its intractable regionalism (that they also acknowledge). To that
end, historians have also tended to take the words and actions of the movement’s leaders
at face value, as a reflection of the outlook of its membership at-large. Those political
studies often neglect the potential insights gained by analyzing their lexicon, activities,
and espoused values.

Purpose and Approach
As with all research projects, this one materialized out of a desire to answer a
question that has not been sufficiently addressed in the historiography—what was the
Heimwehr movement? While much of the scholarship written on the Austrian
Heimwehren offers surface-level explanations, this has not been a question that historians
have sought to answer.29 This study is not an exhaustive examination; such an endeavor
would require numerous volumes. Building on existing scholarship that has focused on

Franziska Schneeberger’s unpublished dissertation, “Sozialstruktur der Heimwehr in Österreich.
Eine vergleichend-politische sozialgeschichte der Heimwehrbewegung,” is a significant step toward a more
extensive understanding of the Heimwehr movement, though her important points get bogged down in
sociological theory at times.
29
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the political impact of the movement, this study emphasizes pre-war cultural continuities
that helped shape the movement itself.
Contrary to the conventional periodization, the Heimwehr movement cannot be
fully understood without understanding the resonance of pre-war customs and attitudes,
which did not simply vanish with the conclusion of the Great War. As Jay Winter
explains, distinct traditional versus modern boundaries established in the cultural
historiography of the Great War invites “distortion by losing a sense of messiness, its
non-linearity, its vigorous and stubbornly visible incompatibilities.”30 Winter continues,
“The ongoing dialogue and exchange among artists and their public, between those who
self-consciously returned to nineteenth-century forms and themes and those who sought
to supersede them, makes the history of modernism much more complicated than a
simple, linear divide between ‘old’ and ‘new’ might suggest.”31 More specific to the
Austrian case, John Boyer rightly points out, future scholarship needs to connect “what
happened before 1914 and what happened after 1918…in order to understand the broader
structures and systems that defined Austrian political culture in the later twentieth
century.”32
Beyond the severe economic constraints of the new Austrian republic, its inability
to achieve political stability reflected the fact that “the First Republic was deeply shaped
by the memories, traditions, and institutional practices from the Empire, and…was hard
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pressed to extricate itself from, much less to overcome, the stunning collapse of the
Empire.”33 The hegemonic social groups of Habsburg Austria, despite suffering their own
economic and legal setbacks, remained influential in the new republic and found
themselves threatened by the rise of Marxism across Europe.34 The continued prominence
of these social groups in the First Republic reiterates Winter’s conclusion that “the
rupture of 1914-18 was much less complete” than has often been suggested.35 And when
the new system of government proved unwieldy and ineffective in smothering the Social
Democratic opposition, these same circles quickly lost their patience parliamentary
democracy. Together, Christian Social and pan-Germanist party officials, Catholic
clergy, declassed aristocrats, financiers and industrialists, and former k.u.k. officers
actively worked to undermine the democratic system, primarily through the creation of,
and continuous support for, the Heimwehr movement.36 Indeed, the Great War might
have destroyed the monarchy in a physical sense, but it could not erase its impression on
Austrian society. To Wolfgang Maderthaner’s point, one might as easily view the process
of revolution and the creation of the First Republic as one of “de-feudalization” as much
as state building.37 Ultimately, neither process succeeded, as the latter depended on the
successful realization of the former.
Indeed, there is a universal and enduring cycle of ‘old’ and ‘new;’ what was once
the ‘new’ inevitably becomes the ‘old.’ Those who doggedly clutch traditional values in
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juxtaposition to those that gravitate toward the avant-garde invariably find themselves at
opposite ends of a perpetual Kulturkampf, or “culture war.” While the Heimwehr
movement indeed “reflected the conditions of central Europe in the interwar period,” as
Edmondson contends, it was also a central part of an enduring struggle for political and,
thus, cultural hegemony.38 To better understand the Heimwehren, one must understand
the mass politics of the First Republic on a cultural level, as a fundamental struggle over
the fate of traditional German values, which most Heimwehr leaders viewed as being
inherently intertwined with Catholic social teachings and the ancient connection between
southern Germans and the Church. As social scientist Edgar Shein explains,
If we understand the dynamics of culture, we will be less likely to be puzzled, irritated,
and anxious when we encounter the unfamiliar and seemingly irrational behavior of
people in organizations, and we will have a deeper understanding not only of why various
groups of people or organizations can be so different, but also why it is so hard to change
them. Even more important, if we understand culture better we will better understand
ourselves—better understand the forces acting within us that deﬁne who we are, that
reﬂect the groups with which we identify and to which we want to belong.39

This study approaches the Heimwehr movement on two levels. On one hand, it
places the Heimwehren in the context of the wider phenomenon of counter-revolutionary
Paramilitarism in what Robert Gerwarth and John Horne have called “shatter zones” in
the footprint of the defeated Central Powers.40 In particular, it will focus on the antiMarxist “Ordnungsblock” forged through the paramilitary Bavarian Citizen’s Guard
(Einwohnerwehr) organization and its successor, the League for Bavaria and the Empire
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(Bayern Bund und Reich) the fledgling Austrian Heimwehr movement, and the Horthy
government in Hungary between 1920 and 1923. Despite this coalition’s collapse in the
wake of the Hitler’s abortive Beer Hall Putsch, the Heimwehren resurrected their
Bavarian connections, establishing a close working relationship with the Bavarian state
association of the Steel Helmet, League of Front Soldiers (Landesverband Der Stahlhelm,
Bund der Frontsoldaten) in 1927. Utilizing contacts in the Horthy government in
Hungary they facilitated a working relationship with Fascist Italy, which would last until
1936. As these sections will demonstrate, the Heimwehr movement actively sought
cooperation and support from neighboring governments and paramilitary organizations.
In doing so, it functioned as a hub for transnational reactionary collaboration.
On the other, this project analyzes the Heimwehr movement inside Austria.
Specifically, it teases out the question of the movement’s popularity, looking closely at
the support offered by its domestic patrons. It examines the activities of the Heimwehr
organizations, such as military actions and training, rallies, religious ceremonies, and war
memorial dedications, and what those events reveal about the movement’s cultural
influences. While the battle with the Social Democrats was a clear cut, mobilizing force,
the conflict that emerged with the Nazis in 1931 was much more complicated and would
evoke divisions among Christian Social and pan-Germanist factions within the
Heimwehren. Particular attention is given to the Tyrolean organization—the Tiroler
Heimatwehr, also referred to as the Selbstschutzverband (S.S.V.) Tirol—whose
leadership stood at the forefront of the movement throughout much of its existence.
Alongside Dr. Richard Steidle, leader of the Tyrolean Heimwehren and Bundesführer
(federal leader) of the national confederation, was his chief of staff, German émigré,
14

Major Waldemar Pabst. Pabst was the driving force behind the organization of a national
Heimwehr front. Thus, the organizational files of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr offer not only
a window into the Tyrolean organization but also into the movement itself.

Figure 1. Dr. Richard Steidle and Major Waldemar Pabst, 1930
(Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-2005-0413-501 / CC-BY-SA 3.0, CC BY-SA 3.0 de)

What is more, in no other provincial organization were the peculiarities developed
over the centuries of Habsburg rule more influential than they were on the Tyrolean
Heimatwehr. Austria’s Alpine provinces historically relied heavily on the volunteer
militia for self-defense and the members of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr understood
themselves and their group as building on the province’s long legacy of civic militarism.
Only in Tyrol and Vorarlberg, however, did they develop an extensive militia system
(Landesverteidigung) outside the control of the House of Habsburg. This “privilege”
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became part of Tiroler identity, illustrating the contrarian, independent-mindedness of its
population.

A Note on Sources
In addition to the body of secondary literature written on the Heimwehr
movement, this study draws from a variety of primary source material compiled over the
course of months of research conducted at the Tiroler Landesarchiv (TLA) in Innsbruck,
Austria and serves as the foundation of this study. Particular attention was given to its
organizational files, which offer insight into a wide variety of aspects regarding the dayto-day operation and logistical planning, training, and relationships with other
organizations and important actors. Events that Tyrolean leaders were involved with and
helped plan, such as the November 1920 shooting festival (Festschießen) at Berg Isel—
the first open clash between the Heimwehr movement and the Social Democrats—and the
October 1928 rally in the Social Democratic stronghold of Wiener Neustadt, were
especially insightful. Though not comprehensive in the fact that they do not span the
entirety of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr’s existence, its rich contents complicate and dispel
older interpretations of the Heimwehr movement.41 In addition to its primary source
material, the manuscript collection at the TLA also has a number of doctoral dissertations
focusing on all matters of the Tyrolean history, two of which were consulted in this
study.
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The British National Archives houses copies of several German Foreign Office
(Auswärtige Amt) files seized at the end of World War II. Document collections focusing
on the Anschluss Movement in Tyrol in the years immediately following World War I
(1919-1921), as well as “Secret Files” on the Tyrolean Heimatwehr (1927-1933) have
also been consulted in this investigation, adding an outside, but knowledgeable
perspective on the Heimwehr movement. Moreover, these record groups offer insight into
the close cooperation between the Bavarian and Tyrolean governments in establishing
defense agreements and contingencies for the dissolution of the Austrian state. An
important, and stealthy, avenue of this cooperation was through the alliance between the
Bavarian Einwohnerwehr and the Tyrolean Heimatwehr. The ultimate change in direction
of the Tyrolean government—to seek unification with Germany as an independent
state—reflected the power of regional identity, particularly in the Tyrol.
German Foreign Ministry “secret files” on the Austrian Heimwehr center upon
the activities of the Heimwehren between 1927 and 1933, and provides useful insight into
its efforts to establish collaborative relationships with Bavarian defense organizations.
They present a German Foreign Office whose representatives discouraged Bavarian
cooperation with the Heimwehren for fear of prompting international scrutiny that could
bring further repercussions on Germany. Moreover, the documents offer valuable
perspectives from German officials observing and evaluating the Heimwehren and their
leading personalities. This was especially telling is their perceptions of Waldemar Pabst,
whose gift for intrigue they were most leery.
This study also draws on Heimwehren newspapers Die alpenländische
Heimatwehr from 1926 to 1933, as well as the Tyrolean Heimatwehr Blätter from 1924
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and 1925, housed at the Main Library of the University of Innsbruck. The Austrian
National Library (Österreichische Nationalbibliothek) has digitized and made available
for the public, an extensive online collection of historical newspapers—AustriaN
Newspapers Online (ANNO)—that span, intermittently, from 1568 to 1944. The
newspapers referenced in this project are, aside from the various Heimwehr newspapers
mentioned above, are almost entirely drawn from the ANNO collection. The Austrian
National Library has also digitized, and published online, stenographical reports from the
provisional Tyrolean Tyrolean National Council (Nationalrat) from 1918-1919 as well as
those of the Tyrolean Diet (Landtag) meetings for 1920-1921, which are also cited in this
investigation. Older, relevant historical texts whose copyrights have expired are widely
available online, and were utilized, as were published primary source materials available
via digital literature collections maintained by the University of Innsbruck, the Hathi
Trust Digital Library partnership, and Google Books.

Arguments
The overall structure of this study is topical, to better highlight themes and its
principal arguments. However, it follows the general chronology where possible, for the
sake of clarity, and to illustrate change over time. Using the Tyrol as its primary window
into the Heimwehr movement, chapter one argues that the province’s long legacy of civic
militarism exercised significant influence on the Heimwehren. Of special significance
was the system of shooting ranges (Schützenwesen) that became the basis of its state
defense system (Landesverteidigung). Though originally not an official component of
Tyrol’s military infrastructure, these shooting ranges were constructed by local gentry
18

and were home to recreational rifle clubs. The democratization of firearms helped make
sport-shooting increasingly popular, which lead to the construction of more ranges and
the formation of more clubs. The gun culture that materialized from this past-time (as
well as hunting) became deeply entrenched in the Tyrolean identity.
By the early eighteenth century, some rifle clubs—in times of war—volunteered
to serve as light infantry (sharpshooter) companies. Originally, these companies were
under no formal obligation to the state, volunteering their skills out of patriotism for
“Vaterland Tirol.” Over time, these “hand-shake” agreements evolved into more
formalized obligations. These rifle club companies, or Standschützen, as they became
known, formed the basis of Tyrol’s militia system (Schützenwesen). The Schützenwesen,
in turn, formed the core of Tyrol’s system of defense. Likewise, the shooting ranges
around which the clubs were based, took on an increasingly official, militaristic character
until they—like the rifle clubs that used them—were wholly integrated into the Tyrolean
defense system by the early twentieth century. Over the course of the nineteenth century,
the Tyrolean Landesverteidigung had decayed and lost its autonomous character,
becoming increasingly reliant upon, and subject to, imperial (Habsburg) funding and
oversight.
The codification of militia obligations added an increasingly formalized the
militarism of the Landesverteidigung. This process was formative in that it helped to
transform the vibrant gun culture in Tyrol into a more dynastically-oriented culture of
civic militarism. Thus, the essence of Tyrolean civic militarism lay in the intersection of
multiple facets of identity. One might argue that regional (Tyrolean) patriotism and
loyalty to the Habsburg crown were the pillars, while their religious devotion was the
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“glue” that held those pillars firmly in place. Throughout Tyrol’s history, the dominating
presence of Catholic clergy proved crucial in motivating and directing—often both
spiritually and militarily—the patriotic energies of its people.
The shooting ranges, themselves, were conduits that fostered this civic militarism
in that they were spaces where camaraderie and unit pride were forged, military skills
were learned and honed, and dynastic and provincial patriotism were cultivated. The
shooting ranges served dual purposes as nodes of community and military mobilization,
which cultivated the militarization of Tyrolean society by subconsciously connecting
military service with fundamental aspects of daily life. Thus, the unit pride of a
Standschützen company was closely intertwined with its local identity. This connection
was articulated by the participation of rifle companies in community, religious
ceremonies, shooting competitions, and social events, such as concerts and dances, put on
by the companies for their communities. As subsequent chapters will reveal, this process
of militarization remained a formative influence on identity of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr
and, by extension, the movement as a whole. Heimwehr propaganda framed the
militarism of the movement in traditional, masculine terms. Military service and war
volunteerism in defense of one’s home and hearth was a duty for which he had been
trained from his youth through activities like hunting, sport shooting, and rugged, outdoor
games boys played. As such, the activities Heimwehr youth groups centered around
shooting contests, marches, map reading exercises, and various other outdoor activities.
The parallels between Heimwehr and Schützen militarism is especially clear.
Chapter two will examine the establishment of the Heimwehr movement within
the broader context of reactionary Paramilitarism in the footprint of the former Central
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Powers. The political upheaval of Marxist revolution was the catalyst for galvanizing
counter-revolutionary defense organizations such as the Freikorps in Germany, the
Hungarian National Army, and local Heimwehren in Austria. Their resistance to Marxist
revolution in central Europe was heightened by what Wolfgang Schivelbusch has called a
“culture of defeat,” which was founded on the myth that the loss of the war was the work
of Judeo-Bolshevik revolutionaries scheming behind the backs of the German and
Austro-Hungarian armed forces, not military defeat on the field of battle.42 As such, the
violence unleashed in Germany and Hungary, in particular, was excessively brutal.
The founding of Heimwehr movement in 1920 was achieved through
transnational cooperation between reactionary circles that made the Austro-Bavarian
border the epicenter of anti-Marxist paramilitary activity in Europe. With the cooperation
of the Bavarian government, the paramilitary Einwohnerwehr helped to arm, organize,
and train Heimwehr groups. Provincial Austrian officials provided legal protections and
resources, while the Hungarian government was the major financier of the Heimwehren.
While ultra-nationalism has been the watch-word for the radical right in interwar Central
Europe, the transnational collaboration that took place in establishing the Heimwehren
illustrates the counter-revolutionary right’s pragmatism, ideological flexibility, and very
real fear of communist revolution. Their efforts in Austria would pay dividends, as they
laid the foundation for what would be a strong, anti-Marxist bloc in Central Europe.
Their cooperation was short-lived, however. In the face of intense international
pressure, the Einwohnerwehr was dissolved in June 1921. Hungarian support also dried
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up that winter when it became evident that its aims for funding the Heimwehren—
regaining the Burgenland—was not to be. The predecessor of the Einwohnerwehr, Bund
Bayern und Reich, proved divisive, prompting the Heimwehren in some provinces to
leave its tutelage in favor of that of Erich Ludendorff, rival of Bund Bayern und Reich
leader, Dr. Otto Pittinger. Nevertheless, money, arms, and equipment continued to flow
from Bavaria. The cooperation between Austrian and Bavarian organizations all but dried
up in the wake of Hitler’s failed “Beer Hall Putsch,” and would not be resurrected until
the summer of 1926.
Chapter three analyzes the organizational culture of the Heimwehr movement,
teasing out its founding charters, organizational hierarchies, mission statements, and
membership data. Analysis of state leadership (Landesleitung) documents provide insight
as to the identity and interests—and, therefore, the purpose—of the Tyrolean
Heimatwehr. Documents detailing the leadership hierarchy of the organization at the
district and precinct levels, offering names and professions where the information was
known or communicated by the respective leaders, are also revealing. When compiled
and broken out, the professions of Heimatwehr leaders indicate the predominance of
elected officials in these roles, demonstrating how the organization was intertwined with
mainstream conservative circles. Though purposefully vague so as to not outwardly
violate the peace treaties ending World War I, it is clear that Heimatwehr was a
voluntary, “patriotic,” German nationalist, and anti-Marxist organization.43 The statutes
of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr also reveal its basic organizational hierarchy that generally
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followed existing provincial administrative zones, as well as its limited membership
requirements.
Though not addressed in the organization’s charter, two seemingly insignificant,
but mutually reinforcing, membership policies emerged to drive the actions and decisions
of its leadership and had profound impact on the development of the movement. The first
was the fact that the Heimwehren did not require their members to pay dues for various
reasons. This meant that the organizations did not generate any of their own revenue.
Therefore, they were wholly dependent upon the generosity of private donors and the
governments of their provinces, many of whom they served as auxiliary police forces. By
depending solely on external sources of income, they found themselves beholden to the
agendas of their patrons, at first willingly and later begrudgingly. Despite the pleas of the
influential German émigré and federal chief of staff, Waldemar Pabst, this policy went
unaltered.44 Second, the Heimwehren maintained a largely open membership policy:
anyone who was not a member of the Social Democratic Party and was of non-Jewish,
German descent was eligible to join. Combined with the absence of membership dues,
this policy generated a broad support base across all socioeconomic strata and political
ideologies. These policies worked well together in establishing the organizations as nonpartisan, civil-defense groups, amassing a combined membership of between 300,000 and
400,000 at its peak.
The activities, behaviors, and espoused values of the Heimwehr organizations
reflected the fundamental place of Catholic social teachings. Beyond the incorporation of
field Mass services in all Heimwehr activities, itself, an indication the primacy of the

44

Carsten, Fascist Movements, 180.

23

Church, Catholic social thought shaped the ideological development of the movement.
The rhetoric of Heimwehr leaders, its propaganda, and its political platform—the
Korneuburg Oath—clearly reconcile with the work of Catholic social theorists and papal
encyclicals. The movement’s aversion to Marxism, Capitalism, liberalism, and Westernstyle parliamentary democracy reflected the sentiments echoed in the encyclicals and the
work of Catholic social thinkers. Likewise, its support for a corporatist alternative to
Marxism and capitalism also correlated with the position taken in papal encyclicals and
writings of Catholic philosophers. The lineage of these ideals clearly flowed from the
writings of Karl von Vogelsang and Adam Müller as well as from the papal encyclicals,
Rerum Novarum and the Quadragesimo Anno to political thinkers like Othmar Spann and
his students, Heimwehr ideologues, Hans Riehl, Walter Heinrich, and Odo NeustädterStürmer. Having to balance political Catholicism and German nationalism, these
overtones had to remain subtle and may have been lost on readers not intimately familiar
with the writings of Spann and his predecessors or the papal encyclicals.
The basis of support for the Heimwehr as a mass movement is the subject under
scrutiny in chapter four. The prevailing orthodoxy in the literature rejects Seipel’s claim
that the Heimwehr was an “irresistible people’s movement,” citing estimations of its
membership numbers. As this chapter will demonstrate, this simplistic method of
measuring support tells a story that is consistent with efforts of “coalition historiography”
to white-wash Austria to better fit the “victim” role prescribed by the Allies and the
Soviets following World War II. Beyond the fact that the Heimwehr movement secured a
sizable membership base (per capita) at its peak, it secured the support important crosssections of the Austrian population. That is, it was funded by industrial associations,
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financial institutions, nobles, as well as state and federal governments at various times.
Furthermore, the provincial governments were key to the movement’s success, providing
essential legal protections from federal calls for its disarmament and dissolution. It also
could count on sustenance from Catholic clergy members throughout Austria who lent
the movement respectability. At the same time, the involvement and backing of nobles
provided the movement with standing and flair, while the support of former k.u.k.
officers gave the Heimwehren credibility as a paramilitary organization. Whatever the
Heimwehr movement may have lacked in sheer numbers, it made up for in the fact that
its backers were wealthy, politically powerful, and socially influential. In other words,
their wealth, power, and influence were force multipliers.
Chapter five picks up with the resumption of contact between the Heimwehren
and Bavarian paramilitary organizations in the summer of 1926. Of particular importance
was the “Arbeitsgemeinschaft” or “working group” between the Heimwehr and the
Stahlhelm in Bavaria, among other defense organizations. Through the Stahlhelm, the
Heimwehr secured access to arms, munitions, military equipment and money from
Bavarian nobles. Agreements that obliged the Stahlhelm to come to the aid of the
Heimwehren in the event of civil war or neighboring conflagrations proved elusive. The
German Foreign Office was concerned that the Heimwehren would drag Bavarian
paramilitary organizations into a reckless civil war by attempting to march on Vienna.
The resistance of its German counterparts to agree to come to its aid did not deter
Heimwehr leaders, who were simultaneously exploring similar agreements with
Yugoslavian paramilitary organizations, Hungarian contacts in the Horthy government,
as well as with Fascist Italy. The relationship forged with the latter would be its most
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formative, permanently changing the trajectory of the Heimwehr movement and the
Austrian state. Nevertheless, a productive “working group” with the Stahlhelm was
achieved. Steidle and Pabst would also connect federal leaders Franz Seldte and Theodor
Duesterberg with Mussolini, who aided them with political advice and support as the
Stahlhelm entered the realm of politics in the 1930 German federal election.
Shortly after Ernst Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg toppled Steidle and Pfrimer
from federal leadership over the Heimwehr movement, he met with Mussolini who
became something of a mentor to the young Bundesführer. In 1932, Starhemberg would
in turn connect new Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss with “Il Duce.” Mussolini’s
financial backing of the Heimwehren, economic stimulus to Austria, diplomatic support,
and political guidance for the Dollfuss government helped stiffen its resistance to Nazi
terrorism after the party’s banishment in 1933. The close support Austria enjoyed from
Mussolini, for all intents and purposes, died with Dollfuss in July 1934. Shortly
thereafter, Italy became embroiled in the so-called Abyssinia Crisis, the international
reaction to which would, over the course of the next year-and-a-half, push Mussolini
toward an alliance with Hitler.
Ultimately, this dissertation will demonstrate that the development of the
Heimwehr movement in Austria did not occur in a vacuum. Quite the opposite. It was the
product of close transnational cooperation among anti-Marxist circles in Germany,
Austria, and Hungary. Like its influential Bavarian mentors, the Heimwehr movement
understood itself to be heirs to the heritage of Alpine civic militarism, embodied in the
deep-rooted history of volunteer Schützen and Standschützen companies. As such, the
Heimwehren adopted much of the longstanding rituals and ideals that were underpinned
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by conventional Catholic notions of gender that glorified masculine duties of military
service and war volunteerism. The voluntary character of the movement would,
unintentionally impact the decision-making of its leadership and eventually prove to be
its Achilles heel. Catholic social thinking figured centrally in the Heimwehr movement’s
worldview, mirroring the values and beliefs espoused by Popes and Catholic social
theorists. The ubiquitous place of Catholic clergy and ceremony in the events staged by
the Heimwehren simply reiterated its firm Catholic underpinnings. The Schützen and the
Church were not the only entrenched imperial-era institutions with which the Heimwehr
connected. It also enjoyed the patronage and involvement of many members of the
leading circles in Habsburg society. It was these continuities that, in part, helped inspire
spirit of the Fatherland Front and the identity of the Austria corporatist state. The
economic stagnation resulting from the Great Depression was the rock upon which the
energetic Nazi Party broke the backward-looking Fatherland Front.
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CHAPTER I – AUSTRIA’S LEGACY OF ALPINE CIVIC MILITARISM

Former Austrian Chancellor, Kurt Schuschnigg described the impetus for the
Heimwehr movement from a historical perspective, explaining that “[t]he desire for
military preparedness, more particularly in the Alpine lands, was deeply rooted in the
character of the people.”45 Schuschnigg, a Tyrolean himself and founder of the Catholic
paramilitary Östmärkische Sturmscharen (Eastmark Stormtroopers), was well acquainted
with the militaristic nature of Alpine culture that remained prevalent throughout the
interwar period.46 The specificity of “the Alpine lands,” implies a distinct group from
those dwelling in Austria’s plains. Deep-rooted militarism in the Alpine lands represents
what Edgar Shein calls “the critical defining characteristic of a group,” as “its members
have a shared history.” He adds, “Any social unit that has some kind of shared history
will have evolved a culture, with the strength of that culture dependent on the length of
its existence, the stability of the group’s membership, and the emotional intensity of the
actual historical experiences they have shared.”47 This shared historical experience did
not simply vanish with the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, rather it remained a
formative cultural influence in Alpine Austria. The paramilitary Heimwehr movement
that emerged in 1920 was an indication of just how deeply-rooted that influence was,
most especially in the province of Tyrol.
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Focusing primarily on the province of Tyrol, this chapter establishes the
functional, organizational, and cultural continuities from the imperial-era Tyrolean
Standschützen, which fundamentally shaped the character of Tyrolean Heimatwehr and,
by extension, the Heimwehr movement. First, the Heimatwehr emulated the
Standschützen in its function; both served the purpose of civil defense against all manner
of threats—rioting, rebellion, or foreign invasion—to their local communities. Moreover,
the Heimwehr, like its Standschützen forerunners, served as an extension of the local and
provincial governments. Second, the Heimatwehr emulated the Standschützen in its use
of Tyrol’s extensive pre-war network of shooting ranges. Though it followed the general
organizational model of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, which was structured to
correspond to local, regional, and provincial administrative zones, it also utilized the
shooting ranges to train and store weapons it smuggled across the border from Bavaria.
Third, the impression of Standschützen culture could be seen in the organizational
culture of the Heimatwehr on several levels. The Heimatwehr paralleled the
Standschützen in its close relationship with local Catholic clerics; shared rituals and
activities such as flag dedication ceremonies, shooting competitions, and parades, almost
always included Sunday Mass service. Also like the Standschützen, the Heimatwehr
maintained an active youth component that trained young men in marksmanship; in the
case of the Heimatwehr, this extended to general military conditioning, drilling, and
training. Too, both served as channels for social engagement. The Heimatwehr would
also adopt the social conventions of Standschützen: holding concerts, dances, and family
events and activities created a sense of community and togetherness among the families
of the participants. As such, the Standschützen and the Heimatwehr both reflected
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traditional Catholic ideas of masculinity, offered fellowship, and served as mediums of
patriotic expression.
Lastly, the connection with the Standschützen was expressed clearly by the
Heimatwehr. Before the towering likeness of Andreas Hofer on Berg Isel, the
Heimatwehr regularly drew inspiration from the courage and achievements of the
Standschützen in 1809. These links were also articulated in Heimatwehr newspapers,
propaganda, and speeches. Indeed, the Heimatwehr saw themselves as the heirs to Tyrol’s
Standschützen tradition. These many shared characteristics took on new meanings in the
hyper-politicization of the First Republic. Though the Heimatwehr understood
themselves to be protecting the same communities and values as their Standschützen
predecessors, they had become political militiamen who expressly combated the
existential threat of Marxist internationalism. Andreas Hofer, himself devoutly loyal to
the Habsburg dynasty, was portrayed as a symbol of the German nationalism, a defender
of German culture against the encroachment foreign Enlightenment ideals. Heimatwehr
Masses, flag dedications, and benedictions no longer represented ordinary religious
conventions they did for the Standschützen ancestors, but were also protests against the
godlessness of Socialism. Not to be dismissed, the fact that both functioned as extensions
of their local and provincial governments also had new meaning for the Heimatwehr;
their enemy was not from outside Austria, but were the Socialist enemies within that
those governments used to intimidate and suppress. The Heimatwehr understood
themselves as representing the same virtues as their forerunners, but in the new post-war
world, they were combatting a different enemy.
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Militarizing Alpine Society—A Medieval Origin Story
In Tyrol, the beginnings of this “shared history of experience” can be traced as far
back as the early Middle Ages, when geopolitical norms allowed duchies and counties to
function as virtually autonomous realms despite owing allegiance to a king. In this way,
nobles were obliged to defend their borders and communities with their own armies.
Thus, the militarization of Tyrol during the Habsburg reign manifested out of necessity.
This militarism evolved over the centuries, merging war volunteerism, provincial
patriotism and imperial loyalty, expressed through the age-old mantra, “Für Gott, Kaiser,
und Vaterland.” The militarization of Tyrolean society was a formative influence on
population’s collective identity.48 Over time, even recreational activities such as hunting
and sport shooting acquired increasingly formal, militaristic tinges.
Time and again the Habsburg’s imperial army sought to gain control over matters
of Tyrolean state defense (Landesverteidigung). Tyrol’s numerous shooting ranges
(Schießstände) and clubs served as the infrastructure for the Landesverteidung. The
official integration of Tyrol’s militia system into the imperial military industrial complex
reduced its civilian complexion further. By the late-nineteenth century, traditional
volunteer militia institutions had almost entirely been integrated into the k.k. Landwehr,
Austria’s “National Guard.” As such, Tyrolean shooting ranges now became nodes of
military mobilization for reservists and militiamen, beyond their original roles as
community spaces for socializing, camaraderie, and target shooting.

It should be noted that discussions of identity, including, “Tyrolean identity,” should be
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In 1363 the last of the Meinhardiner line, Margaret, Countess of Tyrol, bequeathed
the county to Rudolf IV of Austria. In this way, Tyrol became a possession of the House
of Habsburg. Feudal obligations required vassals, peasant farmers, and retainers
(knechten) to serve as soldiers in the armies of their respective landlords’ private army or
in the levies (Aufgebot) of the cities in which they lived. These levies were one of the
“pillars” of the “military constitution” of the late medieval and early modern Tyrol. As is
evident in the writings of chroniclers of sixteenth century Tyrol, military service was a
significant aspect of the lives of the peasantry and townsfolk. Military campaigns,
whether they be wars with neighboring duchies or “death feuds” (Totschlagsfehde)
between nobles, were unwelcome interruptions in their lives. Not surprisingly, then, the
topic of who was obliged to serve and for how long, was an “exceedingly controversial”
one between noble and peasant, Bürgermeister and townsfolks, particularly from the
fifteenth century onward. Not surprisingly, the “military constitution” framing the
parameters of service became increasingly detailed and sophisticated.49
For townsfolk, the genesis of codified civilian military obligations appears to have
evolved from earlier civil defense duties such as watch duty (Wachtdienst).50 The city of
Salzburg, for example, obliged citizens to man and defend the towers at Mönchsberg and
its gates. In another instance, an executive decree (Ausfergenurkunde) dated 31 January,
1278, required six crossbowman units (Armbrustschützen) to help defend the bridge,
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ramparts, and walls of the city of Laufen (Salzburg).51 Nearly a century later, little had
changed. Townsfolk remained obliged to perform civil defense duties. The Tyrolean city
of Hall, for example, paid two watchmen at a time, stationed in the “Hallerturm” in
1365.52
Civil defense duties expanded to encompass more sophisticated schemes of
military preparedness (militärische Bereitschaft). In one detailed example, a city captain
(Stadthauptmann), typically a noble, and often the city’s mayor (Bürgermeister), oversaw
district captains (Bezirkhauptmann), who commanded militia units from their respective
districts of the city. This system of organization, used in the city of Hall, is among the
earliest incarnations of civil defense in Tyrol. Further indications of the increasingly
sophisticated nature of the Tyrol’s civil defense system can be found in documents such
as a muster list (Musterregister) for the city of Lienz (Tyrol) from to 1410, which
included not just the personal information of the militiamen but also the weapons that
they were trained to use.53 In the late Middle Ages, such measures were local initiatives
and, thus, varied greatly from one municipality to the next. Nevertheless, in Tyrol and
across Europe, militia systems (Schützenwesen) were refined and standardized over the
next five centuries.
The transition from melee to ranged weapons, contributed greatly to the transition
from well-trained, expensive, and unwieldy Söldnerheer (mercenary armies) to the
formation of standing armies and the recruitment of subjects for militia duty. 54 Officers
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could train civilians to use crossbows and muskets in a comparatively short amount of
time with a reasonable degree of efficiency, as opposed to mounted knights (Ritter), or
mercenary foot soldiers (Fußtruppen) who required much more extensive military
training to become proficient with the melee weapons. City governments constructed
shooting ranges (Schießstände) outside city walls to provide spaces to drill and practice
marksmanship on set days on the calendar.55 In 1461 in the city of Hall, a “shooting
order” (Schießenordnung) was introduced that required shooting practice every Sunday.56
Shooting ranges became crucial components in Tyrol’s system of defense
(Landesverteidigung) in numerous facets beyond shooting exercises. They came to
function, more importantly, as spaces where war volunteerism and dynastic patriotism
converged with pastimes such as shooting competitions and hunting, fashioning a culture
of civic militarism that became innately intertwined with the regional identity of
Tyroleans.
In 1511, Holy Roman Emperor, Maximilian I, signed the much-venerated
Tyrolean “Landlibell,” which obligated the County of Tyrol to provide the emperor with
militia forces ranging between 5,000 and 20,000 troops, depending on the severity of the
threat. In exchange for this commitment, Tyrolean militiamen would not have to
campaign outside of Tyrol.57 Despite the reverence attained among Schützenkompanies,
the Landlibell codified administrative practices that had already been in place—some
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long before 1511.58 For example, in 1497 Tyrol was quartered for the express purpose of
military mobilization. Each of the four regions had to provide up to 5,000 men depending
on the degree to which the state was threatened.59
While Tyroleans long placed much emphasis on the importance of this document
as conferring special rights and a greater degree independence, it was not a unique
arrangement. The Habsburgs had reached similar agreements with neighboring duchies
before the Landlibell von 1511. In Lower Austria, the first set of laws declaring general
levies in a state of emergency were written between 1278 and 1281. In Styria, similar
defense edicts had been in place since 1443. In same year (1511), the Habsburgs brokered
similar covenants in Vorarlberg and Carinthia.60 Nevertheless, the Landlibell was critical
in that it laid the foundation for the Landesverteidigung (Tyrolean defense system),
which, more or less, lasted until the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in 1918. It
established recruitment quotas for judicial districts and four-year obligations to the
farmers and citizens that filled out its ranks with required weapons exercises in peace
time. The right of militiamen to own their own firearms and the increasing availability of
firearms helped facilitate the establishment of shooting ranges and the popular pastime of
target shooting. What resulted was an increase in the number of shooting ranges being
constructed and rifle clubs or guilds being established, most typically in or around more
densely populated Tyrolean towns.61 The Landlibell, established the Landesverteidigung,
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which created a framework for the militarization of Tyrolean society not only through
militia service, but also by fostering its gun culture.
The growing fear of Ottoman invasion of Habsburg lands offered Maximilian I an
opportunity to create a mutual defense policy in the form of the 1518 “Innsbrucker
Libell.” Nevertheless, in terms of defense, the policy sought to secure the cooperation of
the individual provinces. That is, the fragmented character of the Habsburg lands
(Landesfürsten) was not only acknowledged in defense agreements, but those agreements
perpetuated their individuality. The geopolitical landscape of medieval and early modern
Austria guided imperial defense policy and would have a lasting effect on the identity of
the Austrian people.62
By 1633, the Thirty Years War had raged throughout Europe almost continuously
for fifteen years, prompting further refinements of the Tyrolean civil defense system.
Archduke Maximillian III increased community militia quotas, requiring men between
the ages of 24 and 45 to perform militia service. The decree also required regular military
exercises (every two weeks on Sundays and public holidays).63 The law divided into
military districts, created an “Unteroffizierskorps.” The county appointed uniformed
officers who possessed authority to implement martial law in communities directly
threatened by war.64 The excessive brutality of the Thirty Years War—particularly
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toward civilians—wore on soldiers and populations alike, making it increasingly difficult
to get militiamen to fulfill their service requirements. Some refused to from the outset
while others marched out, slipping away later at an opportune moment, to return home.65
The constant presence of violence and armed combat in the Middle Ages and the
early modern era, forged crucial values of military obligation and sacrifice for family and
community. This is not to imply that Habsburg subjects accepted military service without
question; the examples above indicate quite the opposite. Rather, it was a protracted
negotiation of expectations and limits that was an understood facet of ordinary life.
Though the Tyrolean Landmiliz reforms reflected the circumstances specific to 1633, it
also increased the proximity between civilians and military service in its demands for
increased militia quotas. It also marked an increasingly formalized and sophisticated
system of training and mobilization.
In the late seventeenth century, private gun clubs began organizing and fielding
sharp shooter units in times of conflict. The defense order (Zuzugsordnung) of 1704
codified the informal, voluntary actions, obligating sharp shooter companies to mobilize
as called upon. Separate from the Landmiliz, they elected their officers, a tradition that
remained intact over 200 years later when the Standschützen were mobilized in 1915 to
protect Tyrol’s Italian border.66 This tradition was also a defining feature of the
Heimwehren, which distinguished it from fascist paramilitary groups that operated under
the Führerprinzip (leadership principle), which emphasized blind obedience to one’s
superiors. As it were, it prevented the development of a “cult of leadership” that defined
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the National Socialist and Italian fascist movements. Moreover, the continuity of this
democratic feature enabled factionalism to develop within the provincial groups and the
federal level.67
By the mid-eighteenth century, the first levy of Tyrolean militiamen was
organized into four regiments, which represented the first line of defense and the
provinces’ most able-bodied men. These regiments mustered for inspection and drills
twice biannually. The units formed from the second and third levies were mobilized “only
in case of imminent enemy threat.” Virtually any and every able-bodied Tyrolean stood in
defense of his community in one of these levies. Lengthy periods of peace and inactivity
in the eighteenth century eroded the social and cultural resonance of civic militarism
militia in the identity of Tyroleans. The French invasion of Tyrol in 1796 revived these
virtues, however temporarily; the role played by Tyrolean sharp shooters remains a
source of veneration in the collective memory to this day.68 Over time these various
levies and the military formations to which they belonged, represented the three “pillars”
of the Tyrolean Landesverteidigung: The Landesschützen (a provincial guard), the
Standschützen (sharp shooter units), and the Landsturm (militia).69
The Tyrolean Landesverteidigung underwent numerous refinements over the
centuries, but overall, the system remained largely unaltered over the centuries and
continually stood out as the exception to otherwise universal changes instituted in the
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Habsburg military. The provincial government consistently rebuffed imperial efforts to
integrate Tyrol into its general military framework (such as, the imperial army’s
unsuccessful attempt to introduce conscription in 1785 in Tyrol). Even the dramatic
changes the empire’s military underwent during the monarchy’s transition to the dualist
system were not enough to effect change on the Tyrolean system (whereas it had
succeeded in other areas such as the old military border region of Croatia and in southern
Dalmatia). The relationship between Tyrolean militia formations and the imperial
government “remained informal and without legal foundation in the 1868 law.”70 Only in
1870 did the imperial army finally implement compulsory military service in Tyrol in
conjunction with its increasingly codified defense system.71
Of particular importance to the Landesverteidigung was the Tyrolean
Schießstandswesen. As Laurence Cole points out, the shooting guilds who constructed
many of these shooting ranges, were not originally a part of the Tyrolean provincial
defense system, but were reflections of corporative (noble) privilege. The term
“Schützen,” then, carried the meaning of “shooter,” rather than “protector.”72 With the
democratization of firearms, private and government-funded shooting ranges became an
integral part of Tyrolean society, serving a variety of functions. Shooting competitions
had been commonplace in Tyrol since the mid-fifteenth century, with imperial, state, or
local officials offering prize money for the best shooters in various categories.73 In
addition, the Habsburg government supplemented the shooting ranges with annual
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“gifts,” (Gnadengaben), drawing the ranges and guilds into the imperial military system.
By the mid-eighteenth century, the imperial government, in conjunction with the Tyrolean
Ministry of Defense, implemented a new Schießstandsordnung (shooting range order),
which instituted an increasingly standardized structure and hierarchy, as well as practices
and procedures for all imperial shooting ranges in Tyrol and Vorarlberg.74
As the 1845 shooting range order (Schießstandsordnung) indicates, the Tyrolean
shooting range system mirrored the Austrian government and society in that it was a top
down organization, with the Governor standing as its principal overseer. The shooting
range system also closely paralleled the government administrative structures. Section
one of the 1845 order recognizes the main provincial shooting range to be in Innsbruck,
while order named seven counties (which also served as district court ranges) shooting
ranges in Bregenz (Vorarlberg), Imst, Schwatz, Bruneck, Bozen, Trient, and Rovereto; the
county shooting range in Meran was “entitled to equal respect.”75 In order to petition the
Governor for a new range to be constructed, communities had to have a least twenty
Schützen enrolled shooters. Once approved, the new imperial shooting range was entitled
to its own flag with its own name, unique shield, and seal, alongside the Habsburg
imperial eagle. In the 1845/6 revision of the Schießstandsordnung, communities
constructing imperial shooting ranges would receive an annual contribution of 40,000
florins from the imperial coffers. Additionally, ranges received another 40,000 florins
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toward the purchase of rifles and ammunition members could use, but remained the state
property (Ärar) of the range.76
The compact between the imperial government and the Tyrolean shooting range
system required that all ranges keep detailed records of its membership in the form of
Matrikelbücher (enrollment books). These books contained the rights and duties of
members and member information. The ranges kept enrollment books for documentation
and collecting shooting fees, but also for the purpose of maintaining muster lists for the
Standschützen units, should they be called upon by the Kaiser to protect Tyrol’s borders
in times of war. Upon reaching eighteen years of age, young men could enter into the
ranks of a shooting guild.77 Reforms to the Landesverteidigung and the
Schießstandsordnung in the wake of the Franco-Austrian War in 1859 required men
between the ages of 18 to 30 to enroll at their local shooting range.78
Oversight of the shooting ranges was the responsibility of the
Oberschützenmeister (Shooting Master) along with an Unterschützenmeister (Lieutenant
Shooting Master) and a “corresponding number” of Schützenrat (shooting council)
members, typically senior members of the guilds.79 The “corresponding number”
pertained to the status of the shooting range, as previously addressed. Ranges were either
the main provincial range, a county range, a court district range, or a municipal range.
The main provincial range in Innsbruck retained an eight-man shooter council, while at
the county ranges maintained a six-man council. The district court ranges were allowed a
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two to four-man council depending on the size of the range. Range members elected this
administrative hierarchy, who served fixed terms of service in their roles; the
Oberschützenmeister served for a duration of five years, the Unterschützenmeister for
four, and Schützenrat members, for two.80 Their duties and responsibilities consisted of
all manner of shooting range business, including asset management, handling disciplinary
matters, and jurisdiction over shooting matters.81
The grandest event among the Tyrolean shooting guilds was the imperial open
shooting competition (Kaiserlichen Freischießen). The shooting festival cycled through
the cities of Innsbruck and Trient, Bregenz and Bozen/Meran (alternatively), Bruneck and
Imst, and Rovereto and Schwatz. The Kaiser would supply 200 ducats to assist the city
hosting the competition for that year.82 The best shooters from their respective ranges
were entitled to participate in the imperial shooting competition where they would
compete for prizes (Gnadengaben) offered by the emperor. These often included a
wreath-shaped target and a financial reward for the best shooter, which varied from one
competition to another and from year to year.83
In the comparatively peaceful decades following the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars, Kaiser Ferdinand I had encouraged the continued health of the
Standschützen and Tyrol’s shooting ranges.84 By the latter decades of the nineteenth
century, the Tyrolean Schützenwesen thrived beyond what would have been his wildest
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expectations. Despite the military inadequacies of the Schießstandswesen, by 1875 there
were 330 registered shooting ranges, 412 in 1895, and 501 by 1913.85 In the period
between 1880 and 1914 overall shooting range membership doubled and, in nearly a
quarter of the ranges, tripled.86 In preparation for the Jahrhundertsfeier (centenary
celebration) in 1909, the centennial celebration of the 1809 Tyrolean uprising, of the
shooting ranges recorded, 359 had a predominantly German speaking membership.87 The
renovation and expansion of shooting ranges in Tyrol, Cole points out, was a product of
genuine patriotism as well as friendly competition between neighboring communities.88
At the same time the Tyrolean network of shooting ranges experienced exponential
growth, the Landesverteidigungsgesetz (provincial defense law) of 1887 integrated the
ranges into the larger imperial military infrastructure to serve as mobilization nodes and
the sites where Landsturm men would take part in obligatory long distance shooting
drills. From an organizational perspective, little changed except for the institution at the
levers of power.89
The 1913 provincial defense law and shooting range order of 1913 was the final
step in the full militarization of the shooting range system, integrating the last levee, the
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Standschützen, into official military hierarchy.90 Little had changed in terms of the place
of the shooting ranges in Tyrol’s overarching system of defense. Despite the order’s
claim that the shooting range system was “an independent institution without military
incorporation,” it is clear that the network had been streamlined into the Habsburg
military system.91 Quite explicitly the law states: “The institution of provincial defense is
organized through the shooting range system.”92 Moreover, it adds, Tyrol’s militia
formations, as well as the k.k. Schießstände, were to maintain a “military character.”93 In
the event of war and general mobilization, veterans’ association members—who
comprised the bulk of the emergency Standschützen companies—functioned as a
"volunteer" (Freiwillige) pool of emergency troops.94
The 1913 shooting range order also tasked the members of the shooting ranges
themselves with the responsibility of the general well-being of the shooting range system
as an institution of provincial defense, to arrange formal training for young “Schützen” in
the handling of firearms, and “to enliven the public spirit of the Schützen for the defense
of the Fatherland and loyalty to the Kaiser.” To accomplish the penultimate task, they
were to establish “Jungschützenschulen” (young shooter schools) to train youths to
handle army rifles and get acquainted with the shooting range system, thereby better
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preparing youths for their compulsory military service and expanding its military
potential to include older youths.95 The Jungschützenschulen reflected a further
formalization of longstanding practices. By 1865, if not earlier, a “Jungschützen” class
appeared in Tyrol’s imperial shooting festivals.96 By 1868, the involvement of youths in
local shooting ranges took another step toward the Jungschützenschulen through the
creation of youth shooting groups (Jugendschützengesellschaft) who met regularly and
engaged in shooting exercises and competitions.97 As will be discussed in greater detail
later in this chapter as well as in chapter three, the youth organizations established by the
Heimwehren carried on this tradition of acclimating Austrian youths to handling rifles
and marksmanship. With the prohibition of compulsory military service, it also took on
the task of instilling military education and virtues into its young members.
The 1913 defense laws reflected the successful revival of popular interest in
Tyrol’s gun culture. The construction of new shooting ranges, the renovation of old ones,
and the consolidation of less active ranges created a bustling and ideologically healthy
system. On a practical level, consolidation of less active ranges served the purpose of
simplifying administrative processes, maintenance, and upkeep.98 Broadly speaking, it
was the culmination of a slow, methodical process of integrating the principal elements of
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Tyrol’s militia defense system—the volunteer Standschützen and the shooting range
system around which they were organized—into the Habsburg military hierarchy.

Schützenkompanies in the field
From their earliest incarnations, Tyrol’s rifle ranges and war were inextricably
intertwined. They were important support centers of the three "pillars" of the
Landesverteidigung, providing spaces for weapons training, volunteer mobilization,
dynastic patriotism, and, in the late imperial era, spaces of imperial mobilization.
Throughout the military history of the early modern Habsburg Empire, shooting range
members, or Schützen, laid down the ‘tools of their trades,’ retrieved their rifles and
powder, and defended Vaterland Tirol.99 Eyck makes the apt comparison of Tyrolean
militiamen to colonial American militiamen “in their localism, formations, drill, and light
armament” as well as in fact that they were used only periodically and for a brief time. 100
One might also draw similarities in their democratic nature and the fact that units elected
their officers—almost always men who were respected figures in their communities and
in some cases wealthy and influential in their respective communities. This unique
attribute distinguished the sharpshooter units from those of regular imperial army.
Provincial Schützen detachments participated in the military campaigns of the
empire’s major conflicts of the nineteenth century. Their most celebrated achievement,
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however, was the 1809 Tyrolean uprising. In 1809, Tyrolean militiamen spearheaded
military operations against French and Bavarians forces while the regular Austrian army
served in an auxiliary capacity.101 The successful ouster of their French and Bavarian
occupiers by the Tyrolean Standschützen became the centerpiece of Tyrolean lore. The
story of the insurrection and its leading figures became legendary and an inextricably
intertwined component of Tyrolean identity. Contemporary chronicler Jakob Bartholdy
explained, “The most distinguished heads of civil and military matters in the war of 1809,
the most remarkable in the history of the princely county, —were from the peasantry.”102
In the more rural areas of Tyrol there was little distinction between nobles and wealthier
peasantry. It was individuals of this strata led local Tyrolean militia groups. Since the
peasantry accounted for approximately 85 percent of the population in Tyrol in 1809, its
militia companies had a similarly peasant complexion. The largely peasant-driven
insurrection reflected a developing fissure between town and countryside.103
Innkeepers, for several reasons, played an especially prominent role in organizing
and leading the Tyrolean insurgency. Four reasons, in particular, account for their
conspicuous representation in the leading ranks. First, they were among the wealthier
strata, owning their properties and businesses, which often made them influential figures
in their respective communities. Second, inns often set at strategically important
mountain passes where traffic—and information—flowed, making them ideally placed in
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a position to communicate important information gleaned from guests and outside
connections established by the nature of their business. Third, they were usually able to
read and write and were shrewd businessmen. Lastly, inns often boasted shooting ranges
and offered a convenient space to stow rebel weapons caches.104
The most revered figure of the rebellion, Andreas Hofer, was a South Tyrolean
innkeeper whose inn, the Sandhof, lay at the base of the Jaufen Pass that linked North and
South Tyrol. Hofer served as the commander of all Tyrolean militia forces and, after the
successfully expelling their French and Bavarian occupiers, was recognized by Kaiser
Franz I as the Regent of Tyrol. His position, success, and “martyr’s death” elevated Hofer
to a mythical status among Tyroleans in the decades and centuries that followed.
According to a Tyrolean noble and contemporary of Hofer, Baron Josef von Hormayr, he
was “the representative of the Tyrolean general will in 1809.”105 It would perhaps be
more accurate to say that Hofer's sentiments represented the general will of the
countryside, which consistently exhibited devotion to the House of Habsburg and its
respect of traditional privileges exercised by Tyroleans. The 1809 insurrection was
commemorated throughout nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Hofer and other
figures such as Joseph Speckbacher and Joachim Haspinger, the Capuchin monk,
insurrection orchestrator, and battlefield commander, became symbols of Tyrolean virtues
of patriotism, dynastic loyalty, and civic militarism.106
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Much of the success of the 1809 insurrection can be attributed to only lightlymanned Bavarian garrisons, the overwhelming support of peasant militia volunteers, and
the adept use of unconventional, guerrilla tactics that utilized their intimate knowledge of
the mountain landscape. Moreover, many commanders of the sharpshooter companies in
1809 had also fought against the French in their initial invasion of Tyrol in 1796, so they
had combat experience.107 Combined, these factors enabled the Shützen companies to
compensate for whatever they lacked in organization and military discipline. Ultimately,
it was military defeat elsewhere and that forced the Austrian Empire—if but
temporarily—to end its support of the rebels and its claims to the Tyrol.
Though there were varying degrees of cooperation with the small Austrian Army
force aiding the rebellion, the popular revolt was only loosely organized; the recurring
pattern of "everybody commanded themselves" is readily apparent in the primary source
literature.108 The voluntary participation of the militiamen and their leaders exemplifies
the already strong legacy of civic militarism established by 1809. Moreover, the civilian
nature of the Tyrolean insurrection was also demonstrated in Hofer's call for numerous
war councils, which included Schützen companies leaders and Landsturm commanders,
in order to get their input on the state of the situation and develop strategic and tactical
responses.109 The nature of the insurrection was a seesaw affair in which Tyrolean militia
forces would take control over Tyrolean cities only to be forced to abandon them shortly
thereafter in the face of a reinforced enemy and, ultimately, Austrian defeat at the Battle
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of Znaim (Moravia). Few Schützen wore uniforms of any sort, rather most were
identifiable only by their plumes of feathers, peacock tails, or sprigs of rosemary.110 From
concealed positions, Tyrolean sharpshooters harassed French and Bavarian ranks to great
effect. They also, at various times, felled trees, and rolled large rocks down from enemy
troops.111

Figure 2. The tomb of Andreas Hofer in the Hofkirche, Innsbruck, Austria.
(Photo by the Author)

Not typically found in the commemorations of the brave Schützen of 1809 is what
took place in the aftermath of the first and second seizures of Innsbruck (April 11-12,
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1809). Numerous Schützen took to looting businesses and residences of purported
Bavarian sympathizers, Jews, or homes of wealthy residents that simply looked worth
looting. The general mistrust between the peasantry and city residents—a feature that had
and would continue to surface—found expression in the pillaging.112 While there were
undoubtedly Bavarian sympathizers in Innsbruck and others indifferent to Bavarian rule,
much of the plundering underscored the diverging outlooks between city and countryside.
This dichotomy remained firmly intact decades later and would be exacerbated by Karl
Marx’s Communist Manifesto, which threatened the rise of the urban, working class in
revolution against the bourgeois capitalist system. As his treatise gained adherents among
the urban, working class, Austrian cities became symbols of Marxism for its peasant and
bourgeois opponents. This was the backdrop for which the Heimwehren and the Marxist
Republikanischer Schutzbund (Republican Defense League) would do battle throughout
the duration of the First Republic.
In 1816, after the final defeat of Napoleon and Tyrol was restored to the Austrian
Empire, it was required to contribute manpower directly to the imperial army in the form
of a Kaiserjäger Regiment. Maintenance of a standing regiment garrisoned in Tyrol
increased the financial strain for the Tyrolean government (Landesregierung). The
weakening of Tyrol's traditional militia defense system was the intended effect of this
directive from Vienna, as it hoped to increase its authority in the process.113 As a result,
the Landesverteiding fell increasingly into financial neglect, which would prove readily
apparent in subsequent actions in which Schützenkompanies participated.
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Quite unlike the 1809 rebellion in Tyrol, Schützenkompanies in subsequent
conflicts would be the ones playing only minor auxiliary roles. During the revolutions of
1848-49, Italian nationalists seeking to create a unified Italian state challenged Habsburg
sovereignty in the crown land of Lombardy-Venetia, and in the largely Italian-speaking
region of South Tyrol. While six volunteer Schützen battalions from Styria took part in
Field Marshal Josef Radetzky’s famous campaign to reassert Habsburg control in
Lombardy-Venetia, some 144 German-Tyrolean Schützenkompanies—a total of 16,653
men—engaged Italian revolutionaries on the south Tyrolean border in Judikarien, the
Ampezzo, and Stilfser Joch.114 While the spirit of patriotism, dynastic loyalty, and war
volunteerism was high in the Schützenkompanies, their performance in the field left
much to be desired according to Habsburg officers. The mayor of Bozen, Josef Streiter,
complained in 1848 that Schützen troops were unreliable and required close supervision
by officers.115 As a whole, the Tyrolean Landesverteidigung was in a state disarray and
lacked the organization and arms to field reliable militia units.116
Military opinions of Tyrolean militiamen and their system of mobilization
remained low during and after the 1859 war with Piedmont and France. An army report
from Rattenberg complained of insufficiency of the Schützenkompanies weapons as well
as their training.117 Furthermore, Feldmarschall-Leutnant Maximilian von Baumgarten
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found the process of mobilizing the Schützenkompanies “inadequate and in need of
improvement.” The antiquated practice of Schützen using their own personal rifles had
also run its course; the army would need to supply the companies with military grade
weapons. Furthermore, Baumgarten complained, Schützenkompanies were too large and
that elected officers should maintain their positions in peacetime and supervise further
training.118 Post-war reforms in late 1859 required Schützen to use military rifles when
conducting their obligatory shooting exercises in hopes of acclimating the sharpshooters
and militia companies with the rifles.
In 1866, the Austrian Empire faced war on two fronts. In the north, the k.k.
Nordarmee, along with its southern German allies, faced a Prussian-led north German
coalition. In the south, the empire faced the Kingdom of Italy, which was determined to
take the remaining Italian-speaking areas under Austrian control, including South Tyrol.
This threat, as had been the case in 1848 and again in 1859, required the mobilization of
the Tyrolean militia.119 The Schützen detachments that were deployed to the front lines
spent much of their time fighting Garibaldi's invasion of South Tyrol.120 In the face of
mobilization for war in 1866, members of the Innsbruck-Sonnenburg sharpshooter
company were more concerned about their “lack of weapons and money,” had to look to
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local aristocracy for both.121 Post-war evaluations of the Landesverteidigungkommando
corroborate concerns the Innsbruck-Sonnenberg unit faced, complaining once more of
poorly armed, ill-trained Tyrolean militia volunteers. The fact that only four of the twenty
Schützenkompanies mobilized were deployed to the front and no more than six were ever
“dressed out” illustrated the lack of organization and exercises in the peacetime prior to
outbreak of hostilities.122 Be that as it may, the large number of volunteers that turned out
in 1866 demonstrated their willingness to defend “Vaterland Tirol” against foreign
incursion.123 Throughout the nineteenth century, Schützenkompanies actively participated
in the defense of Tyrol's territorial integrity, Habsburg sovereignty, and values they
symbolized—conservativism, Catholicism, and militarism. In the process, a rich tradition
of civic militarism and war volunteerism was cultivated in the Schießstandswesen and
through its sharpshooter companies.
It would not be until the outbreak of the First World War that Tyrolean Landsturm
and Standschützen companies were mobilized again for war. In the forty-eight years
between the Austro-Prussian War and World War I, the imperial army had fully integrated
the Tyrolean Landesverteidigung and all of its institutions into the imperial infrastructure.
In the first weeks and months of the war, Tyrol—for the first time—sent some 85,000
men to the fronts in Galicia and Serbia. Though traditionally understood as reserve levees
to mobilize in the event that Tyrol's borders were threatened, the k.u.k.
Armeeoberkommando (AOK) mobilized Landsturm formations—across the Austro-

121
Viktor Laschan, Erlebnisse der ersten freiwilligen Scharf-Schützen-Kompagnie InnsbruckSonnenburg, 1866 (Innsbruck: Vereins-Buckdrukerei, 1867), 3.
122
Cole, Für Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland, 426-7.
123
Cole, Für Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland, 425-6. See footnote 34.

54

Hungarian Empire for that matter—almost immediately for front line service.
Subsequently, the AOK activated 25 Standschützen companies for training, watch duty,
and to guard prisoners of war.124 When Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary in May
1915, only the Standschützen companies and a few Tyrolean replacement battalions
(Marschbatallione) remained in Tyrol and could be immediately deployed to defend its
southern Alpine passes.
The composition of the Standschützen companies illustrated the totalizing effect
of the First World War. With the exorbitant volume of casualties in the opening months of
the war, the age limit for service in the Landsturm had to be expanded in both
directions—from 19 years of age to 18 years of age and from 42 years of age to 50. This
meant that the remaining individuals eligible for service in the Standschützen were either
too young or too old to be conscripted into the Common Army or the Landwehr.125 Thus,
it would not have been unheard of for a grandfather serving in the Standschützen with his
grandson. On July 9, 1915, 14 year old Standschütze, Josef Egger of the Sillian battalion,
was killed in front line duty, despite directives that required youths under the age of 17 to
remain behind the front lines, in support roles.126 To be sure, the all-encompassing nature
of the First World War reflected the climax of the militarization of European society that
started in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. For Central Europe, the
militarization of society did not end with the conclusion of the Great War. Instead, it was
amplified in the “culture of defeat” that materialized in its aftermath. Many of the
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institutions that contributed to the militarization of society survived in a very real,
physical sense or in the subconscious of those formative years were spent as soldiers and
in the war.
The k.k. Schießstände as Cultural Fabric
Tyrolean shooting ranges served in numerous capacities, making them an
invaluable lens into the mentalité of a significant cross-section of the population. In
addition to being spaces where Tyrolean militiamen participated in their required
shooting drills, the k.k. Schießstände were essential spaces for inculcating military
culture, dynastic loyalty, and provincial patriotism as well as for socializing, camaraderie,
and community shooting competitions. Shooting ranges in Tyrol, thus, were dynamic
hubs where numerous facets of a Tyrolean’s identity converged. As this section will
illustrate, the shooting ranges were crucial nodes in the formation of identity and rituals.
The interconnectedness of all of these facets of Tyrolean identity are captured nicely in
the romanticized poetry of the early and mid-nineteenth century.
Hermann von Gilm’s collection of poetry entitled Tiroler Schützen-Leben (The
Life of the Tyrolean Shooter), self-published in honor of Tyrol’s 500th anniversary under
Habsburg sovereignty, offers a useful case-study.127 The poems offer a window into the
general outlook of the Tyrolean Standschützen in the mid-nineteenth century, highlighting
the prominence of hunting and sport shooting in the communities and social lives of
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Tyroleans. The sonnets also record (and mythologize) events Gilm deemed important in
the broader narrative of the Standschützen.
Careful examination of Gilm’s work reveals two main ideological threads. The
Schützen’s idea of freedom appears as a principal force compelling the other recurring
themes. In addition to being innately connected to imperial sovereignty, freedom is
symbolized through the natural beauty of the Alpine setting, through God’s will, and in
via Tyrol’s hunting and gun culture. War volunteerism in defense of Tyrolean freedom
and integrity is the second recurring feature in Gilm’s poetry.
The special liberty of owning guns, among other things, that Tyroleans enjoyed
required special obligations, namely wartime service to the crown in defend its borders.
The hallowed “Landlibell von 1511” established the basis of this arrangement.128
Tyrolean men commonly viewed militia service as an obligation, to defend Tyrol’s
borders, its freedoms, their communities, and their families. The obligation of militia
service required the establishment of protocols for mobilizing formations and practices
for the military training of volunteers, both of which took place at local shooting ranges.
Thus, war volunteerism became an essential motif in Tyrolean society. These
requirements went far in militarizing Tyrolean culture. The intersection of these
fundamental values, not surprisingly, bolstered traditional social constructs and gender
roles, the third major thread. Gilm’s verses accentuate the innately conservative and
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masculine characteristics of Tyrolean identity. The fourth, and last, major thread evident
in Hermann von Gilm’s volume, is German nationalism. Tyrol’s location on the border of
Austria’s increasingly bitter enemy in the Kingdom of Italy, along with ethnic tensions
between German Tyroleans and “walschtiroler”—a pejorative moniker for non-German
(and usually Italian) Tyroleans—fortified German national identity.129 In turn, German
Tyroleans saw themselves as defenders of “Vaterland Tirol,” the territorial integrity of the
Habsburg Monarchy, as well as a first line of defense for the broader nation of Germanspeaking kingdoms to the north.
For most Tyroleans the high peaks and valleys of the Alps were symbolic of
freedom. The beauty and purity of the mountains provided a landscape in which nature
and independence seamlessly meshed. Gilm’s opening poem, called “Unsere Berge,” or
Our Mountains, is demonstrative of this symbiosis. The last stanza is especially telling in
that it also illustrates the militaristic outlook that often coincided with the freedom of
Tyrol:
Let the enemies break into the land,
Let thousands and thousands come;
We have whistling lead on hand
And iron singing and swishing.
Pulling freedom from this world,
We’ll build the banished a secure camp
On our mountain.130

The Alps were also a defining feature of Tyrolean identity. Joseph Rohrer’s early
ethnographic study of Tyroleans is an apt example. Throughout, he references Tyroleans
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as “Bergvolk” (mountain folk) or “Berganwohnern” (mountain residents)
interchangeably. He also employs the concept of ‘nation,’ referring to Tyrol as the
“tirolische Bergnation.”131 In basic terms, the use of “mountain nation” uses the
mountains as a delineating feature, while “nation” alludes to a group distinguished by one
feature or another that separates them from another group. A French general who
campaigned in Tyrol shortly after the Rohrer’s study, likened the province to “a natural
fortress whose belligerent population constitutes an equally natural garrison.” As F.
Gunther Eyck aptly notes, “Tyrol and the bulk of its inhabitants proved no exception…to
the corollary that mountain people are generally combative, clannish, traditionalist, selfcentered, and self-reliant.”132 While early anthropological studies perhaps exaggerated
their “backward” world of ancient rituals, traditional dress, and old-fashioned fables,
there is plenty of evidence of self-centeredness, self-reliance, conservatism and
militarism.133 These attributes underline would underline the reason Heimwehr
movement thrived in the Alpine provinces.
While the mountainous landscape played an important role in shaping Tyrolean
identity and notions of freedom, so too did the geopolitical location of Tyrol. Located in
the southwestern corner of the Habsburg Empire, it constituted a particularly important
border region to the Swiss Confederation after 1363 and throughout the early modern era.
The Landlibell von 1511 codified the parameters of existing regulations and practices in
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Tyrol’s provincial defense system, which remained—in varying and incrementally lesser
degrees—intact until the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1914.134 Unlike the
other Habsburg crown lands, Tyrol long-remained “something of a self-contained defense
unit,” with no professional troops garrisoned in the region.135 There were numerous
reasons for this arrangement. Mercenary armies were expensive and often maintained
counterproductive tendencies like pillaging the countryside of their employers, while
exhibiting no higher motivation beyond what was necessary to receive their ransom. With
the existing protocols in place, local militia forces, by contrast, could be mustered and
deployed to the border quickly and had the added motivation of defending their
communities from invasion. Gilm captures the attitude of Tyrolean militiamen (Schützen)
in his couplet:
Wir sind Deutschlands Grenzsoldaten,
Seiner Freiheit Gemsenwacht
We are Germany’s border soldiers,
Its freedom watch.136

While not as readily apparent in Gilm’s liberal, nationalist-oriented poetry,
religious freedom was a central aspect of Tyroleans’ broader notions of freedom and is
particularly evident through the role clergy played in sanctifying war in defense of
Vaterland Tirol, the Kaiser, and the Roman Catholic Church. Thus, the primacy of
tradition in Tyrol lent itself to rigid piety. The reactions of the “overly conservative”
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German Tyrolean clergy and nobility to the enlightened reforms of Joseph II, which
sought to reduce the influence of the Catholic Church throughout the empire, was
especially truculent. The addition of the archbishoprics of Brixen and Trient to the Tyrol
in 1803 further solidified the preeminence of the Catholic Church.137 Tyrolean resistance
was not limited to the Joseph’s reforms, but opposed wider influence of Enlightenment
ideals, which they viewed as undermining “the strongest, the primary foundation of the
state, that is religion.”138
The French Revolution further aligned Tyrolean identity and religious beliefs.
Refugee priests’ stories of the persecution of clergymen and the church by revolutionaries
incited increasing fear among Tyrolean clerics who, in turn, unleashed antiEnlightenment sermons that made obedience to the crown tantamount to obedience to
God. Defense of “Vaterland Tirol,” the Kaiser, and the church was expressed in
militaristic religious terms, as a holy crusade against a godless enemy in the French. 139
One Tyrolean memoirist wrote, that “the revered priesthood encouraged as much as
possible only through prayer and prepared for the coming struggle by granting
blessings.”140 Indeed, for most Tyroleans, the French Revolution and the Enlightenment
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ideals propelling it was very much understood as a serious threat to their system of values
and very identity.
One observer of the 1809 Tyrolean rebellion noted their obsessive attachment to
the Roman Catholic Church.141 The role of the clergy in sanctifying—and in this case,
planning, and participating in—war and resistance reiterates the continuity of the
mutually reinforcing relationship between religion and militarism. The central role of
Capuchin monk, Joachim Haspinger, as an instigator, planner, and commander of the
revolt is not a surprise.142 In April 1848, some 80 Tyrolean-born students at the
University of Vienna formed a volunteer company, electing Dr. Adolf Pichler as their
captain and, the then 72 year-old, Haspinger as their field chaplain.143 Haspinger’s story
is not an isolated case, as he was not the only, nor the last, Tyrolean cleric to minister to
and lead combat troops. In June 1915, Josef Hosp, chaplain with the 1st Standschützen
battalion, Innsbruck, “led patrols, scouted enemy positions, and even served as an
artillery spotter.” Hosp was supposed to have shot and killed enemy troops who
approached his position while on one such patrol. As with Haspinger, Hosp was
celebrated by his men who admired his participation in combat operations and,
consequently, understood their own violent actions as having “divine sanction.”144
Paralleling the Tyrolean devotion to the Catholic Church was their loyalty to the
Habsburg dynasty, which had long viewed itself as the defender of the Roman Catholic
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faith. This facet of imperial identity became particularly pronounced during the Protestant
Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and the Thirty Years War. The Turkish siege of
Vienna in 1683, reinforced the belief, for Austrians, that they were the first line of
defense for the Christian faith. Tyroleans remained loyal to the Habsburgs due to their
continuous devotion to the church and respect for their special defense privileges granted
in the sixteenth century.145 Gilm’s work also illustrates how dynastic loyalty was an
important value of the Tyrolean Standschützen. His elegy, Der Kaiserstutzen, written
from the perspective of a “poor son of the people,” whose innate obligations to “the
Kaiser and to the land” are accepted without question:
Call me when it's necessary to protect,
I'll follow bold and blind,
And I am not paying with my blood,
So certainly pays my child.146

Another poem of Gilm’s, Tirols Ehrentag (or Tyrol’s Day of Honor), printed in the Volksund Schützenzeitung, pays homage to Tyrol and the person of the Kaiser, telling the story
of how Tyrol became a part of the Habsburg Monarchy. Thus, the 500th Anniversary
celebrations reaffirmed the loyalty of Tyrol to the Kaiser, who attended the festivities in
Innsbruck as the guest of honor.147 The anniversary offers an important opportunity to
examine how this milestone was celebrated and, consequently, what that reveals about
Tyrolean culture and society at that time.
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The celebrations concluded with a two-week shooting festival at the
Hauptschießstand in Innsbruck. Indeed, as Laurence Cole explains, since the Middle
Ages, nearly all celebrations included shooting matches, which symbolized the special
military rights Tyroleans held sacred. At the same time, it represented the centrality of
shooting and hunting in the identities of Tyrolean men. As noted in one contemporary
source, “there cannot be a genuine Tyrolean celebration without a Schützen procession
and a shooting festival.”148 Even today, Ernst Bruckmüller points out, “Costumes and the
shooting clubs prove to be central symbols especially of Tyrolean provincial
consciousness…reinforced through the celebration of certain festivals…connected with
them.”149
Some 5,160 Schützen participated in the competition as well as 162 Schützen
from Germany (of which 151 came from Bavaria).150 The events taking place on 28
September 1863 commenced with the ceremonial presentation of the honorary shield of
the Habsburg Army in front of the Hauptschießstand with all of the Schützenmeisters
gathered at its entrance and their Schützen surrounding. With the business of the day
complete, patrons were treated to the festival theater and ended the night taking in
fireworks from Castles Ambras, Büchsenhausen, and Weierburg, while enjoying a
serenade in front of imperial Palace.
On the morning of 29 September 1863, the festivities were to begin with a
cannonade, volleys, and the “jubilant sounds of all of the musical bands.” A field Mass
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for the Schützenkompanies was to follow at 10:00am, then came ceremonial processions
through various plazas in Innsbruck at 11:00am. Nearly 100 former Standschützen and
imperial soldiers who fought in engagements in 1809, 1813, 1848, 1849, and 1859 were
to be recognized and expected to join the ceremonial procession of the Hall
Standschützen.151 Several volunteer organizations also filled out the schedule of events
and participated in festival activities; the Tyrolean Sängerbund (choral association) and
the deutscher Turnverein (or German Gymnastic Association), among others, made
noteworthy contributions. A ball, to be held on the evening 29 September, rounding out
the celebration with the arrival of His Imperial Highness Archduke Carl Ludwig. The
unexpected arrival of His Imperial Majesty Kaiser Franz Josef punctuated the anniversary
celebrations.152 Save for the fanfare of the Kaiser and the royal family, if one were to
divorce the specifics from the activities—leaving simply a procession, field Mass,
shooting competition, honoring veterans, ball—one could seamlessly replace the program
of activities for a large, multi-day Heimwehr gathering with this program of events from
1863.
In all, the festivities illustrated the general character of Tyrolean society:
militaristic, loyal to the Kaiser, and pride in “Vaterland Tirol” and German cultural
heritage, all of which Gilm expresses throughout his commemorative verses.
„Tirol, die schöne Jubelbraut,
Wird neu dem Kaiser angetraut.“
„Fünfhundert Jahre blühet schon
Die Liebe zu dem Kaiserthron.“
„Wie uns're Berge hoch und frei,
So fest besieht Tirolertreu.“153

Tyrol, the beautiful cheering bride,
To the new Kaiser wedded.
Five hundred years already blooms
The love for the Imperial Throne.
How our mountains high and free
So firm is Tyrolean loyalty.
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However, there were underlying political and ideological tensions. For (the
typically rural) conservatives, the festivities represented merely a “restatement of
dynastic loyalty,” whereas, for (urban bourgeois) liberals, it was a broader expression of
German nationalism conveyed through regional patriotism “within the framework of
loyalty to the Kaiser.”154 Thus, fealty to the monarchy inhibited the maturation of a
wholly German identity. Furthermore, pious obedience to the Catholic Church also
trumped German national identity in the hierarchy of self-identification for many
conservative Tyroleans.155 That is to say, in the larger ‘Kulturkampf’ emerging in the midnineteenth century between the urban, liberal bourgeoisie—for whom Großdeutsch
nationalism had become an increasingly central point of self-identification—and rural
conservatives, religion limited the extent to which they sanctioned the notion of a unified
German state.156 Only under Habsburg hegemony would a Großdeutsch nation be
acceptable. A Prussian-guided (Protestant-guided) Germany was not an outcome
conservative Tyroleans would support.157 This difference in ideological interpretation
illustrated the divisions within the province, the continuity of what had was an already
longstanding ‘Kulturkampf’ between urban and rural, liberal and conservative.158 The
fracture amongst the Tyrolean population was symptomatic of a broader socio-political
divide throughout German Cisleithania. The absence of consensus would continue to
plague the hereditary Habsburg lands of Austria, even after the monarchy’s collapse. It
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would be precisely this internal conflict that would wrack the Heimwehr movement and
drive the struggle over Austrian independence.

Militarism and the late Habsburg Monarchy
The military complexion of such public festivals would be reinforced throughout
the Austro-Hungarian Empire with the implementation of compulsory military service in
1868. “It seems fair to assume that such aspects of military service as being obliged to
wear ‘the Emperor’s uniform,’ swearing an oath of loyalty to his person, obeying the
commands of his officers, traveling through and/or living in different areas of the
monarchy, and being confronted with other ethnic groups (often on a daily basis in
barracks, as well as on the outside) would all have raised the individual’s consciousness
about the multinational state and its ruler,” Cole contends. His Imperial Majesty Kaiser
Franz Josef set the militaristic tone for the Habsburg administrative culture, as was
almost always in uniform; it was his long reign that the military assumed center stage in
the projection of Habsburg dynasty and its history.159 The discipline and loyalty to the
dynasty exhibited by the supranational imperial army were features the Habsburg
government actively sought to inculcate in civil society whenever and wherever possible.
The ‘federalization’ of private, voluntary veterans’ associations and rifle clubs are
excellent illustrations of how the empire sought to guide their activities in the direction of
imperial loyalty and military virtues.160
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Militarism was indoctrinated into the broader civilian population at an early age.
Elementary schools taught children not only to read, write, do basic mathematics, but also
about the great figures of the monarchy’s past—most especially its military past. “The
traditions of the Habsburg army [took] center stage. Victorious battles and commanders
played an important role alongside prominently emphasized rulers…”161 As Ernst
Bruckmüller reveals in his examination of elementary school textbooks, they were
introduced to prominent Habsburg figures and important events in the construction of the
empire. As students progressed through their schooling, the historical narrative became
increasingly complex, particularly as they navigated the often-thorny issue of nationality.
Attention to national myths, histories, and figures illustrated the notion that devotion to
the Habsburg crown while taking pride in one’s nationality were not contradictory ideals
according to student textbooks.162
Outside of militarism in the Habsburg education system, Tyrolean youths were
also indoctrinated with duty, camaraderie, and military service to the Fatherland in the
Standschützen community. It was the duty of the older Schützen to impart on the youth
the significance of these virtues. “The young shooters, and those who are called in ranks
to protect the country, may procure from the course of the festival the conviction that
their elder brethren will be united with them in good days and bad,” explained Vorarlberg
Governor Sebastion von Froschauer at the Landeschießen in Bregenz, Vorarlberg in June
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1865. The older Standschützen praised the valuable work of the young riflemen, adding
that “they did not allow the love of the fathers' weapons to be broken, and preserved the
old, impenetrable bond of brotherhood and loyalty to this day faithfully and
unimpeded.”163 In Schwaz (Tyrol), the election of Gregory Tafatscher as
Oberschützenmeister of its rifle range was, according to one observer, “of the best
consequence,” as his vision emphasized young shooters and the Landesschützen.164
The formation of the Akademischen Schützengilde (Academic Rifle Club) at the
University of Innsbruck is an excellent example of the confluence of teaching state and
imperial patriotism in school and the education young men received at the rifle ranges. A
pamphlet written to document the guild’s flag dedication ceremony on 1-2 July 1901
illustrates how some students embraced the traditional “pillars” of Tyrol: Gott, Kaiser und
Vaterland.165 Flag dedication ceremonies like this one typically entailed a Mass service,
which included the blessing of the flag by the church father (Pfarrer).166 As such, the
“three pillars”—Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland—was ubiquitous. The identity of the
Akademischen Schützengilde was firmly couched in traditional role of
Schützenkompanies as the defenders of Tyrol, linking the new guild with the origins of
Tyrol’s defense system (Landesverteidigung) and, thus, emphasizing its solemn
responsibility. The passage below captures how innately militarism, religion, and
patriotism were intertwined:
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Undoubtedly Andreas Hofer and his heroes in holy joy look down today at the Berg Isel.
For those young men who represent the hope of the future of the country, swear loyalty
today for all the world the faith and the church, faithfulness to the holy covenant of our
fathers.167

The Akademischen Schützengilde (Academic Shooting Club) became the youngest
association in the Tyrolean militia system and received congratulations for His Imperial
Highness Kaiser Franz Josef. In the end, the effectiveness of teaching students state and
imperial patriotism as a part of their broader education is difficult to discern, as on one
hand, many of the most radical nationalists were educators and students. On the other
however, students also demonstrated devotion to the crown, religious piety, and
patriotism for their state. For the Tyrolean youth, the role of the Standschützen added
another source of indoctrination that imparted the mixed signals of German national
pride, patriotism for “Vaterland Tirol,” and loyalty to the dynasty.
The 1909 Jahrhundertfeier (centenary celebration) of the 1809 Tyrolean rebellion
against French and Bavaria occupation, was another occasion in which Tyroleans
recognized the accomplishments of their brave predecessors, promoted the growing
number of shooting associations throughout the province, and reiterated Tyrolean fealty
to the Habsburgs. The celebrations of Anno Neun, as it had come to be known, were
aimed at idealizing civic militarism in the form of the Tyrolean militiaman. Andreas
Hofer, among others, was portrayed as the personification of Tyrolean militiamen’s
mantra of “Für Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland,” which reflected the intersection of religious
piety, provincial patriotism, and dynastic loyalty, which had been traditional tenets of
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Tyrolean society for centuries. Thus, the occasion was utilized to exhibit and cultivate
those virtues for the broader imperial population.168
The two largest ceremonies took place on the “sanctified ground” of Berg Isel
(Innsbruck)—the site of three important engagements of the 1809 rebellion—on 29
August 1909 and illustrated the overarching themes of “Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland.”
Here, during Mass, Tyrol’s oath of religious obedience was reaffirmed, followed by the
recitation of Andreas Hofer’s oath of loyalty. Both of these oaths took place in the
presence of clergymen and Kaiser Franz Josef, the benefactor of the celebration, which
reflects the union of all three elements that impelled Tyrolean militarism. This ceremony
was followed by the Schützenzug (Schützen parade). Indeed, the “whole event had the
character of a military operation.” Uniformed members of the imperial family, army, and
regimental bands were joined by the shooting guilds, who themselves, wore their own
uniquely designed versions of traditional Tyrolean Nationaltracht (national dress).169
Just as the 1809 Tyrolean Freiheitskrieg was executed largely by peasant militia
units, the Jahrhundertfeier was aimed principally at the rural populations “aus allen
Tälern” of Tyrol, as these were the Tyrolean elements most loyal to the crown. Local
leaders of the rebellion in those valleys were recognized by their respective residents as a
part of the commemoration. In doing so, as Laurence Cole points out, provincial and
imperial officials attempted to shape the parameters of Tyrolean identity around the ideals
and actions of loyal, devout, and patriotic predecessors and the “institution of the
Schützen was at the core of the hegemonic version of Tirolean identity.”170 The approach
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of the Jahrhundertfeier was an important event that helped revive interest in the traditions
of Tyrolean rifle clubs and their volunteerism in sharpshooter companies during times of
war, which had lapsed in the decades that followed the Napoleonic Wars. The reestablishment of expired Schützen groups was bookended by the creation of new
groups—some specifically for the celebration of the Jahrhundertfeier—both of which,
however, were distinctly German in character.171
Much of the ceremonies and festivities were orchestrated by voluntary
associations, particularly shooting guilds (Schützenkompanies), veterans associations,
state and local government from parish councils all the way up to the Governor
(Landeshauptmann), as well as imperial institutions such as the army and the MilitärMaria-Theresien-Orden (The Military Order of Maria Theresa), which honored the
highest virtues of Habsburg militarism. The celebration of the Jahrhundertfeier engaged
virtually all levels and institutions of Tyrolean society. The Berg Isel Mass gave the feel
of a “ständisch (corporative) medieval society,” with clerics, nobility, peasants, and
citizens all in attendance.172 The seating arrangement further illustrated the primacy of
historical tradition with the Kaiser on one side of the pavilion surrounded by highranking military officers in attendance one side and clergymen and courtesans on the
other. Facing the Kaiser and his entourage were provincial representatives to the federal
diet along with the provincial diet as well as the mayor, parish councilmen, local
bureaucrats.
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The Jahrhundertsfeier celebrated the courageous and efforts of Tyrolean
militiamen to restore the province to Habsburg rule. It was also an important event in
cementing a Tyrolean identity carefully constructed by Catholic conservatives. The
commemoration of Anno Neun did not cease with the collapse of the Monarchy. As the
heirs of the Schützen tradition, the Heimwehr movement regularly celebrated the
patriotism, piety, and war volunteerism demonstrated by the Tyrolean Standschützen in
1809. Their commander, Andreas Hofer, became a symbol of the legacy that the
Heimwehren understood themselves to be upholding.

Figure 3. The Schießstand at Berg Isel today
(Photo by the author)

The cult of Andreas Hofer
No other figure in Tyrolean history—save for perhaps Kaiser Maximillian I—has
been mythologized like the Standschützen major and innkeeper of the Sandwirt Gasthof.
His ascent to mythical status corresponded closely with the resurgence of
73

Schützentradition in the popular imagination of Tyroleans in the latter half of the
nineteenth century. Poets, writers, and composers attempting to document and pay
homage to the life and exploits of Hofer and his role in the Tyrolean rebellion, played a
central role in laying the foundation for the hagiographic process. The virtues authors
chose to emphasize are instructive as to their political leanings. The cultivation of the
Hofer myth, thus, benefitted from the political tensions inside Tyrol. The historical figure
of Andreas Hofer was co-opted by competing political ideologies that, in parallel, made
Hofer into the archetypal figure of Tyrolean identity.173
The Hofer myth did not emerge immediately after his death in 1810, but decades
later amid a “Kulturkampf” among Tyrolean Catholic conservatives and liberals. While
the imperial house often worked closely with Catholic conservatives against liberal
nationalism, its alliance sought to foster dynastic loyalty. Contemporary chroniclers
conveyed more critical evaluations of Hofer’s deeds. His close cooperation with the
Habsburg government during the 1809 rebellion, and subsequent recognition as the
Kaiser’s regent of Tyrol, was problematic for some Catholic conservatives, as they saw it
as clashing with Tyrol’s traditional opposition to Habsburg efforts to centralize. The early
criticisms of Hofer did not stop them from utilizing Hofer has a vehicle for conveying its
own Weltschauung. Instead, Catholic conservatives emphasized his virtues that aligned
with their own. The construction of the Andreas Hofer Memorial Chapel in Hofer’s
birthplace, Sand in Passeier, depicts Hofer as a deeply pious man and a “most ardent
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admirer of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and a relentless conveyor of this covenant.”174
Indeed, Hofer was a “Christian hero” that “endured as a fearless martyr.”175 Given the
humanist ideals of the Enlightenment that drove Revolutionary and Napoleonic French
armies, Hofer’s religiosity—while not extraordinary for his time—could be readily
highlighted.
From a present-day perspective, the divergence of Catholic conservative and
liberal interpretations seem barely distinguishable on the surface. The clearest point of
divergence, however, was the religious embellishments of the former as opposed to the
nationalistic window dressing of the latter. Tyrolean liberals—like their German
counterparts—viewed Hofer, and the rebellion he ended up leading, in a broader context,
as a German freedom fighter and the “embodiment of a national ideal.”176 Gilm, like
other liberal authors, also understood the term “freedom” in the context of freedom from
the “Zwangsmaßnahmen (coercive measures)” of the Church.177 The prominent place of
the Catholic Church and the fervent anti-nationalist stance of the Habsburg Monarchy,
however, prevented liberal constructions of the Hofer myth from gaining imperial
recognition; memorial dedications and celebrations such as the Jahrhundertfeier
accentuated conservative portrayals that stressed his piety and loyalty to the crown. 178
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In 1880 the officer corps of the Tiroler Kaiserjäger initiated a project to erect a
statue of Hofer (as well as a Tiroler Kaiserjäger museum) on Berg Isel. The aim was to
highlight Tyrolean patriotism and loyalty to the Habsburg crown. Hofer’s personage and,
therefore, his deeds and martyrdom, became a representation of Tyrol. The proclamation
of the committee overseeing the statue’s construction summarizes the sentiments
underlining its intent:
The monument has only the name and features of a man, but honors the country
itself, it is embodied in him with all that has met a genuine Tyrolean heart and
preserved through centuries. The faith of his fathers, the honesty of his
sentiments, the strength and endurance of his heroism. Moreover, because far
beyond its original meaning, the simple man is full unselfishness long since
become a symbol of popular loyalty, unswerving devotion to his imperial family
and faithful holding together with the brothers of the Empire countries.179

Hofer, as a prominent symbol of Tyrolean identity, survived the collapse of the
Habsburg Monarchy to which the Sandwirt was loyal. The competing interpretations of
Hofer, and by extension, central elements of Tyrolean identity, became increasingly
indistinguishable during the course of the interwar period as the end of the Habsburg
dynasty meant the end of the Catholic conservatives’ hegemony over Hofer’s legacy.
With the pervasiveness of nationalism in post-World War I Europe, the liberal
construction of the Hofer myth would gain increasing traction. Indeed, Andreas Hofer in
the First Republic exemplified a compliment of both the German nationalism and
political Catholicism.
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Heirs to a Legacy
The revival of civic militarism that occurred in Habsburg Tyrol in the late
nineteenth century was an orchestration of Franz Joseph I. The Kaiser saw the loyalty and
discipline instilled through the army as archetypal virtues that he wanted to inculcate into
the general population of the empire. The revival of interest in the ancient Tyrolean
militia system, the construction of new shooting ranges throughout the province, and the
establishment of new Schützenkompanies indicated the success of his initiative. This was
also successful on a deeper level. The central role of the Tyrolean Standschützen in the
celebrations of 500 years of Habsburg rule in Tyrol as well as in the centenary of the
vaunted 1809 rebellion, demonstrated the central place civic militarism in Tyrolean
identity.
The Great War propelled the militarization of Habsburg society to its zenith, but
also brought about the Monarchy’s collapse. In its downfall, the Monarchy reiterated the
continued need for the civic militarism it nurtured for so many centuries. So too did the
strict limitations the Allied Powers placed on the size of the new Austrian state’s army.
Mistrust of the republic’s new army, the Volkswehr, also echoed the need for militia.
Overseen by the heavily Social Democratic government in Vienna at the time, the
Volkswehr was comprised of mainly unemployed industrial laborers sympathetic to the
ideals of Marx and Lenin. While the immediate response to civil defense needs
materialized at the local level with communities cobbling together their own militias from
the remaining able-bodied men, the longer-term vision of Governor Josef Schraffl and his
deputy, Dr. Franz Stumpf, was that Tyrol’s traditional militia system would continue to
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function as the basis for peacekeeping measures.180 This was not to be, however, at least
not officially. Article 128 of the Treaty of Saint Germain prohibited the continuity of this
arrangement, stating that “all sporting and other clubs…must not occupy themselves with
any military matters.”181 Schraffl and Stumpf would not be deterred, maneuvering easily
around the vague language of the article, and in May 1920, the “Selbstschutzverband
Tirol” (Self Defense Association of Tyrol)—often referred to as the “Tiroler
Heimatwehr”—was born.
Tyrol’s network of shooting ranges through which the Landesverteidigung was
organized, served a similar purpose for the Tiroler Heimatwehr. The dissolution of the
Habsburg Monarchy left the shooting ranges under the stewardship of the cities in which
they were constructed; the close cooperation and support of Tyrol’s local and state
governments facilitated their use by the Heimatwehr for the purpose of training and
stockpiling illicitly attained arms.182 To that end, Landesführer of the Tiroler Heimatwehr,
Dr. Richard Steidle quite successfully recruited many members of newly reconstituted
recreational rifle clubs.183
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The connections between the Standschützen and the Heimatwehr extended
beyond utilizing the same shooting range system. In one article in the Tiroler
Heimatwehr-Blätter, the organization’s newspaper, drew clear connections between the
Tiroler Heimatwehr the province’s heritage of civil defense. Throughout the article, it
highlighted the parallels between the Heimatwehr and Tyrol’s seventeenth century
militia. Emphasizing the voluntary, democratic nature of both seventeenth century civil
defense formations and the Heimatwehr, as well as the similarities carried forward in
their organizational structures, comparing the Viertelgemeinden (quarter groups) of the
militia system to the Schutzgemeinschaften (defense groups) of the Heimatwehr. A
committee of four to eight mayors and other respected figures in the community would
elect a “Quartermaster,” who would oversee self-defense measures for the representative
communities. The residents of those communities, as it related to self-defense, were
commanded by the Quartermaster. Similarly, defense group leaders were elected by local
group leaders and would develop and maintain plans for the protection of the
communities represented in those groups.184
To understand the military culture of the Heimwehr movement it is necessary to
look to pre-war provincial militarism. That is, the military character of the Heimwehr
movement was underpinned by the traditional, patriarchal values of its Alpine provinces.
Like Gilm’s poems idealized hunting, shooting sports, and the war volunteerism of the
Standschützen, the language of Heimwehr propaganda romanticized military service as a
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masculine duty, the requisites for which had been cultivated in them from childhood
through hunting and sport shooting.185
In November 1920, the Tiroler Heimatwehr staged a province-wide shooting
contest (Landesschießen), which, as demonstrated above, was a centuries-old tradition of
the Standschützen and the first to be held since before the First World War. Tyrolean
People’s Party (Tiroler Volkspartei) representative and leading figure in the Tiroler
Heimatwehr, Andreas Thaler, called sport shooting something that was “in our blood.”186
The surroundings and trappings of the Landesschießen also exhibited the fact that the
Tiroler Heimatwehr saw itself as continuing the Tyrolean legacy militia service. The
ceremonial aspects of the shooting match took place before the massive statue of Andreas
Hofer, at the old Hauptschießstand (main shooting range) atop Berg Isel in Innsbruck.
The Heimatwehr men in attendance donned green and white armbands—the traditional
colors of the Tyrolean Standschützen.187 As Steidle explained, the “true meaning” of the
Landesschießen lay simply the fact that it represented the continuity of “ancient”
Tyrolean Schützenwesen traditions.188
The prominent role of the Church and clergy in the Landeschießen further echoed
the traditional features of the festivities. Just as church fathers consecrated the flags of the
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local Standschützen, they did the same for the Tiroler Heimatwehr. “Here held the forces
of Andreas Hofer, Speckbacher, and Haspinger. Here tended their bullet-ridden war flags.
Today we dedicate no war flag, but a simple banner for peaceful competition,” Steidle
explained.189 The Landesschießen program fittingly ended with the singing of the HerzJesus-Hymne (Hymn of the Sacred Heart of Jesus)—the cult for which Hofer had been a
most vigorous champion. After the program at Berg Isel concluded, a procession of some
1500 participants marched to the Tiroler Landeshymne (Tyrolean national hymn) to
Basilika Wilten for Mass and the consecration of the Heimatwehr flag, carried out by
Abbot Adrian Zacher, who spoke of the banner as a “symbol of peace, quiet and
order.”190
Social Democratic opposition to the Heimatwehr confirm the self-identification of
the Heimatwehr with the province’s legacy of civic militarism:
The Tyrolean Heimatwehren draws on the old traditions of the Standschützen. The
military special rights of Tyrolean peasants stubbornly insisted on from the Habsburgs,
but in the war, was the most fruitful undoing; the liabilities resulting from the rights
forced children and old men into the murderous steel hail of the fronts and tore the
wounds of the force of the Tyrolean people, which is far from healing. The Heimatwehren
now in Tirol wreaking havoc, has nothing to do with the past of the Standschützen; they
have been by Mr. Steidle an instrument against the working class, against the republic,
against the Großdeutsche idea...191

In a March 1920 interview published in the Allgemeiner Tyrolean Anzeiger, Steidle
explained—in true, independent-minded Tyrolean fashion—that the Tyrol did not need
the presence of the Volkswehr to maintain “peace and order” in the province, it needed
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only the police and “our volunteer organization,” meaning the Tiroler Heimatwehr, with
the support of “Schießstandorganisationen” (system of rifle ranges).192
The Heimatwehr shooting festival was a controversial affair, which will be
explained in greater depth in subsequent chapters. Suffice it to say, Social Democrats
opposed the event for several reasons. When it became clear that the Heimatwehr was
determined to move forward in their decision to hold the event, the Social Democratic
Party orchestrated a labor strike in Tyrol. An article in the Vorarlberger Tagblatt covering
the Landesschießen and Social Democrats’ “wanton” response—in the form of a railroad
strike—to the fact that “the Tyroleans are resuming their furrowed prewar customs again
and that does not suit the leaders of the SDP.”193 The conservative Reichspost echoed
similar sentiments, complaining that the annoyance of Tyrolean Social Democrats had
forced “the sons of Andreas Hofer to bury the Stutzen of their fathers.”194 The articles are
somewhat disingenuous in their grievances, positioning the shooting match as being
staged by the general populous as opposed to one organized by the Heimatwehr. While
there is little indication of the wider public opinion on the Landesschießen they, however,
emphasize continuities of the pre-war past and backward gaze of conservative segments
of Austrian society. Indeed, the expiration of the monarchy as a sovereign did not mean
its cultural resonance ceased to be a formative influence.
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Figure 4. Statue of Andreas Hofer at Bergisel, Innsbruck.
(Photo by the author.)

The desire of the Heimatwehr to maintain and revive disappearing customs was
not an anomaly, but part of broader efforts of conservative circles to halt the shifting
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sands beneath their feet. For instance, they campaigned for Austria’s youth to be taught
their “glorious past.” As one flyer notes:
The Austrian youth must not be deprived of the history of its people, for when youth
knows nothing of the glorious, glorious history of its fatherland, it is only too easily the
prey of paid, fatherland-less demagogues. Yes, it lies in the system of today's youth
education, only if the history of their fatherland is partially falsified, or withheld, then,
can youths become mindless, international socialists.195

In another instance, an article in the Tiroler Heimatwehr-Blätter criticized Social
Democratic opposition to religion education in school. “Who gives the Social Democratic
leaders the right to strive with all their might to deprive the children of our people of
values that they can never later acquire,” the article complained.196
In promoting the Landesschießen, Tyrolean Heimatwehr propaganda praised the
“old German passion” for hunting and sport shooting, explaining that the “beautiful, old
custom” had been an integral part of their development into men and should remain a
“right” of the youth:
When I was a boy, it was our greatest pleasure to shoot a bow and arrow…More and
more the old German lust for shooting-sport grew, the arm and eye steeled, the pleasure,
quick and sure with a shot to hit a difficult target and to stalk and capture wild game and
game birds in flight. The Tesching and lead ball, and soon, the rifle and cartridge became
our inseparable companion. It was only when we knew how to handle them with
complete certainty that we felt ourselves as men who were aware of their own strength
and masters of their bodies, who did not need to crouch and shamefully stand aside when
others put the bullet in the black.197

Not only was mastering the rifle depicted as a rite of passage into manhood, but also that
it was an extension of one’s body, a part of his being. The continuity of the region’s gun
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culture was, therefore, a fundamental component of militarizing its young, post-war
generation.
The thrust for these efforts gained further impetus through the Treaties of Saint
Germain and Versailles, which forbade compulsory military service in Germany and
Austria, a requirement of all male citizens 18 years of age in both the Habsburg and
Hohenzollern empires before the war. The limitations placed on their militaries reduced
its ability to function as a formative institution in shaping the worldview of their youths
and many bourgeois families feared that the values that military service instilled would be
lost on their sons.198 As a result, there emerged a broad push to militarize youth scouting
and athletic associations throughout Germany and Austria to compensate, in however
limited the extent, for this loss.199 Hallmarks of military training such as physical fitness,
discipline, and drills were introduced through these channels now. In Germany, for
example, it was estimated that before World War I, 400,000 were enrolled in sports clubs.
After the war, that number spiked to 3,500,000. At the same time, boy scout troop leaders
were encouraged to conduct military exercises, marching, stage “surprise attacks” and
“sham night battles on difficult ground,” among other military-related activities.200
The absence of the formal institutional constraints traditionally exercised by the
army allowed the most virulent and radical völkisch ideals to intermingle with the
residual elements of imperial military, framed by fantasies of revenge for their humiliated
state. The freedom of expression that accompanied the parliamentary democracies in
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Germany and Austria allowed for this amalgam to spread into the political discourse of
the interwar period, creating a political climate where the militarization of mass party
politics became an accepted and, therefore, legitimate form of expression. Instrumental in
this development was the militarization of scouting groups and the formation of
uniformed youth combat leagues such as the Wikingbund, Reichsflagge, Werwölfe,
Jungstahlhelm, Hitlerjugend, and Bund Oberland. The youths of these organizations
provided the thrust (muscle) from below to push these radical reactionary ideals to the
forefront of German, Austrian, and, to a lesser extent, Hungarian society.
With that in mind, the fact that the leadership of the Innsbruck chapter of the
German Scout Federation (Deutschen Pfadfindersbundes) approached the Tiroler
Heimatwehr, in February 1925, to administer military training to its young scouts,
requesting that they “agree to the formation of an independent company,” which was to
be named the “St. Georg-Zug” (St. George Company) after the federation’s patron saint,
St. George. Many of the older scouts—sixteen years of age—of this chapter were already
members of the Heimatwehr youth formations, mainly in the telephone company of its
Innsbruck machine gun battalion. As a part of their agreement of affiliation, those
members would were to be transferred to the new St. George company. It was the desire
the scout leaders, Kurt Mair and Franz Ferkow, to have the company trained as
Jägertruppen (infantry troops) and receive the same training as that of a regular infantry
company.201
Just as the Standschützen made concerted efforts to orient Tyrolean youth to the
virtues of loyalty, militarism, and wartime service in the defense of their communities, so
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too did the Heimatwehr. From the outset of its efforts to establish a youth organization,
the Heimatwehr leadership praised Tyrol’s centuries-old gun culture, positioning hunting
and sport shooting as a natural German pastime. The connection of hunting to
masculinity, independence, and confidence was a useful pivot to exalting the virtues of
military service that followed. The youth organization of the Tiroler Heimatwehr,
established in 1921, outlined a similar mission as that of the German Scout Federation in
that it sought the “improvement of our youth morally and physically, so that each of our
organization’s young members can become leaders…when the Germanic destiny calls, be
it in the struggle for the spirit or armed combat.” In addition to marksmanship and sport
shooting competitions, however, the Heimatwehr implemented a much more extensive
military training and physical exercise regimen for its “Heimwehrjugendgruppe”
(Heimwehr Youth Group). The more extensive military training program the Heimatwehr
established, not only taught youths to shoot military-grade rifles as had long been done in
the Jungschützenschule, but also proper technique for throwing hand grenades (using
wooden hand grenades), military field exercises, and a physical conditioning regimen.202
The activities of its youth groups, while paralleling the military training regular
Heimatwehr units received, also paralleled the impetus of scouting that it emphasized
being outdoors and in nature.203 In addition to military objectives like map reading,
navigation, judging distances, and night hikes, they were to “arouse the body and the
mind, stimulate cunning and imagination, strengthen the spirit of adventure and daring.”
All of this was, “of course…only for boys and youths” and, thus, “not suitable for girls.”
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In contrast to the rejuvenating power of hours spent in nature, their time spent in the city
was “wasted.”204 Generally negative views of the city and city life emerged right-wing
circles in the 1890s, as “[u]rbanization and the growth of the working class, as well as,
more nebulously, the spread of values and modernist culture, were leading in this view to
the increasing ‘degeneracy’ of the masses.”205 As Large points out, they shared the same
views of cities as their Bavarian brethren—a haven for Jews and foreigners. As such, they
“were seen as the root of all evil: while their rootless coffee-house intellectuals dispensed
moral poison in the form of “asphalt literature” and atheist-socialist philosophy, their
parasitic civil servants cooked up schemes to exploit and defraud the honest working men
in the provinces.”206 As expressed in the romantic theories of Catholic social thinkers,
nature was pure and organic, the work of God, while cities were manmade and became
synonymous with the vice and ills of secular modernity that robbed men of their spiritual
reason for being.207
The Tiroler Heimatwehr was not the only organization to established a youth
group. The Styrian Heimatschutz founded its own youth group on December 1, 1928, but
it appears to have been short lived, as according to Pauley, no youth organization was
worthy of mention appeared until the White-Green Young People (Weiß-grüne Jungvolk)
and the Heimatschutz High School Group (Heimatschutz-Hochschulgruppen), both of
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which were founded in 1932. The establishment of these two youth organizations roughly
coincided with the founding of the national youth organization of the Heimwehr
movement—Young Fatherland (Jung Vaterland). Nationally, the Heimwehr youth
movement grew steadily from 1934, numbering around 15,000 to 103,000 by the end of
1935.208
The role of the war youth generation was clearly articulated in the in the
Heimwehr movement’s vision for Austria. This is evident, for example, in the Heimwehr
propaganda pamphlet, The Path to Austria’s Freedom (Der Weg zu Österreichs Freiheit),
published in 1929, which makes clear the centrality of patriotic youths in the rise of the
Heimwehr movement:
[M]ilitancy is the new style with which the young generation leads the confrontation with
Bolshevism and to commemorate the devastated homeland. The red blood of these youths
is the liquid, other than the bilious black ink of Marxist scribes, that flows in the veins of
Austria. No more cowardly compromise. It is the will of this blooming youth to kick in
the barriers to what Austria's people think and feel. Their rallying cry is simply: the
Heimatwehr!209

College-aged young men were the building blocks of the movement’s military capability,
forming the radical basis of its mobile shock units. To reinforce the virtues of military
service, war volunteerism, and sacrifice to its youth formations, the Alpenländische
Heimatwehr regularly printed entries “From the Tyrolean book of Heros,” which
contained brief biographical portraits of young Tyroleans who died in the Great War.210
Simultaneous lamentations of the Heimwehren are indicative, however, that such young
men were among the minority of Austria’s war youth generation. The “craving of
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pleasure,” “worship of foreign customs and dances,” and “dwindling love of the
homeland” appears to have been the concerns of most of Austria’s adolescents.211

Conclusions
Shared historical experiences are, as Shein points out, the “critical defining
characteristic” of a social group.212 In Tyrol, by the outset of the Great War, there was a
longstanding culture of independence, illustrated in its citizens’ deep love of hunting and
shooting—privileges not typical of the general population in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Its gun culture was a product of Tyroleans’ obligatory militia service
in defense of the county (Landesverteidigung). This obligation allowed Tyroleans the
freedom to maintain personal firearms during times of peace, as they served a dual
purpose as the weapons they would carry into battle.
Over the centuries, the parameters of militia service changed little from their
original codification in the Landlibell von 1511. Simultaneously, the proliferation of
firearms across the Tyrol facilitated the emergence of local rifle clubs who had
constructed shooting ranges of varying degrees of sophistication. These clubs began as
independent and unrelated entities to the militia levees that were mustered in times of
war. By 1703, however, these rifle clubs were obliged to contribute sharpshooter
companies to the Landesverteidigung in times of war. This marked the beginning of the
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integration of rifle clubs into the Tyrolean defense system. The first shooting range order
(Schießstandsordnung) was decreed in 1736, codifying the role of the shooting ranges
and their members in the broader provincial defense system.
The organization of the ranges and their members’ obligations remained largely
the same until after the Austrian Empire’s defeat in the Austro-Prussian war in 1866,
which paved the way for the dualist system to emerge in 1867. Among the government
reforms of the compromise (Ausgleich) of 1867 was compulsory military service. This
reform was an important step in the militarization of Habsburg society, as all able-bodied
nineteen-year-old men would serve two years of military service and eight years of
reserve duty. This exposure to the military culture of the Habsburg army during their
active duty, and stints as reservists, were formative experiences that helped ingrain a
sense of loyalty and duty to the empire. These residual effects of military service were
also observable in the creation of veterans associations, which emerged as voluntary
associations to help fellow veterans invalided or suffering through financial difficulties,
as well as assistance for war widows and their children. Indeed, the presence of the
military in Habsburg society was, as Mark Twain remarked in 1898, “as pervasive as the
atmosphere. It was everywhere.”213
With the outset of the Great War, the militarism of conservative Austro-Hungarian
society reached its pinnacle. The features of Habsburg and regional militarism remained
ubiquitous in the identities of provincial Austrians of all social strata even after the
monarchy’s collapse. The chapters that follow will illustrate this continuity in greater
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depth. The deeply entrenched virtues connected with imperial civic militarism, were
formative in shaping the core values, espoused beliefs, behaviors, and activities not just
of Tiroler Heimatwehr, but of the movement as a whole. Beyond informing the
organizational culture of the movement, they would play an unintended role in effecting
the decision making of Heimwehr leadership.
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CHAPTER II – THE HEIMWEHR MOVEMENT AS A TRANSNATIONAL
PHENOMENON

The vicious feudal dogma of an absolute national sovereignty makes almost impossible
all social life…All the states of Central Europe live in a state of clandestine anarchy.
Nations have no consideration for each other either in economics or in politics. This
system destroys all moral unity in Europe. European distress, misery, anarchy, and civil
war are, in their deepest roots, a moral problem. What our most profound and noble
thinkers…predicted long ago, has become a reality: Europe is in a state of dissolution,
because the spirit of a new Machiavellism destroys private and public moral.
-Oskar Jászi, 1923214

The incredible death and destruction wrought by European armies on the
battlefields of the First World War was, in large part, a result of the advances in weaponry
made possible by the industrialization of European societies over the course of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Manifesto of the Communist Party, penned by
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in 1848, was also a product of industrialization that
reproached capitalism and capitalist governments for the low wages, poor housing,
unsafe, and unhealthy conditions in which factory workers languished because of the
Industrial Revolution. That the war precipitated socialist-led revolutions, is ironic, but at
the same time fitting. That war-weary soldiers and sailors were at the forefront of these
revolutions, brought this vicious cycle full-circle.
The theory of “class struggle” laid out in The Manifesto of the Communist Party
helped drive the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917. Marx and Engels’ treatise detailed
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how the factory owners (bourgeoisie) emerged, over time, to control modern societies by
exploiting the production of wage laborers (proletarians).215 Factory owners owned, and
thus controlled, the means of production—the tools, machinery, facilities—to
manufacture products, which they, in turn, sell at tremendous profit. The workers, whose
labor physically produced the products are, on the other hand, paid meager wages on
which they and their families could barely survive and were, thus, forced to live in
dilapidated tenements. Marx and Engel’s “class struggle” was, thus, an ongoing conflict
between the exploiter and the exploited, which the latter—the proletariat—would
gradually triumph through its greater strength in numbers and seize control of the means
of production in a violent revolution. The proletariat, they predicted, would reconstitute
society in the more commensurate system of government in the form of communism.
Through the communist system, “The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest,
by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in
the hands of the State.” The manifesto goes on to list the measures necessary for
“revolutionizing the mode of production,” which entailed the confiscation of all private
property (including land), the abolition of inheritance rights, and the consolidation of
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means of communication into the hands of the government.216 The overarching goal was
to “level the playing field,” so to speak, through the destruction of class distinctions.
While the First World War was the catalyst of the revolutions in Central Europe,
the Social Democratic parties who guided them were inspired by the Russian
Revolutions, which saw the fall of the Romanov dynasty in February 1917, only to be
followed by the overthrow of the provisional government in October by a radical faction
of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, calling themselves Bolsheviks, or
“members of the majority”. In the case of the latter, Bolshevik revolutionaries stormed
the Winter Palace in Saint Petersburg and arrested present government officials, thereby,
seizing control of the primary administrative hub of the federal government. Radical
decrees soon followed, placing land, industry, and financial institutions under the control
of the Bolshevik government. These measures were part of a larger effort to suppress
“class enemies,” which came to be known as the “Red Terror.” The term “class enemy,”
while subjective, was generally understood to mean anyone who made money off of the
labor of others, such as factory owners, managers, wealthy peasants (pejoratively known
as “kulaks”), or army officers. It was also used as a moniker for members of the
aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, Tsarist officials, or clergymen, amongst other groupings
generally persecuted as the Bolsheviks consolidated power. Those deemed “class
enemies” were typically either imprisoned, deported to the developing system of labor
camps, or executed by the secret police organization, the Cheka, established by Bolshevik
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leader, Vladimir Lenin.217 It requires little imagination to see why the ideals of
communism, carried out by radical revolutionaries like the Bolsheviks were viewed by
bourgeois and wealthy circles in Central Europe with great fright, as something akin to an
intellectual contagion, especially given the weak economic and political positions by
1918. The political discourse of conservative political parties and right-wing
organizations in Central Europe illustrated as much, frequently calling Marxism a
“poisonous bacteria,” a “red plague,” or the “Moscow Scarlet [Fever]” corrupting their
society.218
According to Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, four “overlapping and mutually
reinforcing factors” were the catalysts for paramilitary violence across Europe from the
later years of the Great War to the mid-1920s:
the legacy of mass armed combat in the First World War; the Russian Revolution
(and subsequent civil war) and the ideological counterrevolution that it generated
internationally; the military collapse and dissolution of the multinational dynastic
Ottoman, Habsburg, and Romanov empires, along with the often-violent attempts
to create ethnically homogenous nation-states under the banner of “selfdetermination” (including many contested nation-states that obviously contained
sizable ethnic minorities); and, ﬁnally, the experiences of defeat that accelerated
violence in those countries that had been on the losing side in the war.219
As this chapter will demonstrate, there was little surprise that the outgrowth of
reactionary Paramilitarism was most fervent in the footprint of the former Central
Powers, as they were affected by each of these factors simultaneously. Chief among these
forces was the fear of communist revolution. As news of the “Red Terror” and brutal civil
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war in Russia spread westward, fears of a similar fate reached a fevered pitch in Austria,
Germany, and Hungary. These fears were exacerbated by the political upheaval in Central
Europe in 1918. Military defeat was the catalyst for political change in the region, as
monarchy gave way to parliamentary democracy. The centuries of rule enjoyed by the
Habsburg and Hohenzollern families provided their dynasties legitimacy. The
declarations of the fledgling democracies, made at the expense of the abdicating
sovereigns, were not universally welcomed or accepted as legitimate.
This was the attitude of many army officers who returned their homeland to find it
in the throes of disarray and revolutionary demonstrations in November 1918. These
officers, dismayed by the collapse of “peace and order” at home, would become the
leading figures of the counter-revolutionary, paramilitary movement in Central Europe.220
The post-war refrains of military officers touted that the armies of the Central Powers had
been “im Feld unbesiegte” (undefeated in the field of battle), only to be “stabbed-in-theback” (Dolchstoß legende) by “Judeo-Bolshevik” revolutionaries at home. These
sentiments illustrated the connection officers made between the revolutions and
communism, which reinforced the impetus for the numerous paramilitary organizations
that materialized after 1918. As Jászi noted, “According to their (the ruling “oligarchy” in
Hungary) ideology Hungary was innocent of complicity in bringing on the World War,
which was really caused by German-French capitalistic rivalry. The Hungarian army was
actually victorious, and its collapse was brought about by conspiracy.”221
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This myth resonated not only amongst former officers but also gained credence
amongst bourgeois and aristocratic circles throughout Central Europe, galvanizing these
segments of society against what they perceived to be a common enemy.222 The outbreak
of violence in Central Europe over disputed borders and the protracted process of
deciding their fate only contributed to the political instability of the region. To make
matters worse, inflation, unemployment, and food and material scarcity—particularly in
Austria—only added to the sense of uncertainty. Combined, these conditions created
environments in which the process of political demobilization from the war proved
impossible.223
Another influence that Gerwarth and Horne do not directly address is the
hardships and uncertainty exacerbated by the treaties of the Paris Peace Conference.
Indeed, the setting in Austria, like that of Germany and Hungary, in the months and years
immediately that followed, was a subject of great concern for the international diplomatic
community. One observer of the circumstances in Austria wrote, “[t]o Austria the Treaty
of Versailles has been more destructive than any war or revolution or scourge or pest or
natural calamity, for time can heal such things; but for the consequences of the Treaty of
Versailles there is no remedy.”224 American diplomat, Philip Marshall Brown, declared
that Austria was “so reduced in population and economic resources, so hopeless of a
national future, that she now remains a proud beggar requiring both food and justice. Her
situation is nothing short of tragic.”225 Sir James Salter, head of the League of Nations’
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economic and financial section, wrote that “Austria lived—but pitifully and precariously.
She froze in the winter, and a large part of her population was hungry throughout the
year. Her middle class was almost destroyed...Mortality was high and, among children,
terrible.”226 The peace treaties emerging from the Paris Peace Conference were, indeed,
the products of adversarial emotion, rather than objective consideration and was generally
perceived as “war” carried out “with the weapons of peace.”227
In the footprint of the Central Powers, the Paris Peace Conference carved out
successor states, reducing the territories of Germany, Austria, and Hungary and causing
significant national antagonisms. For the anti-Marxist, militant right in Germany, Austria,
and Hungary, however, it created opportunities for transnational cooperation. Private
organizations, political parties, and government officials worked together in establishing
a coalition to defend themselves from communist revolution. The paramilitary Heimwehr
movement was at the center of this activity, as the Bavarian and Hungarian governments
and paramilitary organizations worked with provincial Austrian officials to fund,
organize, arm, and train the Heimwehren. In doing so, they created an anti-Marxist
“Ordnungsblock.” Its Bavarian counterpart, the Einwohnerwehr, was dissolved in the
summer of 1921 and its successor, Bund Bayern und Reich, enjoyed a brief period of
growth that tapered due to its decentralized character, its members defecting to emerging
paramilitary organizations such as the Nazi SA. Unlike its Bavarian mentors, the
Heimwehr movement remained intact and increased its membership and influence in
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Austrian public life. At its pinnacle in 1929, the Heimwehren confederation was among
the largest paramilitary association in Central Europe, exceeded only by the likes of the
Stahlhelm and the “Reichsbanner Schwartz-Rot-Gold” (Black, Red, Gold Banner of the
Reich), which constituted the largest paramilitary organizations in Germany. 228
Within Central Europe, the Heimwehr movement represented the linchpin of
transnational cooperation amongst reactionary right-wing governments and paramilitary
organizations working to create a strong, conservative paramilitary front in Austria that
would, in turn, solidify an anti-Marxist bulwark in Central Europe. So long as the shadow
of the Soviet Union loomed from the East, the threat of communist revolution remained
palpable. The ascent of Benito Mussolini and the National Fascist Party (Partito
Nazionale Fascista) to power in Italy, however, would inspire these militant right-wing
organizations like the Heimwehr movement and the Nazi Party to attempt to implement
their own militaristic, authoritarian governments.
As this chapter will illustrate, the menace of communist revolution was the
fundamental catalyst for the creation and continuity of right-wing paramilitary
organizations and their collaboration in Central Europe. A communist coup attempt in
Berlin and the establishment of violent communist regimes in Bavaria and Hungary
triggered fierce reprisals from counter-revolutionary paramilitary groups like The
National Army in Hungary and the Freikorps (free or volunteer corps) in Germany. The
Einwohnerwehr, which emerged after the successful quashing of the communist
government in Bavaria, was a byproduct of the wave counter-revolution in Germany and
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was an influential force in the creation of the Heimwehr movement. From financial
support flowing from Hungary to its East and the guidance of the Einwohnerwehr in the
West, provincial officials were at the center of a transnational collaboration to create an
anti-Marxist bulwark in Austria that would connect the states in a Central European
“Ordnungsblock.”

Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Central Europe
In the post-war revolutions occurring in Germany, Austria, and Hungary, and even
the Russian Revolution of February 1917, moderate social democratic parties were at the
forefront. Their platform, while based on Marxist theory, sought a gradual transition to
communism rather than violent revolution. Behind these moderates, however, lurked
more radical communist elements waiting for the opportune time to orchestrate their own
revolution.229 The nature and extent of the “Red Terror” in Bolshevik Russia sent
shockwaves of anxiety among conservative and moderate circles across Europe.230
“White émigrés” fleeing Bolshevik persecution brought with them first-hand accounts of
“Red Terror” and, as Michael Kellogg argues, claims that Jewish capitalists were funding
the Bolsheviks.231 These fears were realized in March 1919.
Though paling in comparison to the excesses of the Russian Civil War that
followed the October Revolution, the communist revolution in Hungary was, in spite of
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its brevity, brutal. Amidst international controversy surrounding the Hungarian
government’s resistance against the territorial revisions of the Treaty of Trianon, the
ineffective Károlyi government resigned. Hungarian social democratic party leaders
bowed to public pressure and agreed to merge the party with the Hungarian communist
party, creating the Soviet Republic of Hungary. The confluence of the two parties
promised political connections to the West through the Social Democrats and a direct line
to the Soviet Red Army through communist party leader, Béla Kun. As the understudy to
Lenin, Kun unleashed his own version of the “Red Terror.” Playing the role of the Cheka
was a “terrorist corps” that came to be known as the “Lenin Boys.” Their leader, in the
words of C.A. MacArtney, was “a particularly revolting and bloodthirsty Jew,” named
Tibor Szamuely.232 While clearly written to insight the reactionary right, Ladislaus
Bizony’s 133 Tage ungarischer Bolshevismus (133 Days of Hungarian Bolshevism),
offers a contemporary account of Hungary’s “Red Terror.”233 The “Lenin Boys” outfit
Szamuely commanded was composed of youths who were “convicted vagabonds and
murders,” but absolutely loyal to him.234 Bizony details what became commonplace
operations for Szamuely’s terrorist unit:
Szamuely received a special train from the (Hungarian) Soviet government so that
wherever it showed, counter-revolutionary movements appeared in due time.
Szamuely traveled in a parlor car, while the terrorists, armed to the teeth, took
other cars…Wherever he stopped, designated a legion of people to be hanged. He
ordered the executions to be enforced without trials. Mostly he haphazardly
collected together people in the individual villages and hanged them without
hearings. He carried with him just a bunch of small perforated forms and a stamp.
On the form he wrote the name of the person sentenced to death and stamped it,
232
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having already led to the victim to the gallows. The people in the villages spoke
with horror of Szamuely’s atrocities. For the scene of executions, he usually chose
the main square of the community, the town hall, or the square outside the church.
In most cases he ordered the residents of the village, chiefly the family members
of the condemned, to the scene of the execution. He brought a chair and gave—
with icy calm, smoking his cigarette—the executioners his orders. After the
executions he climbed in his car and drove between rows of trees on which the
hanged dangled.235
Bizony even quotes Kun as having said he feared Szamuely would eventually come for
him. In total, Gerwarth estimates, between 400 to 500 Hungarians lost their lives in the
Red Terror of 1919.236 This brutalization of perceived enemies of communism would
prompt a subsequent, retaliatory “White Terror,” under the Horthy government. Taken
together, such political violence contributed to a general state of affairs throughout
Central Europe where political and military demobilization became an impossibility.
Simply put, neither the left nor the right felt safe enough to “let down their guard.” In this
environment of political omnipresence, the radicalization of politics was no longer a
matter of “if,” but “when,” and to what extent and for how long.
The outbreak of revolution in Germany and Hungary was met with and followed
by strong counter-revolutionary violence. In Budapest, after the disintegration of Béla
Kun’s communist regime and the brief occupation by Romanian troops, former k.u.k.
Admiral, Miklós Horthy and his paramilitary “National Army” opportunistically fell on
Budapest, claiming to ‘liberate’ the capital and securing Hungary’s national
independence. This formation was composed largely of fellow former officers who were
“[d]eeply resentful of Hungary’s dismemberment at the hands of former national
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minorities and unable to cope with the severe economic dislocations of a lost war.”237
More precisely, 3,800 of the 6,568 volunteers of Horthy’s National Army were former
army officers or officers of paramilitary border guard and police formations.238 In
addition to its loftier goals of restoring to Hungary its lost territories and, thus, its
national pride, the National Army sought retribution for communist revolutionaries and
perpetrators of the Red Terror.
Between 1919 and 1921, reactionary paramilitary formations travelled throughout
Hungary arresting, torching, and executing communist supporters of the Kun regime. Just
as often, however, Jews and individuals against whom squadron leaders had personal
vendettas were the targets of their brutality. Moreover, as Bela Bido explains, in rural
Hungary, large land owners invited these paramilitary detachments to their estates to
terrorize and intimidate the peasant farmers who worked their land through “a generous
amount of lashing.” Estimations regarding the death toll of this “White Terror” vary
between 3,000 to 5,000, with approximately 70,000 more individuals imprisoned.239
In Germany, this took the form of the “Ebert-Groener Pact,” in November 1918.
Quartermaster General Wilhelm Groener, fearing Germany would devolve into complete
chaos, creating an opportunity for Bolshevik revolution, offered to throw the weight of
the army—what remained of it—behind the new government of Social Democratic
President Friedrich Ebert. In return, Ebert agreed defend the army and its traditional
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structure and place in German society against calls for its dissolution in lieu of a
“people’s militia.” What was left of the German army was augmented by Freikorps
(volunteer corps) formations, which were comprised of demobilized soldiers and officers,
frequently of the violent, ultra-nationalist persuasion.240
In January 1919, communist revolutionaries—and disciples of socialist
revolutionary Kurt Eisner, President of the “Free State of Bavaria”—and founders of the
“Spartacist League,” Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, led the group in a rebellion
against the Social Democratic Party over the direction of Germany’s government. At the
request of President Friedrich Ebert and Minister of Defense, Gustav Noske, the rightwing, paramilitary Freikorps (volunteer corps) crushed the general strike that came to
known as the “Spartacist Uprising” and executed Liebknecht and Luxemburg (allegedly
on the orders of Captain Waldemar Pabst, the future Stabsleiter (Chief of Staff) of the
Tyrolean Heimatwehr as well as the federal umbrella organization, the
Selbstschutzverband Österreich). A month after Luxemburg and Liebknecht’s execution,
Eisner was assassinated in Munich by the young, right-wing nationalist Anton Graf von
Arco auf Valley.
In a confusing spate of successive and, by April 1919, competing governments in
Bamberg and Munich that emerged in the aftermath of Kurt Eisner’s assassination,
Russian communist, Eugen Leviné, seized control over what Ernst Toller had only a week
earlier proclaimed as the Bavarian Soviet Republic.241 Inspired and encouraged by the
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support he received from both Kun and Lenin, Leviné began arresting bourgeois
opponents and executing others he feared to be reactionary spies. Dismayed by these
events, German Minister of Defense, Gustav Noske, once more turned to the paramilitary
Freikorps to smash the communist government in Bavaria. The Freikorps Württemberg
worked with brutal efficiency, capturing Leviné and destroying his “Red Army.”242 Upon
entering Munich and re-capturing its public buildings, Freikorps troops discovered those
executed, “mutilated to the point of being unrecognizable,” of which three had been
beheaded.243 In total, it is estimated that between 100 to 200 Germans died in various
incidents of Red Terrorism in 1918-19.244 The communist revolution in Hungary and the
coup attempts in Berlin and Munich created a palpable fear of communism throughout
Central Europe that remained a driving motivation for counter-revolutionary
Paramilitarism and their cooperation in the Interwar Period.
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The recurring appearance of Jews in leading roles of communist revolutions
between 1917 and 1919, helped solidify in the minds of Marxist opponents that there
were legitimate connections between Judaism and Bolshevism. Moreover, given the fact
that the Jewish population in Europe represented roughly only one quarter of one percent
at the time, this would have likely seemed all the more conspicuous.245 This recurrent
theme began with the fact that Marx, was a Jewish philosopher. Aside from Vladimir
Lenin, the most widely known figure of the Russian Revolution was Leon Trotsky,
founder of the Red Army, was the son of a wealthy Ukrainian Jewish farmer. The lead
perpetrator of Red Terror in Hungary, Tibor Szamuely, was also a Jew.246 Leviné, Eisner,
and Luxemburg were, likewise, Jews. In the case of the Bavarian revolution, it is worth
nothing that Leviné was also a Russian national. As David Clay Large explains, “middleclass Bavarians saw a Russian conspiracy at work” that, according to a police from June
1919, was financially supported by Jews. This was important in creating an environment
in Bavaria in which the idea of a “Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy” seemed particularly real
and where the anti-Semitic National Socialists German Workers Party (NSDAP) could
thrive.247
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While effective in beating back the threat of Bolshevism in Germany, the EbertGroener Pact was a pyrrhic victory in that it allowed the Prussian militarism that colored
imperial Germany to survive. It also set a precedent for government-supported and
subsidized Paramilitarism in Central Europe, a precedent that spilled over into Austria
and was modeled elsewhere. In this way, it helped inaugurate a cycle of counterrevolutionary political violence that would span the interwar period. The noteworthy
number of Freikorps men who would become Nazi Party members also speaks to the
significance of Ebert-Groener Pact. It encouraged the development of Freikorps
formations, and their use in crushing revolutions provided them opportunities to engage
in gratuitous, political violence. The Freikorps experience, to be sure, was formative in
solidifying the foundational beliefs of Nazism for many of these members, particularly
those of the war youth generation who were too young to have experienced the Great War
from the front lines. In any case, National Socialism offered a platform that aligned with
their patriotic fanaticism with the brutality inherent to its ideals.
Meanwhile in Austria, state and local governments raised volunteer militia
formations to defend communities and cities from marauding bands of deserters and
transports full of Hungarian and Czech soldiers passing through on their journey home in
the last days of the war. Moreover, these militia units fought to defend the territorial
integrity of Carinthia and Styria. Quite apart from the notion that local self-defense
groups “sprang into existence…virtually spontaneous[ly],” their formation was recruited,
organized, and equipped through the cooperation of the Austrian local, state, and
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provisional governments.248 On November 30, 1918, the ministry of war distributed
1,156 machine guns, 80,345 repeating rifles, 13,627 carbines, 396 hand grenades, 888
sidearms, 8,702,640 rifle cartridges, and 72,891 pistol cartridges to local militia units in
an effort to maintain order, keep the peace, and defend citizens and their property.249
Austrian newspapers published appeals for men to form or join local efforts to
establish civil defense groups to protect unarmed citizens, homes, railways, factories,
communication networks, and food depots. The Lower Austrian newspaper, Der
Bauernbündler, called on farmers to keep their “head high” in this difficult time and
“Form militias that patrol constantly!”250 The national council in Vienna—comprised of
representatives of the Social Democratic, Christian Social, and German Freedom Party—
urged cooperation among all circles of society. “Should we, however, maintain order, the
foundation of home defense is made up from all circles of the population, of workers and
citizens, in this most urgent hour of need,” reads the Österreichische Land-Zeitung. The
Lower Austrian city of Krems, for example, instituted the general conscription of ablebodied citizens between 18 and 36 years of age, not employed by public services and
utilities such as the railways, the post office, and electric companies. Those fitting the
criteria were required to report to various locations in Krems and its outskirts within three
days. These who were required to take part in watches and patrol duty every third day for
a 24-hour shift; those on duty were provided lunch and supper as well as coffee at 6:00am
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and 6:00pm. Individuals serving militia duty were paid eight kronen upon completing
their service day.251
Police and military assistance was required to protect food and weapons depots in
its larger, more industrialized cities, which were prone to demonstrations, riots, and
looting.252 In Tyrol, the state assembly (Nationalrat) established a defense committee to
oversee civil defense.253 The committee was tasked with three initial goals: the disarming
and removal of any non-German-Austrian troops, the removal of all prisoners of war, and
the recall of German-Tyrolean troops and Standschützen. Available military supplies were
used to establish ad-hoc fortifications throughout the city. Locally garrisoned troops were
drafted into Sicherheitsgruppen (security groups) to man these posts and guard against
plundering and unrest.254 Beyond the Sicherheitsgruppen, the Tyrolean state assembly
also authorized the formation of voluntary Bürgerwehren and Bauernwehren, or citizen
militias and farmer militias, respectively.255 The Innsbruck Bürgerwehr company, for
instance, was under of the oversight of the mayor, Dr. Wilhelm Greil, and was broken
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down into four platoons—a total of 140 men—who the city provided meals and six
kronen per day compensation for their service. This auxiliary civilian force functioned as
a standing formation, serving in six-hour rotations. Less experienced volunteers formed
an emergency cadre mobilized only in dire circumstances.256
After the plundering of the Austrian countryside had subsided, there was still
reason for provincial militias to remain at the ready. The Social Democratic-led
provisional government in Vienna had begun the project of raising a new federal army,
tapping Dr. Julius Deutsch, a Landsturm officer during the war and the future leader of
the Republikanische Schutzbund. The new army’s ranks were filled with unemployed
industrial workers. The army’s leadership, despite including members of the Christian
Social Party and German nationalists, was primarily Social Democrats.257 The markedly
urban, Socialist complexion of Austria’s new army (the Volkswehr), complete with
soldiers’ councils (Soldatenräte), a hallmark of the Soviet Red Army, evoked trepidation
among conservative provincial officials and gave them cause to support the continuity of
their militia groups. The deputy major of Innsbruck and finance committee chairman of
the Tiroler Heimatwehr, Fritz Fischer, would liken the Volkswehr to “a red labor
union.”258
Another significant cause that prolonged the life of provincial militia groups that
would form the basis of the Heimwehren, was the fact that bands of Yugoslavian militants
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invaded southern Carinthia in an effort to ‘liberate’ its Slovene population. Carinthian
Heimatschutz groups and the Volkswehr, under the direction of provincial commander
(Landesbefehlshaber) General Ludwig Hügerth, cooperatively fought off the Yugoslav
invasion, though not without tension. Lieutenant Hans Steinacher, who recruited 200
volunteers from his former infantry regiment—K.u.k. Infantrieregiment Graf von
Khevenhüller Nr. 7 (Klagenfurt)—to join in the defense, for example, was particularly
hostile toward the “city slicker” Volkswehr troops. In his memoir he repeatedly refers to
them as worthless “Red Guards,” who demonstrated more interest in exploiting the
countryside than fighting the Yugoslavs.259 Despite an agreed ceasefire arbitrated by an
American mission sent to investigate, the Yugoslav force once more attacked on April 29,
1919, making only minor gains. An Austrian counter attack succeeded in pushing the
Yugoslav force back, south of the Drau, recovering Grafenstein and Völkermarkt.
Chancellor Renner, ordered Hülgerth—the future Landesführer of the Carinthian
Heimatschutz—to halt any further offensive operations in order to let the negotiations run
their course. Renner’s “defeatist” orders were promptly ignored and Hülgerth’s force
ejected the Yugoslavians from Carinthian soil all together, illustrating once again the
“general tension between Vienna and the provinces, characteristic of all of modern
Austrian history.”260
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The fighting in Carinthia was principal catalyst for the continuity of militia
formations in Carinthian and neighboring Styria.261 A May 1919 report estimated that
paramilitary formations existed in approximately 70 percent of Styria’s communities,
varying from 15 to 100 men, depending on the size of the community.262 Dr. Willibald
Brodmann, a regimental doctor in the Great War, established the first significant
paramilitary organization in Styria, the Untersteierischen Bauernkommandos (Lower
Styrian Peasant Squad). Brodmann was, according to Pauley, widely popular and “the
soul of the south Styrian resistance against Yugoslavian aggression.” His sudden death in
May 1922, at the age of 39, cut short his career as potentially the most influential
Heimwehr leader in Styria.263
In Tyrol, Social Democratic members of the Tyrolean Landtag balked that
Governor Stumpf’s refusal of the IMCC request to disband the Bürgerwehr, complaining
that his “mercenary army” was costing the state 2,500,000 kronen a year and would
bankrupt the state. Tiroler Volkspartei representatives responded by agreeing to disband
the Bürgerwehr only if the federal government disbanded the Volkswehr.264
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Bavarian Humiliation and the Creation of the Einwohnerwehr
The inability of Bavarians to suppress the radical Räterepublik on their own was
“a source of great humiliation” and the principal impetus propelling Hoffman and Gustav
von Kahr’s project of building a strong paramilitary organization in Bavaria.265 The early
vestiges of the Einwohnerwehr would emerge from small units of civilians such as that
from Rosenheim, commanded by Rudolf Kanzler, who took part in the first, failed
attempt to liberate Munich. Local bureaucrats, like Kanzler, played a leading role in
organizing volunteers into paramilitary militias. The other principal figure who would
emerge from this process was forestry officer, Georg Escherich, who recruited and
commanded a paramilitary unit in Isen and who would become the leader and principal
driver of the Einwohnerwehr movement.266 Escherich’s connections to the nobility, which
he established during his forestry studies, would get him a post as an organizer and
administrator in the Bialowies district of occupied Poland during the Great War. Through
this post, he came into contact with Quartermaster General, Erich Ludendorff, who came
to admire his “harsh though efficient” style. His post-war career as a lobbyist for wealthy,
landed aristocrats only expanded his network of influential contacts.267 These connections
would prove crucial in funding and organizing the Einwohnerwehr. With the support of
the federal government in Berlin, several Freikorps units had already been established in
Bavaria. Freikorps Epp, established by Colonel Franz Ritter von Epp, was comprised of
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junior officers, NCOs and soldiers and from his former unit (The Royal Bavarian Infantry
Lifeguards Regiment). Freikorps Oberland and Kanzler’s Freikorps Chiemgau were
among the other, larger formations organized.268
It is worth pointing out that the composition of Freikorps Chiemgau—as was the
case of most of the militias formed in Bavaria—was quite diverse, drawing from a range
of social strata, with Catholic peasants, demobilized soldiers, and university students
particularly prominent in filling out its ranks.269 Thus, the diversity of these formations
tended to give them a more conventional, conservative outlook that contrasted the “rigid
military organization and…grim fanaticism” displayed by the more radical, ultranationalist Prussian Freikorps units that have come to symbolize the movement in the
popular imagination.270 Nevertheless, in the same way Freikorps Chiemgau became a
founding component of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, those more radical elements of the
Freikorps would go on to serve as the hard core of the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA). And,
whereas the Nazis would attempt their own coup d’état in Munich in 1923, the
Einwohnerwehr worked hand-in-glove with the von Kahr government, serving as an
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auxiliary police and security force ensuring that revolutions like those taking place in
1918 and 1919 did not happen again.
Though the growth and development of the Einwohnerwehr paralleled fears of “a
resurgent Bolshevism,” it also reflected Bavarian separatism and a disdain for their
Prussian overlords. As Large explains, in the mind of many Bavarians, Prussia became
responsible for the war and, thus, all of their sufferings. At the war front, similar
resentment was echoed amongst Bavarians who saw themselves as having been
“exploited” by the Prussian General Staff for the benefit of Prussian troops. These
tensions remained palpable after the war, as representatives of the Bavarian People’s
Party declared prior to the opening of the provincial diet, “We are not going to tolerate
being ruled from Berlin in the future…We categorically reject the ruthless one-sided
Prussian domination.”271 Heimwehr leader, Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg, in his
memoir, similarly described the Bavarians as maintaining “an old and strong dislike for
Protestant Prussianism.”272 These were, however, simply the most recent episodes in a
long, strained relationship between Bavaria and Prussia, the roots of which extend as far
back as the Protestant Reformation.273 Turning to its alpine, Catholic neighbors in
Austria—as opposed to the Protestant north—is, therefore, not surprising. Large adds,
that “[w]hile Bavarians and Prussians eyed each other suspiciously, if not with mutual
contempt, Bavarians, Salzburger, Tyroleans, and Vorarlberger tended to see themselves as
belonging to a common alpine heritage, even to the same ‘racial stock.’”274 For good
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reason, Einwohnerwehr-Heimwehr cooperation evoked the suspicion of Berlin,
particularly regarding Bavarian intentions. German Consul General in Innsbruck, Hans
von Külmer, quizzed Tiroler Heimatwehr leader, Dr. Richard Steidle, as to the Bavarian
attitude toward the German Reich; Steidle assured him, perhaps somewhat
disingenuously, of their “absolute Loyaltät.”275

The Bavarian Einwohnerwehr—Clandestine Agent of Anschluss
The Einwohnerwehr-Heimwehr alliance was predicated upon two mutually
reinforcing motivations. First, it was intended to strengthen the position of Munich vis-àvis Berlin.276 As one Einwohnerwehr representative explained, “[t]he Bavarians need
above all support in their rear by the Tyroleans and Salzburgers if they should be forced
to march to the north.”277 The phrase, “if they (the Bavarians) should be forced to march
to the north” implied the possibility of the Einwohnerwehr marching on Berlin, which
many Bavarian conservatives viewed as being “entirely oriented towards the left.” The
strong anti-socialist reaction in Bavaria emerged in the aftermath of the Räterepublik,
infiltrated the Reichswehr. As Captain Ernst Röhm explained to Colonel a.D. Max
Bauer—adjutant to Erich Ludendorff and Kapp Putsch conspirator—in July 1922, the
German army headquartered in Bavaria “formed the true center of all nationalist
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organizations.”278 Bavarians harbored a longstanding dislike of Protestant Prussia and
came to see Berlin as a haven of unscrupulous leftist elements, beneath which communist
revolution could bubble to the surface. The dread of this potentiality prompted the second
motivation for the alliance between the Einwohnerwehr and the Heimwehr—the
continued belief that Marxist revolutionaries were lying in wait for the opportune time.
The best way to buttress the new “center of all nationalist organizations,” in
Munich, was the consolidation of resources. Despite being expressly forbidden in the
Treaty of Saint Germain, Anschluss (or unification) with Germany was strongly desired
by the vast majority of the Austrian population. Not content to simply abide by this edict,
the Einwohnerwehr-Heimwehr alliance was also guided by genuine pan-German
overtures. These sentiments were articulated quite clearly in the ceremonies surrounding
the controversial Landeschießen (provincial shooting contest), staged by the Tyrolean
Heimatwehr in November 1920. It was no coincidence that the shooting contest was held
at Berg Isel; it was the site of three important clashes in the 1809 Tyrolean uprising in
which Tyrolean militiamen defeated the French and Bavarian occupation forces. This also
presented a convenient venue for Tyrolean Volkspartei and the Tyrolean Heimatwehr to
emphasize the Landeschießen as an important foreign policy event.279 “We welcome the
fact that the former opponents of 1809 celebrate with us today firmly in peace a faithful
brotherhood,” reads a transcript of one speech.280 A report on the Landeschießen
concluded:
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As the sun of freedom, Tyrol induced the German people to a joint struggle against the
proud Corsicans, ever may this Landesschießen of the H.W.—on the blood-soaked
battlefield of the heroic struggles of Andreas Hofer and his death-defying heroes at Berg
Isel—embellish and further deepen the union of all German crests and begin working in
intimate collaboration between the Reiche and us, which has been ever successfully
inaugurated in Munich in the interests of the whole German people.281

Indeed, there was some truth behind Tyrolean Volkspartei contentions that the
Landeschießen was an important “foreign policy” gesture—one couched not just in
Tyrol’s tradition of civic militarism but also in a broader South German, Catholic
militarism, both of which having adopted a distinctly anti-Marxist hue.
Social Democrats were particularly outraged by the planned attendance of Escherich,
Kanzler, and units of the Einwohnerwehr. Social Democrat Landtag representative,
Martin Rappoldi explained the Tyrolean Heimatwehr “originally similar to earlier
shooting clubs, has lost their sporty character by way of the influence of Orgesch and
serve its monarchist purposes.”282 Thusly, Social Democrats vehemently opposed the
shooting festival on the grounds of the “counterrevolutionary and monarchist character”
of the Einwohnerwehr its Heimwehren functionaries. The Landesschießen, therefore,
constituted a “provocative monarchist demonstration” by what was little more than a
“monarchist mafia” colluding with the Bavarian Wittelsbach dynasty who was
“determined to shatter the German Reich, to drown the idea of unity in the blood of the
German nation.”283 The Social Democratic news organ, the Arbeiter-Zeitung, argued that
the reason for the shooting festival was, in fact, to test the “war capability” of the
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formations and their guns.284 Like the majority of articles published in both left and rightleaning news organs, the facts were sprinkled in amidst the indignant sensationalism.
Beyond the sharp criticism of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr and the Landesschießen, Social
Democrats armed Tyrolean workers and implemented a general railroad strike in order to
grind the rail system to a halt in effort to prevent the participation of the Bavarians. Train
engineers removed critical engine parts to prevent Heimatwehr emergency technical
assistance section (Technische Nothilfe) from restoring the rail system, while armed
workers occupied Innsbruck’s gas and electricity works. Despite the best efforts of the
Tyrolean Heimatwehr, who did manage to get the rail system working again on very
limited degree, the strike succeeded in preventing a sizable contingent of Einwohnerwehr
men from participating in the competition.285
To be sure, the Einwohnerwehr-Heimwehr coalition was not merely an alliance
between two paramilitary organizations, it served as a channel through which Munich—
with the blessing of Berlin—collaborated with provincial Austrian officials of politically
and culturally compatible Alpine provinces, to establish alternative paths toward
unification.286 Kanzler and a staff of liaison officers to Austria, functioned as “unofficial”
contacts between Austrian provincial governors and Munich, just as they did for between
the Heimwehren and the Einwohnerwehr. Their efforts, naturally, focused on those
bordering alpine Austrian provinces—Salzburg, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg.
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In the case of Tyrol, its Lieutenant Governor at the time, Dr. Franz Stumpf, who
was the driving force behind the creation of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, and colleague,
fellow Tyrolean Volkspartei member, Landtag (state parliament) representative, and
Landesführer of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, Dr. Richard Steidle, were the two most
influential proponents of Anschluss.287 Stumpf and Steidle, supported by a coalition of
pro-Anschluss Christian Social Party members and Großdeutsch Volkspartei
representatives within the Landtag, negotiated a general agreement in January 1921 that
was designed to bring Tyrol into Bavaria’s orbit in the event of Austria’s “dissolution.”
According to the agreement, the Tyrolean government was to inform Berlin of its
intentions, but work directly with the Bavarian government to secure any “neighborly
aid” needed. If Tyrol were invaded, Bavarian Freikorps units were to be sent in to aid in
its defense.288
This agreement was also intended to gage the Allied reaction to the development
and to determine if a gradual integration of Tyrol into Bavaria might be possible if
conditions in Austria continued to deteriorate. Steidle and the Tiroler Heimatwehr, did
what they could to expedite the unrest, threatening that:
if there is a conflict with Vienna, it is right on our side, because Vienna has caused our
misery. The Balkanization of Austria has proceeded from Vienna; In the last few days
there have been unscrupulous people exploiters, foreigners who have found a great
witches' sabbath around the market, and the death of the State.289

One can only make inferences based on the language of Foreign Ministry documents as
to the source of this “dissolution.” References to “enemy states” and the discussion of
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deploying armed force implies an organized foreign invasion. Moreover, Steidle’s alleged
“Balkanization of Austria” makes the “Little Entente,”—Romania, Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia—who threatened military action should Austria or Hungary return the
Habsburg dynasty to the throne or if Austria attempted unification with Germany, the
most likely candidate.290

Forging the “Ordnungsblock”
The Einwohnerwehr-Heimwehr “Ordnungsblock” was a reaction to Socialist
Revolutions in Austria and Germany in 1918 and was designed to oppose any future
communist coup attempts, as it proclaimed publicly at the Tyrolean Landeschießen:
1. To protect the constitution
2. To protect the people and their property
3. To support existing protective institutions (primarily Tyrolean police) in keeping
peace and order and in the event of natural disasters.
4. To defend the rights of everyone against any Leftist putsch attempts

The speeches delivered at the event—which was the first significant clash between the
Heimwehr movement and the Social Democrats—decried Marxist doctrine and the Social
Democratic Party. At the same time Escherich and the Heimatwehr leadership appealed to
workers, explaining that the Heimwehren were not against the workers, but rather their
Marxist leaders. He stressed that the Wehrmänner present were from all “Stände und
Berufsklassen” (segments and professions), were men young and old, university
professors, officers, workers, officials, and veterans.291
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Many of the poorly organized and equipped militias that had remained under arms
were retained by provincial governments for fear that the Social Democrats would use the
Volkswehr to initiate a communist revolution. The association established between the
Bavarian Einwohnerwehr and the Austrian Heimwehren provided essential capital,
weapons, and organizational support. Communications and transporting weapons from
Bavaria to the Landesleitung (state leadership) in various Austrian provinces, however,
proved difficult at times. As such, it required the organizations to utilize a variety of
methods—trucks, train car, as well as via the wagons of sympathetic peasants—to
transport arms. It also became clear that communications through the mail system were in
danger of interception by Social Democratic postal workers. As such, the Heimwehren
adopted “cover addresses” (Deckadressen), preventing interference and allowing them to
communicate through the mail.292
According to Kondert, it was the Bavarians who initially contacted the officials in
Salzburg. In the spring of 1919, Dr. Hans Oellacher began organizing volunteers for a
paramilitary unit in Salzburg, initially funded by Christian Social representative, Dr.
Heinrich Mataja and armed by Styrian sources. By the end of November, Oellacher’s
group had brokered an agreement with Escherich in which his group would send 400 men
to Bavaria in support of Escherich—and vice-versa—in the event of unrest. By February
1920, Kanzler attended the official founding of the Salzburger Heimwehrdienst and
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discussed more a more extensive alliance that would help the organization reorganize,
receive more extensive military training, and expand. Kanzler returned to Bavaria,
leaving 2,000 marks to aid the Salzburger Heimwehrdienst, which expanded dramatically
over the course of 1920.293 Throughout 1920 the Heimwehrdienst received numerous
loads of weapons transported from Bavaria by train and truck. Rape details some 1480
rifles, 110,200 rounds of rifle ammunition, 20 light and heavy machine guns, 35,200
rounds of machine gun ammunition, 4 telephones stations, 5 kilometers of telephone
wire, 50 pairs of boots, and 200 tunics.294
A month later in Kufstein, Tyrol, Kanzler met with Steidle, Stumpf, and Professor
Heinrich von Schullern, Chairman of the Andreas Hofer Bund. At this meeting it was
decided that the Tyrolean Heimatwehr would follow the general model of the
Einwohnerwehr, which was aligned with Bavaria’s administrative districts and
precincts.295 By June of 1920, the Einwohnerwehr had delivered 2110 rifles of various
types, two machine guns, five light machine guns, 106,000 rounds of rifle ammunition,
ten telephone stations with 20 kilometers of cable, and spare machine gun parts to the
Heimatwehr.296 In his memoir, Starhemberg admits having direct involvement in stealing
weapons from weapons depots around Innsbruck as well as being involved in trafficking
weapons across the Austro-Bavarian border during his time in Tyrol.297 In addition to the
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“generous material and moral support” they received thereafter, Einwohnerwehr leaders
and Bavarian officials provided the Tyrolean government with much-needed credit, trade,
food, raw materials, and supplies.298 Ahead of the Tyrolean Landeschießen, held in
November 1920, Steidle had expected to receive a load of 5,000 rounds of rifle
ammunition, machine gun ammunition, and pistols, but half of this shipment never
reached the Heimatwehr. The Inter-Allied Military Control Commission (IMCC), aided
by intelligence supplied by the Social Democratic Party, began deploying patrols on the
main roads that intersected the Bavarian-Austrian border. With some success, several
weapons shipments headed to the Salzburg and Tyrolean formations in the fall and winter
of 1920-21, were confiscated.299
The Einwohnerwehr and Heimwehren redoubled their efforts to keep these routes
open for weapons transportation. Closer communication between the two sides and
utilizing intelligence from sympathetic locals to help monitor the routes enabled weapons
shipments to resume by March 1921. Between March and June 1921, the Einwohnerwehr
successfully smuggled some 778 rifles, well over 50,500 rounds of rifle ammunition,
2,500 cartridges, and 1000 ammunition clips, 14 revolvers, 700 revolver cartridges, and
two crates of hand grenades. In total, despite the transportation challenges, the Tiroler
Heimatwehr received more arms and equipment than any other Austrian formation.300
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Einwohnerwehr representatives had made inroads into Vorarlberg as well, meeting with
officials in April 1920. Just two weeks after the founding of the Tiroler Heimatwehr, the
“Selbstschutzverband Vorarlberg” was officially founded.301 In July 1920, the Vorarlberg
organization received 200 carbine rifles with 53,000 rounds of ammunition, four
telephone stations with 10 kilometers of phone cable from Bavaria. Thereafter, police
reports from districts throughout Vorarlberg documented the proliferation of arms from
Bavaria. For example, an August 1920 police report from Bregenz, a small cache of 60
rifles, a machine gun, and ammunition had been smuggled into across the Bavarian
border. In another case, police reports from the village of Hittisau documented three
wagons full of weapons and ammunition being deposited and held at an inn in Krumbach.
Police in the community of Lingenau reported a delivery of 6,000 pounds of rifles,
ammunition, and hand grenades.302 The Selbstschutzverband received another 500 rifles
and 25,000 rounds of ammunition in October 1920. In early June 1921, Rape notes, 300
more rifles, an additional 34,875 rounds of rifle ammunition, 3,250 rounds of machine
gun ammunition, 8,180 ammunition clips, 80 steel helmets, seven munitions crates, and
seven ammunition belts arrived from Bavaria.303
The Austrian-Yugoslavian border dispute over the Slovene-populated areas of
south Carinthia offered a logical incentive for a standing Heimwehr organization. Here
too, Kanzler and its deputies played a central role in bringing the Carinthian
Heimatschutz to fruition. Not only that, in days leading up to the October 1920 plebiscite
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to determine the fate of the two disputed zones, they directed a pro-Austrian propaganda
campaign in each zone. “Zone A” was occupied by Yugoslavian troops, so these activities
were necessarily clandestine and carried out via “advisory councils,” that persuaded
residents to vote that the zone remain Austrian. After the successful conclusion of the
plebiscite, these resources turned their attention to recruiting and obtaining arms for the
Heimatschutz with equal success.304
Even in provinces where the connection between the Einwohnerwehr and the
Heimwehren was not as strong still received arms and assistance. The Upper Austrian
Heimwehren, for instance, received roughly the same number of arms as the Vorarlberger
Selbstschutzverband, but needed some 6,000 rifles to equip their members.305 Most of
those arms went to groups around the westernmost Innviertel (Inn Quarter) of the
province.306 Despite the refusal of some Styrian paramilitary leaders—particularly the
anti-clerical faction under Walter Pfrimer—to join Kanzler’s organization, he worked
with Governor Anton Rintelen and Lieutenant Governor Jakob Ahrer to cobble together a
cooperative agreement between the two main paramilitary organizations in the
province.307 The Einwohnerwehr is known to have delivered 1,000 Mannlicher rifles,
100,000 rounds of ammunition to the Rintelen-Ahrer organization in Graz in November
1920.308
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In July 1920, Escherich and Kanzler hosted the leaders of the various provincial
Heimwehren in Munich “to gather into a single organization all elements who ‘wish to
take up the struggle against Bolshevism by upholding the constitution and by maintaining
order in the state.’” Steidle proposed to the other Heimwehr leaders present that the
Austrian formations be under Bavarian, specifically Kanzler’s, direction.309 The other
Heimwehr leaders agreed with Steidle’s proposal and accepted Bavarian leadership. By
the end of October 1920, the reach of the Einwohnerwehr even extended into Vienna and
Lower Austria, as Kanzler arbitrated an agreement with the retired Field Marshall, Josef
Metzger, head of the Selbstschutzverband Wien und Niederösterreich (Self-Defense
League of Vienna and Lower Austria).
Indeed, between 1920 and 1923, the Austrian Heimwehr movement received an
extensive volume of weapons, military supplies, and equipment from Bavarian
sources.310 British Foreign Ministry records document frequent transactions of weapons
over the Austro-Bavarian border.311 By contrast, German Foreign Office records note
only one, occurring on November 29, 1920, illustrating either the general success of
Bavarian and Einwohnerwehr leaders at keeping federal officials “in the dark” regarding
their clandestine operations, or the blind-eye federal officials turned toward
Einwohnerwehr activities.312 The latter is more likely the case given the keen interest
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Austrian Social Democrats took in exposing this weapons smuggling network. As
Kondert indicates, numerous writings of Social Democratic representatives leveed
accusations that the Heimwehren were being supplied by international counterrevolutionary elements.313 Provincial party newspapers also documented Social
Democratic complaints of the Heimwehren smuggling weapons from Bavaria.314 In total,
it has been estimated that between 1920 and 1923, the Austrian Heimwehr movement
received some 2,500,000 infantry rifles, 130,000 light machine guns, 3,000 heavy
machine guns, artillery pieces, howitzers, and cannons, as well as 30 airplanes, from
Bavaria.315 If Rape’s calculation is correct, these figures represented about 90 percent of
the Heimwehr movement’s weapons stores.316
Though the stamp of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr on the Heimwehr movement
was clear, some of these similarities reflected a common Catholic, South German
worldview. Like the Heimwehren, the Einwohnerwehr drew inspiration from a similar
tradition of civic militarism, one rooted in Bavaria’s shared militia tradition, derived from
hunting and sport shooting clubs throughout the state.317 As Large notes,
The cult of the Schiessstände also embodied the Bavarian peasantry's traditional hostility
toward standing armies and official state militarism. The shooting societies stood for a
different kind of militarism: not that of the well-disciplined and tightly organized modern
military machine, but a kind of home-grown, populistic, Lederhosen militarism, which
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favored extreme decentralization, election of officers from within the ranks, the continued
reliance on primitive weapons and styles of combat.318

This was the very same style of civic militarism its Alpine Austrian neighbors had long
nurtured and the Heimwehr movement embodied. Paradoxically, however, both
paramilitary formations materialized with the oversight of their respective provincial
governments and were intended to serve as auxiliary forces for the police and, in
emergency situations, the military. As such, both claimed to be “non-political”
organizations of “patriotic” volunteers, despite their openly anti-Marxist dispositions. As
chapter three will illustrate, this “non-political,” open membership policy that served the
Heimwehr movement so well in its formative years, would ultimately prove to be its
Achilles’ heel.
While booth organizations worked hand-in-glove with the state and local
governments, they also received significant portions of their funding from private
sources, particularly, industrialists and declassed nobles; in relation to the Heimwehren,
this will be covered in depth in chapter four. It is unclear how much money the
Heimwehren received from Bavarian sources or if those funds were funneled through the
Einwohnerwehr or arranged independently, though the latter seems unlikely given the
extent of control the Escherich and Kanzler exercised in other aspects of the
organizations’ relationship. Archival sources indicate that the Salzburger Heimwehren,
for instance, received a monthly stipend of 10,000 marks beginning in March 1920,
which was increased to 12,000 marks in July 1920 due to the growth of the outfit.319

318

Large, The Politics of Law and Order, 42-3.
Protokoll vom 1.April 1920. Akten der Organisation Kanzler, ehemaliges NSDAPHauptarchiv, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, NS 26/vorl. 649, cited in Rape, Die österreichischen Heimwehren, 94.
319

130

According to Kondert, Social Democratic sources contended that Steidle had received
80,000 marks from German “monarchists” to purchase weapons, supplies, and
equipment, however, this claim has never been substantiated by archival sources.320
Similarly, German Foreign Ministry documents claimed that the Tyrolean Heimatwehr
had been receiving 14,000 marks per month, as of the spring 1921, which does not appear
to be have been substantiated through Einwohnerwehr records.321 It seems unlikely,
however, that the Salzburg formations would have been the only to receive any sort of
monthly remuneration outside of that which was Kanzler distributed to the Heimwehren
to pay his staff in the various Austrian provinces.322 To this end, the movement’s official
history, Heimatschutz in Österreich, the Tyrolean Heimatwehr was entirely dependent on
Bavarian subsidies in its infancy.323 However, as Edmondson notes, foreign subsidies had
been dramatically reduced by the end of 1921.324
There were also many similarities in the social composition of their membership,
both groups attracting a broad range of socioeconomic groups with a high number of
former officers, civil servants, and middle class professionals serving in leadership
positions.325 Of the 26 members of Kanzler’s staff in Austria, for instance, 13 were
former army officers.326 Similarly, throughout the Austrian Heimwehren, former officers
held a high percentage of leadership positions, particularly as organizers and trainers of
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its various Sturmtruppen (storm troops) and Jägerbatallion (rifle battalion) combat units.
As chapter four will illustrate, only elected officials outnumbered former army officers in
the leadership of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr.
Moreover, both frequently functioned as strike breakers, intimidating workers into
breaking off labor stoppages and, in other cases, getting trains, buses, and utilities back
up and running, thereby weakening the position of strikers. Like the Einwohnerwehr, the
Heimwehren established special technical assistance groups (Technischen Nothilfe)
intended to cancel out the paralyzing effects of general strikes by temporarily keeping
public transportation and basic utilities online. In doing so, it blunted the most significant
weapon in the Social Democrats’ arsenal.327 The relationship between the Bavarian
Einwohnerwehr and the Heimwehren were close-knit on many levels, particularly with
Austria’s western-most provinces. Heimwehr leaders quickly developed relations with

Horthy’s Hungary: The other side of the Ordnungsblock
With the ascent to power of the Hungarian Communist Party, many Hungarian
conservatives fled to Vienna to escape the Red Terror. Amongst them were individuals
who would figure prominently in Horthy’s regime, such as Gyula Gömbös, Anton Lehár,
István Bethlen. Bethlen, in particular, would play an important role in fostering a
transnational counter-revolutionary block. While a refugee in Vienna in the spring of
1919, he established the Anti-Bolshevik Committee, which met at the palace of Karl von
Schönborn-Buckheim.328 It was at this same time that Kanzler established contact with
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these men, who, upon the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, returned to
Hungary and filled high-ranking positions in the Hungarian government.329
Hungarian contact with Austrian counter-revolutionaries began in 1919, most
likely after the Horthy government took power. A November 1919 article in the Vienna
newspaper, Neues Wiener Journal, reported that the “foreign club” operated out of the
palace of former Habsburg foreign minister, Count Leopold Brechtold. “At the top of the
company stands the former Imperial Economic Director, Imperial Councilor (Karl
Freiherr von) Priles(z)ky,” the report contends. The “Wiener Kasino,” was a wealthy
social club for international aristocrats, businessmen, artists, and scholars, modelled on
similar clubs in London, Paris, and other “international cities,” was also a front for a
clandestine organization known as the “Association for Law and Order.”330 Prileszky, a
Hungarian noble, would have naturally been well-connected in Hungarian aristocratic
circles, which were prominent supporters of Horthy’s government. According to
Hungarian historian Lajos Kerekes, the Hungarian Embassy in Vienna made contact with
the Wiener Kasino in January 1920. Hungarian officials offered the organization
substantial material and financial assistance if it 1) agreed to overthrow of the Social
Democratic government in power at that time, 2) establish a conservative authoritarian
government, and 3) relinquish any claims to the Burgenland, which was formerly a part
of Hungary.331 It is important to note that priest, leader of the Christian Social Party, and
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future Chancellor of Austria, Ignaz Seipel, a member of the Wiener Kasino, was a key
figure in these negotiations. The sum of 10,000,000 Hungarian crowns was distributed to
Prince Johann von Lichtenstein, a leading organizer of the Wiener Kasino.332
In order to bring about such a concession of power from Chancellor Renner’s
government, a strong, organized paramilitary organization would be needed; in Seipel’s
mind, the Heimwehr movement was the ideal candidate. In March 1920, he provided an
estimate to Hungarians officials that projected roughly 50,000,000 Austrian crowns
would be needed to build the Heimwehren into such an organization. In the months that
followed, significant funds from Hungarian sources poured into the reserves of Metzger’s
Selbstschutzverband Niederösterreich und Wien.333 This occurred, of course, at this same
time the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr was actively working with Austrian provincial
officials and paramilitary formations to organize, train, and arm Heimwehren units. The
subordination of the Heimwehren to the Einwohnerwehr necessarily brought Kanzler into
the scheming for a right-wing putsch.334 It is also worth noting that Colonel a.D. Max
Bauer, Ludendorff’s adjutant, had become involved in the Wiener Kasino-Hungarian
putsch planning. It is unclear as to how, precisely, Bauer entered into these discussions,
though it is well-known that after the failure of the Kapp Putsch, those involved fled to
Bavaria and into Austria and Hungary. In doing so, Bauer spent some time in Vienna and
Budapest, cultivating relationships with both Austrian and Hungarian counter-
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revolutionary organizations. It was most likely through these channels that he became
involved.335
During these meetings, held in the summer of 1920, various approaches were
discussed, all of which envisaged Hungary undertaking the lion’s share of the financial
responsibility; an apparently meager price to pay to keep the Burgenland Hungarian. In
the midst of their planning, Renner resigned as Chancellor, paving the way for a
conservative Christian Social-German National coalition government and a parliamentary
majority in the first general election held in October 1920. With the Social Democrats
ousted and subdued in the minority, the usefulness of a coup had expired.336 Nevertheless,
the Hungarians still fearful of the potential of Austrian Social Democrats, continued to
funnel a monthly stipend of 2,000,000 Hungarian crowns to the Heimwehren formations
until the autumn of 1921, when it became clear that the Burgenland was not to remain
Hungarian.
Large contends, however, that Hungarian support “continued well into the
twenties, despite disappointments in the Burgenland dispute and Austrian foreign policy,”
but offers no specific source corroborating this claim.337 Kerekes explains that the Horthy
government had maintained contact with the Heimwehren among other on the
“österreichischen äußersten Rechten,” but stops short of saying that they continued to
fund the Heimwehren.338 If Hungarian money did continue to flow into the coffers of the
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Heimwehr movement it most likely did so through sympathetic private donors or came in
the form of irregular contributions, as there is no evidence of consistent contributions
from Hungarian sources.
Historians estimate that between 1919 and 1921, Hungary had been the main
financial backer of the Heimwehr movement, and Bavaria its main supplier of arms and
military equipment—a clear indication of the centrality of Austria and its paramilitary
organizations to the cooperative efforts of the counter-revolutionary right in Central
Europe.339 The apparent halt in Hungarian funds, at the same time, demonstrates the
subservience of transnational anti-Marxist cooperation to nationalist geopolitical realities
in Central Europe. The collapse of the Austro-German cooperation reiterates this point.

The Collapse of the Ordnungsblock
Despite the immense volume of weapons, equipment, and organizational support
the Einwohnerwehr supplied the Heimwehren, grumblings emerged both within
Kanzler’s staff as well as amongst Heimweheren leaders. Those in Austria’s eastern
provinces complained about the “special status” the westernmost states of Tyrol,
Vorarlberg, and Salzburg enjoyed with the Einwohnerwehr. These grievances mirrored
the grumbling of Kanzler’s staff members assigned to the various provinces to his chief
in Austria. All signs indicate that Major a.D. August Hörl, Kanzler’s staff leader, oversaw
the distribution of weapons and equipment to the various Heimwehren. His appraisal of
the political state in the various provinces factored into which were ‘favored’ over others.
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Captain Herbert von Oberwurzer, stationed in Upper Austria, and Major Max von
Wandesleben, in Vienna, voiced complaints of favoritism, the former writing that, while
the southwestern provinces received all the weapons, the rest got “nothing but promises.”
To Wandesleben’s protests, Hörl explained that Vienna was “prone to fall to Bolshevism,
and that it would serve the Viennese right as they were doing nothing against it.”340
Indeed, the continued uncertainty over Austria’s viability as an independent state factored
greatly into such logic. Carinthia and Styria, for their part, were awash with arms and
military support from the border conflicts with the Yugoslavian military, so their reliance
on the Einwohnerwehr for weapons and monetary support was less immediate.341 This
left most of the Upper Austrian, Viennese, and Lower Austrian groups to languish without
the requisite arms, explaining why the Heimwehr movement did not mature in these
provinces until later in the decade.
As a covert instrument of Anschluss, a chief propagator of pan-German
Paramilitarism, and leading obstructionist of IMCC operations, the Entente pressure to
‘dissolve’ the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr became too great and Bavaria’s recalcitrant
President, Gustav von Kahr, finally caved in June 1921—a year after the Allies had first
demanded its disarmament.342 What resulted from its dissolution was the decentralization
of Bavaria’s network of local paramilitary formations. The heart and soul of the
Einwohnerwehr organization was in its centralized hierarchy. Now beheaded, its
constituent parts—local paramilitary units—were left to their own course of action,
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which meant most devolved back into the localized civil defense groups from which they
began.343
The dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr opened the door to more radical, völkisch
paramilitary elements, which emerged into the vacuum left in its wake.344 The void left
by Einwohnerwehr was filled, principally by an organization born from its ranks, but far
more openly radical in its pan-German, völkisch outlook, called Organisation Pittinger
after its leader, Sanitätsrat (health inspector) Dr. Otto Pittinger. Unlike Escherich and
Kanzler whose nationalism was tempered by their fondness for the institution of
monarchy and Bavarian particularism, Pittinger was a strident anti-Semite, maintaining a
völkisch, ultra-nationalist Weltanschauung (worldview); his organization followed suit.345
Indeed, the openly pan-Germanist political agitation of Pittinger’s organization, renamed
Bund Bayern und Reich, quickly strained relations with influential Christian Social and
monarchist leaders, both within and close to the Heimwehren, who held fast to the
“Austrian Idea” and preferred Austrian independence over unification and subordination
to the Protestant North.346 As a result, clear tensions emerged between segments of
Austria’s two main bourgeois parties, the Christian Social Party and the Pan-German
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People’s Party, as well as within and amongst the provincial Heimwehren. A letter to
Reichstag representative Dr. Max Pfeiffer, from Dr. Hans Wohlmannstetter of the
Ministry of Economic Affairs, in April 1921, captured this disposition as it related to the
Tyrol:
the mass of the population seems generally favorable to the vote for Germany, but are
strongly influenced by the doubts and concerns dominant in leading academic circles.
The decisive factor in many circles is, first and foremost, the hardship of the women of
the clergy. This clearly stands in opposition to the idea of unification. Even though the
majority (of the clergy) are cautious and reserved, the opinion of the leaders of the clergy
is much more pronounced, and widely known. The reasons for this attitude are, in part,
monarchist-dynastic; on the other hand, considerable anxiety arises against the Reich,
which is supposedly dominated by the Protestant Prussians.347

In October 1921 Styrian Lieutenant Governor, Jakob Ahrer, expressed concern over the
growing influence of “radical Reich German elements.” Ahrer called an urgent meeting
of leading Christian Social Heimwehr members from each of the provinces, which took
place on October 29 in Salzburg. Ahrer saw the Bavarians as being behind the ideological
split of the Styrian Heimatschutz, complaining that a “united bourgeois front can no
longer be observed.” As Steidle notes in his report on the meeting, the Christian Social
faction of the Styrian Heimatschutz wanted nothing more to do with Major Hörl,
Kanzler’s—and, later, Pittinger’s—chief of staff in Austria, whom Ahrer “addressed
formally as the ‘evil spirit.’”348
This opinion of Major Hörl was not isolated to Ahrer. The Upper Austrian
representative at the meeting, Dr. Rudolf Reisetbauer, added to the indictment of the “evil
spirit,” complaining that their political activism for Anschluß was too radical and stirred
unrest. He continued, with particular distress over the radicalism exhibited by the German
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paramilitary outfit in Vienna called “Brigade Wandesleben,” under the direction of Major
Max von Wandesleben, an associate of Ludendorff’s. The conditions for the Heimwehren
in Upper Austria were “very distressing,” as moderate Christian Social governor, Prelate
Dr. Johann Nepomuk Hauser, maintained a reasonably cooperative relationship with
Upper Austria’s Social Democrats. Christian Socials predominated the Upper Austrian
Heimwehren in 1921, as pan-Germanist and Legitimist sentiments were weak.349 The
strength of the Christian Socials in Upper Austria might be attributable to the fact that
Hauser opposed any sort of collusion with Bavarian elements.350
Similar concerns existed amongst Vorarlberg’s Christian Social leaders. The
growing influence of Großdeutsch elements was also evident in Vorarlberg. Dr. Josef
Feuerstein—a dedicated Christian Social—explained, however, that “Landesführer,
Stefan Kohler from Bregenz, is a very popular man, he belongs to the Christian Social
Party, but also enjoys the full confidence of the Greater Germany Party.” Feuerstein
characterization of Kohler as an able administrator, but not a politician, perhaps worked
in his favor in gaining the trust of both sides and maintaining a comparatively unified
front.351
The Carinthian Heimatschutz, Dr. Ignaz Tschurtschenthaler reported, was “for the
most part in the hands of Pan-Germans.” However, he indicated that existing local
Heimwehr groups were well-organized and that Christian Socialists were slowly gaining
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ground.352 Landesrat Wilhelm Scherntaner described the Heimwehren in Salzburg as in a
“satisfactory” condition, with the Zell am See district having been the best organized.
Moreover, he added that relations between pan-Germanist and Christian Social elements
were good. Deutsch-Freiheitliche Partei (German Freedom Party) representative and
Landesführer, Dr. Anton Christoph was an important linchpin in maintaining good
relations between the Pan-Germanist and Christian Social Party, as he was trusted by both
factions.353
In Tyrol, Steidle briefly noted, a united front had been maintained between PanGerman and Christian Social circles.354 Steidle, having received substantial arms and
funding from Escherich and Pittinger, maintained a warmer relationship with both than
most other Heimwehr leaders and became the Heimwehr representative to Munich. Based
on Steidle’s report of the October 1921 meeting, it was only in Styria and Upper Austria
that the circumstances seemed especially bleak. The situation in the former is more
understandable when placed in context. The Rintelen-Ahrer faction based in Graz, had
Dr. Walter Pfrimer’s völkisch, anti-clerical faction to the north, to which it had been
hostile. With Pittinger’s takeover of Kanzler’s organization, the Rintelen-Ahrer faction
now had to deal with an equally unfiltered völkisch, ultra-nationalist organization in the
role of its patron. The sour circumstances in Upper Austria, however, stemmed from
Governor Hauser’s hostility toward Bavarian collusion, coupled with the general failure
of Bavarian suppliers to make good on their promises of arms and equipment.
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The misgivings voiced by Christian Social Heimwehr leaders were expressed in a
meeting held on Sunday, March 19, 1922 between the Landesleitung of the Tyrolean
Heimatwehr and the Oberleitung of Organisation Pittinger. Steidle’s agenda for the
meeting made clear the desire of the Heimwehren leaders for more frequent and discrete
communication between Munich and the Austrian Heimwehren in order to avoid
information being leaked to newspapers. The agenda also expresses their desire for
Pittinger’s lieutenants to refrain from the radical Pan-German political agitation and the
“tactless” attacks the House of Habsburg, which did more harm than good, alienating the
legitimist elements of the Austrian right. Steidle stressed, “the Heimwehr wants to
organize not politicize.” Steidle offered the same message to the Greater German
People’s Party leadership in January 1922, but with a markedly different tone. “The
Heimwehr is, and will be, only a tool for the maintenance of peace and order; it has
nothing to do with party politics, and will oppose taking up such a thing from all sides,
with all of its power.” he warned.355
Their grievances fell upon deaf ears and the factionalism amongst the
Heimwehren became even more defined. This, in turn, would cause further chaos
amongst the various organizations in Bavaria that were jockeying for the allegiance of the
Austrian formations. The distressed Christian Social factions abandoned Pittinger’s
organization, turning, ironically, to Ludendorff and Bauer.356 The message of the
Christian Social members to Bauer was echoed in a communication back to Ludendorff
in Munich, explaining that Pittinger’s “untruthfulness, secretiveness and well-aimed

355
356

TLA: Landesleitung der SSV (Tirol), I/1, fol.410, 316-319, 393.
Carsten, Fascist Movements, 56.

142

villany” had prompted the undoing of the alliance.357 Thus, the Heimwehren began
dividing along political lines, fraying the very delicate balance the movement needed if it
was going to grow into the powerful anti-Marxist bulwark in Central Europe its creators
originally envisioned. Among the first of the Austrian organizations to fracture was
Metzger’s Selbstschutzverband, as the nationalist faction broke off and formed the
Deutscher Wehrbund (German Defense League), led by former k.u.k. general, Alfred
Krauss and aligned with Pittinger.358 Conversely, Krauss wrote of Bauer, the new
Christian Social champion, that he was “the greatest enemy of the German people and of
Austria.”359 The divisiveness between the various Bavarian groups was more acute than
those within the Heimwehren but brought about division amongst the latter nonetheless.
Efforts to unify the Heimwehren on a national scale found only limited success. The
formation of the “Alpine Club” in January 1923 indicated that the clear majority of the
Heimwehren groups in Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Salzburg, Upper Austria, and Carinthia
maintained allegiance to Pittinger. Carsten, painting with a broad brush, contends that this
bloc was representative of the strength of the Großdeutsche sentiment within the
Heimwehr movement, and offers an indication of why so many of its ranks would
eventually defected to the Nazi SA when it they saw the tide shifting in Austria toward
National Socialism. Conversely, by 1923, Bauer and Ludendorff had maneuvered more
tactfully and had gained the cooperation of strongly Christian Social and monarchist
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formations and was strongest amongst the with the formations in Vienna, Lower Austria,
and Styria.360
Ultimately, multiple factors combined to condemn the transnational
Ordnungsblock. As noted above, Hungarian subsidies for the Heimwehren dried up in the
winter of 1921-22. The political agitation of Bund Bayern und Reich quickly became a
source of irritation for Heimwehr leaders attempting to preserve bourgeois unity.
Moreover, its agitation for Anschluss caused friction with pro-independence and
monarchist segments of the Heimwehr movement as well as their supporters in the
Austrian government. The growing tension between the two sides led to proindependence circles actively undermining the Anschluss activism of their Bavarian
counterparts. An October 3, 1921 memo from German General Consul in Innsbruck, Fritz
von Gebsattel to the Foreign Office in Berlin, warned of misinformation leaked to the
French government by “local monarchist circles,” which revealed a scheme in which
Tyrol would join Germany as an independent state with Steidle as its president.361
While a Steidle presidency was most likely misinformation, the favor for a TyroleanBavarian union, by this time, had indeed shifted. Steidle and the Tyrolean Heimatwehr
appear to have been central to this change in direction. In another memo from Gebsattel
to Berlin, “Dr. Steidle and leading circles of the Heimatwehr are certainly not thinking of
a union of Tirol with Bavaria, rather they are seeking unification of Tyrol with the
German Reich as an independent federal state.” Gebsattel adds, citing a conversation with
Steidle, who explained that
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In the event of a catastrophe in Vienna, we will first declare the independence of Tyrol.
However, we are thinking of an economic partnership with Bavaria, with the removal of
customs barriers that separate us from Germany. Governor, Dr. Stumpf, is also of this
point of view.362

Tyrolean patriotism also factored into this shift. In 1809, Tyroleans had rebelled against
their Bavarian rulers, to whom Napoleon had gifted the province for their loyalty to
France in the War of the Third Coalition. Voluntarily submitting Tyrol to Bavarian rule
would have, thus, undermined the deeds of their forefathers. In a subsequent letter,
Gebsattel explained, “A proud, self-confident, and conservative people, like the Tyrolese,
who are so rigidly strong in all their institutions, whose ancestors as the first among the
Germans to try to shake off the Napoleonic yoke, and are now again at the head of a
national movement, would surely not be able to give up their own political life, to
renounce any sort of self-government and to go wholly into another state.”363
A 1923 article by journalist Sigmund Münz, illustrated this shift in attitude, “A
prominent German diplomat said to me lately: ‘While two years ago more than ninety per
cent of the population of the Tyrol was in favor of annexation to Germany, today perhaps
not more than twenty-five per cent could be found to favor a union with Bavaria.’ It
should be emphasized that the Tyrol has turned against Bavaria in particular, but not
against Germany as a whole.”364 While pan-Germanism was a powerful force in shaping
the political climate in Austria and Germany, as the Bavarian and Tyrolean cases show,
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regionalisms offered strong resistance, complicating and limiting the extent to which panGerman ideals guided the agendas of the Einwohnerwehr and Heimwehr movements.
Perhaps the main way pro-independence circles worked against pan-German radicals,
however, was by cultivating a relationship between like-minded Austrian industrialists
and Heimwehr leaders.365 Seipel and Styria Lieutenant Governor, Jakob Ahrer, were two
central figures that worked to connect the Heimwehren with domestic patrons, in hopes
that it would curb the general Großdeutsch disposition of the movement. This strategy,
taking advantage of the existing strains in the Bavarian-Heimwehren relations, proved
effective, demonstrating, once more, the limits of pan-German nationalism.

Conclusions
The collaboration of the counter-revolutionary governments and organizations in
Central Europe cannot be properly understood without realizing the impact of the First
World War on the region. Military defeat caused the fall of the Habsburg and
Hohenzollern dynasties that ruled Central Europe. Within the footprint of these empires
remained but "shatter zones," which Gerwarth describes as “large tracts of territory where
the disappearance of frontiers created spaces without order or clear state authority.”366 In
these spaces the absence of “clear state authority,” combined with inflation,
unemployment, and food and material scarcity creating a social and political climate
susceptible to radicalism of all persuasions. The cognitive dissonance that developed
amongst the officer corps of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies in the immediate
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aftermath of the Great War, created an alternate reality in which the Central Powers were
“undefeated in the field,” only to fall to a “stab-in-the-back” from Judeo-Bolshevik
revolutionaries on the home front.
This myth would prove to be a potent mobilizing force for demobilized officers
who returned home to “mobs” waving red communist flags, fellow officers being beaten
by soldiers and demonstrators or having their war medals and rosettes torn from their
tunics and caps.367 Inflation reduced officers’ pensions to a starvation wage and
unemployment reduced them to standing in bread lines. In such conditions, manufactured
notions of sinister communist Jews pulling the rug from beneath their feet seemed
plausible amidst the deteriorating economic conditions juxtaposed with the general
success of Jews in white-collar professions. The resultant, general anti-Semitic outlook
reinforced these ideas. As one author wrote of Austria in 1922:
It is pointed out that the Jews possess nearly everything worth having in Austria. They
own all the newspapers except one little clerical sheet, and therefore they control public
opinion. They made practically all the money during the war; they comprise the majority
of the medical and legal professions; they control the banks; indeed, they are allpowerful. This, I am told, is particularly true in Vienna.368

In the “culture of defeat” that consumed Central Europe, reconstituting their soiled
national pride became something of a quest, and in a sense, a continuity of the war, an
opportunity finish what they had started in 1914, by righting the wrongs propagated in
these illusions and remedying the ills—Marxism, parliamentary democracy, capitalism,
Jewish profiteering, the injustices of the Versailles “diktat,” and the like—of their
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societies. Hungarian social scientist and émigré, Oskar Jászi, captured this mentality quite
lucidly and with chilling accuracy, writing in 1923 that
Hungary today, in her mutilated form, is a country incapable of existence. All serious
economic and social reforms must await the restoration of her historic frontiers.
Therefore, it must be Hungary's sole endeavor to create an efficient army and to get
powerful allies for the new war which will come within a short time.369

A principal vehicle through which they pursued this quest was the paramilitary movement
that had emerged throughout the region, originally out of necessity, but that remained out
of fear of communist revolution, and later, as an instrument of political force.
Indeed, attempts and fleeting successes of communist revolutionaries to
overthrow the republics across Central Europe only served to verify the “Dolchstoß
mythologie” (stab-in-the-back mythology). By the beginning of 1919, reports of the
brutality of Bolshevik “Red Terror” were well-known in Central Europe; these stories
became reality for some Hungarians under the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic. At
the same time, German “Spartacists” attempted—with some success in Munich, at
least—to seize power in Prussia and Bavaria, while Viennese communist cells were
planning their own putsch attempt, which were snuffed out before they materialized. The
tide of communism in Central Europe, however, was checked with ruthless efficiency by
nationalist paramilitary groups such as Horthy’s National Army and the German
Freikorps.
The numerous redrawn borders at the Paris Peace Conference also gave
significant impetus to rise of Paramilitarism in Central Europe. Hungary’s periphery was
awash with bloody fighting, as Bela Kun’s government stubbornly refused to comply
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with the Allied award of historically Hungarian land to the new Czechoslovakian and
Yugoslavian states, Romania, and Austria. At same time, Germany’s contested eastern
borderlands of East Prussia, Pomerania, and Upper Silesia were the sites of violent
clashes with Polish fighters. In Austria, fighting in southern Carinthia and Styria broke
out when Yugoslavian troops attempted to seize control and annex these areas due to their
sizable Slavic populations. The border disputes throughout Central Europe were
expressions of the festering national resentments, as the territorial secessions were
viewed as insult piled onto injury, a betrayal of the ideal of national self-determination
Wilson pontificated in his Fourteen Points.
The success of paramilitary formations in squashing communist insurrection and
defending national borders guaranteed the quasi-official, volunteer groups a future in
Central Europe. The largest and most-organized paramilitary organization was the
Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, who armed and organized the Heimwehr movement in Austria.
The Einwohnerwehr-Heimwehren alliance established in 1920, formed a strong antiMarxist, civil defense force that also functioned as a quasi-official channel of
communication and coordination between both the organizations and Bavarian and
Austrian officials. While, the Einwohnerwehr was building up the provincial
Heimwehren, Hungarian representatives initiated contact with the monarchist Wiener
Kasino organization and offered finance a coup d’état to overthrow of the Socialist
government in Vienna. Among the potential putschists were Heimwehr leaders in Vienna
and Lower Austria, who agreed that the Heimwehren would be the perfect instruments for
the coup. Accepting Horthy’s offer, financial support poured in from the Hungarian
government throughout 1920 and 1921. The establishment of the Austrian Heimwehr
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movement was the crowning achievement of transnational counter-revolutionary
collaboration in Central Europe during the first-half of the 1920s.
The ulterior motives of their Bavarian and Hungarian patrons proved to be the
undoing of their collective efforts. Underpinning Bavarian support for the Heimwehren
was the broad distrust of the Social-Democrat-laden government in Berlin. Building up
and subordinating paramilitary outfits in bordering Austrian provinces was an imperative,
should the Bavarian formations need to advance on the capital city. Moreover, German
and Austrian provincial officials planned for an alternative contingency. Should the
Austrian government collapse, Bavaria would, in effect, annex its neighboring provinces
(Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Salzburg, and perhaps even Upper Austria). The popular desire for
Anschluss made this an attractive possibility, at least initially. The dissolution of the
Einwohnerwehr, however, and the influx of competing, radical-right elements into
Austria triggered destructive factionalism amongst both the Bavarian organizations and
Austrian Heimwehren. At the same time, Hungarian support for the Heimwehr movement
was predicated on its desire to have a similar, conservative, authoritarian government
installed in Austria, but also retain the Burgenland, which was about to be ceded to
Austria in yet another territorial secession outlined at the Paris Peace Conference. When
it became clear that neither of their aims would come to fruition, the monthly
disbursements to the Heimwehren (for the purpose of overthrowing the democratic
government) ended.
Though historians of the Heimwehr movement explain that the Bavarian and
Hungarian right offered financial and military aid, they have done so only to further the
Austro-centric narrative along, failing to appreciate the significance of the movement in
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the broader space of interwar Central Europe. Instead, the depiction of the Heimwehren
has been one that, in many ways, parallels the narrative of the miserable and chaotic
beginnings of the tiny, now-insignificant successor state. While there is certainly truth in
those depictions of discord and turmoil, the focus of scholarly literature on this aspect of
the movement has, by and large, neglected the fact that the Heimwehr movement was the
product of a transnational collaboration that created what would become one of the
strongest and most stable paramilitary organizations in Central Europe. Moreover, this
collaboration was paramount in the fate of Central Europe in that it forged lasting ties
between Germany, Austria, and Hungary, all of whom, along with Fascist Italy, would
form the core of the Axis Powers in World War II. Indeed, the continuous presence and
increasing politicization of Heimwehr movement over the course of the 1920s and early
1930s, helped create a climate in Austria, and Central Europe for that matter, in which
Paramilitarism became an acceptable mode of right-wing political and cultural discourse.
The Heimwehr movement paved the way for the militaristic, authoritarian regime of the
Vaterländische Front and, ultimately, the Nazi Party in Austria.
As chapter five shall demonstrate, despite the erosion of this collaboration over
the course of 1922 and 1923, the foundation for the Heimwehr movement had been laid.
Four short years later, the movement would, again, be at the center of a much more
extensive coalition of the radical-right that extended beyond Central Europe. In this
iteration, the Heimwehren would supply the arms and support Bavarian formations,
reconstituting the Einwohnerwehr in the form of the Bavarian Heimatschutz. On the other
hand, however, it would, itself, be the recipient of aid, arms, and counsel from a heredity
enemy—Italy. Through Hungary, which both the Austrian right and Fascist Italy had
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developed close relations, Mussolini funneled arms, money, and political guidance. In the
Heimwehr movement he, like Chancellor Seipel, saw an instrument through which to
overthrow the republican government and install an authoritarian, right-wing regime.
Like the coalition of the early 1920s, conservative government officials on all sides
played key roles facilitating the next partnership, whose efforts would lay the
groundwork for Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss’s authoritarian government in 1933.
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CHAPTER III – CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE MAKING OF THE
HEIMWEHR MOVEMENT

As has been demonstrated thus far, the Heimwehr movement was a product of a
successful transnational effort to establish firm, counter-revolutionary footing in Austria;
Bavarian and Hungarian money, arms, equipment, and organizational guidance created a
firm foundation for the Heimwehr movement. Simultaneously, Heimwehr leaders,
particularly in Tyrol, identified with the ancient traditions of Alpine militarism, the seeds
of which were rooted in the gun culture that materialized with the democratization of
firearms. The wartime volunteerism of sport shooting clubs was the paradigm in which
Heimwehr organizations understood themselves to be the heirs. This chapter will
demonstrate further continuities of the imperial past and how they shaped the Heimwehr
movement.
According to social scientist, Edgar Shein, understanding an organization’s
culture enables one to attain a deeper insight into its identity, behaviors, and beliefs.370
This chapter will examine the organizational culture of the Heimwehr movement in the
hopes of doing just that. Shein suggests there are three levels of culture. The first level is
what he calls “artifacts,” which constitute things such as documents, symbols, style of
dress, rituals, songs, slogans, and so forth. In other words, things you can see, touch, or
feel. Without very specific explanation, however, “artifacts” can be difficult to interpret
accurately.371 In the case of the Heimwehren it would constitute its uniforms, rifles,
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exercises, flag consecration ceremonies, rallies, field Masses, propaganda flyers, and so
forth. They also reveal the “tangible, sensory, [or] felt experiences” that underpinned the
culture of the movement; in other words, the emotional reactions, often times through
sights and sounds, evoked. In short, these artifacts assimilate the emotional responses and
aesthetic symbolism into a meaningful, “shared code” that members internalize, which
reflects and informs an organization’s culture.372
The second level of culture, Shein contends, are “espoused beliefs and values.”
These are beliefs and values a group collectively validates, adopts, and articulates. As
such, they are observable correlations between an organization’s cultural artifacts and its
espoused values. The numerous anti-Marxism, anti-parliamentary democracy, antiliberalism, anti-capitalism, and expressions of the Heimwehr movement reflect some of
its central “espoused beliefs.” Thus, the negative, obstinate nature of the movement’s
“espoused values” was reflected in its appearance and activities as a self-defense
association.
Lastly, is what Shein calls “basic underlying assumptions.” These, he explains,
are assumptions that “have become so taken for granted that one finds little variation
within a social unit.” In other words, they reflect entrenched, fundamental truths in which
behaviors to the contrary are unthinkable. “In an occupation such as engineering, it would
be inconceivable to deliberately design something that is unsafe; it is a taken-for-granted
assumption that things should be safe,” Shein offers as an example. Thus, basic
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assumptions are such deeply ingrained shared values and beliefs that they are followed
without question.373 Basic underlying assumptions offer the requisite context to make
sense of the espoused values, the conspiratorial signal to Geertz’s wink.374 The “artifacts”
and “espoused values” of the Heimwehr movement its artifacts were, thus, predicated on
the “basic underlying assumptions” of Catholic social thought and imperial traditions of
civic militarism.
Indeed, the Heimwehr movement was driven by the shared historical experiences
of its leadership and members as subjects of the former Habsburg monarchy and as
Catholic parishioners. That is to say, features of imperial Austrian society continued to
influence republican Austria, particularly in the provinces. The Habsburgs’ existential
fear of nationalism translated into the suppression of that facet of identity and redirection
toward cultivating regional identities in each its counties, duchies, and bishoprics.
Moreover, the Catholic Church, which enjoyed a most productive relationship with the
House of Habsburg throughout its reign, staked its claim to another facet of Austrian
identity. This is not to say that German nationalism did not factor strongly into Austrian
collective identity, but rather that it had been historically constrained through its pairing
with Catholic, Habsburg, and regional identities; they were German Catholics, German
Tyrolians, and German Habsburg subjects. Its ubiquity allowed it to be married it to the
other more internally unique elements of self. The dissolution of the Habsburg Empire
and, therefore, Austrians’ identities as Habsburg subjects, only strengthened regional
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identity, much of which, however, was rooted in imperial traditions, making the Habsburg
influence unshakeable.
Catholic social thought served as the foundation of the two central characteristics
that defined the Heimwehr movement—its militarism and its politics. On May 15, 1891,
Pope Leo XIII published the Papal Encyclical, Rerum Novarum (or On Capital and
Labor), which is widely accepted as the foundational text outlining Catholic social
teachings.375 It codified the philosophies of Church theorists had held for centuries as
well as spoke the Church’s position on the social, economic, and political issues caused
by industrialization and urbanization. More specifically it spoke to the “misery and
wretchedness” of the working class.376 On the fortieth anniversary of the publication of
Rerum Novarum, May 15, 1931, Pope Pius XI published the Papal Encyclical
Quadragesimo anno (or On the Reconstruction of Social Order), which laid out the
Church’s vision for the reordering of society based on concepts laid out in the Leo XIII’s
Rerum Novarum. It sought a middle ground in the face of the extremes represented by
capitalism, fascism, and communism. The juxtaposition of these texts with the
assumptions and values articulated in Heimwehr activities and propaganda reveal a
strikingly consistent parallel that demonstrates that it was a thoroughly traditional
movement. It opposed the greed and individualism of laissez faire capitalism. Heimwehr
leaders did not entirely oppose democracy, but rather Western-style parliamentary
democracy, where corruption and political partisanship belied the “common good.” Its
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federal leaders also proposed a collectivist arrangement of society in the form of
corporatism, they rejected the notion of class conflict proposed in Marxist theory and
promoted by the Communist and Social Democratic parties; animosity amongst the
various strata of society would not lead to the “common good.”
Historians have depicted the Heimwehr movement as being almost entirely
negative in its aims, conveying the false impression that the Heimwehr movement lacked
a firm ideological basis. It rejected capitalism, parliamentary democracy, and socialism
out of its own ideological obedience to the principles of Catholic social teachings. As
such, they understood the purpose of the state to be, first and foremost, the promotion of
the “common good.”377 Its Korneuburg Oath—along with its frustration with the
bourgeois political parties—echoed this overarching belief as well as other fundamental
elements of the Church’s teachings.
Within the concept of Subsidiarity, the Heimwehr movement found importance in
its role as a voluntary association. Founded on the establishment of local groups, the
Ortsgruppen sought to assist their communities--a collection of individuals and families-in protecting their communities and, therefore, improving the quality of their lives. At a
higher level, the Heimwehren saw themselves as patriotic, voluntary organizations
seeking to renew the pride and prosperity of their Heimat. In this way, they understood
the confederation as serving in a valuable role in the decentralized approach of social
order conceptualized by Catholic social theorists. As voluntary associations, their
members paid no dues and went through no vigorous exclusionary process; its members
needed only to be “patriotic” and possess the desire to service their communities and their
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Heimat through the movement. Thus, the “renewal” for which they hoped to evoke in
Austria was one wholly aligned with Catholic social thought and ultimately began to take
shape with the establishment of the May Constitution of 1934.
The traditional patriarchal outlook inherent in Catholic social theory underpinned
the militarism of the Heimwehr movement. A central component of masculinity was—as
the head of his family—the protection of home and hearth, his community, and his
country. As chapter one demonstrated, the “throne and alter” relationship was a
particularly potent in Habsburg Austria, most especially in its Alpine regions. Like an
altar boy being introduced to the inner-workings of the church, young shooters were
introduced to firearms and learned how to shoot and hunt. Familiarity and comfort with
firearms served as an important precursor for military service, which after 1867 was
mandatory in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The qualities young men learned from
compulsory military service—duty, obedience, loyalty, sacrifice, discipline, and so
forth—were virtues that Kaiser Franz Josef sought to instill in his subjects, but were
compatible with Catholic social teachings, which had been instilled in them from birth.
When obligatory military service was outlawed in the Treaty of Saint Germain, private
scouting organizations and athletic clubs militarized their activities to help compensate
for this loss. Similarly, the patriarchal foundations of the Heimwehr movement were
observable in the activities of its women’s auxiliary organizations. The groups were
geared toward the growth and development of the movement and the promotion of its
social agenda, which was consistent with the main tenants of Catholic social teachings,
focusing on the promotion traditional values, protecting children from the corrupting
influences of modern society, and aiding families in need.
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The close relationship between the Church and the Heimwehren is clear. The
Church saw the Heimwehr movement as a protector from the anti-clerical, secular ideals
of Marxism. As such, the Church and the Christian Social Party were the movement’s
most ardent supporters.378 In virtually every Heimwehr event the Church was involved:
shooting contests, war memorial dedications, rallies, and flag dedication ceremonies, all
consistently included Mass services as a part of the program of events. As such, the
alignment of the Heimwehren and the Church was frequently a point of ridicule by its
Communist and Social Democratic Party opponents as an indication of the Church’s
hypocrisy. To that end, not all clergy agreed with this association with the Heimwehren;
however, most remained steadfast in backing the movement. Nevertheless, the
fundamental tenants of Catholic social thought, cultivated through centuries of Catholic
hegemony in the Alpine realms of the Habsburg Empire, shaped the character and
outlook of the Heimwehr movement.

The “Tyrolean Example”
The Tiroler Heimatwehr was officially established on May 12, 1920.379 Steidle
proposed utilizing the same organizational structure of the old Tyrolean Schützenwesen,
with districts and district leaders. Like the old militia system, Innsbruck would serve as
its main administrative hub.380 Given that the Standschützen had been outlawed by the
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Treaty of Saint Germain, which was enforced by the IMCC, the statutes of the Tiroler
Heimatwehr were necessarily vague and open to lose interpretation. Its statutes,
coordinated with the Tyrolean government and finalized in October 1920, explain the
organization’s general purpose, basic structure and hierarchy, parameters for
membership, and the electoral process for its leaders.381 In §3 of its statutes, the
Heimatwehr declared itself a collection of “patriotic-minded people” gathered for the
purpose of 1) protecting the constitution from any attempt at “violent constitutional
amendment,” 2) protecting the people, their personal property and work, 3) supporting
existing authorities in “maintaining peace and order,” as well as 4) “intervention” in
natural disasters. It adds, that the Heimatwehr is a private establishment that promotes to
the reconciliation of all classes of people and, in particular, “the rebuilding and revival of
the patriotic spirit.”382
The first point and its reference to “violent constitutional amendment” clearly
referred to the specter of communist revolution, which threatened to seize all private
property and turn it over to the state. This was a point of Marxist theory with which
Rerum Novarum took particular issue, citing Deuteronomy 5:21, “Thou shalt not covet
thy neighbor's wife; nor his house, nor his field, nor his man-servant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is his.”383 Moreover, the encyclical
explains, “every man has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one
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of the chief points of distinction between man and…animal.”384 As such, the confiscation
of private property by a state was “emphatically unjust, for they would rob the lawful
possessor, distort the functions of the State, and create utter confusion in the
community.”385
The phrase “peace and order,” is used repeatedly by Heimatwehr leaders in
writings and speeches and, thus, necessitates unpacking. While the word “peace” is rather
innocuous and quite understandable given the turmoil that Tyrol experienced since the
end of the Great War. It is the word “order” that is more curious and warrants further
examination. One might reasonably interpret “order” as having three different but related
meanings. Its most obvious meaning can be derived from a literal interpretation—to
regulate or manage, in this case, “keeping peace and order” as auxiliary support for
protective institutions such as the police. In an alternative definition of the word “order”
carries authoritative connotations in that it can also be interpreted as “commanding” or
“directing;” in the context of the close cooperation with and support of the Heimatwehr
by the Tyrolean state government, “order” takes on an authoritative tone. “Order,” in this
setting, entails having control over Tyrolean society by the process of maintaining the
peace and regulating the state’s political landscape. Interpreting “order” as a euphemism
for tradition or conservatism is not too great a leap of the imagination given Tyrol’s long
history as such in the former Habsburg Monarchy. The often-used, related turn of phrase,
“order-loving people,” (ordnungsliebenden Bevölkerung) thus, might as easily be
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understood as “tradition loving people.” In that sense, then, the “Ordnungsblock” formed
between Bavaria and Alpine Austrian paramilitary organizations can just as easily be
understood as a “conservative block.”386 Meanwhile, the term “Patriotic” is not given any
special definition in the statutes so one must apply a generic definition, which entails
devotion and support for one’s country. It is unclear, however, as to what “country” might
imply—Tyrol itself, Austria as an independent state, Austria as a part of Germany, or the
German cultural nation. The use of the words “rebuilding” and “revival,” however, imply
a pre-existing patriotic sentiment in a pre-existing community. One might reasonably
infer, then, that the Tiroler Heimatwehr was dedicated to the restoration of TyroleanGerman patriotism.
Beyond its role as a paramilitary auxiliary to the police and gendarmerie, the chief
task of the Heimwehren was to maintain a unified bourgeois front. As such, its
membership policy was open-ended. The statutes defined the parameters for membership
in the Heimatwehren as follows: individuals at least eighteen years of age and of
“reputable German descent” (beleumundete Deutschstämmige); Jews were specifically
identified as being excluded. Local Heimatwehren leaders (Ortsführer) determined the
admission of individuals, while provincial leadership (Landesleitung) determined
whether other German associations could join and form their own formation; this allowed
the Heimwehr movement to amass substantive membership numbers quickly. The
practice also allowed the alignment of interests and the benefit of cross organizational
support. Membership would be terminated by death, loss of citizenship, incapacitation,
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alcoholism, mental illness, voluntary termination of membership, or ejected by
committee for a “severe breach of duty” (schwerer Pflichtverletzung).387
Thus, the Heimwehren considered themselves non-political organizations
dedicated to maintaining an organized bourgeois front. Despite their seemingly dubious
claim, maintaining its anti-Marxist, non-partisan bourgeois outlook was a task taken with
the utmost determination. On numerous occasions, Steidle reiterated this point explaining
to the leadership of the German nationalist party (Grossdeutschen Volkspartei), for
example, that the Heimwehr “is and will only be a tool for the maintenance of peace and
order, it has nothing to do with party politics and will come against such a carrying in the
side from which it wants to set with all ounce of strength to fight back.”388 At the same
time, they declared that they were “keine Fascisten.”389 The underlying motivation for
preserving this equilibrium was three-fold. First, it allowed for the movement to create a
sizable financial and material support base from adherents to both pan-Germanist and
Christian Social parties. Second, in doing so, the Heimwehren could remain appealing
organizations to interested recruits of all non-Marxist persuasions. Finally, as a result, it
placed the Heimwehr movement in a unique position in Austria—and Central Europe for
that matter—in that it functioned as a unifying force, a center of gravity if you will, for
counter-revolutionary anti-Marxism. So long as the Heimwehren remained a source of
bourgeois unity, it would be their most powerful weapon against communist revolution.
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Though not stated in its charter, Heimatwehr members were not required to pay
membership dues, as they were viewed strictly as private citizens volunteering their time
and energy. The voluntary nature of the Heimwehr movement reflected its deep-rooted
Schützen tradition of war volunteerism and civic militarism throughout its time under
Habsburg rule. This had historically been reinforced by the clergy, who drew upon
Catholic ideals of service and sacrifice for the greater good of their families and
communities. The concept Subsidiarity in Catholic social teachings envisioned voluntary
associations as serving important functions in society, as a vehicle for ordering society at
local levels.390
The implications of policy were ultimately of grave detriment to the Heimwehr
movement. Pabst had implored Steidle and the other provincial leaders to institute
membership dues in order to cull the membership of those not committed to the
movement; to his consternation, they were not moved.391 Equally as critical was the fact
this feature made the Heimwehren completely reliant on external sources of revenue.392
As subsequent chapters will point out, this meant that the Heimwehr movement was
limited in its ability to maneuver. That is, it was beholden to the interests of its
financiers—provincial governments, private aristocratic supporters, financial institutions,
industrial associations, as well as foreign supporters.393 Shackled to multiple, and often,
conflicting interests, the Heimwehr movement was greatly reduced in its capability to
affect the ideological and political changes it envisaged. This was not clear when the
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principal target of its ire was the Social Democratic Party, as virtually all anti-Marxist
circles backed the Heimwehren in this endeavor. It was only revealed when Heimwehr
leaders found themselves at odds with the rising tide of the National Socialist German
Workers Party, that this fatal flaw revealed itself, and by that time it was too late.
Coupled with the absence of membership dues, the lack of meaningful
membership criteria would prove detrimental to the Heimwehr movement in several
ways. According to Wiltschegg, the spike in popular interest in the Heimwehren after its
smashing the Social Democratic riots in labor strikes of the “July Events,” caused an
unsuspected “mass influx of opposing elements,” which he adds, “would… have serious
consequences.”394 The fact that Heimwehren began as an anti-Marxist, civil defense
organization, admittance of individuals of all anti-Marxist persuasions into its ranks is
logical. As was the case with its financial dependence on external capital, its diverse
membership had conflicting outlooks that diverged primarily into two camps—those that
wanted Austria to unify with Germany (Anschluss) and those who wanted Austria to
remain an independent state. When the Nazi Party became the second largest party in the
German Reichstag (parliament) in the 1930 general election, the Austrian Nazi Party also
began to gain electoral ground, which would split the Heimwehren along these lines.
The general structure and hierarchy of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr is also described
in its statutes. Its most fundamental unit was the Ortsgruppe (local group). The leader of
the Ortsgruppe, the Ortsführer, along with his deputy and an admissions committee, was
elected by the Ortsgruppe members. While maintaining a standard disposition of units,
one defending the locality itself, one defending the locality’s infrastructure (train stations,
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bridges, mills, factories, electrical works), and one defending the perimeter of the
location, the Ortsgruppen were given the flexibility to organize their formations to best fit
their unique situations.395 Formations protecting larger populations often developed a
more sophisticated structure command structure and specialized units. By 1924,
Ortsgruppe Hall, for example, created an ordinance service and a specialized platoon of
storm troops. The locality was divided into six subsections (Abschnitt), each having its
own Abschnittsführer, or section leader.396
Ortsgruppen established in neighboring communities cooperatively created a
Schutzgemeinschaft, or defense community. The leaders of the Ortsgruppen would elect a
Schutzgemeinschaftführer and his deputy. Together, the established defense communities
would form districts, or Bezirks. Defense community leaders would, in turn, elect district
leaders, or Bezirksführer, his deputy, along with a finance committee that consisted of
four to ten members.

Schutzgemeinschaft

Ortsgruppen

Bezirk

Bezirk

Ortsgruppen

Schutzgemeinschaft

Ortsgruppen

Schutzgemeinschaft

Ortsgruppen

Bezirk

Schutzgemeinschaft

Schutzgemeinschaft

Gau
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Figure 5. Organizational Levels of the Tyrolean Heimwatwehr
The chairman of the committee, the deputy to the district leader, and the district leader,
himself, formed the district’s executive committee. Collectively, the district executive
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committees would be responsible for electing the provincial leadership, or Landesleitung.
Shortly after the charter finalization of the charter, an additional hierarchical level was
added beyond the district level, that of the Gau (section).Tyrol would be divided into four
sections initially: Gau Reutte, Gau Mittel- und Westtirol, Gau Unterinntal, and Gau
Osttirol.397 By 1928, however, this organizational structure changed slightly, collapsing
Gau Reutte into Gau Mittel- und Westtirol and essentially making Innsbruck its own
“Gau,” despite retaining the title of “Bezirk Innsbruck-Stadt.” Within these sections, the
Bezirke (districts) were to parallel those of the political districts, signaling the changing
disposition of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr from a paramilitary, civil defense organization to
a paramilitary political pressure organization.398

Figure 6. The Sections of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr in 1921
(Modified with permission of the author, OpenStreetMap / Wikimedia Commons / CC-BY-SA-2.0)
TLA: Landesleitung der SSV (Tirol), I/1, fol. 410, 202; Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler
Heimatwehr,” 35-50; See Appendix A for further information regarding the structure and organizational
hierarchy of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr.
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The city of Innsbruck, Tirol’s capital city, was, itself, a district (Bezirk) and had
its own unique organizational structure. It was divided into six subsections, in which one
might liken to the Schutzengemeinschaften. Each of the subsections was defended by
groups that were organized into four platoons: a machine gun detachment, a combat
detachment (Kampfabteilung) of former soldiers with military training, a watch
detachment of typically older men not necessarily suited for fighting, and a school, or
training, detachment (Schulabteilung) of teenagers who were trained to handle various
types of arms and instilled with military discipline to ultimately take their place in
combat detachments.399
The Landesleitung consisted of, first and foremost, the Landesführer, or
provincial leader, his deputy, the military leader, chair of the provincial finance
committee (Landesschatzmeister), and the leader of the emergency technical assistance
wing of the Heimatwehr, tasked with maintaining and restoring infrastructure in the event
of a strike, civil war, or natural disaster.400 Naturally, the various levels of regional
leadership served in supervisory roles beyond their duties as electors. The Landesleitung
directed the provincial organization, oversaw the annual gather of the Ortsgruppen, and
represented the Tiroler Heimatwehr outside of Tyrol. It made important high-level
decisions, distributed funds to local formations, and maintained the ability to modify the
organization, its structure, and hierarchy, as needed.
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In guidelines laid out in 1928, Steidle defined specific duties and responsibilities
of leaders at all levels of the movement. In general, however, all leaders were to work for
the betterment of the movement through three areas of action: organizational work,
promotional activities, and leadership activities. “Organizational work” involved the
leader taking the necessary measures to ensure his group(s) was as effectively organized
as possible as it related to deploying it in order to protect the community, district, or
section under his charge. “Promotional activities” were undertakings meant to “deepen
the Heimatwehr thought in the subordinate Heimatwehr organization(s) in his sphere of
action,” with particular emphasis placed on youth groups. Lastly, “leadership activities,”
as defined, speaks to the leader directing his organization(s) during the event of
mobilization in defense of his sphere of action.401
Most crucial in securing the success of these activities was the staff leader
(Stabsleiter), who was the engine of the Heimatwehr, fulfilling a variety of functions
corresponding with the general duties of promoting and organizing their respective
Ortsgruppe, district, section, or provincial formations, depending on their place in the
organization’s hierarchy. They were also responsible for establishing protocols for
mobilization of their group. What all this meant in reality was that staff leaders were
expected to function as administrators, promoters, event planners, liaisons between the
group leader and the rank and file, the general public, and important groups in their
respective community. The position of staff leader, thus, “requires a whole German man,
as the glory and the shame falls on him with the success or failure of these united sons of
the Heimatwehr when Tirol calls in its hour of need. So goes the staff leader, so goes the
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county.”402 The centrality of staff leaders such as Herbert von Obwurzer, Waldemar Pabst,
and Hanns Rauter, to the Heimwehr movement is no coincidence.
The organization of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, as was the case in all of the
provinces, reflected the dual—military and civilian—character of its purpose as a
paramilitary civil defense organization. It utilized the residual imperial infrastructure and
assumed a similar character of the traditional Tyrolean militia system (Tyrolean
Schützenwesen) and, as did its predecessors, it continued to work in closely with the
Tyrolean state government. The Heimatwehr’s admission, finance, reception committees,
as well as its executive committee (Landesvorstand) reflected the influence of state and
local administrators and councilmen that filled the upper ranks of most of the provincial
Heimwehren. Moreover, its “Emergency Technical Assistance” wing, whose primary task
was to maintain the function of communication infrastructure in the event of labor
strikers, was composed primarily of civilian members with expertise.403 From the
standpoint of administration, the Tiroler Heimatwehr resembled a civil organization much
more than a paramilitary one. As shall become apparent below, however, the military
elements dominated the Heimatwehr from an organizational culture perspective.
The statutes of the Tiroler Heimatwehr, as approved by the Tyrolean state
government, were deliberately vague in an effort to allay IMCC scrutiny. As such, the
statues emphasize the Tyrolean Heimatwehr as being a voluntary, “patriotic” self-defense
organization that assisted the Tyrolean government and police as an auxiliary peace
keeping force rather than disclosing itself as a collection of local, anti-Marxist
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paramilitary bands. The charter of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr was virtually identical to that
of the Salzburger Heimwehrdienst, among others, both of which were based on the
statues of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, yet does not mention any affiliation with the
Bavarian movement. The Heimatschutzverband Burgenland, formed in the Burgenland in
1927, still maintained virtually identical by-laws, and reflected the formative influence of
the Einwohnerwehr on the character and the direction of the Heimwehr movement.404
A memorandum to the IMCC in Innsbruck offers further detail, explaining that
the first task of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr is the maintenance of “peace and order,”
supporting the police in emergency situations as a private security organization. It adds,
the Heimatwehr existed as a counterweight to the Volkswehr, which the people in the
Alpine lands mistrusted and viewed as an instrument of the Social Democrats, citing as
evidence, the “Russian system of soldiers’ counsels.” Moreover, the formation of a
workers’ guard (Arbeiterwehr) in Tyrol on May 1, 1920 was presented as a decisive
moment prompting (or perhaps justifying) the creation of the Tiroler Heimatwehr.405
The Styrian Heimatschutz, for instance, was financed very early on by the Styrian
provincial government, financial institutions, and industry and, thus, was not dependent
upon Bavarian financial support and arms. As such, its organizational hierarchy was not
obliged to follow that of Orgesch and, instead, mirrored that of the provincial
government; the Landesleiter (provincial leader) functioning at the level of the
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Landeshauptmann (provincial governor). Thus, the Styrian organization had an additional
level of leadership in the Kreisleiter (circuit leader) beyond the Gauleiter, Bezirkleiter,
and Ortsgruppenleiter that paralleled the hierarchy of its counterparts. Similar to their
counterparts, however, the main combat units of the Heimatschutz—the Jägerbataillon
(rifle battalions)—were well-equipped detachments consisting of its young, most
physically fit and well-trained members. Other fighting units were organized with
consideration for marital status, age, and employment and were generally anchored to
their local areas. Likewise, Heimatschutz leaders were elected by their immediate
subordinates and were expected to obey their elected leaders unbendingly.406 Generally
speaking, most Heimwehren were ultimately organized around the administrative
(“politische Bezirke”) structures of their respective province. As a result, they all
maintained similar organizational structures, with minor variations.
The 1929 charter of the Lower Austrian Heimatschutzverband, while maintaining
a similar format, offered more specificity around the purpose of the organization and how
it intended to achieve its aim. Though still a patriotic association whose aim was to
protect citizens, their property and their work, the Heimatschutzverband also described
itself as being dedicated to combatting “corruption in public life,” advocating for general
well-being against individual interests, and the education of the youth on the “Austrian
character in manners and customs,” among other fundamental objectives. Unlike earlier
charters, there is less ambiguity around the “ways and means” of achieving its aims,
which it defined as: the regular publication of patriotic writings, lectures, meetings,
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rallies, and the holding of ski courses and shooting exercises and contests.407 The more
specific discussion of objectives and means of pursuing those objectives reflected, by
1929, the development of a stable organizational culture. That is, the objectives and
activities described in the Lower Austrian by-laws were applicable to any of the
provincial Heimwehr formations.
Some historians of the Heimwehr movement have erroneously interpreted it as
having been divided into two distinct sections: a political wing and a military wing. 408
The Heimwehr movement was a not a political party with a paramilitary force; it was a
paramilitary movement that eventually created a political party (Heimatblock). The
provincial Heimwehr organizations were comprised of local groups that, depending on
their numbers and composition, were designated specific types of units, such as mobile
storm troops, machine gun units, artillery units, local guard formations, or emergency
technical assistances groups comprised members with infrastructure expertise, among
other specific formations. More accurately, the “military leaders” of the Heimwehren
were tasked specifically with overseeing the military preparedness, training, and physical
fitness of the local Heimwehren (which is discussed in further depth in chapter three).

The Heimwehr Movement by the Numbers
The lack of membership rolls for the Tyrolean Heimatwehr makes attaining accurate
membership numbers a challenge. References to member numbers in the historiography
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are often gleaned from reports written by foreign observers whose sources close to the
formations are unclear.409 For instance, Kondert, in his unpublished dissertation, relies
heavily on correspondences from Sir Francis Oswald Lindley, British Ambassador to
Austria in 1920-21, to the British Foreign Office for membership numbers. When
compared with figures gathered from other archival sources, Lindley’s estimations appear
to be consistently inflated and unreliable. For example, in a letter to Lord Curzon,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated December 17, 1920, Lindley estimates that
the Tiroler Heimatwehr had as many as 25,000 members the time. Several weeks later,
that estimation had fallen to 20,000 members, which is corresponds to figures found in
Rudolf Kanzler’s memoir and from the Heimwehr propaganda publication, Heimatschutz
in Österreich.410 Lindley’s estimate for the Salzburger Heimwehr in December of 1920
was that it had 15,000 members.411 This figure is far more than approximations seven
months earlier of no more than 2,000 members, according to a report based on Kanzler’s
conference with the leaders of the Salzburger Heimwehr.412 As it were, Lindley’s figures
cannot be utilized for analyzing approximate membership numbers.
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At the same time, Lauridsen finds the Heimwehren figures of the movement’s
strength in its early years to be questionable, contending that they could, likewise, be
inflated but for the purpose of gaining foreign financial support.413 Considering the
Heimwehren, by 1920-21, had the active support from the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr as
well as from the Hungarian government, there was little reason to exaggerate their
numbers.414 Nevertheless, the decentralized nature of the movement makes the figures of
questionable and little more than rough estimations. Moreover, they are inconsistent in
terms of what point in time they were made. In short, they simply reflect a snapshot of
the given provincial formation at the given time and must be treated with caution. Too, it
is worth mentioning that the fact that high membership numbers in one province and low
in another does not necessarily mean that support for the Heimwehr movement was
stronger in that province than in the other, as it might simply indicate that the population
was greater and participation in the movement reflects that variance. As such, these
figures should be used to compliment qualitative data and should not be taken at face
value on their own, for all of the reasons given.
What the existing membership estimates indicate, however, is a pattern of
expansion and contraction over the course of the movement’s existence and generally
correspond to important shifts in Austria’s political landscape. As Table 3 (below)
indicates, three events that elicited the attention of contemporary observers to the
movement’s membership figures, are as follows: the founding of the provincial
organizations in 1920-1921, the “Events of July 1927,” and in 1933, when Chancellor
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Engelbert Dollfuß seized an improbable opportunity to dissolve parliament and govern by
emergency decree. In the case of the latter two events, the attention given to the
movement’s membership reflected marked increases that amplified the visibility of the
Heimwehr movement as a powerful instrument of the Christian Social-led federal
government.
With the continued growth of the Heimwehr movement, total estimates have
varied wildly, topping out anywhere from 200 to 800,000.415 Lauridsen, who as most
recently examined this, places the height of the Heimwehr movement closer to the lower
end of those figures, viewing the 227,401 votes the Heimatblock received in the 1930
federal elections as corroborating evidence.416 While it does offer some indication of
membership numbers, it is likely on the low side for reasons outlined in chapter four. One
might reasonable surmise that membership figures at its peak lay in somewhere in the
middle, most likely between 300,000-400,000.
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Table 1. Membership Estimates of the Heimwehr Movement, 1920-1936417
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The for these figures are largely derived primary source material cited in Carsten, Fascist
Movements, 46, 48-9, 52, 114, 128, 131, 218; Wiltschegg, Die Heimwehr, 127-8, 136, 148, 154, 160-1,
164-5; Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 23, 60, 319, n.29; and Pauley, Hahnenschwanz
und Hackenkreuz, 61; Rebtisch, Tirol—Land in Waffen, 117; Lauridsen, Nazism and the Radical Right,
104-8, 138-146. Where figures conflict, their average was used.
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The Socioeconomic Makeup of the Heimwehr Movement
Demographic statistics for the First Republic are limited due in large part to its
chaotic birth in the aftermath of the First World War and its perpetual lack of funds to
dedicate to a comprehensive socioeconomic study of its population. Consequently,
attaining any sort of empirically dependable information on the composition of the rank
and file of the Heimwehren is a difficult task, especially given the decentralized nature of
the movement and the inconsistent availability of membership rolls. As such, it is not
surprising that the socioeconomic composition of the Heimwehr movement has been a
topic of much historiographic confusion.
Franziska Schneeberger argues, quite effectively, that generalizations of the
Heimwehr movement being a peasant-oriented is not accurate. This description, she
contends, can be attributed to several factors. Schneeberger dedicates the first chapter of
her dissertation to unpacking, is the different linguistic interpretations of the word
“peasantry” (Bauernschaft). That is, the term in German is more ambiguous and
applicable to a variety of different, but related professions. In English, however, the word
“peasantry” means “farmers.”418 As Schneeberger explains, more precise terms are
needed to define the necessary delineations between “rural,” “agrarian,” and “peasant.”
She defines “rural” as the including the entire population of those not living in urban
centers; the “agrarian” population, by contrast, should consist of those livelihoods are
connected to the land, but not land-owning farmers, which belong in their own category,
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represented in the term “peasant.”419 This differentiation, consequently, creates the
potential for equally variable worldviews among the rural population.
Schneeberger pinpoints the origins of this myth to a New York Times report
written by American journalist, Clair Price, who estimated the composition of the
Heimwehr movement as being 70 percent farmers, 20 percent members of the “old upper
classes of the empire,” and 10 percent being workers.420 The authors of early works in the
historiography of the Heimwehr movement, draw heavily from this assessment and,
consequently, skew historical interpretations of the Heimwehren as being a largely
agrarian, Catholic, militant movement. The broader, politically-oriented research aims of
scholarship and the scarcity of reliable socioeconomic information about Heimwehren
members, helped propagate this misconception throughout the historiography.421 Even as
recent as 2008, studies of the Heimwehr movement continue draw from this inaccurate
portrait.422
Indeed, much of the historiography speaks to the socioeconomic consistency of
the Heimwehren in very generalized terms, borrowing the same inaccurate portrait from
existing works. Edmondson draws on recollections of Guido Zernatto, who described the
“active core” of the Heimwehr movement as being:

Schneeberger, “Sozialstruktur der Heimwehr,” 14. Unfortunately, Schneeberger does not define
what she considers “urban,” which, for Austria, is essential in order to clearly delineate its difference from
“rural,” as most of Austria’s cities are relatively small by comparison to the United States. At what point a
space considered urban? What is the threshold of population density that constitutes an urban space as
opposed to a “rural” one?
420
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degraded and maligned professional officers and aristocrats, left with a small
pension or luckily—if they but realized it—most of their land; reserve officers
who were not content to become merely school teachers or white-collar workers;
and disillusioned youth who wondered at the military exploits of their bitter elders
and who saw no future in a society that tolerated economic depression and
unheroic politic.423
Scholars who do attempt to offer more detailed information on the subject tend to
contradict themselves. For example, Carsten contends that “Apart from the peasantry
which provided the bulk of the local Heimwehr members, two social groups were
particularly prominent, students and officers.”424 He adds that after July 1927, the
Heimwehren received a “mass influx” of new members from a variety of socioeconomic
backgrounds. Carsten further muddies the picture, stating that, based on a detailed police
report from August 31, 1929, most members of the Heimwehren were “manual workers,”
or “unemployed” men, between 25 and 40 years of age. The balance of the membership
consisted of individuals from “all social groups, business circles, officials, employees of
the state and of the municipalities, many of whom had joined recently.” He follows this
up, stating that “there is no doubt that the Heimwehren were above all a rural
movement,” whose leaders were drawn from the old aristocracy, educated upper and
middle class professionals, and former military officers.425
To Schneeberger’s point, it is unclear, how Carsten interprets “rural.”
Schneeberger indicates, however, that based on articles from the contemporary press, the
success of the Heimwehren in smashing the Social Democratic strikes in July 1927
attracted large numbers of farmers and agricultural laborers, eventually comprising
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substantial portions of several provincial formations, particularly the Lower Austrian,
Styrian, and Tyrolean organizations. In the case of the Bauernbund (Peasant’s League) of
Lower Austria, the association committed the entirety of its 100,000-members to the
establishment of the Lower Austrian Heimwehr in 1929.426 This seems to contradict
Carsten’s assertion that this influx was highly variable, illustrating the contradictory
nature of the historiographic discussion of the Heimwehr movement’s socioeconomic
composition.
Given the local and regional orientations of the Heimwehren movement, each
provincial formation had its own unique socioeconomic composition, making it difficult
to apply generalizations. For provinces such as Styria, for example, where industry was
more prominent than in neighboring provinces, there was a greater concentration of
workers in its ranks. Similarly, the Lower Austrian Heimwehr would have a larger
concentration of farmers and agricultural laborers, as its fertile plains along the Danube
was Austria’s ‘bread basket.’427 According to Verena Lösch’s breakout of the Tyrolean
Heimatwehr, replicated below, it attracted a quite diverse membership:428
Table 2. Membership Breakout of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr
35.2%

Public Officials: State Representatives, Mayors (Bürgermeister), Policemen
officials, Government bureaucrats/administrators, etc.

55%

Businessmen: commercial and industrial (frequently lower level functionaries
of companies), shopkeepers, innkeepers, master craftsmen, etc.

35%

Former k.u.k. Army officers

37%

White Collar Professionals/Academics: Doctors, Lawyers, Engineers,
Professors, Teachers, etc.

Schneeberger, “Sozialstuktur der Heimwehr,” 64.
Schneeberger, “Sozialstruktur der Heimwehr,” 64. According to Schneeberger, farmers and
agricultural laborers made up 80 percent of the Lower Austrian Heimwehr.
428
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14%

Farmers/Agricultural Laborers

5%

Clergy and/or church functionaries

5%

Hausbesitzer or Landlords/Landowners

4%

Declassed Aristocrats

3%

Industrial Workers

There is, however, cross-section of the Tyrolean population that played an important role
in the Tyrolean Heimatwehr that is absent from this breakout. As Carsten notes, the
Heimwehr movement “possessed a strong following…principally among students and
peasants,” the former being absent in Lösch’s statistics. Students—some young war
veterans and others, who were too young at the time, but who idealized the “front
fighter”—played an important role, for example, in the Styrian Heimatschutz.429 In the
case of the Frontkämpferverein (Front Fighters Association), students eventually became
more prevalent in its ranks than actual war veterans.430 “In the Tyrol too, the mobile
Heimwehr units were formed by the student companies of Innsbruck University,” Carsten
explains.431 As chapter three will reveal in further detail, the Tyrolean Heimatwehr
exercised substantial time, money, and effort into “winning” the Tyrolean youth. While
offering a useful snapshot of the various socioeconomic groups involved in the Heimwehr
movement, the absence of such a core social group calls into question the reliability of
these figures.
Based on archival records, such as organizational hierarchies and memorandums
communicating the results of local and district leadership elections, limited but useful
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indicators can be compiled that indicate the composition of the leadership of the Tyrolean
movement. For the sake of consistency, the same groupings specified in Lösch’s breakout
will be maintained. Table 5, below, provides a statistical snapshot of the information
gathered from these records.432
Table 3. Breakout of Tyrolean Heimatwehr Leadership
53% Occupation not given
Public Officials: State Representatives, Mayors (Bürgermeister),
13%
Policemen officials, Government bureaucrats/administrators, etc.
Businessmen: Bank Officers, Shopkeepers, Innkeepers,
9% Attorneys, craftsmen (Blacksmiths, Carpenters, Tinsmiths,
Saddlers, etc.)
7% Former k.u.k. Army officers
7%

White Collar Professionals/Academics: Doctors, Lawyers,
Engineers, Professors, Teachers, etc.

5% Land/Property Owners
Unfortunately, over half of the cases where individuals were identified as filling
leadership positions, their civilian occupations were not given. Excluding instances where
no occupational information could be derived and focusing on the known quantities, the
figures align more favorably with existing evaluations of the composition of Heimwehren
leadership across Austria:
Table 4. Breakout of Tyrolean Heimatwehr Leadership excl. Unknown Occupations
Public Officials: State Representatives, Mayors (Bürgermeister),
28%
Policemen officials, Government bureaucrats/administrators, etc.
Businessmen: Bank Officers, Shopkeepers, Innkeepers,
19% Attorneys, craftsmen (Blacksmiths, Carpenters, Tinsmiths,
Saddlers, etc.)
15% Former k.u.k. Army officers
15%
432

The percentages illustrated in the table are based on a sample size of 165 Tiroler Heimatwehr
leader names and, where indicated, their civilian occupations. The rank of the leaders varied from the
Landesführer to Ortsführern within a ten-year span (1920-1929), though most of the information was
extrapolated from documents created in the years 1921 or 1928.
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White Collar Professionals/Academics: Doctors, Lawyers,
Engineers, Professors, Teachers, etc.
11% Land/Property Owners
There are several socioeconomic groupings seemingly absent from the leadership
breakout that were present in the general composition of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr:
church functionaries, farmers and agricultural laborers, workers, and aristocrats.
According to Lösch, her statistics do not accurately reflect the influence of farmers and
agricultural laborers in the Tyrolean organization, as in smaller rural communities,
farmers often served as Bürgermeister (mayor) or in other public office.433 Moreover,
farmers could also constitute landowners, cultivating their own land (as was most often
the case in the Tyrol). Similarly, members of the declassed aristocracy also owned estates
and were considered landowners as well. Furthermore, they often served as elected
officials at local and state levels. Clergy and church functionaries as “members” of the
Heimwehr movement, must be understood as functioning in the capacity of officiating
ceremonies, advocating for the movement, and other public support roles. Simply put,
there is a good deal of potential overlap in these figures, meaning that they cannot be
interpreted rigidly, but offer concrete suggestions of the social groups leading the
Tyrolean movement. The remaining groups (aside from farmers and aristocrats) not
present in these leadership statistics—agricultural laborers, workers, and students—
represented the core of the “rank and file” of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr.
An examination of a different provincial organization would likely yield varying
percentages, but the socioeconomic groups and their positions would have remained
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reasonably consistent based on qualitative information gleaned from existing studies of
the various provincial Heimwehr movements. Lauridsen offers an occupational breakout
of the leadership of the Carinthian Heimatschutz in the years 1928 and 1933:434

Table 5. Snapshots of Carinthian Heimatschutz Leadership
1928
1933
Former Army Officers
7
3
Aristocrats/Land Owners
0
3
White Collar Employees
0
4
Merchants
0
2
Liberal Professionals
9
0
Industrialists
0
2
Unknown
2
1
Total
18
15
While it is unclear as to what exact professions these groupings include or the extent, if
any, overlap existed in any of these categories that might skew its results, it indicates a
clear turnover in, and diversification of, the organization’s leadership over the course of
five years. Much of this variation was a product of the movement’s expansion, which
peaked in 1929.
What conclusions can be drawn from these figures? Early generalizations that the
Heimwehren maintained a largely peasant rank and file are over-simplifications that do
not account for the wide range of rural and agricultural occupations and socioeconomic
conditions. It was not until the Heimwehr’s coalition with the Christian Social
Bauernbund in 1929, that it could be confirmed that the movement’s ranks swelled with
farmers and agricultural laborers. Determining the composition of the rank and file is
more difficult to prove with empirical data, at least for the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, due to
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the absence of membership rolls. There is evidence, however, that indicates that this body
was composed of the petit bourgeoisie, agricultural laborers, and students. The efforts the
movement put into establishing independent workers’ unions reflected, at least in part, the
fact that a sizable portion of its rank and file were unemployed. As chapter four will
explain in further detail, the Heimwehr leaders’ connections to industrialists was a
tangible benefit for this segment of its members. Lastly, there was a sizable contingent of
university students—the core of its storm troop unit—involved in the Heimwehr
movement, which, as Lösch’s assessment indicates, is not consistently represented.
If the figures of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr are any indication of the composition of
the wider movement’s leadership, it was local officials who were most frequently
founding and leading Heimwehr groups, an indication that the movement was indeed an
instrument of entrenched political interests. When considered alongside the fact that the
next largest groups were firmly bourgeois and petit bourgeois elements, with the influx of
the aristocrats into leading positions in the late 1920s, the composition of the Heimwehr
movement’s leadership reiterates the fact that it defended socioeconomic interests of the
middle class and wealthy elites. As chapter two explained, paramilitary organizations like
the Heimwehren offered former k.u.k. army officers an opportunity to continue working
in that capacity, often as chiefs of staff who received modest stipends, or as military
leaders responsible for the training and operational leadership of Heimwehr units.

The Heimwehr as a Paramilitary Movement
The military character of the Heimwehr movement was its most unmistakable
attribute. They wore military-style uniforms that varied from one province to another and
186

from one point in time to another. Most commonly associated with the Heimwehren is the
wind jackets, which ranged in shades of green; the most recognizable one, perhaps, being
the stone-green of the Styrian Heimatschutz. The wind jacket was commonly worn with
trousers and shoes of all variations, and a leather waist belt with a shoulder strap. More
varied was the headgear the formations donned. Most synonymous with the Heimwehr
movement was the jägerhut (hunting cap), which varied in color depending on the
province. For example, the Styrian, Lower Austrian, Viennese, and Burgenland
formations wore stone-green hunting caps with dark green cords and a game cock feather
on the side, while the Carinthian Heimatschutz wore a brown hunting cap and the Upper
Austrians, a dark green cap. At other times, various formations wore the M1917 steel
helmets.435 In the 1930s, the old imperial style field cap with a cock feather, like those
worn by the Tyrolean mountain troops (Landesschützen) in World War I, became more
common, particularly amongst the Schützenkorps (Defense Corps) formations established
by Vienna Heimwehr leader, Emil Fey.436
Wiltschegg argues that the various styles of uniform—among others—are
indicative of the movement’s provincial character and its general lack of unifying
ideology. To be sure, the regionalism of the Heimwehr movement was a quite strong and
stifled its capacity to affect the kind of change its leadership desired. At the same time,
however, there is no evidence to indicate that variation of uniform styles was a reliable
indicator of regionalism or ideological division. If anything, it is an indication of the
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piecemeal manner in which the various Heimwehren were forced to procure clothing and
equipment due to the ebb and flow of funds; this has more to do with the absence of
membership dues and self-sufficiency than it does with underlying divisions. What is
more, when placed in the broader context of the Austro-Hungarian army, variations in
uniform reflect something of a continuity of practices not uncommon in the Habsburg
army (or many other European armies, for that matter). Austro-Hungarian army units
frequently wore differing facing, patch, and button colors on their uniforms.437 Some
units wore differing styles of puttees, different shades of gray—the Common Army
transitioned from pike gray to field gray uniforms in 1916. Bosnian units wore different
caps from the Polish Legion, whose caps differed from the standard field cap; for that
matter, the Polish Legion wore a different style of uniform all together.438

Figure 7. The Styrian Heimatschutz at Wiener Neustadt, October 7, 1928
(Bundesarchiv, Bild 102-00840 / Georg Pahl / CC-BY-SA 3.0)
437
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As previous explained, provincial Heimwehr organizations were typically
organized in conjunction with official administrative boundaries. By the end of 1924,
mobilization plans were established that connected various levels of provincial
administration to roughly corresponding military unit in terms of size and numbers.439
This structure enabled mutually beneficial arrangements between local groups
(Ortsgruppen) and local officials, who, in many cases, leading figures in those
Ortsgruppen. These local formations offered their communities a convenient source of
auxiliary law enforcement. Given the severe restrictions placed on the Austrian military
by the Entente in the Treaty of St. Germain, the Heimwehren was also considered, in
conservative circles, a viable auxiliary defense force. These designs, in fact, align quite
well with the very definition of “paramilitary,” which is “of, relating to, being, or
characteristic of a force formed on a military pattern especially as a potential auxiliary
military force.”440
Table 6. The Military Organization of the Heimwehr Movement
Administrative Level
English Translation
Military Unit Size
Kreis
Circuit
Brigade
Gau
District
Regiment
Bezirk
Precinct
Battalion
Ortsgruppen
Municipal
Company*
* Companies were to be comprised of four platoons of 20 each
According to Edmondson, the training regimen of the Heimwehren “consisted
generally of target practices, lectures and map problems, and during the summer minor
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terrain exercises and practiced marches.”441 The training program established in October
1928 was much more in-depth, however, laying out seven specific areas of training for
infantry and machine gun battalions: shooting and weapons systems, exercise regulations,
field service, service regulations, pioneer service, terrain, and military organization.442
The aim of the shooting and weapons systems training constituted a substantial part of the
Tyrolean Heimatwehr’s program. For the Innsbruck Heimatwehr formations, for
example, regularly scheduled drills took place at the Berg Isel shooting range in the
summer and autumn under the supervision of the shooting leader and in accordance with
shooting range rules (Schießstandordnung). Ironically, though members did not have to
pay dues, they did have to pay for the ammunition they used while participating in
shooting drills; ten groschen per shot.443 Exercise regulations covered, among other
things, marching, facings, falling into formation, troop movements, attack formations,
close-quarter and hand-to-hand combat, as well as conducting attacks from up to 400
paces away. The field service training focused on field operations, with sections on
proper transmission of commands, announcements, and messages, transporting troops,
marches, billeting, securing an area, and sentry duty. The training area of service
regulations included the duties and behavior of a soldiers in various circumstances
(interfacing with the general public, before the enemy, while on sentry duty, and so forth),
personal hygiene and appearance, official channels, inspection service, escorting and
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guarding prisoners, relieving posts, and assisting the public. Pioneer training constituted
learning to use infantry equipment such as pickaxes and field shovels to create
encampments, dig latrines, cooking trenches, and so forth. It also sought to teach the
basics of road and bridge building, using explosives, constructing obstacles, and dugouts
for protection against artillery fire. The section on terrain taught Heimwehr troops to use
maps, compasses, how to gauge time based on the position of the sun, functioning in
mountainous terrain, determining heights, reading layer lines in the rocks, and reading
various types of topographical maps. The last area, military organization, was simply
learning military ranks, insignias, and badges of the Bundesheer as well as its
organization and unit hierarchy.
Apart from their efforts to understand the size of the Heimwehr movement,
historians have also sought to establish the military strength and capability of the
Heimwehr movement by examining the number and size of mobile, combat troops in
each of the provincial formations. Their estimations of the military strength of the
Heimwehren have differ quite substantially. A 1925 American intelligence report
indicated that the Heimwehr movement could muster 31 brigades, 111 regiments, 405
battalions, and 1,409 companies, but does not offer any figures regarding troop strength
for any of these units. Pabst’s plan of each company having four platoons of 20 men
each, would place the “actual strength,” based on the number of units given, 112,270
troops. Edmondson finds this estimation far too high for 1925, when the movement
experienced a marked decline in interest and membership numbers.444 Yet a June 1928
report filed by American military attaché, Major W.W. Hicks—submitted within the
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timeframe in which the Heimwehr movement grew significantly—contends that the
Heimwehren had 52,000 organized and trained men, of which only 22,000 were readily
deployable outside of their home communities. Next to the figure Steidle claimed the
Heimwehr possessed in a letter to the Hungarian Premier, Count István Bethlen, this
number seems quite conservative.445 At the time of Hicks’ account the Heimwehr
movement was on the upswing due to the prestige it won in crushing the Social
Democratic riots and general strike that occurred in July 1927. Moderate estimates
indicate that the Heimwehr movement grew to 300-400,000 members, total, at its peak in
1929.446 As such, one must reasonably assume that the military strength of the
Heimwehren would have correspondingly grown. Wiltschegg roughly estimates the
military strength of the Heimwehr movement as follows:
Table 7. Military Strength of the Heimwehr Movement, 1930-1935447
November 1930
146,000
December 1931
44,000
September 1932
46,000
January 1933
35,000
February 1934
32,100
1935
121,880
The sharp drop in troop strength corresponds with the increasing traction gained
by the Nazi Party and its Sturmabteilung (SA). Despite the sharp dip in membership
numbers after 1930, the organization arguably got leaner in terms of its military capacity.
As Wiltschegg notes, Starhemberg, elected as new federal leader in 1930, established a
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federal “Wehramt” (defense office) to improve efficiency by streamlining communication
between the Bundesführung to the leaders of the various specialized areas (technical
emergency assistance, medical, railway, and air corps) of the provincial Heimwehren.448
It is unclear, however, how much more effective the Wehramt was in practice.
Beyond the federal government’s distribution of arms to local communities for
self-defense in November 1918, which most local militia groups kept and used to form
the basis of the Heimwehr movement, provincial organizations also robbed weapons
depots that were to be turned over to the IMCC. In Styria, for example, Governor Anton
Rintelen would later recall that 17,000 rifles and rifle cartridges, 286 machine guns, 12
artillery pieces, and even airplanes were stolen from local army stores.449 The reported
theft of weaponry by the Heimwehren continued to be a trend throughout its existence.
As future Bundesführer, Ernst Rüdiger Starhemberg, later admitted, he played a part in
the largest theft of artillery—some 22 mountain howitzers—from a store in Tyrol in
January 1921.450 In a December 16, 1929 article covering the Nationalrat budget debates,
Social Democrat, Dr. Julius Deutsch, accused the Tiroler Heimatwehr of “stealing” six
mountain guns from a workshop of an army artillery brigade stationed in Innsbruck.451
Given the close cooperation between the Heimwehren, local, provincial, federal
governments, and provincial Bundesheer headquarters, one might reasonably view the
“theft” of equipment was much more likely to be something of an arranged “transfer,”
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given the fact that no investigative efforts of consequence ever materialized, outside of
that conducted by the Social Democrats.
As it were, Hicks’ 1928 report estimated the Heimwehren had ready access to
some 10,000 German Mausers and another 30,000 Austrian Mannlicher rifles with
sufficient ammunition. Edmondson adds that thousands of men also maintained
possession of their rifles. Furthermore, Hicks projected that the Heimwehren also had in
its possession 15 howitzers and 500 rounds of ammunition per gun, a surplus of hand
grenades, gas bombs, and several armored cars.452 Here too, Hicks’ report does not
reconcile with other sources. Starhemberg’s admission—which is also corroborated by
other sources—that he and his men stole 22 mountain howitzers in a single theft, by
itself, exceeds the total of 15 Hicks estimates all the Heimwehren to have possessed in
June 1928.453 Hicks’ figures here appear dubious. Chapters five and six detail the arms,
ammunition, and equipment the Heimwehren received from foreign suppliers—
principally Bavaria and Italy.
The Hicks report also indicated that, despite having no formal connections with
the Bundesheer (Federal Army), in several provinces Heimwehr groups participated in
military exercises with Bundesheer units.454 Long-serving Minister of Defense (19211933), Carl Vaugoin, maintained a close relationship with the Heimwehr leadership
throughout his tenure and actively facilitated cooperation between the Bundesheer and
the Heimwehren.455 The Heimwehren in Tyrol, Carinthia, and Styria, most frequently
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engaged in training maneuvers with the local Bundesheer formations. Schutzbund leader,
Dr. Julius Deutsch, naturally took issue with Heimwehr leaders observing Bundesheer
maneuvers and vice-versa. Chancellor Seipel’s response to his complaint was to point out
that it was not uncommon for “functionaries who were closest to the majority parties,
such as deputies, federal committees, or provincial officials [to] have participated in such
exercises as honored guests.”456 In other words, Seipel justified the presence of Tyrolean
Heimatwehr leaders at Bundesheer maneuvers as having to do with the fact that many
were elected officials observing as guests.
The Heimatwehr also participated in exercises with the Tyrolean state police and
gendarmerie, which Deutsch pointed out, once more, was also a “transgression of the
law.”457 With a Heimatwehr-friendly chancellor and governor, Deutsch, his Schutzbund,
and the Social Democratic Party had little recourse against the favor given the
Heimwehren but to stage their own field exercises and openly, and often sarcastically,
point out such instances in the numerous party-friendly newspapers.458 “The chancellor,
of course, cannot search the Heimwehr for weapons,” juxtaposing the open Heimatwehr
machine gun and rifle drills to the frequent weapons searches of workers’ tenements and
union halls.459
Beyond training exercises, the Heimwehren in Tyrol and Salzburg also
collaborated with the Bundesheer to seal off Austria’s borders to prevent the infiltration
of Nazi terror units from entering the country in 1933. In the brief conflagration in
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February 1934, as well as in the days after the July 1934 assassination of Chancellor
Dollfuss, Heimwehr men performed valuable duties. The fact that the Heimwehr
movement was widespread in the provinces gave authorities the ability to react quickly to
changing situations. Moreover, Heimwehr troops possessed a more intimate knowledge
of the surroundings than did federal troop deployed from elsewhere. Heimwehr units
bolstered gendarmerie posts, assisted in weapons searches, guarded bridges, railways,
provided traffic control, prisoner escorts, and were able to take over security
responsibilities after the withdrawal of federal troops. In this way, the Heimwehren
served as effective force multiplier for a severely restricted federal army.460
At the same time, Heimwehr military leaders were working to establish war plans.
On February 23, 1928, the federal military leadership under Kletus von Pichler, met to
discuss potential fighting scenarios based loosely around the events of July 1927. The
primary scene consisted of a “red coup attempt” in Vienna, which was setup to kick off
the following day (February 29). The plan called for a coordinated effort between the
police, federal troops and the Heimwehren to “besiege” Vienna, surrounding the city and
cutting off the roads and bridges into and out of the capital. The areas south and east of
Vienna—particularly the Social Democratic strongholds of Wiener Neustadt and St.
Pölten—were also emphasized in their planning. Any Red forces materializing from these
areas would be neutralized by Styrian formations mobilized just to their southeast.461
With the discussion of this war scenario were also estimations of how quickly and
the military capability of formations in and around the areas surrounding Vienna. Major
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Hans von Prankh projected that 2,000 trained troops from Judenburg (Upper Styria)
could be mobilized and deployed to Leoben (Upper Styria) by the evening of March 2.
Generalmajor Gottwald estimated a force of 1,500 men could be mobilized for operations
by March 2—two battalions from Hartberg (Upper Styria) and one from Weiz (Upper
Styria), while Major Arthur Karg von Bebenburg predicted that 1,500 men from
Wolkersdorf (Lower Austria) could be mobilized by March 2, but lacked the necessary
weaponry to be deployable. The small figures in these estimations most likely refer to
mobile shock troops and would seem to favor the numbers presented in the Hicks report
rather than those communicated by Steidle to Bethelen.462 Steidle’s estimate was likely in
reference to the movement’s active membership in general and not its better-trained,
mobile combat units.
As it were, the scenario Pichler and Prankh debated for nearly an hour over the
potential for a “roten Durchbruch” (red breakthrough) in the Mürztal (Styria). Pichler was
adamant that the Styrian Heimatschutz needed a single military command to avoid
potentially being defeated if acting individually. Prankh’s obstinacy enraged Pichler who
resigned his post as federal military leader of the Heimwehr out of sheer frustration.463
Since the Heimwehren were never engaged in any meaningful combat scenarios,
save for the several thousand men in the Wiener Heimwehr who saw action—and by all
accounts represented themselves well—in the fighting in February 1934, it is difficult to
speak to their fighting capacity with any accuracy. On one hand, as Wiltschegg points
out, the movement relied entirely on volunteers, which meant that it’s military
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effectiveness depended entirely upon their level of dedication to the movement, training,
and discipline. Moreover, their members were working professionals and could train only
in the evenings or on the weekends, thereby limiting their potential preparedness.
Furthermore, he argues, the localized basis of the movement made it difficult for those
Ortsgruppen to combine with any sort of unified outlook or cohesion. As such, the
movement resembled more a “uniformed club.”464
Furthermore, contemporary sources indicate that alcohol consumption was
synonymous with Heimwehr men. For instance, Heimwehr exercises appear to have been
frequently capped off with prolific beer drinking sessions.465 The Linz Social Democratic
newspaper, Tagblatt, frequently made light of their reputation as heavy drinkers,
sarcastically calling the “beer table” the “war front” of Heimwehren and complaining of
the fanaticism Heimwehr leaders preached from their “beer table pulpit” (BiertischKanzel).466 In an October 1929 instance, Steidle received a memo regarding two drunk
Heimwehr men present at a Ottakring (Vienna) Christian Social Union meeting. After
one’s diatribe against Leopold Kunschak, head of the Christian Social Worker’s Union
the other “declared the people’s representatives as inferior.” These men could “not be the
ideal of a Heimwehr man,” the memo queried.467
Though Wiltschegg makes several valid points around the potential military
weaknesses of the movement and its general organization, on the other hand, his
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assessment fails to take into account an important mitigating factor. According to one
report Hicks filed, approximately 70 percent of Heimwehr men were Great War veterans,
which would mean that the clear majority would had received at least some formal
military training and/or would have had combat experience in the war.468 If true, a large
percentage of its members would have had varying degrees of military training and
experience, making the limitations around training time perhaps less detrimental than
Wiltschegg surmises. Furthermore, having had the shared experience of wartime military
service and being comrades in a common cause, there existed a common basis that could
conceivably transcend the potential limitations of the movement’s local nature.
Comparatively speaking, even if the Schutzbund had greater numbers than the
Heimwehr movement, it is difficult to imagine them being any better trained, equipped,
or armed, especially considering the frequency with which the police and gendarmerie
raided—many initiated by Fey and Starhemberg in their time as Vice-Chancellor and
Minister of the Interior—Schutzbund weapons caches in the early 1930s. In the case the
Bundesheer, they were without question better trained and better equipped than the
Heimwehren, but was numerically inferior, even after 1930 when Heimwehr troop
strength sharply declined they still doubled that of the Bundesheer in 1931 and 1932. For
the Heimwehr movement, its Achilles’ heel lie not so much in weapons, training, or troop
strength, but in its decentralized organization and ideologically diverse membership—
these were the forces that limited its overall capacity as a paramilitary organization.
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The Ideology of the Heimwehr Movement
One of the principle criticisms historians have leveled against the Heimwehr
movement was its lack of a unifying ideology, while others have called the movement a
fascist movement, thereby lending it at least the base ideology that comes standard with
“generic fascism.”469 Like in so many other facets of the historiography, there exists a
great deal of contradiction in relation to the ideology of the Heimwehren. Lauridsen
rightly recognizes that the Heimwehr movement did not suffer from ideological
deficiency. He contends, “The “lack” of ideology—rightly understood as ideological
restraint—was, however, a necessary precondition for the existence and development of
such a politically heterogeneous movement and, not the least, for being not simply
tolerated but also supported and promoted by the Austrian bourgeoisie.”470 He proceeds
to speak to the antisocialism, antiparliamentarianism, anti-Semitism, militarism, and
corporatism as ideological “traits.”471 The Heimwehren exercised little in the way of
“ideological restraint,” particularly in juxtaposition to the “traits” he describes;
Heimwehr leaders were quite vocal and descript in their views on socialism,
parliamentary democracy, Jews, their corporatist platform, while putting the militarism
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on display regularly in their marches and rallies. What is more, in his discussion of these
“traits,” he misses an important unifying element—their basis in Catholic social thought.
The Korneuburg Oath, the political manifesto published by the federal Heimwehr
leadership in May 1930, according to some historians, reflected a clear turn to fascism
influenced by Mussolini and Fascist Italian money.472 In reality, however, it was an
unconscious affirmation of Catholic social teachings. A translation of the full oath is
included below, which the Heimwehren incorporated into their national propaganda
publication, Heimatschutz in Österreich:
We are determined to rebuild Austria from its foundations!
We are determined to bring into being the Volksstaat of the Heimatschutz.
We demand of every comrade:
undaunted faith in the fatherland,
untiring zeal in service, and
passionate love of his native land.
We are determined to take over the state and to remould it and its economy in the
interests of the whole Volk.
We must forget our own advantage, must subordinate absolutely all party ties and
party interests to the aims of our struggle, for we are determined to serve the
whole community of the German Volk!
We repudiate western parliamentary democracy and the party state!
We are determined to replace them with government by the corporations (Stände)
and by a strong national leadership which will consist, not of the representatives
of parties, but of leading members of the large corporations and of the ablest,
most trustworthy men in our own mass movement.
We are fighting against the subversion of our Volk by Marxist class struggle and
liberal and capitalist economics.
We are determined to bring about an independent development of the economy
on a corporate basis. We shall overcome the class struggle and replace it by
dignity and justice throughout society.
We are determined to raise the standard of living of our Volk by fostering an
economy based on the soil and administered for the good of all.
The state is the personification of the whole Volk; its power and leadership ensure
that the interests of the Stände are contained within the framework of the needs
of the whole community.
Let every comrade realize and proclaim that he is one of the bearers of a new
German national outlook, namely:
472
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that he is prepared to offer up his blood and his possessions, and that he recognizes three
forces only: Faith in God, his own unbending will, the commands of his leaders!473

From the Oath’s first sentence the influence of Austria’s Catholic heritage: “We
are determined to rebuild Austria from its foundations!” “From its foundations” is a clear
reference to its historical roots. Rebuilding Austria from its historical roots was
tantamount to the restoring the dominance of its German Catholic tradition.474 This was,
of course, in line with the desires of its Christian Social patrons as well, and would be
realized in the May Constitution of 1934.
The Heimwehr movement’s rejected “western parliamentary democracy,” the
“subversion of our Volk by…liberal and capitalist economics” and its goal of the
“subordination of all party ties and party interests.” This was, in part, a reaction to the
staunch support of the republic by the Social Democratic Party and the degree of parity it
allowed them to achieve.475 Moreover, the arrival of Heimwehr leadership to the
Korneuburg Oath was gradual and reflected a mounting frustration with parliamentary
democracy, the Christian Social, and German National parties for their failure to more
aggressively suppress, or their agreement to allow the Heimwehren to destroy, the Social
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Democratic Party.476 They admonished the bourgeois parties for having “bowed” to the
Social Democrats, beginning a “permanent state of cowardice.”477
Heimwehr views were also consistent with the Catholic Church’s skepticism
toward Western parliamentary democracy. The individualism and greed inherent to
classical liberal capitalism lent itself to the corruption of the institution of parliamentary
democracy.478 Thus, the corruption led to the favoring of party interest and ties over the
“common good.” The Papal Encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, published a year later,
spoke to Pope Leo XIII’s efforts, “boldly breaking through the confines imposed by
Liberalism, [he] fearlessly taught that government must not be thought a mere guardian
of law and of good order, but rather must put forth every effort so that “through the entire
scheme of laws and institutions…both public and individual well-being may develop
simultaneously out of the very structure and administration of the State.”479 In other
words, the liberal democratic states must do more than preserve the population for the
sake of maintaining the health of commerce, it must make the best interests of the whole
population its priority. Pope Pius XI reminded the Catholic faithful, “let all remember
that Liberalism is the father of this Socialism that is pervading the morality and culture
and that Bolshevism will be its heir.”480 Indeed, as Diamant points out, several official
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communications from the Austrian Church described liberalism as the “principal enemy
of Catholicism because it had undermined the place of religion in Austrian life and had
thereby become the pacemaker of socialism and, ultimately, communism.”481 Among
them was Prelate Ignaz Seipel—twice chancellor, a stalwart supported of the
Heimwehren, and leading personality of the far-right wing of the Christian Social Party—
who believed that this was precisely why Austria’s parliamentary democracy had to be
swept away; political partisanship prohibited the government from administering to “the
interests of the common good” and therefore contradicted Catholic social theory.482
Like the lamentations of Heimwehr leaders, Pope Pius XI indignantly described
the ills brought about by free market capitalism. “Free competition has destroyed itself;
economic dictatorship has supplanted the free market; unbridled ambition for power has
likewise succeeded greed for gain; all economic life has become tragically hard,
inexorable, and cruel,” he laments. “To these are to be added the grave evils that have
resulted from an intermingling and shameful confusion of the functions and duties of
public authority with those of the economic sphere – such as, one of the worst, the virtual
degradation of the majesty of the State, which although it ought to sit on high like a
queen and supreme arbitress, free from all partiality and intent upon the one common
good and justice, is become a slave, surrendered and delivered to the passions and greed
of men,” Pius XI adds.483
The Church and the Heimwehren did find agreement with capitalist liberal
democracy in their fear of socialism, as it gained more adherents in latter half of the
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nineteenth century and into the early twentieth. Marxism’s secular, anti-clerical stance
threatened the Church as well as liberal principals of private property and free market
economics were existential threats. “The notion that class is naturally hostile to class, and
that the wealthy and the working men are intended by nature to live in mutual
conflict…[is] irrational and so false is this view that the direct contrary is the truth,” Leo
XII criticized.484 He adds, “every man has by nature the right to possess property as his
own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and…animal.”485 Pius XI
notes, that in the 40 years since Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum, socialism “has sunk into
Communism,” which intensified class warfare and the assault on private property. “To
achieve these objectives there is nothing which it does not dare, nothing for which it has
respect or reverence; and when it has come to power, it is incredible and portentlike in its
cruelty and inhumanity,” he explains, referring to the communist revolutions in Russia
and, perhaps, Hungary.486 Christian anti-Semites also frequently viewed Marxism as an
“apocalyptic conspiracy, a coordinated international assault on Christian values.”487
Heimwehr propaganda articulated this fear of Marxism, as illustrated above, in much
more venomous, metaphoric terms, likening it to intellectual poison, bacteria, disease, or
illness.
In reality, it was not the fear of socialism that so much disturbed conservative
Catholic and nationalist circles, rather it was the fear of Marxist revolution and the onset
of communism. As Pius XI explains in Quadragesimo Anno,
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[Socialism] not only professes the rejection of violence but modifies and tempers to some
degree, if it does not reject entirely, the class struggle and the abolition of private
ownership. One might say that, terrified by its own principles and by the conclusions
drawn therefrom by Communism, Socialism inclines toward and in a certain measure
approaches the truths which Christian tradition has always held sacred; for it cannot be
denied that its demands at times come very near those that Christian reformers of society
justly insist upon.488

Its emphasis on the protection of the working poor and their interests, in particular, were
congruent with Catholic social teachings. As such, there existed some overlap between it
and the Church’s ambiguous proposal of corporatism. While Leo XIII lamented the
disappearance of occupational guilds, Pius XI called for their reintroduction, as the
fundamental component of the “Christian reconstruction of human society.” The revived
occupational guilds would be charged with the duty of selecting their “apostles” among
themselves who “should demonstrate that they are men possessed of the keenest sense of
justice, who will resist with true manly courage the dishonest demands or the unjust acts
of anyone, who will excel in the prudence and judgment which avoids every extreme,
and, above all, who will be deeply permeated by the charity of Christ, which alone has
the power to subdue firmly but gently the hearts and wills of men to the laws of justice
and equity.” The Church would, naturally, play a central role in this “reconstruction” by
providing Christian education, establishing “study groups guided by principles in
harmony with the Faith,” and utilizing “Spiritual Exercises” within the occupational
milieu.489
As its Korneuburg program outlined (above), Heimwehr leaders also sought to
establish a Christian corporatist government in Austria, a middle path between the
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extremes of socialism and parliamentary democracy. Its language was also similar to the
expressions of Catholic social thought: “we are determined to serve the whole
community;” replacing class struggle with “dignity and justice throughout society;” “for
the good of all;” “of the needs of the whole community,” all of which are consistent with
the Church’s fundamental understanding of the purpose of government. As Leo XIII
explained, “the object of the government of the State should be, not the advantage of the
ruler, but the benefit of those over whom he is placed;” in other words, it should “serve
the common good.”490
Heimwehr ideologues, Walter Heinrich, Hans Riehl and Odo Neustädter-Stürmer
had been traditionally portrayed as the chief architects of its corporatist vision and were
inspired chiefly by Catholic social theory and the writings Heinrich and Riehl’s mentor,
Othmar Spann. Spann, Riehl, and Heinrich, among others, had been tireless critics of
Austria’s democratic system. Spann, whose writings Catholic thinkers “drew heavily”
upon, contended that there could only be two types of society, individualistic and
universalistic. Individualistic societies were comprised of atomized individuals in pursuit
of their own, selfish aims, at the expense of the well-being of the collective whole. In
universalistic societies, Spann argues, people functioned more naturally as a part of a
collective, which prioritized the general well-being of society over selfish individualism.
This is also the overarching philosophy of Catholic social thought, which praises the
righteousness of the “common good.” Spann blamed liberal individualism for the
Enlightenment and the French Revolution, which destroyed medieval “organic unity” of

490

Leo XIII, “Rerum Novarum,” §32, 35.

207

European society.491 The latter, of course, corresponded with the ideals of Catholic social
theory, as it “reinforced the Romantic tendencies introduced into Austrian Catholic social
thought by [Adam] Müller (1779-1829) and [Karl von] Vogelsang (1818-1890).”492
The Korneuburg program, and later, the May Constitution of the “Austrofascist”
corporative state, extended beyond the rather cryptic, open-ended directive Pius XI to
establish an authoritarian framework that reflected the theories initially forwarded by
Vogelsang and refined by Heimwehr theoreticians. Heinrich explained at a Heimwehr
leadership meeting in January 1930, “The goal is the national, Christian, and social
German state, the basis of which are indicated in German history.” As Edmondson notes,
“in his view the corporative state would overcome class warfare, expertly promote the
economy, advance the common welfare, and be the guardian of social justice.”493 The
influence of Italian fascism on the Korneuburg program has been greatly overstated.
Furthermore, it did not mark a sudden and radical shift in ideology as historians have
described, at least not inside the leading circles of the Heimwehren.494 Dr. Raimond
Günther, an “ardent nationalist and anti-socialist,” whose work, according to Edmondson,
helped inspire Pfrimer’s 1931 coup attempt in Styria, was no stranger to the Heimwehr
leadership. He had supplied a basic framework for corporatist, authoritarian platform to
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the Heimwehren in February 1927.495 Interest in pursuing the corporatist direction is most
likely to have begun at least as early as 1926.
What the Korneuburg program did reflect, however, was a longer, more gradual
drift toward nineteenth century Catholic social theory that saw authoritarianism and
corporatism as a more organic combination—given the history of the region and
people—to ordering society as compared to the foreign, unnatural, and degrading effects
of liberal democracy, capitalism, and reactionary Marxism. The interpretation of the Oath
as being fascist and its rejection of various Heimwehr leaders indicates a widespread
misunderstanding of the foundations of Catholic social thinking from which it drew.
Carsten notes the potential for misunderstanding corporatism, questioning “how it was
possible to foist this child of a German professional brain on to the Heimwehren most of
whose members could not have made any sense out of Spann’s complicated and
highfaluting theory of ‘universalism’, or could even have been expected to read his turgid
prose.”496 Interpreting the Korneuburg Oath as fascist is, therefore, tantamount to
interpreting Catholic social theory as fascist.497 Lastly, the Korneuburg Oath was very
much indeed a “challenge” to their bourgeois political party patrons whose complacency,
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they felt, had allowed the Social Democratic Party, and the potential for communist
revolution, to grow into and remain a strong force in Austrian politics.498

Heimwehr Ideals in Practice
The activities and propaganda of the Heimwehr movement married traditional
militarism and Catholic social thought. In addition to various types of print media,
including posters, pamphlets, newspapers, books, leaflets, flyers, as well as radio
broadcasts, the ideals of the movement found expression through events such as flag
consecration ceremonies, rallies, war memorial services, as well as shooting
competitions, among other types of events.499 Consistent amongst these gatherings was
the presence of religious ceremony. Almost always held on weekends, each of these core
types of events incorporated Sunday morning field Mass services where Church fathers
reiterated the duties of the Heimwehren to defend God, the homeland, and its spirit.500
The Heimwehr rally would become the calling card of the movement and a powerful
political weapon, toppling one government and inspiring another.
The Heimwehr rally, which at times included each of these various activities,
served multiple purposes. To Lauridsen’s point, Heimwehr rallies were primarily
intended to promote esprit de corps amongst the local and provincial formations and
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reiterate the movement’s aims and ideals to the rank and file.501 However, rallies were
also intended for public consumption, creating a backdrop for the recruitment of new
members and inspiring public support.502 Federal leader, Dr. Richard Steidle, explained
the reason the Heimwehr held their rallies:
We hear so often that it would be better to spend money on other purposes than on our
marches. These are, however, necessary and have paid off amply. We want to show our
strength through our marches, and thus eliminate the organizing battles on the so-called
bourgeois side, and, on the other hand, show the workers, who are forced to organize with
the Social Democrats, to find shelter with us. Our marches have to take place mainly in
the industrial areas and cities, because there can be no red reservations in Austria and in
particular, Vienna cannot be a red one.503

In other words, in their uniforms, and some cases bearing their rifles, they were intended
to display the movement’s numbers, uniformity, discipline, and, thus, to project its
military strength to the encouragement of their supporters and intimidate their Social
Democratic and Republican Schutzbund opposition.
The rallies and counter-demonstrations of the Heimwehren and the Republican
Schutzbund normalized the militarization of politics in the First Republic. The series of
“monster” rallies in the autumn of 1928, which Steidle tabbed as “the fight for the
freedom of the streets,” the cities of Wiener Neustadt and Innsbruck were each
transformed into a “large military camp.”504 At the tension-filled October 1928 rally at
Wiener Neustadt, the city’s population was more than doubled by the over 19,000
Heimwehr men, 14,000 Schutzbund members, who were there to stage their own counter-
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demonstration, and the 8,000 gendarmerie and police officers to keep the peace, flooded
into the city.505 Many observers—both inside and outside of Austria—feared that the rally
would spark a civil war between the two paramilitary forces.
Less than a month later, a Heimwehr rally held on November 12, 1928—the tenth
anniversary of the republic—saw over 17,000 Heimwehr men from across Austria
descend on Innsbruck. The anniversary was, according to Steidle, “purely a family matter
for the Austro-Marxists,” insinuating that it was most definitely not a day of celebration
for non-Marxist circles. Instead, he added, it was up to the Heimwehren to re-sow into the
Austrian ground, the “Christian and national ideals of old” to remedy the contamination
of “non-German cultural heresy” of Marxism.506 The result of the two-and-a-half-hour
long Heimwehr procession before Tyrolean Governor, Dr. Franz Stumpf, was indeed
reminiscent of the Austria of old.507 An account in the Vorarlberger Tagblatt described
the “triumphal procession” through Innsbruck:
Along the streets there formed innumerable rows of people. All windows of the
houses were occupied. Everyone rejoiced, a rain of flowers spilled over the
Heimatwehr men. It was an enthusiasm that has not been seen in Innsbruck for a
long time. The most impressive moment of the whole event was the heroic feat.
The peak of the train, surrounded by the exultation of the population, had just
reached Maria-Theresa Street. Then the chime of all the churches began, the
parade halted, followed by an impressive silence as a respect for the fallen
members of the army. The impression of this honor was indescribable.
Throughout the city there was a great silence.508
The Heimwehr units carried their rifles over their shoulders as they paraded through the
city, acknowledging the traditional Tyrolean “right to bear arms.” Indeed, according to a
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report to the chancellor’s office in Vienna, the Heimwehren “made the best possible
impression in view of their equipment and discipline.”509 After, Stumpf would liken the
mood of the city during the rally to the outpouring of jubilation in 1914, when the people
of Innsbruck sent their young men off to front.510
The desire and efforts of the Heimwehr movement to re-institutionalization the
prewar culture of militarism as a central feature of Austrian state was not unique to the
Heimwehr movement, nor to Austria. Rather it was a consistent feature of the “culture of
defeat” that emerged in radical right circles in the footprint of the defeated Central
Powers. The virtues extolled in the militarism of the Habsburg army framed the
militarism of the Heimwehren.511 It was “[n]ot the drill was the distinguishing mark of
the old army, but discipline. An undisciplined people are resigned to the decay without
rescue.”512 Within the Heimwehr movement, regional expressions of militarism, often
couched in local mythology and patriarchal militarism, were also recognizable in its
gatherings. In the case of Tyrol, for instance, this is evident in the continued veneration
for the patriots of the Tiroler Freiheitkampf of 1809, most especially Andreas Hofer. As
Gauführer (district leader) of the Lower Inn Valley (Tirol), Ludwig Psenner, explained to
his subordinates, the Heimatwehr wanted to “to protect the home and hearth from the of a
breakup of the country in order to preserve the inheritance which others have left us and
to renew our lives for our children and their children…Whoever does not defend his
home is not worthy of having a home.”513
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One of the ways the Heimwehr movement glorified Austria’s legacy of civic
militarism was through its participation in war monument dedications. If the estimations
of American military attaché, Major W.W. Hicks, are to be believed, roughly 70 percent
of the Heimwehr members had been in the military during the war, so such ceremonies
also had personal resonance for many Heimwehr members.514 Furthermore, war
memorial ceremonies provided the Heimwehren a platform to reiterate their credibility as
quasi-official auxiliary peacekeeping troops, particularly given the fact that many
Heimwehr leaders were, themselves, government officials on various levels. At
commemorations in smaller cities, local Heimwehr groups often played a more prominent
role, helping to officiate the ceremonies.515 They also presented the movement with
opportunities to gain the approval of former high-ranking officers of the old k.u.k. army,
whom remained respected figures in Austrian public life.516
Usually held on Sundays, the war memorial ceremonies were typically
concatenated with Mass services. Given solemn atmosphere of the occasion and the fact
that many war memorials were on church grounds or inside the churches themselves, the
centrality of the Church and the clergy to the events becomes obvious.517 In a particularly
extraordinary case was the sermon from the war memorial dedication at Brixlegg (Tyrol)
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in August 1926. Delivered by Prelate Anton Müller, a patriotic, Catholic priest and
adamant German nationalist who wrote under the pseudonym of “Bruder Willram”
during the Great War, and won acclaim for his glorification of war. His sermon did not
disappoint, remaining consistent in his glorification of the war dead. “Death on the
battlefield is a holy death,” he explains. Adding that “the hero’s death is like a sunset” in
that it is “enveloped in quiet beauty.”518 Müller’s romantic view of death in battle echoes
Hermann von Gilm’s idealized views of the masculine virtues civic militarism and the
war volunteerism of the Standschützen.
Following Mass, the planned orators would speak—lamenting the fallen, praising
the courage of the veterans and the army in the Great War, extolling the necessity of
perseverance, and preaching the need to restore the prestige and prosperity of German
culture—, and the ceremonies would be closed out with musical arrangements. As the
Reichspost detailed in one example memorializing the dead of the Deutschmeister
Regiment No.4, “Particularly poignant was the laying of fir-wreaths by the orphans of the
Deutschmeister Association, while the Regimental band played the song "Ich hatt’ einen
Kameraden" (I had a comrade), hardly one eye remained dry.”519
The rallies, memorial dedications, commemorations, and flag consecration
services of the Heimwehren reflect a clear alignment of the behaviors and actions of the
Heimwehr movement with its core values and assumptions. The central role of religious
ceremony in all of these events reflected the fundamental connection between the Church
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and the movement. Likewise, the gatherings, in each case, paid homage to vestiges of the
monarchy or lamented its passing. The passing of the dynasty was not so much lamented
as was the values bourgeois circles came to associate with it. Moreover, the rise of social
democracy corresponded with the fall of the empire, giving further reason to bemoan its
death. The ideology, behaviors, and activities of the Heimwehren, including its gendered
conceptualizations of militarism, mirrored the teachings of Catholic social thought that
undergirded the movement.

Conclusions
The Heimwehr movement—not unlike the Freikorps (volunteer corps) and the
Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria—materialized from the political instability, economic ruin,
and social upheaval in the wake of the First World War. The successful implementation of
social democracies in Germany and Austria, the communist triumph in the October
Revolution in Russia, followed by various, admittedly short-lived, communist
governments in Hungary and Bavaria, and coup attempts in Vienna and elsewhere in
eastern and central Europe, triggered widespread alarm in the conservative bourgeoisie
and upper classes. The paramilitary groups that had originally been mustered to combat
civil unrest and foreign invasion became anti-Marxist formations tasked with defeating
any leftist attempt to seize power. The Heimwehr movement—beyond its role in
maintaining “peace and order”—also served as a source of unity among the non-Marxist
Christian Social, German National, and agrarian parties. Its latter aim depended wholly
on the first, defending Austria from the grave threat of Marxist revolution. So long as the

216

Social Democratic Party and its paramilitary wing, the Republikanischer Schutzbund,
remained strong, the Heimwehren would remain relevant and its survival assured.
The charter of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr and those of the other Heimwehren, were
derived from that of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, and not only proscribed their general
organizational structure, but also included rudimentary parameters for membership;
specifically, one only need be of “reputable German descent” to join the Heimwehr
movement. This purposefully open-ended membership policy was designed to appeal to
non-Marxists of all political persuasions, which was what allowed it to be the unifying
factor that it was. Thus, its socioeconomically diverse membership ranged from elected
public officials, to members of the declassed aristocracy, to industrial workers. This basic
membership criteria, thus, prized numbers over a specific ideological uniformity—
disdain for anything “Rot” was sufficient. As such, it allowed the movement’s ranks to
swell between 300,000-400,000 members at its zenith in 1929.520 Furthermore, a
significant percentage of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr’s local and regional leaders were
elected officials, which offered numerous benefits and reflected the organization’s
attachment to, and dependence upon, local and provincial governments.
This membership model was satisfactory for building a unified bourgeois, antiMarxist defense organization, but proved problematic when the Heimwehren became
increasingly disenchanted with the perceived negligence of their political, industrial, and
financial patrons in the mid-1920s. Moreover, it indicates that the Heimwehr movement’s
eventual desire for independence from its patrons was not planned, but was an organic
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development born of the unwillingness of their patrons to allow for the overthrow of the
republic and the institution the Christian, corporatist state Heimwehr leaders came to
view as the only viable option for Austria’s survival. Be that as it may, Heimwehr leaders
remained true to the Schützen tradition of volunteerism and chose not to adjust its
membership parameters.
The tradition of civic militarism and war volunteerism of the Schützen were not
the only virtues the Heimwehr movement retained. It also reflected and cultivated the
traditional patriarchal attitude of conservative Catholic circles in Alpine society. The
defense of home and hearth were foundational duties of men, which were to be inculcated
from childhood. This was naturally intertwined with the gun culture of Alpine states like
Tyrol, where hunting and shooting were taught from youth by their fathers and through
the Schießstände. Combined with the institution of compulsory military service, hunting,
shooting, and military service were fundamental experiences shaping the worldview of
Austrian men and became foundational components of Heimwehr militarism. The
establishment of youth formations complimented the militarization of scouting
organizations in post-war Germany and Austria in the creation of a “new militarism” that
would propel the revitalization of the German cultural nation.
Like its traditional notion of militarism, its ideals were also informed by Catholic
social theory. This has been a point of misinterpretation by historians who have depicted
the movement as being purely negative in its orientation. The anti-Marxism, antiLiberalism, anti-Capitalism, and anti-parliamentary democracy was driven by Chuch
teachings, particularly after Leo XIII’s encyclical, Rerum Novarum. Catholic social
thinkers such as Adam Müller and Karl von Vogelsang constructed the foundation upon
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which University of Vienna Professor, Othmar Spann, built his argument for corporatism
in study, The True State (Der wahre Staat) and his students, Walter Heinrich and Hans
Riehl, wrote the Korneuburg Oath. The call of Heimwehr theorists for a corporatist
government was reiterated by the Pope Pius XI’s encyclical Quadragesimo Anno
published a year later, which called for the resurrection of occupational systems of
representation as a middle between Marxism on one side and liberal parliamentary
democracy on the other. The May Constitution of 1934 would marry the two, establishing
an authoritarian, Christian corporatists government in Austria, replacing the 1920
constitution.
The rallies and events of the Heimwehr movement reflected the convergence of
its conservative ideals and its brand of militarism that melded regional flavors with
Habsburg imperial traditions. As such, the Heimwehr rally reiterated the movement’s
purpose—as a paramilitary defense association and a source of unification for the
bourgeois right—and aims—the destruction of the Social Democratic Party,
constitutional reform, and ultimately, the implementation of an authoritarian, Christian,
corporatist state—for to its supporters and to foster camaraderie in its ranks. At the same
time, Heimwehr rallies were staged for public consumption to disseminate propaganda,
cultivate public support, and recruit new members. In this way, it served as an instrument
of political intimidation that helped normalize the militarization of politics in the First
Republic.
As chapter four will demonstrate, the Heimwehr movement enjoyed a broad basis
of support, most especially from those social groups who wielded influence in Habsburg
society, further echoing the its thoroughly traditional, mainstream character. The
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provincial governments, dominated by the bourgeois right, particularly the Christian
Social Party, created, supported, and protected the Heimwehr movement; Catholic clergy
legitimized it, the Habsburg aristocracy gave it standing and panache, while Austrian
banking and industry filled its coffers. While some scholars contend that the Heimwehr
movement was never a mass movement, it enjoyed much broader support than most
historians have given it credit for having.
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CHAPTER IV – THE HEIMWEHR: “AN IRRESISTIBLE POPULAR MOVEMENT”

Charles Gulick, in his two-volume study of Interwar Austria, posits that the
Heimwehr movement was never a “mass” movement based on its numerical strength.521
Edmondson, contends that only at its peak—by the summer of 1929—was the Heimwehr
movement “something approaching a popular movement.”522 To reduce perceptions of
the influence and support the Heimwehr movement garnered throughout interwar Austria
was a principal aim of the post-World War II “coalition historiography.” Austrian
historians advanced the interpretation that the movement was propelled by foreign
influences and, thus, not widely supported by the Austrian people. From this angle, the
realization of the movement’s aims of rolling back the republic and destroying the Social
Democratic Party once more depicts Austrians as the victims of foreign fascist designs.
This interpretation has remained the orthodox narrative but is problematic in that it does
not reconcile with the empirical evidence, nor with the overwhelming popular support for
the Nazi dictatorship.
How does one, then, define a “mass” or “popular” movement? What is the
threshold that must be crossed in order for an organization or idea to be considered as
having mass popular appeal? The illustration below offers a snapshot of approximate
membership figures of the Heimwehr movement at the peak of its strength:
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Table 8. Heimwehr Membership per Capita
Total Population in 1929:523
Heimwehr Membership:524
6,664,000
300-400,000

Population percentage:
4.5-6%

A comparison to current American membership organizations offers some useful
perspective. At the outset of 2016 the U.S. Census Bureau estimated the American
population to be 322,761, 807.525 If one takes this total, multiplied by the estimated
percentage of Austrians who were Heimwehr members in 1929 (between 4.5 and 6
percent), that would equate to an American organization having between 14,524,281 and
19,365,708 members. By population percentage, the Heimwehr movement boasted three
to four times as many members—at its peak—as the National Rifle Association,
according to the most recently released membership estimates. Put differently, there were
eleven to fifteen times as many Heimwehr members than there are active service
members in the United States military.526 Just as membership numbers for the National
Rifle Association are not representative of the totality of gun enthusiasts in the United
States, membership figures for the Heimwehr movement, alone, did not represent the sum
of all those who supported the its objectives and the ideals it represented. Like the figures
for active military personnel do not include veterans who served before them, nor do they
account for the families and friends of both soldiers and veterans that respect and support
American troops and veterans in a variety of capacities, the Heimwehr movement’s
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membership figures, alone, do accurately represent the broader popular support the
movement enjoyed. Thus, membership numbers cannot account for alternative
demonstrations of support in the form or monetary donations from provincial
governments, bourgeois political parties, private donors, and conservative media outlets
within Austria.
Thus, to determine the mass appeal of a movement by membership numbers alone
ignores numerous other important factors. As sociologist, William Kornhauser, explained,
“[m]ass movements mobilize people who are alienated from the going system, who do
not believe in the legitimacy of the established order, and who therefore are ready to
engage in efforts to destroy it. The greatest number of people available to mass
movements will be found in those sections of society that have the fewest ties to the
social order.”527 Scholars studying the Heimwehren have, by and large, considered it to
have not had a mass following, yet their depiction of the Heimwehr movement aligns
closely with Kornhauser’s classification and achieved a support from a significant
percentage of the population.
A more accurate way to engage this historiographical contradiction is to examine
the relationship of the Heimwehr movement with various segments of Austrian society
during the First Republic. The diverse membership of the Heimwehren would indicate
that had a wide appeal among various socioeconomic groups. Gulick suggests that:
The real impetus and support within Austria for Heimwehr-Clerical Fascism came
primarily from the following groups: 1. Big business. 2. Big finance 3. A few relatively
big landowners such as Prince Starhemberg. 4. Many Roman Catholic political leaders of
whom the most important were the priest, Ignaz Seipel (who was chancellor in several
cabinets), Steidle, Dollfuss, and Schuschnigg. 5. Many Roman Catholic priests who,
without identifying their Church with the movement, gave it substantial and important
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support. 6. Disgruntled army officers and aristocrats who had been declassed by the
disintegration of the empire. 7. Political adventurers, not to say "thugs," of the type who
flocked into Hitler's S.A. and S.S. formations. 8. Large groups of peasants. 9. Middleclass and "new" middle-class groups; that is, professional and small businessmen and
white-collar proletariat.528

If not mass in number, the socioeconomic groups which provided the Heimwehr the
greatest degree of support were substantial in their influence over virtually every
meaningful facet of life (political, social, religious, economic). The influence these
groups held in Austrian society was a force multiplier; their preeminence in crucial areas
of society enabled the Heimwehr movement to succeed with, perhaps, numerically less
popular support than their Schutzbund rivals. Though the historiography of the Heimwehr
movement has followed narrow numerical assessments, the wider support base of the
movement deserves further attention in order to achieve a more sophisticated
understanding as to the support it enjoyed.
This section will demonstrate, most especially in the Tyrolean case, that the
Heimwehren often drew their most dedicated supporters from those social groups that
were most prominent and faithful in the former Habsburg monarchy, many of which
Gulick identifies: the declassed aristocracy, former k.u.k. army officers, Catholic clergy,
financiers and industrialists, as well as farmers and agricultural laborers. There was also a
significant degree of overlap between these groups, particularly as it related to the
aristocracy, industrialists, financiers, and the former officer ranks. That is to say, contrary
to how they have been portrayed in the historiography of the Heimwehr movement, these
were not entirely discrete social groupings; there are numerous examples of nobles being
former officers or leading figures in the financial and industrial sectors. In this way, facile
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assertions that one social group or another supported the Heimwehren, must be
considered with greater care.
Moreover, Gulick neglects to include the numerous government officials at all
levels of administration, who were integral in establishing provincial Heimwehr groups,
helping to secure funding and weapons as well as offering a legal basis for their very
existence; without participation and support of local and provincial officials, the
Heimwehr movement could not have materialized, much less survived. The establishment
and development Heimwehr movement did not follow the grass-roots, revolutionary
trajectory of contemporary “fascist” movements in Europe. Provincial Heimwehr
organizations were thoughtfully created by, for the support of, those state governments
who feared the advance of Marxism after 1917; thus, it was a product of the political
crises spawned by the First World War and collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy. As such,
the Heimwehr movement was an extra-legal vehicle through which mainstream
conservative circles of Austrian society combatted the foreign ideals of Marxism and
attempted to reassert a Church-guided authoritarianism that would, therefore, restore
traditional German culture and destroy the international worldview of Marxist ideology
and its subjugation to Western parliamentary democracy.

Provincial Governments and the “loyal aspirations” of the Heimwehren
Most fundamental in the foundation, survival, and expansion of the Heimwehr
movement was the support of local, state, and federal government officials. In virtually
all of Austria’s provinces, particularly in the movement’s early years, government
officials worked closely with Heimwehr leaders. Numerous other provincial governors
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played important roles in establishing the Heimwehr formations in their provinces.
Kondert offers several illustrative examples, noting how Upper Austrian Governor Franz
Langoth worked diligently to secure and distribute the necessary weapons to Heimwehr
formations in the province. Vinzenz Schumy, a figure of later Heimwehr disdain, helped
subsidize the Carinthian Heimwehr while provincial governor from 1923-1927.
Vorarlberg Governor, Dr. Otto Ender, was instrumental in protecting the Heimwehren in
his province, arguing in the Vorarlberger Landtag (Vorarlberg Diet), that the formations
had the right to receive arms from Bavaria. Arguably the most strident supporter of the
Heimwehr movement, among provincial governors, was Styrian Governor, Anton
Rintelen. Rintelen aided in securing an immense stockpile of weapons and, with
Lieutenant Governor, Dr. Jakob Ahrer, helped obtain an equally immense amount of
money for the Styrian Heimatschutz.529 Further instances of collusion were offered in one
particular speech delivered by Dr. Julius Deutsch, leader of the Social Democratic
paramilitary organization, the Republikanischer Schutzbund, he spoke, as Gulick notes, at
length about:
the cooperation between the Heimwehr and local officials, both city and state, he went on
to the matter of arms smuggling, giving precise dates, the license number of an
automobile seized in Innsbruck, the character of the weapons being transported, and
similar details. The most convincing item in his indictment was the official report of a
gendarmerie inspector in Salzburg stating that every night between October 10 and 15,
1920, some 30 to 40 men had crossed from Bavaria bringing arms.530

In Tyrol, the state government supported the Heimatwehr in much the same
fashion it had the Standschützen before the Great War, granting it semi-official
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recognition as a, more or less, national guard and financing its operation.531 Against the
demands of the Interior Ministry, concerned over violations of the Treaty of Saint
Germain, the Christian Social and German nationalist officials played a key role in the
creation of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr. Governor of Tyrol, Dr. Franz Stumpf, justified the
formation of the Heimatwehr by pointing to civil unrest such as the hunger riots that took
place in Innsbruck the year before, explaining that the “organization…serves to maintain
peace and order and [is] therefore quite legitimate.”532 The Heimwehr organizations, most
especially in Austria’s Alpine provinces where Christian Socials dominated state and
local governments, functioned in similar auxiliary capacities. According to Gulick, their
“peace keeping” mission as a euphemism for suppressing Social Democratic influence,
labor unions, and workers’ strikes.533
The 1920 Landesschießen (statewide shooting contest), staged by the Tyrolean
Heimatwehr in conjunction with the Tyrolean government, is a useful example that
illustrates the ardent support of the Heimatwehr by conservative state officials. The
announcement of the Landesschießen sparked a national controversy. The close
collaboration between the Tyrolean government and the Tyrolean Heimatwehr in
planning the shooting festival prompted fear that it would violate Article 133 of the
Treaty of Saint Germain, which stated:
Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, all arms,
munitions, and war material, including any kind of anti-aircraft material, of whatever
origin, existing in Austria in excess of the quantity authorized shall be handed over to the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Delivery shall take place at such points in
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Austrian territory as may be appointed by the said Powers, who shall also decide on the
disposal of such material.534

According to the IMCC, the shooting festival was in “certain contradiction” of the treaty.
The general fear was that the Allies would respond by reducing or withholding the food
aid being poured into Austria, which Austrian citizens desperately needed to stave off
malnutrition and starvation. In response, the Federal Foreign Ministry directed the
Interior Ministry to compel the Tyrolean government to distance itself from the
Landeschießen.535 Tyrolean Volkspartei (the Christian Social party in Tyrol) officials
flouted pleas from Vienna to distance themselves from the shooting competition and,
instead, took the opportunity to remind the federal government and the IMCC of the
centuries-old right to bear arms Tyrol had enjoyed under the House of Habsburg, stating
that “the use of rifles is a holy right of which no one can deprive the Tyrolese.”536
Stumpf was the key figure in the creation of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr and it
functioned largely at his discretion, especially in the early years of its existence. The
police force in Tyrol’s larger cities and, especially its capital city, Innsbruck, were, in
Stumpf’s opinion, sympathetic to local Social Democratic leaders and, therefore,
unreliable. He used the Heimatwehr as a counterweight to this problem and demanded
that police leaders, and their subordinates, become Heimatwehr members. In this way,
Stumpf essentially subordinated the police to the Heimatwehr prompting, then Minister
of the Interior, Johann Schober, to counter that public confidence in the police would be
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shaken if it were not completely impartial.537 The Governor responded to Schober’s
warning, stating that:
The policeman is civil servant; he must not be impaired in his civic rights. These include
memberships in clubs. I am not aware of a single club that would prohibit the
policemen…But the Selbstschutzverband (the Tiroler Heimatwehr) with its loyal
aspirations focused on the restoration of our destroyed nationality is forbidden.538

While no doubt this was Stumpf’s sincere belief, his rebuttal ignored the reality of the
situation in the province—that he was using the Heimatwehr as, to use Charles Gulick’s
words, “an instrument of force” to intimidate Tyrolean factory workers, police leadership,
and the Arbeiterwehr (Workers’ Guards).539 As it were, Heimatwehr men—normally
unemployed members—continued to function as auxiliary policemen, usually in
emergency situations. On other occasions, such as in the autumn of 1924 when Tyrolean
police forces were considerably shorthanded, Heimatwehr men filled the gap for an
extended period of time.540
In May 1929 the federal government, in an effort to protect summer tourism,
prohibited “all parades of uniformed paramilitary associations” during the summer
months.541 Stumpf as well as the Governor of Styria, Anton Rintelen, did not enforce the
ban, allowing the Heimwehren to continue their rallies and parades, “in open contempt
for (Vinzenz) Schumy’s directive.” In Lower Austria blood was shed in a couple of
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different instances in which the Heimwehren defied the moratorium.542 Despite the
determination of the Styrian Heimatschutz to initiate a violent confrontation at St.
Lorenzen, the incident illustrated disregard for the Vice Chancellor’s edict by both the
Heimatschutz as well as the Republikanischer Schutzbund.543 Despite the fact that Allied
governments continuously dangled loans as incentive for Austrian governments to press
harder for the disarmament of paramilitary organizations, their efforts failed to gain
traction, as the constitution afforded the provinces significant autonomy. As in the case of
Tyrol, the Landtag simply passed measures to activate the Heimatwehr as an emergency
police force, placing it under the protection of the Tyrolean government.544
Stumpf not only protected the Tyrolean Heimatwehr from the federal government
in Vienna, he also insulated the formation inside Tyrol. In strictly confidential directives
issued to district-level party officials, he declared that they were to 1) become
Heimatwehr and Technischen Nothilfe (Technical Emergency Assistance) members
themselves, 2) protect Heimatwehr members from threat of punishment, and 3) exempt
Heimatwehr members from motor vehicle driving bans.545 The Heimatwehr was, for all
intents and purposes, given carte blanche in Tyrol.
In addition to functioning as an auxiliary police force, and counterweight to the
comparatively modest Arbeiterwehr and, after 1923, the Republikanischer Schutzbund,
Stumpf also tasked the Heimatwehr to initiate preparations for an “eventual Italian
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invasion.”546 The basis for this directive is not entirely clear, though it is likely predicated
on the tensions between Austria and Italy over South Tyrol. It is clear, however, that he
distrusted Italy. This makes the agreement that Steidle and Pabst eventually struck with
Mussolini in June 1928 all the more ironic; in exchange for Italian financial and military
support, they promised that the new authoritarian government they intended to install
would clamp down on anti-Italian sentiments expressed in the Austrian media, which
were due in large part to the annexation of South Tyrol in 1919. Günther Messner
contends, however, that was unlikely that Stumpf was aware of the specifics of their
agreement, as he would have otherwise rejected it because of his commitment to the
South Tyroleans.547
Indeed, the Heimatwehr alliance with Fascist Italy cemented a new trajectory for
the Heimwehr movement and challenged the generally close relationship with their
respective provincial governments. Mussolini’s military and financial support allowed the
Heimwehren to distance itself from Austria’s bourgeois parties, which it had previously
relied upon and served, and develop its own, more radical, anti-democratic platform inline with Mussolini’s. According to Messner, when information regarding the relationship
between the Heimwehr movement and Fascist Italy was exposed by Social Democrats in
the Tyrolean Landtag (Tyrolean parliament) in December 1929, it put the Tyrolean
Heimatwehr and its supporters in an unenviable position and hastened the codification of
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the movement’s commitment to an anti-democratic, authoritarian regime in the form of
the Korneuburg Oath. The information revealed to the public highlighted not only
Heimatwehr cooperation with Italy, but worse, its willingness to acquiesce to Italian
possession of South Tyrol in exchange for Italian money and arms. Additionally, it also
exposed the cooling of attitudes among Heimatwehr leaders toward the unification of
Austria with Germany. Tyrolean Social Democrats adeptly exposed the “duplicity” of the
Heimatwehr leadership and, by association, their bourgeois party supporters, particularly
in their willingness to forgo the issue South Tyrol.548
At the same time, however, suspicions of a relationship between the Heimatwehr
leaders and Mussolini should not have been a shock by December 1929. A November 3,
1927 article in the conservative Allgemeiner Tiroler Anzeiger, for example, dismisses a
report from the previous day’s Münchner Neuesten Nachrichten warning of right-wing
putschist activity in Austria, stating that “circles in Austria, which have long sympathized
with fascism and say that the active assistance of Italy in establishment of a fascist-like
dictatorship in Vienna would not be too dearly bought with the final renunciation of
German-South Tyrol.” The Anzeiger article continues, by dismissing earlier reports which
claimed that Steidle had seen departing a Heimatwehr leadership meeting in Baden
(Germany), accompanied by Italian and Hungarian representatives. Social Democratic
propaganda was behind this ludicrous idea.549 It was not the cooperation with Fascist
Italy that so much strained the relationships between the governments and the
Heimwehren, rather it was the escalating anti-democratic hostility of Heimwehren
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rhetoric that created rifts between the movement and its provincial supporters. So long as
the Heimwehren continued to function as an anti-Marxist instrument of the Austrian
bourgeois parties, connections to Italy could be overlooked. Open threats and ultimatums
to the government could not be glossed over, as the foreign aid that kept Austria afloat
was predicated on the stability of its political climate.
Whatever tensions that emerged between the Heimatwehr and the Tyrolean
government as a result of the ‘revelations’ presented by Tyrolean Social Democrats were
not readily apparent. The publication of Steidle’s Korneuburg program evoked resolute
action from Chancellor Johann Schober. It was Schober’s belief that Pabst had been the
“evil” force behind this turn toward fascism and had him deported to Italy. It was no
surprise that Steidle criticized the government’s actions, but Stumpf’s reaction was an
indication of the close personal relationships he had developed with the members of the
Heimatwehr Landesleitung (state leadership) and his reluctance to readily abandon his
creation.550 According to Stumpf, Pabst was:
taken into custody without prior consultation with the Tyrolean government and removed
from Austria. It sees this as an assault not only on the person of Major Pabst, but also on
a movement which much of the state-abiding population closely adheres. The Tyrolean
Government regrets this incident all the more as it is due apparently to a member of the
Federal Government opposed to the Heimwehr and is regarded as an act of weakness
against elements hostile to the state.551

Furthermore, in letters to Schober and Vice-Chancellor Carl Vaugoin Stumpf appealed
Pabst’s case and eventually petitioned the Administrative Tribunal in Vienna to have the
expulsion order overturned, to no avail.552
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With the publication of the Korneuburg Oath, combined with Mussolini’s
pressure for more decisive action, the new Bundesführer, Ernst Rüdiger Prince von
Starhemberg, called for the Heimwehren to enter a list of candidates for the forthcoming
federal election, which further soured relations with bourgeois party leaders. As a result,
Christian Social and pan-German party leaders cut off what financial support they had
either arranged or could influence. Starhemberg’s decision also aggravated Heimwehr
members who were bourgeois party representatives, most especially of the Christian
Social Party. Despite being couched firmly in Catholic social theory, the Korneuburg
Oath evoked mixed reactions that spanned the gambit of complete support to outright
rejection among the provincial Heimwehr leaders in attendance and was an immediate
strain on the confederation. Division within and among the provincial organizations
emerged between those favoring the Korneuburg course and Heimwehr leaders who
favored continued cooperation with the bourgeois parties.553
The political challenge the Korneuburg program issued to the bourgeois parties
placed the Heimwehren firmly at odds with many influential government officials who
had, heretofore, supported the movement or, at the very least, did not oppose them or
their activities. Many of the leading members of the Tyrolean Volkspartei, not
Heimatwehr members, chided Steidle and his oppositional program and demanded that
the Tyrolean government “break” with the Heimatwehr and create a new, governmentsubordinate civil defense force.554 Stumpf acquiesced. It was not until the autumn of 1932
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that the Heimatwehr and the Tyrolean government resumed close cooperation. In the
meantime, however, it was clear that Italian funds alone were not enough to sustain the
organization; as one report complained, the organization nearly withered away.555
Nevertheless, the Heimwehren persevered and after March 1933, with suspension
of parliament and end of democratic government, gained substantial power funding in
Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss’s new authoritarian government. Dollfuss appointed
Heimwehr men to high ranking federal government positions. Vienna Heimwehr leader,
Emil Fey, was made Vice Chancellor, Starhemberg was given leadership over the
Fatherland Front, the state political party, Odo Neustädter-Stürmer assumed the position
of State Secretary, Steidle now served as the Federal Commissioner and Vice President
the state radio system (RAVAG), and Dr. Ludwig Draxler—who would later serve as
Finance Minister under Schuschnigg—became legal counsel for Austria’s national bank,
Creditanstalt-Wiener Bankverein. The Heimwehren assumed the familiar role of an
auxiliary peace keeping force, only this time at the behest of the federal government.
Most importantly at this time, Heimwehr units served as border patrol forces to prevent
the potential smuggling of weapons and equipment into the country from foreign
supporters of the Social Democrats and most especially, a new enemy—the German
National Socialist Workers’ Party (DSNAP).556 The Heimwehr movement, in terms of
political clout, peaked under the Dollfuss government, only to be whittled down and
eventually dissolved in October 1936 by his successor, Kurt von Schuschnigg.
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The paramilitary Heimwehr movement was a creation of the provincial
governments of the new Austrian republic. The formations reflected the widespread fear
of Marxism and the threat of communist revolution, which had overcome eastern and
central Europe in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. For many conservativeminded Tyroleans like governors Schraffl and Stumpf, the Heimatwehr also represented
the continuity of its centuries-old militia system, which, by the outset of World War I, had
become an integral part of Tyrolean culture and symbolized its regional identity of
independence and historic opposition to centralized authority.

Clerics, Political Catholicism, and the Heimwehr Movement
The protection and backing the Heimwehren received by provincial governments,
and eventually by the Dollfuss government, was underscored by the broad support of
Catholic clergy, church functionaries, and the Christian Social Party (CSP). Church
fathers officiated flag consecrations, field masses at Heimwehren rallies, and performed
invocations at events such as shooting contests, not to mention recruiting the support of
prominent members of Austrian society. Clerical support for the Heimwehren also
translated into the participation of Catholic associations in the movement, such as student
groups, labor unions, agricultural associations and sporting clubs. Given the historical
prominence of the Catholic Church in Austria, clergymen played a particularly vital role
in legitimizing the Heimwehr movement in the minds of their parishioners.557 Moreover,
the Christian Social Party, in which Catholic clerics such as Dr. Ignaz Seipel played
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integral roles in guiding, dominated the government on the provincial and federal levels
and supplied political support, which translated into flexible interpretations of the
ambiguous statutes of the Treaty of Saint Germain, the passing of legislation to
essentially protect party-friendly, anti-Marxist paramilitary formations, and, lastly,
monetary support to the always-needy provincial Heimwehren.558
One of the principal ways clerics exhibited their support for the Heimwehr
movement was by officiating flag dedications and field Masses at Heimwehr rallies. The
Heimwehr newspaper, the Alpenländische Heimatwehr, detailed the flag dedication
ceremony of the Innsbrucker Heimatwehr in December 1925. On the hallowed ground of
Berg Isel, with Landeshauptmann (or Governor) Dr. Franz Stumpf, numerous Tyrolean
officials in attendance, Auxiliary Bishop of Brixen, Dr. Sigismund Waitz, presided over
the ceremony, concluding his benediction with, “Tiroler Heimatwehr, your flag is blessed,
it is raised and flutters in the wind, follow your flag, the blessing of God accompanies
you!”559 In 1935, at the fifteenth anniversary of the Heimwehr movement, Starhemberg
called Waitz, now Archbishop of Salzburg, “an old, loyal friend who has done much for
the (Austrian) Heimatschutz and the enforcement of the Heimatschutz idea.”560
Beyond their support in ceremonial capacities, clergy members leveraged their
place in Austrian society to support Heimwehr objectives. Throughout Austria,
Heimwehren, with the cooperation of Church clergy, used flag dedication ceremonies as a
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way to circumvent the previously mentioned ban of public demonstrations by
paramilitary organizations during the summer of 1929. Because the flag dedications
included a Mass ceremony led by a Catholic priest, they could be considered churchsanctioned events and were, therefore, had to be permitted under the law.561 One
“Heimwehr-Priester,” Father von Rastbach, went so far as to consecrate a shooting range
so as to permit the Heimwehr to hold an event that summer.562 Later that summer, Styrian
Bishop, Dr. Ferdinand Pawlikovski, who was the Military Vicar of Austria, accompanied
a Heimwehren delegation who met with Chancellor Schober, intent on pressing their calls
for constitutional reform.563
Catholic clergymen portrayed the Heimwehren as defenders of the Church in the
tradition of the Habsburg Monarchy. Their politicized sermons that warned that
Christianity was being threatened by the “godless” Marxists of the Social Democratic
Party and their paramilitary wing, the Republikanischer Schutzbund, made their portrait
of the Heimwehren all the more palatable to rural, traditional-minded Austrians.564 As
Schneeberger explains, the smaller and more rural the community, the greater the
influence of the parish church in the religious, social, and, consequently, the political
outlook of its congregation. As such, local clergymen utilized their position in the Church
and the Church’s position in the community to mobilize support among their worshippers
for the Heimwehren and the Christian Social Party through sermons that depicted the
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struggle against Marxism as a holy crusade of good against evil in which the very
survival of Christianity was at stake.565 To be sure, the electoral success of the
Heimatblock in Upper Austria during the 1930 national election, for instance, was aided
greatly by the support of the clergy, who emphasized the positive relationship between
the Church and the Heimwehr movement.566
This does not mean that the relationship between clerics, the Christian Social
Party, and Heimwehren was free of challenges and setbacks. Despite the outward
appearance of unanimity, many Christian Social representatives were reluctant to support
the Heimwehr movement. Despite the success of the Heimwehren in smashing the riots
of July 1927 in Vienna and breaking the subsequent national railroad strike, most
Christian Social representatives were disinclined to agree with Steidle’s—himself a
Christian Social National Council member (Bundesrat)—request for financial subsidies,
which he and Seipel were hoping to attain.567 Instead, party representatives called for the
reduction of the Heimwehren, while others suggested that that money would be better
served in dealing with the multitude of the unemployed. As Wiltschegg notes, numerous
other Christian Social functionaries reflected their mistrust of the Heimwehren, arguing
for the creation of the party’s own paramilitary organization (just as the Social Democrats
had done in creating the Republican Schutzbund), as the Heimwehren represented an
“tremendous danger.” Furthermore, the Christian Social Party’s labor union secretary,
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Hans Müller, claimed that local Heimwehr groups “were terror organizations against
Christian workers.”568
Such discord was not limited to political representatives, as there were also clergy
members who opposed clerical support of Heimwehr ideals and activities. Wiltschegg
offers one particularly extraordinary example where the Bishop of Linz, Dr. Johannes
Maria Gföllner, a strident opponent of the Heimwehren, had retired army chaplain, Josef
Schorr, at the time the parish priest for Laufen in Bad Ischl and supporter of the Upper
Austrian Heimwehr, transferred to Lower Austria, where Schorr proceeded to tend to the
4th Lower Austrian Heimatschutz Brigade. Gföllner would also see to the resignation of
Christian Social Party member and Chairman of the Catholic People’s Association for
Upper Austria, Dr. Josef Aigner. Moreover, Gföllner forbade priests under his supervision
to perform flag dedication ceremonies, while also forbidding Catholic women from
participating in the Heimwehr Women’s Auxiliary (Heimatwehr-Frauengruppen).569
The close association forged between Catholic clergy members and the Heimwehr
movement did not proceed without criticism. Social Democratic newspapers attacked the
sermons and speeches of clerics with biting sarcasm and disgust at what they perceived to
be hypocrisy in Christian prelates condoning the rabid anti-socialist, anti-Semitic rhetoric
of the Heimwehren. On Sunday June 12, 1920, the Shooting League of the Catholic
Workers Unions—whose members were in the Tyrolean Heimatwehr—held a shooting
contest at Berg Isel shooting range, in Innsbruck. As was typical, the contest was
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preceded by a Mass service. The communist party newspaper, Die Rote Fahne (The Red
Flag), disdainfully remarked, “So, first church and then practice for homicide! This
Christianity to be proud of!”570 On another occasion, Die Rote Fahne, called the
attendees of a Styrian rally in August 1928, “sponsors of murder.” The article continued,
suggesting that perhaps Bishop Pawlikowski would “issue a pastoral letter, wherein he
can request entry for the Heimwehr in God's name and his holy spirits, Amen.”571 The
juxtaposition of the “hate speech” of Heimwehr leaders and the Catholic clergy members
who officiated their events prompted wider criticism. A May 1929 article commenting on
a Heimwehr event in Vienna, contrasted the fact that in one moment the priest blessed the
flags of the newly established Heimwehr formations to enthusiastic applause, only to be
followed minutes later by Steidle and Pfrimer’s hateful political diatribes that tactlessly
railed against "the red whore," meaning, of course, Marxism or communism.572
Beyond officiating Heimwehr ceremonies and advocating for the movement,
clergy members also took a more active role in supporting the movement. For example,
in Kollerschlag, Upper Austria, the parish priest, a Father Pichler, founded a Heimwehr
group. He explained that founding a Heimwehr group “would prevent ‘whole villages,
such as Hinternebelberg, from burning down’” in a Social Democratic terror attack.573
There are numerous other cases of clergymen allowing their churches to serve as
weapons depots for the Heimwehren.574
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As previously stated, the decision of the Heimwehren to seek out Mussolini’s
counsel, funding, and military aid enabled the movement to express its disapproval of the
laxed position of Austria’s bourgeois parties vis-à-vis the Social Democrats. This was
evident not only in the publication of the Korneuburg Oath, but also in the establishment
of the Heimatblock, the movement’s own political party. Moderate Christian Social party
officials saw this shift as an ominous development toward the imminence of a coup
d’état. Thus, in December 1930, future Chancellor, Kurt Schuschnigg, founded the
paramilitary Ostmärkischen Sturmscharen, which was intended to compete with the
Heimwehren in recruiting Catholic youths. The Sturmscharen represented the realization
of the aforementioned desires for the Christian Social Party to forge its own paramilitary
wing.575 At the same time, the more moderate Christian Social representative and leader
of the Lower Austrian Heimwehr, Julius Raab, and his followers withdrew from
Starhemberg’s confederation, vowing to hold true to the movement’s pre-Korneuberg
ideals. In a letter written to the Ybbstal Zeitung, rail worker, member of the Union of
Christian Germans Transportation Workers, and Heimwehr member, Franz Bartik,
defends the Christian Social Party, stating that they are not at fault for their split and that
the Christian Social Party “prepared and paved the ground upon which the former
Heimwehr was born and lived.” Imploring his rail worker colleagues to join him, adding,
the “Richtung Raab,” is the “true idea of the Heimwehr.”576
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Indeed, anti-clerical, pan-German leaders within the Heimwehr movement—most
prominently, Walter Pfrimer—consistently opposed close cooperation with the Church
and the Christian Social Party. In April 1931 Christian Social members of the Styrian
Heimatschutz became so exasperated with Pfrimer’s—and likely overall—opposition to
the Christian Social Party and his tirades against its affiliated labor unions, that several
formations in the provincial capital of Graz, split from the Heimatschutz and formed their
own organization, the Grazer Heimatschutzverbandes and elected as their leader,
Oberstleutnant a.D. (Ret.) Ernst Haffenbauer.577
Nevertheless, the relationship between the Heimwehren, the Christian Social
Party, clergy, and their parishioners was reciprocal. Congregation members utilized the
infrastructure and voice of the Church, the Christian Social Party, and the Heimwehren as
a means of furthering their own economic interests. Through the Heimwehren’s
opposition to the secular ideals of Marxism, ecclesiastical circles viewed the movement
as one of potential renewal of German Christianity.578 Thus, the Christian Social clergy
sought to integrate their devout Christians into the Heimwehr movement in order to
insure its reliability as a force to protect the Church. An exchange between Steidle and
pastor Thomas Tembler in Strassen (Lienz, Tyrol), provides an excellent illustration of
how this relationship worked. In his letter dated February 22, 1928, Tembler explained
that the Catholic Workers Association in Strassen sought to form for a “Wehrgruppe,” and
requested from the Landesleitung, a supply of rifles to be sent via post (“for the sake of
safety”) to the association’s office. Steidle graciously responded that he would gladly
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supply the new “Wehrgruppe” with the rifles and would also write to district captain,
Nationalrat Erich Kneussl and Oberforstrat Karl Ritter von Worzikowsky-Kundratitz,
informing them of the transaction and to offer his support for the new group.579
Chief among the clerical supporters of the Heimwehr movement was prelate and
Christian Social Party leader, Chancellor (1922-1924, 1926-1929) Dr. Ignaz Seipel.
Almost immediately upon Seipel’s appointment to the chancellorship, he attempted to
seize upon the potential power of the Heimwehr movement to unify conservative
Heimattreue Bevölkerung against the Social Democrats.580 Seipel brokered a deal in
which sympathetic industrialists would provide 150,000,000 kronen per month to the
Chancellor who would then distribute the funds to the provincial Heimwehren
organizations. Despite Steidle’s efforts to unify the Heimwehren in support of Seipel’s
proposal, the leaders of nationalist, anti-clerical formations in Vienna, Styria, and
Carinthia opposed aligning their organizations with the Christian Social Party.581
In Seipel’s second term as Chancellor, he again made clear his support for the
Heimwehren. Amidst the tensions leading up to what has come to be known simply as the
“Juli Ereignisse von 1927,” or the “July Events of 1927,” Social Democratic appeals to
the Chancellor to disarm the Heimwehren were deflected by half-hearted claims that the
federal government did not have the authority. While not entirely disingenuous, as the
constitution granted the provinces substantial autonomy in administering to their internal
affairs, Seipel had no intentions of even attempting to disarm the Heimwehren.
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Furthermore, any attempt to do so would have most assuredly triggered civil war, as
Steidle made clear the resolute resistance the Heimwehren would offer. On two occasions
in October 1927, Seipel publicly commended the protection the Heimwehren offered
against the “enemies of Jesus Christ,” meaning, of course, the Social Democrats. In the
meantime, with the Chancellor’s encouragement, Steidle made another attempt to unify
the Heimwehren. This time, the financial assistance Seipel facilitated was successful in
creating a federal Heimwehr front—the Bund österreichischer Selbstschutzverbände.582
Quite to the contrary of Jedlicka’s assertion that the Heimwehren utilized rallies
and parades, such as that which occurred in Wiener-Neustadt in October 1928, to “drive
the hesitant government, and above all Dr. Seipel, into altering the constitution, perhaps
through some kind of putsch or coup d'état,” it was Seipel who utilized such
demonstrations to press for the passage of controversial legislation and amendments to
the constitution.583 In fact, in September 1928, prior to their march on Wiener-Neustadt,
Steidle three and other Heimwehr leaders met with Seipel to ask for his backing should
hostilities breakout with the Social Democratic Republican Schutzbund during the course
of the demonstration. Seipel replied to the affirmative, so long as they did not intend to
purposefully initiate hostilities.584 True to their word, the Heimwehren “Aufmarsch”
(parade) and rally in Wiener-Neustadt occurred without incident.
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Indeed, throughout this term as Chancellor, Seipel “encouraged [Heimwehr]
activity in hopes of forcing the socialists to make concessions on bitterly contested
legislation, including the revision of the constitution that he hoped would pave the way
for a more authoritarian form of government.” During the tension-filled days leading up
the Wiener-Neustadt rally, Seipel was resolute in his defense of the Heimwehren against
Social Democratic calls to forbid the march, which many in Austria feared would trigger
a civil war. As Edmondson notes, Seipel refused to restrict their activities and actively
working to strengthen the movement in Vienna—the stronghold of the Social
Democrats.585 The Seipel government continued to subsidize Heimwehren activities until
its very end, as indicated in a March 2, 1929 letter Steidle wrote to Seipel, requesting
“100,000 Schilling für den Grazer Aufmarsch.”586
Seipel’s abrupt resignation in April 1929 was an indictment of the alleged failure
of parliamentary democracy, which he viewed as Austria’s greatest crisis. Thus, his
resignation was quite possibly a single move in a larger plan to undermine the
parliamentary system. That is, Seipel, as the leader of the political Catholic Christian
Social Party, perhaps believed that he could effect change more efficiently behind the
scenes and outside of the office of Chancellor, which, by the very mechanisms of a
republican state, limited the ways in which he could maneuver. He remained a devoted
supporter the Heimwehren, calling the movement a “strong populist movement which
wants to free democracy from party rule!” To be sure, Seipel supported the Heimwehr
movement to see the his own designs for Austria come to fruition, which were most likely
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not aligned with the more fascist, corporative state that sections of the Heimwehren
would come to openly espouse. Nevertheless, as the German ambassador to Austria,
Hugo von Lerchenfeld, reported to the German Foreign Ministry, Seipel supported the
Heimwehr movement’s goals “from a to z.”587 Seipel remained a close and influential
advisor to Steidle, as well as Lower Austrian Heimwehr leader, Julius Raab. While this
aggravated the more radical anti-clerical elements in the Heimwehr movement who felt
their cooperation with the Christian Social Party was hampering the changing objectives
of the movement, Seipel continued to work to keep the Heimwehren unified.
Eventually, the strong political position of the Christian Social Party within
Austria proved irresistible to the new Bundesfüher of the Heimwehr movement, Ernst
Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg, who had previously aligned himself with Pfrimer and
the Nazi-friendly, German nationalist elements with the Heimwehr movement. The
former Freikorps Oberland member publicly divorced himself from the Nazis and entered
into an alliance with Seipel and Mussolini and renewed cooperation with Steidle and Fey.
In the face of the defections that resulted, particularly amongst Styrian and Lower
Austrian formations, Seipel worked to reaffirm and solidify their reconciliation.588
Though the primary source of support within Austria’s federal government, Seipel
was but one of many of the Christian Social officials who supported the Heimwehr
movement. As has already been demonstrated, Franz Stumpf was the central figure in the
creation and preservation of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr throughout the course of its
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existence. Christian Social deputy, Dr. Heinrich Mataja, secured funds and arms from
Styria for the fledgling Salzburg Heimwehr in 1919.589 Early on, Heimwehr formations in
Vienna and Lower Austria won the support of the Christian Social Party, who connected
the formations with the financial backers in the form of the Wiener Kasino, also known as
the Vereinigung für Ordnung und Recht (Association for Law and Order).590
The close cooperation between the Heimwehren and the Christian Social Party
and the Church did not end with Seipel’s death in 1932. In fact, he did not live to see the
fruits of his labors in the form of the “May Constitution.”591 Implemented on May 1,
1934 and establishing what it’s preamble described as a “Christian, German State on a
corporatist basis,” the constitution reflected the collaboration of Heimwehr and Christian
Social leadership in its marriage of Catholic social teachings and corporatism. Chiefly
among those teachings underpinning the new authoritarian constitution was Pope Pius
IX’s encyclical Quadragesimo Anno. As Robert Pyrah contends, despite the institution of
a contradictory governmental structure, the “spirit” of the encyclical was evident in the
“anti-modern Catholic thinking” inherent in corporatism, itself a medieval
construction.592
To be sure, Catholic clergymen and many central figures in their political party
played leading roles in creating and maintaining the Heimwehr movement throughout
Austria. Without their financial, propagandistic, and political support the Heimwehren
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would have never survived, much less matured into the driving force for authoritarian
government. The Church-Heimwehren relationship reflected a continuity of traditional
Habsburg civic militarism, reflected not only in its rituals and ceremonies, but also in the
social groups that it drew its support—those of the leading stratum of the dissolved
Monarchy. Particularly for the more traditional elements of the Heimwehren, their
movement took on, for them, the feel of a holy crusade against the secular, anti-clerical
ideals of Marxism. It reflected not only an assault on their economic and individual
property rights, but also an assault on traditional forms of German cultural expression in
the Catholic Church. "It is not without deeper reason we almost never hold our rallies
without ecclesiastical assistance, without field mass, and as a symbol, it should be
considered that our speaker standing often before the altar as upright men, to speak to
you," explained one Heimwehr member.593 Thus, the relationship between the Church
and the Heimwehren was a natural alliance in the protection of true (Southern Catholic)
German values.

Nobles, Industrialists, and Bankers: Money, Prestige, and the Rise of the Heimwehren
The Heimwehr movement found many of its most prominent adherents from the
leading social groups of the old Monarchy. Not unlike the clergy, members of the
Habsburg aristocracy—despite having lost governmental recognition of their titles—
continued to carry much influence in Austrian society. As Carsten notes
[T]he great aristocratic names, which became prominent in the Heimwehren about this
time (1929), simply looked like a revival of noble and dynastic claims. According to a
report sent by the German legation in Vienna to Berlin, these circles were now thinking
Österreich Volkszeitung und Grenzpost, June 8, 1930, 2, cited in Schneeberger, “Sozialstruktur
der Heimwehr,” 81.
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of a come-back: ‘The Starhembergs and Czernins, the Hohenbergs and Morseys scent the
new air; they even form cavalry detachments, the horses of which they keep and feed.
One thinks the Middle Ages have returned…’

Though Pabst, according to one Hungarian diplomat, complained that a great many who
of them who had flooded into the Heimwehren were “incapable” leaders who “did more
damage to the movement than their names were worth.”594
Furthermore, the primary supporters of the “Ständestaat” would also come from
the “old ruling circles,” particularly the Catholic clergy, and the former aristocracy, who
leveraged the new authoritarian state as a means of “defending their established positions
against the threats from the left and the right.”595 Those nobles active in the Heimwehren
employed their social standing and wealth to help propel the movement into an
instrument of political influence. The ascent of the Heimwehren to the highest ranks of
political power in Austria, thus, restored them to a place of political prominence
commiserate with their old imperial titles and legacy. Moreover, many of the aristocrats
that became involved in the Heimwehr movement were former officers during or before
the Great War, so their involvement in paramilitary organizations like the Heimwehren
allowed them to again fulfill leadership positions, which also helped restore the
legitimacy of their former status.596 Indeed, the Heimwehren, beyond their primary
mission as the vanguard of the anti-Marxist front in Austria, through its deeply
conservative sensibilities, its endorsement by the clergy, and rituals such as parades, flag
consecration ceremonies, field Masses, and rallies, evoked a sense of nostalgia for the
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ritual pomp and pageantry of the empire, among many nobles. The broad backing of the
Austrian nobility highlights the residual culture of militarism inherited from the
Habsburg Monarchy.
Wiltschegg, pointing to the Association of Catholic Nobles in Austria as an
example, contends that of its 1393 total members, only twenty-six—1.9 percent—were
members of the Heimwehr movement.597 He then goes on to identify a total of 55 nobles
who served in middle and high-ranking positions within the Heimwehren.598
Table 9. Nobles in High-Ranking Positions within the Heimwehr Movement
Archdukes
4
Dukes

2

Princes

2

Counts

28

Barons

19

TOTAL

55

Thus, he concludes, “In the group of the highest leaders [of the Heimwehr movement] the
nobility was in no way a strong presence.” Be that as it may, Wiltschegg does not
consider those who were involved throughout the regional and local levels of leadership
within the movement. Take, for example, the son of Karl Matz Graf von Spiegelfeld,
Franz Xavier, who was a local Heimwehr leader in Lower Austria, Major Baron Karl
Skrbensky, who was active in the Upper Austrian Heimatwehr, or Karl von Arbesser, a
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district leader in the Styrian Heimatschutz.599 It is also worth reiterating that throughout
European history, the nobility was always small and exclusive socioeconomic class, so
size has never been an accurate barometer of influence in this case. Despite the fact that
Austrian nobles had lost official recognition of their titles less than a decade earlier; many
remained wealthy and influential figures in Austrian society and maintained much of their
prestige in popular culture.600 Furthermore, the participation of nobles in the Heimwehr
movement, was indicative of broader a counter-revolutionary trend. For example, of the
132 Freikorps known formations in Germany, 42 were led by aristocratic former officers.
In Hungary, 86 of the 163 members of the Prónay paramilitary unit were nobles who
frequently used them to intimidate estate servants, thus, maintaining their place in postwar Hungarian society. Thus, as Gerwarth notes, “aristocrats were highly overrepresented
in the counter-revolutionary movements of Central Europe.”601
Beyond active membership in the Heimwehr movement, it is necessary to address
an important discrepancy between numbers and influence. As this chapter has
demonstrated in the case of government officials and Catholic clergy, just because few of
their numbers were uniform-wearing members, should not be taken as an absence of
support for the Heimwehren. Edmondson notes, the “great land owners” (the nobles)
were counted amongst the principal financiers of the Heimwehr movement as early as the
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spring of 1921.602 An outstanding illustrative example can be found in the October 14,
1930 edition of the Arbeiter-Zeitung, which published the names and land holdings of
some 139 nobles who were either themselves Heimwehren members or had donated
money to the movement. The article carped, “If you leaf through the Year and Address
Book of Agriculture and Forestry, you believe yourself, at first, to have a noble directory
from the Middle Ages.”603 Among the names on the list were indeed among the most
illustrious houses of imperial history: Habsburg-Lothringen, Bourbon-Parma, Czernin,
Schwarzenberg, Starhemberg, and so forth and so on. The source from which the names
of these aristocratic donors were gathered is not declared beyond the vague explanation
of “member lists and donor cards,” which would have likely not been freely accessible to
Social Democratic news organs.
The front page of the October 23, 1930 edition of the left-leaning Linz newspaper,
Tagblatt, continued to push for land reform, as Social Democrats hoped to gain the
support of agricultural laborers and, simultaneously, weaken the conservative,
Heimwehren-supporting aristocracy. A graphic accompanying the article depicts the
considerable portion of Upper Austrian land owned by nine “Heimwehr Nobles.” The
schematic points out not only land owned by the families of well-known Heimwehr
members such as the Ernst Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg, Count Karl Othmar von
Lamberg, and Count Peter Revertera-Salandra, but also the land owned by the
Rothschild, Kinsky, Sachsen-Coburg und Gotha, Württemberg, Almeida, and Arco-Valley
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families were included among these “Heimwehradels.”604 Those identified by the Social
Democratic press cannot, however, be considered comprehensive. The Arbeiter-Zeitung
list was limited to those nobles who owned 1,000 hectares (2471 acres) or more of land.
Thus, any aristocrat owning less than that was omitted. Absent from the list was, for
example, Count Karl Matz von Spiegelfeld. In a letter dated April 8, 1928, Spiegelfeld
requested that Steidle investigate why his son, an Ortsgruppenführer in the Lower
Austrian Heimwehr, was yet to receive his 250 schillings monthly salary, reminding the
Bundesführer of his “material support” in an effort to compel Steidle into investigating
the matter.605 Clearly, the financial, material, and political support of Austrian nobles was
an important pillar in the movement’s growth and popularity.
The aristocracy and Austria’s banks and industry began funneling large sums of
money into the Heimwehren as early as 1921. An article in the Arbeiter-Zeitung detailed
that a meeting that reportedly took place on Saturday March 5, 1921 in Graz, in which
Christian social representatives deputy governor Jacob Ahrer and Dr. Emanual
Weidenhoffer, the “Hauptverbandes der Industriellen,” and representatives of the “Grazer
Großbankfilialen und Banken,” which comprised fourteen financial institutions. The
results of the meeting, according to these articles, was an agreement that the industrialists
would donate 2,000,000 kronen, the banks would contribute another 2,000,000 and

“Die Notwendigkeit der Bodenreform! Der Besitz des Heimwehradels in Oberösterreich,”
Tagblatt, October 23, 1930, 1. These names were almost surely taken from the list that appeared in the
Arbeiter-Zeitung some nine days earlier.
605
TLA: Bundesleitung der österr. SSV, XII/1, fol. 1-1654, 305-7. It would appear that Steidle
referred the matter to Fey’s staff leader, Fritz Stahl. Kondert, “The Rise and Early History,” 100, notes that
the substantial financial backing the Heimwehren received after 1927 made it possible to pay local leaders
small monthly salaries of roughly 300 schillings. This is no doubt what Spiegelfeld is referencing.
604

254

Austria’s “Großgrundbesitzer,” another 1,000,000 kronen annually.606 Hauptverband der
Industrie Österreich President, Ludwig Urban, admitted the association’s contributions to
the Heimwehren in a June 1923 general assembly of its members.607 Vinzenz Schumy, in
his memoir, attributed a 25,000 schillings per month stipend to the Heimwehren from
Austrian financial institutions, though he offers no firm dates as to when these
contributions began and ended.608
The reach of the nobility was not limited, however, to owning large estates. Quite
contrary to the orthodox narrative, the important industrialists, bankers, and aristocrats
who subsidized the Heimwehr movement were not the discrete groups portrayed in the
historical literature; there was a significant degree of intersection. That is, prominent
bankers and industrialists who financed the Heimwehren could be counted, first, among
the nobility. Placed in this context, the role of aristocracy in the movement emerges as
being much greater than previously acknowledged. One prominent example of this
intersection is Robert Freiherr von Ehrhart, vice-president of the Hauptverband der
Industrie Österreich. The relationship between Hauptverband President Ludwig Urban
and Vice President, Baron von Ehrhart and the Heimwehren is largely absent from the
historiography—save for a brief mention that the Hauptverband had been donors to the
Heimwehr movement since 1922, and Ehrhart’s efforts to smooth tensions between
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Starhemberg and executives of the Styrian-based Österreichisch-Alpine
Montangesellschaft (AMG) or, the Alpine Mining Association,—despite being an
important figure in financing the movement.609 Kevin Mason’s study, which relies
heavily on Ehrhart’s papers, housed at the University of Vienna, despite focus its focus
on his political outlook, mentions nothing of the Baron’s contributions to the Heimwehr
movement.610
The Heimwehr movement experienced exponential growth upon crushing Social
Democratic riots in Vienna, and the national railroad strike that followed during the
tumultuous “Events of July 1927.” Seipel’s goal of establishing a strong presence in
Vienna was fully underway with the creation of three formations in Vienna under the
Bund österreichischer Selbstschutzverbände umbrella in December 1928. In addition to
nobles such as Prince Heinrich von Schwarzenberg, who “selflessly” recruited new
members and solicited financial support, Ehrhart played a crucial role in helping cement
the presence of the Heimwehr movement in Vienna through mediating financial
contributions from the Hauptverband to the Viennese groups under Dr. Franz Hemala,
Major a.D. Emil Fey, and Hofrat Eduard Pichl.611
Within a week of the creation of the Heimwehr umbrella organization, Bund
österreichischer Selbstschutzverbände (Federation of Austrian Self-Defense
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Associations), it was supplied with 55,000 Austrian schillings from “Austria’s bankers’
and manufacturers’ assocations,” which, over the course of the next two and a half years,
would total some 1,500,000 Austrian schillings.612 Baron Ehrhart and the Hauptverband
der Industrie Österreich were subsidizing the Heimwehren at this time with a monthly
stipend of 17,500 schillings. By March 1928 it would appear that the Bund had received
an additional 115,000 schillings in special subsidies.613 In addition to the monthly
subsidies from Ehrhart and the Hauptverband, the association also created a reserve fund
for which the Heimwehren could request advances from to help pay for larger rallies or
extenuating circumstances, which is precisely what they did to help pay for the WienerNeustadt rally in October 1928. Correspondences between Ehrhart, Steidle, and Pabst
indicate that the Baron and his associates contributed at least 125,000 schillings toward
preparations for the rally, with 40,000 schillings remaining in the reserve fund.614
The paper trail throughout spring 1929 shows frequent correspondences Pabst,
Steidle, and Ehrhart. Already by January 1929, Pabst had wrote to Ehrhart requesting a
monthly increase of 400 schillings in addition to the 1,000 schillings the Hauptverband
was already contributing to Fey and Pichl’s formations. Fey’s organization was in poor
shape financially, having added 400 new members in less than a month. Additionally,
Pabst requested a one-time grant of 5,000 schillings to a new reserve fund to be used
specifically for the Viennese formations; the Hauptverband met both requests. Ehrhart
granted another 4,100 schillings to Pichl to procure equipment for his Selbstschutz Wien
in February. By the beginning of March, the monthly stipend the Bund received from the
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Hauptverband had increased to 23,900 schillings per month, 53,000 schillings in one-time
contribution, and 25,000 schillings to the Styrian Heimatschutz, which was to be paid
monthly through August at 4,000 schillings per month. At the same time, Pichl added a
fifth Viennese group, led by former Styrian Stabsleiter, Leutenant a.D. Otto Gallian,
under his banner, adding further to the financial needs of his organization. The
Hauptverband delivered once more, adding 300 more schillings to Pichl’s monthly
stipend and 700 schilling contribution for equipping the new “Gallian Gruppe.”615
Despite the fact that the archival paper trail of communications between Steidle, Pabst,
and Baron Ehrhart ends in August 1929, it is clear that the Hauptverband der Industrie
Österreichs played a significant role in the growth and expansion of the Heimwehr
movement into the last remaining Marxist stronghold in Austria. Moreover, it represented
the core industrial supporter of the implementation of the Ständestaat in the May 1934.616
According to an article originating from London’s Daily Telegraph, alongside the
AMG, Ludwig Freiherr von Rothschild was the central financial backer of the Heimwehr
movement. Despite the generally anti-Semitic disposition of the Heimwehren, the article
contends, Baron von Rothschild allied himself with the Heimwehr movement and the
Christian Socials in order to combat Social Democratic-supported luxury taxes.617 The
subsequent, and previously mentioned, Arbeiter-Zeitung article, which listed the major
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aristocratic landowners backing the Heimwehr movement, named Baron von Rothschild
among them.618
Like Ehrhart, Baron Rothschild, save for a single instance in which he reportedly
advised Steidle and Pabst, in November 1930, that a putsch executed quickly and with
minimal bloodshed would not cripple the Austrian schilling, is virtually absent from the
Heimwehr historiography.619 It seems more likely that his business dealings with
Christian Social leaders and important industrial backers of the Heimwehr movement, as
the chairman of Austria’s largest bank, Creditanstalt, placed him in the cross-hairs of the
Marxist press whose penchant for sensationalism likely positioned Rothschild in much
closer proximity to Heimwehr movement than was actually the case.620 On a personal
level, however, Rothschild did help Heimwehr Bundesführer Ernst Rüdiger Prince von
Starhemberg overcome his own financial difficulties that resulted from the heavy
investment of his own money into his personally loyal Heimwehr jäger (rifle)
formations.621
However close Rothschild was to the Heimwehr movement, the financial backing
by Jewish businessmen was not incredible. Indeed, despite the aggressive anti-Semitic

“Heimatschützer und Heimatbesitzer,” 3.
Kerekes, Abenddämmerung, 49, 91; Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 284,
endnote 49; Pauley, Hahnenschwanz und Hackenkreuz, 109; Kondert, “Rise and Early History,” 150. This
also appears to have made it into the Social Democratic press, “Was halten Sie von einem Putsch, Herr
Rothschild?” Vorarlberger Wacht, August 28, 1930, 2-3, which contradicts the Kerekes’s assertion, whih
claims Rothschild advised that a quick and virtually bloodless coup d’état would not damage the shilling,
and supports the evidence Lerchenfeld reported on November 21, 1929, that a putsch would compromise
the shilling.
620
See, for example, “Der Streit um Strafella. Creditanstalt kontra Alpine—Für die Faschisierung
aber sind alle Kapitalsgruppen und auch die Sozialdemokraten,” Die Rote Fahne, March 21, 1930, 3.
621
Bruce F. Pauley, From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-Semitism (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 177.
618
619

259

rhetoric of some Heimwehr leaders, Jewish bankers and businessmen came out in support
of the movement’s opposition to the high taxation leveed by Vienna’s Social Democratdominated city government.622 Moreover, some Jewish business owners acquiesced to
Heimwehr demands that they dismiss employees who were members of the Social
Democratic Party. Some Jewish bankers like Rudolf Sieghart, for example, industrialists
such as Fritz Mandl, and businesses, like Phönix (Phoenix) Life, an insurance and
financial company, the third largest company in continental Europe, in fact, sympathized
with the strident anti-Marxism of the Heimwehren and indeed subsidized the
movement.623
There are much more concrete connections between the Heimwehr movement and
AMG, however. The financial support and membership numbers the association
contributed to the Styrian Heimatschutz and the Heimwehr movement in general, was
well known. The AMG began funding the Heimwehren in 1921, as the lieutenant
governor of Styria, Jakob Ahrer, secured 5,000,000 kronen in financial support for
uniforms and equipment.624 While the Hauptverband der Industrie contributed between
17,500 – 23,900 shillings per month to the Heimwehren, the AMG—Austria’s largest
industrial company—made monthly contributions to the Heimwehren, which according
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to Kondert, came to the sum of approximately 300,000 shillings annually, between the
years 1927 and 1930.625
AMG employees at all levels, were members of the Heimatschutz. The
association’ General Secretary, Dr. Felix Busson, was the leader of the Styrian
Heimatschutz’s “Rechtskampfgruppe,” or litigation group, while head of the blast furnace
plant in Donowitz and former K.u.k. Army officer, Ing. Josef Oberegger, was the military
leader of the Upper Styrian Heimatschutz and served as the industry representative in the
Heimwehr’s abortive Bundeswirtschafts- und Ständeamt, or the Federal Economic and
Corporation Office.626 Additionally, over half of the employees of the Donawitz works
joined the Styrian Heimatschutz.627 In fact, preference was given to Heimatschutz
members in the hiring and promotion process.628 Membership in the Heimatschutz was
encouraged by the AMG, and eventually, in conjunction with the Heimatschutz, those
employees formed their own, “independent” labor union. So successful was this
marriage, that the AMG began hiring only non-Socialist workers, weakening the grip of
the Social Democratic party in Styria.629 In 1930, the AMG fired hundreds of its workers
for being members of the Social Democratic party or sympathizers.630 Indeed, the two
sides worked hand-in-glove throughout the 1920s, while the Heimwehren crushed
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workers’ strikes and Social Democratic labor unions, AMG filled its coffers, ranks, and
openly defended the movement.631
The close relationship between the AMG and the Heimwehr movement continued
until the new Heimwehren Bundesführer, Ernst Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg, took
the side of the independent labor unions, of whom so many were Heimwehr members,
against the Montangesellschaft over laying off massive numbers of employees and
reducing the wages of others. Unsurprisingly, the AMG cut off its subsidies to the
Heimwehren in January 1931.632 In spite of the efforts of Seipel and Baron von Ehrhart to
repair the relationship, AMG began throwing its money, instead, behind the Austrian Nazi
Party (DSNAP) in 1932.
Such efforts were not limited to the Styrian Heimatschutz, the Tyrolean
Heimatwehr, along with other provincial organizations, actively sought to help find
employment for its jobless members. As previously mentioned, unemployed members
were given preference when opportunities arose to work shifts as auxiliary police arose.
Moreover, their close connection with the Tyrolean Manufacturers Association, a major
financier, the Heimatwehr gained for its members, preference in the hiring process.633
Chancellor Ernst von Streeruwitz later confessed in his memoir that "Indeed,
[Austrian] industry had raised substantial sums of money in order to strengthen the
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Heimwehr movement, without ever denying it. Often enough I cooperated in these
resolutions by counsel and vote."634 The general theme amongst historical writings on the
interwar Austrian republic has been that it was a state nobody wanted. Less emphasized is
that parliamentary democracy was a system of government that the majority of Austrians
at the time did not want. This was particularly true for Austrian industrialists who had,
during the Monarchy, utilized connections to the royal court to maintain a favorable for
doing business. The dismantling of the Empire left this group without a patron. At the
same time, in the new government, organized labor grew substantially in power and were
able to force concessions such as increases in wages and workplace improvements and
protections through legislation and labor strikes. According to manufacturers, this
accounted for between 22 to 25 percent of their annual expenses. This was, no doubt, the
primary motivation for their cooperation with the Christian Social Party to fund the
Heimwehr movement, which both sought to use as an instrument of force to break Social
Democratic trade unions.635 Thus, as Gulick concludes, “Austrian industry
furthered…with the greatest vigor the destruction of parliamentary democracy.”636
An “Irresistable Popular Movement?” Popular Support for the Heimwehren
This chapter has demonstrated how the Heimwehr movement enjoyed from a
significant degree of support from the leading social circles from the old Monarchy who
retained prominence in new Austrian republic. The question remains, however, did the
Heimwehr movement enjoy popular support as well, and if so, to what extent? This
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section will expand on the initial observations made in chapter two and seek to supply a
more definitive answer to the question posed above.
Generally speaking, one could divide Austrian society along three principal
socioeconomic lines: the urban proletariat, the rural peasantry and agricultural laborers,
and the bourgeoisie, which is the most diverse of these basic groupings, including
lawyers, university professors, business professionals, mid-level bureaucrats, and skilled
craftsmen among others. As chapter two demonstrated, the social composition of the
Tyrolean Heimatwehr and its leadership was quite diverse. In its efforts to unite the main
conservative bourgeois political parties behind it, the Heimwehren drew its membership
from a wide range of socioeconomic and educational strata and ideological outlooks.
Logically, such diversity would imply the potential for broad popular support.
At the same time the federal umbrella organization, the Bund österreichischer
Selbstschutzverbände, actively worked to increase Heimwehren presence in Vienna, it
also initiated efforts to more firmly establish its formations in the Burgenland. Police
reports from the provincial capital of Eisenstadt indicated that “a large part of the
population” sympathized with the Heimwehr movement; even Social Democratic
workers were joining the Heimwehren. Moreover, a separate report added that local
Heimwehr groups could be found “in nearly all places.” Yet the same report claimed that
the Heimwehr groups were inactive due to a “lack of interest.” The inactivity of the
Heimwehren was much more likely due to a lag in being sufficiently furnished with
money, uniforms, weapons, and supplies, as the focus on the Viennese formations would
have received preference over those in the Burgenland. Altogether, over 300 local
Heimwehr groups were established in the Burgenland after 1927, the vast majority of
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which mustered from small villages, which likely meant that the size and strength of
those Ortsgruppen were negligible.637
The prominence of the Heimwehr movement in numerous small communities in
the Burgenland is exemplary of the broader trend throughout Austria’s provinces and
would seem to corroborate Schneeberger’s assertion that the movement found broad
support in tight-knit, traditional, “kleiner sozialsysteme,” or small social systems, where
Catholic social thought was reinforced by local priests and where community officials
were able to reiterate the virtues of the anti-Marxist movement more effectively. At the
same time, she also finds that rural communities on the periphery of larger cities were
also frequently ‘pro-Heimwehr.’ Their proximity to urban centers meant that their farms,
as Heimwehr propaganda claimed, would be the first to be “burned down” by the
“Reds.”638 Her caveat to these generalizations is that each community’s unique economic,
social, and cultural make-up often played into the degree to which the Heimwehr
movement found success in establishing local formations and support in the community.
In communities that were more diverse and demonstrated clear political fault-lines, the
Heimwehr movement tended to be able to establish more active, enthusiastic local
groups.639
In Tyrol’s long legacy of civic militarism, the historic preponderance of the
Catholic Church in the province, and the traditionally independent-mindedness of its
population, the Heimwehr movement found its most ardent supporters. This seems
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particularly the case in the Lower Inn Valley (Unterinntal) and its side valleys. An August
1928 report submitted by Oberst a.D. Ludwig Psenner, representative for the Gau
Unterinntal, to Steidle details the money donated by numerous private donors and
communities throughout the region, when the money was received, and what it was used
to purchase. The donations ranged from a five-schilling contribution from Wörgl
shopkeeper named Johann Gollner that went toward the purchase of a signal flag to 1,650
schillings in private donations collected in Kunfstein that went toward the purchase of 13
half-liter oil cans, 10 Heimatwehr badges, labor costs for a construction of one artillery
support crate (Requisitenverschlag), 2000 rounds of ammunition, and “repair costs.” The
last page of the report also documented contributions of room and board and use of space
for donations of accommodations in various communities in the Unterinntal. A letter
November 1928 letter addressed to the “Landesleitung” of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr from
a supporter in Tux who requested promotional copies of the Heimatwehr newspaper to
distribute amongst the community, illustrates a shared outlook many conservative
Tyroleans. For this segment of Austrian society, the Heimwehr movement represented
“German men coming together to rescue our state from the rot to which it had fallen
prey.” Furthermore, he adds, there were many “enthusiastic supporters of the Heimatwehr
cause” in his community.640 Even after its falling out with Stumpf and the Tyrolean
government after the publication of its Korneuburg program (May 1930), there remained
“much sympathy” and “extraordinary enthusiasm” demonstrated by the Tyrolean public
for the Heimatwehr.641
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Statistics from the national elections held in November 1930—the first and only
national election in which the Heimwehr movement entered candidates for the
Nationalrat—have also been used to indicate of popular support for the Heimwehr
movement. Lauridsen offers a detailed examination of these electoral results, which paint
a complex picture. The statistics indicate that of the total number of votes the
Heimatblock—the political party of the Heimwehren, created in 1930—received, 68
percent came from districts where the population was under 10,000 people.642 These
areas were predominantly rural, which would seem to corroborate Schneeberger’s
conclusion that the Heimwehr movement was most successful in smaller communities.
Yet compared to the overall percentage for those districts, the Heimatblock received only
7.84 percent of the total number of votes. The assertion that the movement was
comprised largely of peasants is much less compelling in this light.
In districts where the population was 10,000 or greater, the Heimatblock received
7.76 percent of the overall vote total, which represents the remaining 32 percent of the
total votes it received. The difference between 68 percent and 32 percent, however,
indicates a greater degree of support from rural populations. At the same time, these
figures must be used with caution, as they are not representative of the unique
socioeconomic attributes possessed by each province, as regional electoral results would
naturally vary from one to the next. As Lauridsen points out, Styria was—not
surprisingly—the Heimatblock bastion, followed by the Tyrol, where the party received
12.36 percent and 9.28 percent of the vote, respectively.643
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Overall, the meager 6.17 percent of the total popular vote the Heimatblock
collected would seem to indicate that the Heimwehr movement was not the “irresistible
popular movement” Seipel touted. At the same time, the results of the November 1930
elections should not be entirely taken at face value as a referendum of popular support.
As mentioned above, the 1930 election was the first and only attempt of the Heimwehr
movement to field candidates for public office; to that point in time, the movement had
been loose confederation of paramilitary organizations, not a political party that also had
a paramilitary wing as was the case with the Social Democrats (Republikanischer
Schutzbund) and Nazis (Sturmabteilung or SA). Moreover, the number of candidates
running under the Heimatblock banner at the national and provincial levels was,
comparatively speaking, quite limited; in Vorarlberg the Heimatblock was not permitted
on the ballet. In Vienna and Lower Austria, votes cast for the “Christlichsoziale Partei
und Heimatwehr” ticket might also be considered an indication of popular support for the
Heimwehr movement in the same way it counted as a vote for the Christian Social Party.
Popular support for the Heimwehr movement has been a much more difficult
phenomenon to measure compared to the more tangible evidence left by its financial
backers or well-documented evidence of the measures taken by provincial governments
to protect the groups. Provincial and national electoral results have been leveraged by
historians as a vehicle for understanding general backing amongst the population, but
those results are problematic as a true barometer in that the Heimwehr movement was not
a political party and entered the 1930 elections as such—a paramilitary organization
submitting its leaders for election to public office. Prior to the election, it was entirely
possible, and quite probably, for a conservative Austrian to be a member of the Christian
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Social or Greater German People’s Party as well as sympathizing and backing the
Heimwehren. As it were, there is concrete evidence of sizable popular support among
conservative circles of all stripes, which increased greatly after the summer of 1927.

Conclusions
Framed around the question of whether or not the Heimwehr movement was,
indeed, the popular movement it had claimed to be, this chapter demonstrated that the
Heimwehr movement enjoyed a significant degree of support from the provincial and
national governments, prominent social groups such as the Catholic clergymen, many
members of the former Habsburg nobility, wealthy industrialists, and Austria’s most
powerful banks, not to mention a substantial segment of the general population. The
governmental cooperation, and financial backing of these groups makes it clear that the
Heimwehr movement was not a radical, right-wing political party like the Nazis, to
whom it is typically compared. The Heimwehren were creations of provincial
conservatives who distrusted the Social Democratic provisional government in the early
months immediately following the establishment of the Republic. Many of these men
were, themselves, high-ranking public officials, such as Franz Stumpf in Tyrol and Anton
Rintelen in Styria, or who had close connections to those who did fill those offices.
Provincial governments leveraged the 1920 Constitution, which gave them significant
autonomy, which they used to shield the Heimwehren from the IMCC and the federal
government, frequently utilizing Ortsgruppen as auxiliary policemen, giving them a
quasi-official status.
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At the same time, Catholic clergy members sold the Heimwehren to their
congregations as an instrument of God to combat the mortal danger of Marxist secularism
posed to traditional German culture. While not all members of the priesthood were
supporters of the Heimwehr movement, a substantial number of clerics across Austria
officiated Heimwehren events and, in the process, provided the movement with
credibility among the devout Catholic population. Most prominent among those priests
who enthusiastically supported the Heimwehren was Chancellor Ignaz Seipel. It was not
Steidle or Starhemberg who was the lynchpin for the creation of a federal Heimwehr
organization, but Seipel. His connections to great noble land owners, industrialists such
as Baron Robert von Ehrhart, and bankers like Ludwig von Rothschild was absolutely
essential in subsidizing the creation of a federal umbrella organization and facilitating the
movement’s meteoric expansion following the events of July 1927.
Indeed, as has been detailed in the historiography of the Heimwehr movement the
Hauptverband der Industrie Österreich, of which the Alpine Montangesellschaft was a
part, were its chief sources of industrial money. While breaking labor strikes was the
principal reason for their financial support for the Heimwehren, important figures in both
associations were ideologically aligned with conservative, anti-Marxist core of the
movement. Baron von Ehrhart, a confidant of Chancellor Seipel, was a staunch
monarchist and opposed the parliamentary system in the Republic. Similarly, AMG
General Secretary, Dr. Felix Busson, and, plant foreman and head of the “independent”
labor union formed by AMG employees, Josef Oberegger, were both active members in
the Styrian Heimatschutz.
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Alongside Austrian, industry, its financial institutions also funneled extraordinary
sums of money into the Heimwehr movement. From as early as 1921, Austria’s major
banking houses began financing the Heimwehren with monthly stipends. Next to AMG,
Rothschild’s Creditanstalt—the state’s largest financial institution—was said to have
been the movement’s greatest patron. Despite the anti-Semitic rhetoric of several highprofile Heimwehr leaders, Rothschild’s business interests, like those of other Jewish
companies, aligned with the anti-Marxist stance of the Heimwehr movement. Not unlike
the AMG or the Hauptverband, their reasons for funding the movement were primarily
economic, but much less ideological.
Conversely, the various modes of support offered by the general public were,
however, based entirely on the conservative ideals the Heimwehren represented. Beyond
the anti-Marxist ideals shared with the Heimwehr movement by the peasantry and the
bourgeoisie, the lamentation with which its leaders spoke of the weak and fragile state of
Austria echoed the sentiments of traditionally-minded circles who desperately missed
past times of pre-war economic prosperity. In the Heimwehr they found a movement
whose militarism and activism not only represented their traditional worldview, but who
vowed to renew German or Habsburg culture, even at the expense of parliamentary
democracy.
There is little question that the Heimwehr movement rested on a firm popular
base.
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CHAPTER V – AMBITIOUS OPPORTUNISTS OR INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN
INFLUENCE?

On October 28, 1922 Benito Mussolini and some 25,000 “Blackshirts,” the
paramilitary wing his Partito Nationale Fascista (National Fascist Party) arrived in
Rome. Rather than suppressing the insurrection with violence, the following day King
Victor Emmanuel III asked Mussolini to lead the Italian government, appointing him
Prime Minister. Mussolini won many admirers among radical right-wing nationalist
organizations in Central Europe and his “March on Rome” became something of a
blueprint from which to model their own machinations. Hitler was an admirer of
Mussolini’s and his bold move to gain political power for himself and the National
Fascist Party. In November 1923, Hitler contrived his own, ill-fated attempt to seize
power in Germany, starting with the overthrow of the Bavarian government in Munich a
little over a year later.644 Hitler was not the only one inspired by Mussolini and his rise to
power. The leaders of the Austrian Heimwehr movement, too, fantasized about
undertaking their own “Marsch auf Wien” and rolling back the Socialist constitution of
1920.
As it were, by the end of 1928, Mussolini had become a central financial backer
of the Heimwehr movement. Its federal leader, Dr. Richard Steidle, and his Chief of Staff,
Major Waldemar Pabst, further connected Mussolini with Franz Seldte and Theodor
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Duesterberg, the leaders of the largest paramilitary organization in Germany, Der
Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten (The Steel Helmet-League of Front Soldiers), to
whom Mussolini provided political support as they sought to enter the upcoming German
general elections. Particularly important in the Heimwehr movement securing Italian
support was Hungarian Minister President, István Bethlen, who had, over many years,
established a close relationship with the Heimwehr’s Tyrolean leadership. Between
August 1928 and September 1929, through the Hungarian government, Mussolini
funneled millions of Italian lira into the Heimwehr movement’s anti-Marxist and antidemocratic campaign of provocation and propaganda aimed, ultimately, at expunging
socialism and its influence from Austria. After a year of fits and starts the Heimwehren
ultimately failed to meet their expectations, Italy pulled the plug on its joint
“österreichsichen Aktion” (Austrian action) with Hungary.
Nevertheless, Mussolini understood that winning Austria, despite its diminutive
size and struggling economy, was an important piece in helping make Central Europe a
sphere of Italian influence. By 1932 the Heimwehr movement had a new, young leader at
its helm in Ernst Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg, who, once again, looked to Mussolini
for help. This time, however, Mussolini had the added motivation of an aggressive, ultranationalist Nazi Party that was gaining recognition and influence in mainstream German
politics and in its government, signaling an increasing likelihood that an aggressive panGermanist foreign policy could be on the horizon. Moreover, many Germans and
Austrians still resented the Italian annexation of South Tyrol, in which a vocal German
minority was split away from its German brothers in the north. As such, Il Duce feared a
resurgence of Anschluss sentiment among the German and Austrian populations, making
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decisive action more urgent than it had been in 1928, as a unification of Austria and
Germany would bring a potentially belligerent, expansionist-minded Germany to Italy’s
doorstep. The success of the network of reactionary paramilitary defense organizations in
Germany and Austria and the authoritarian regimes of Hungary and Italy was, therefore,
crucial to both Italian interests, as well as those of the hegemonic strata of Austrian
government and society—the Catholic clergy, the declassed aristocracy, industrialists,
high-ranking officers of the former k.u.k. Army, and most Christian Social officials—who
sought to maintain Austrian independence, the arch patrons of the Heimwehr movement.
This network also reflected the fact that sizable segments in German and Austrian
society were disenchanted with what they viewed as frivolous political posturing and idle
chatter of the various political parties. These circles rebuked Western-style parliamentary
democracy as corrupt; the German people were hostages of political partisanship.
Ideologically, the republics were amalgams of socialism and liberal capitalism, both of
which were un-German and abhorrent. It also represented the developing view among
radical-right circles that a fascist-style government—conservative, ultra-nationalist,
authoritarian, and militaristic—was a potentially viable alternative to monarchy and
democracy. Furthermore, it was not coincidental that the states in which these antiMarxist, anti-democratic sentiments found expression were those where revisionist
‘cultures of defeat’ had firmly taken root, nor that the parties involved in this network
were representative of what would become the core of the Axis Powers in a seemingly
inevitable second world war.
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“From Self-Defense to Self-Help”645
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Heimwehr movement was at the center
of counter-revolutionary activity in Central Europe in 1920-1. From the outset in 1920,
the intention of its collaboration with German defense organizations and the Hungarian
government was not simply to establish an anti-Marxist coalition to rebuff Bolshevik
revolution, as stated in the bylaws of the Heimwehren. Rather, theirs was a loftier goal of
ultimately remaking the governments in Germany and Austria, which they understood to
be a decisive blow against Marxism by reversing the socialist revolutions of 1918. In
doing so, they would help remake Central Europe into an authoritarian, anti-Marxist
bulwark. While this aim, at times, receded into the background at times and became
subject to the interests of its patrons, it never subsided, as it evidenced in the very fact
that it approached like-minded foreign governments and organizations for financial and
material assistance.
Historians of the Heimwehr movement have interpreted the recurrent putschist
designs as a confluence of foreign influences and the boundless ambition of its leaders to
gain political power for themselves. Such assertions that Heimwehr leaders harbored
ceaseless personal ambitions to rule Austria is overstated, attributed, in part, to
disagreements among provincial Heimwehr leaders, at various times, over the direction
of the movement. More specifically, scholars viewed the personal feud between
Bundesführer Ernst Rüdiger Starhemberg and Emil Fey (leader of the Vienna Heimwehr)
as the most outstanding example. While both jockeyed for the allegiance of the
movement’s provincial leaders, and did little to conceal their desire to head the
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movement, they still acknowledged and respected the authority of the governments in
power and acquiesced when demoted from cabinet positions, rather than moving to take
power for themselves.646 It would, of course, be foolish to believe that the Heimwehr’s
leaders were selfless ideologues with no personal ambitions of their own. However, the
evidence indicates that their commitment to the movement, in the firm belief that
Marxism reflected an existential crisis for German culture and elected to actively combat
that threat and obtaining a voice for it in the direction of the country, surpassed any
motives of seizing power for personal gain.647
To understand why the Heimwehr movement sought the assistance of neighboring
governments and defense organizations, it is necessary to reiterate its quandary inside
Austria. Two insurmountable and intertwined factors, which have been discussed in
greater depth in prior chapters, hamstrung the Heimwehr movement in its efforts to
achieve its ultimate objective. First, the extremely limited powers of its federal leadership
allowed provincial leaders to retain much of their authority and the general independence
of their formations, preventing the confederation from functioning as a cohesive whole.
In addition, the Heimwehren, being voluntary organizations, had maintained the
volunteer Schützen custom of electing their leaders, which only exacerbated those
regionalisms. Second, the movement’s financially reliance—the refusal to initiate
membership dues being the main culprit—upon its domestic patrons made the
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Heimwehren prisoners to their interests. Generally risk-averse, they preferred the status
quo over the uncertainty of an attempt to roll back the socialist republic. Approval to do
so would require virtually all of its patrons—bankers, industrialists, nobles, provincial
governors, and the bourgeois political parties—in all of its provinces to be in harmony
with that aim, which had proved an impossibility. Moreover, so long as the bourgeois
parties could sustain a majority in parliament and, therefore, keep the SDP suppressed,
support for radical measures such as remaking the government on a corporatist basis were
not seriously considered. Thus, it became clear that the only way the Heimwehren could
end Austria’s wretched parliamentary democracy, to which they attributed Austria’s
continued misery, was to look outside for the requisite money, arms, and resources.
As illustrated in previous chapters, the legacy of civic militarism and war
volunteerism of Alpine Austrian communities inspired the vision of the Heimwehr
movement in Austria. This tradition was especially prominent in the Tyrol, which had
long defended its own borders, rather than depending on the Habsburg dynasty in Vienna.
At the ideological and logistical core of Tyrol's provincial defense system were the
Standschützen, volunteer sharp-shooter units comprised of members of local shooting
clubs. In times of war, when a threat to Tyrol's sovereignty was imminent, these units
were mobilized around their local shooting ranges and deployed to protect their
communities from foreign invaders. Though this institution perished in 1918, the
voluntary and democratic civilian identity of the Standschützen was a hallmark of its
collective memory and was adopted by the paramilitary Heimwehr movement. In the
politically charged climate of First Republic Austria, however, the continuity of these
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features remained foundational characteristics of the Heimwehren, despite undermining
the ‘expanding’ mission envisaged by its leadership.
By the autumn of 1926, Steidle and Pabst had already made efforts to reconnect
with their old Bavarian associates, while also having developed a close connection with
Hungarian Prime Minister, István Bethlen.648 They also briefly entertained potential
alliances with Yugoslav nationalist organizations as well as attempted to gain the support
of the Italian government. The catalyst compelling this outreach was the new party
program the Social Democratic Party published on November 3, 1926, which has come to
be known as the “Linzer Programme.” In it, the Social Democratic Party declared itself
ready to utilize revolutionary violence, if necessary, to attain power, vowing to “preserve
the working-class in a permanent, organized intellectual and physical readiness for the
defense of the republic [and] cultivate the closest intellectual union between the workingclass and the soldiers of the Federal Army… But if, despite all these efforts of the Social
Democratic Labor Party, a counter-revolution of the bourgeoisie succeeded in breaking
up democracy, the working class could only conquer the power of the state in the civil
war.”649
The preface of “if a counter-revolution of the bourgeoisie succeeded in breaking
up democracy,” seems to have allayed moderate fears of a Marxist revolution. The
Heimwehr movement and its leadership, however, were indignant, and drummed up
sensational fears of the inevitability of a Marxist revolution among its membership and
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constituency. They leveraged those fears to whip up hostility throughout the movement’s
rank and file, and according to some provincial leaders, struggled to contain that
aggression.650 When asked in November 1926 why the Heimwehren had become more
active in public and increasingly vocal in recent days, Steidle responded that the
aggressive new party program and the “terror and street demonstrations of the Republican
Schutzbund have forced the Austrian Heimwehren to expand of self-defense to one of
self-help.”651 In other words, the Social Democrat’s new, aggressive party platform had
compelled the Heimwehr movement to shift gears from being an organization oriented
around defending bourgeois ideals and interests to one that would now take the initiative
and more actively agitate for those ideals and interests, which they believed underpinned
traditional German culture. As a result, movement undertook a concerted effort to
reorganize and consolidate. The various Heimatschutz groups in Styria merged into one
under Pfrimer. The leaders of the provincial Heimwehr organizations agreed to create
something of a federal command structure, banding together under the banner of the
“Bund alpenländischer Selbstschutzverbände” (Federal Alpine Self-Defense Assocations,
alternatively referred to as the “Alpine Club”), with Steidle serving as its nominal
leader.652
The increased aggression demonstrated by the Heimwehren disturbed foreign
observers. The German Consul General in Innsbruck, Hans von Saller, expressed concern
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over the potential for civil war inside Austria as the Heimwehr leaders intensified their
agitation. “I am not of the opinion that the Heimwehr movement within Austria is
defensive,” Saller reported, adding that Steidle “expresses quite frankly that the
Heimatwehr also wants to take an offensive approach.” In this statement, he is referring
to a speech Steidle delivered at a Heimwehr rally in Klagenfurt (Carinthia) on January
30, 1927
We want to be a movement of freedom to the people, not content with merely warding
off…Is it not time to assert the will of our side, if necessary, outside the laws of
Parliament? Are we not officially compelled to assert the wish for order in the state, in a
different way? I do not conceal from myself, that we might soon test this example. We
have been patient for too long. I do not hesitate to explain that the members of the Alpine
defense associations feel the sacred obligation that after the fist is driven from its pocket
in indignant holy wrath once, it will no longer be content with parliamentary
delicacies.653

It was with the release of the “Linzer Programme” that was the decisive turning point for
the Heimwehr movement. Its leaders saw the opportunity to “expand” its mission and
transform the waning self-defense movement into a political pressure group to compel the
bourgeois parties toward constitutional reform.654 The “July Events” of 1927
(Juliereignisse) represented the first opportunity for the Heimwehren to act in accordance
with this new offensive trajectory, their success, and the international recognition it
gained among right-wing and fascist circles. Steidle’s often-cited May 1928 letter to
Bethlen, where he explains that the Heimwehr movement was no longer content with
being the “chained watch dog, crouching until the owner…releases it…only to chain it
again…after it has done its job,” simply reiterated sentiments he had expressed in the
days after the Social Democratic Party Congress. Their success in aggressively
653
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suppressing the riots of Social Democratic workers and thwarting the party’s general
strike, won the movement widespread prestige, attracting a significant number of new
members, prompting historians to point to the “July Events” as a critical turning point for
the Heimwehr movement. The shift was, in fact, a more gradual process that was also an
expression of its need to remain relevant in order to survive. The Linzer Programme
proved to be the right medicine and the right time.
A second factor stirring the Heimwehren to again look for allies beyond its
borders in 1927, was the threat of war between Austria’s neighbors, Italy and Yugoslavia.
As had been the case with virtually all of the redrawn borders of the Paris Peace
Conference, two territories—Dalmatia and Albania—became ongoing sources of tension
between Italy and Yugoslavia that ebbed and flowed over the course of the 1920s. In
particular, the Treaty of Friendship and Security signed between Italy and Albania in
November 1926, proved to be a source of consternation for the Yugoslavian government,
as it made any sort of attempt to alter the state of affairs in Albania—whether by official
Yugoslavian institutions or organizations manifesting in Yugoslavia—as potential
grounds for war. Yugoslavia, for its part, feared that the treaty would establish a basis for
the Italian annexation of Albania, as the agreement, for all intents and purposes,
positioned it as a protectorate of Italy.655 Of particular concern for Austria and the
Heimwehren was its southern alpine borders in Styria, Carinthia, and Tyrol.
Heimwehr leaders expressed the fear, to their reactionary German counterparts, that
either Italy or Yugoslavia—perhaps both—would use an outbreak of hostility as a pretext
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to encroach on Austrian border regions. Pabst wrote to Oberstleutnant a.D. Julius von
Reichert, Staff leader to the Bavaria Stahlhelm chief, Major a.D. Carl Wänninger, in May
1927, explaining that the situation had become “extraordinarily critical,” based on
conversation Carinthian Heimatschutz members had had with ethnic German refugees
fleeing Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Pabst requested that he and fellow Stahlhelm member
and friend, Emil Bems, seek an audience with the German Chancellor to discuss the
matter of providing aid to the Austrian army and the Heimwehren in the event of war
between the two, adding that Steidle and Oberst a.D. Thomas Klimann, leader of the
Carinthian Heimatschutz were in Vienna, speaking to the Austrian Chancellor on the
same matter. Nothing ever materialized out of the Pabst’s appeals to his contacts in
Germany. In a subsequent letter to Reichert, Pabst discussed a conversation he had with
an “influential member of the Foreign Office in Berlin” in which the official told him that
Germany would not be able to offer any military or material support, as its foreign policy
actions were limited by the French occupation of the Rhineland.656
Concerns proved great enough that Steidle and Pabst reached out to Yugoslavian
nationalist organizations such as Orjuna (Organisation of Jugoslavian Nationalists),
Matica, and Sokol. In one instance, two leaders from the Orjuna had met with a
Heimatwehr representative in Innsbruck, Dr. Walther Pembauer, but no agreement
appears to have ever been reached regarding the establishment of an alliance between the
two organizations in the event of war. Orjuna representatives offered to supply the
Heimwehren sufficiently with arms to ensure that the Bludenz-Bischofshofen rail line in
Austria was accessible for use against Italy. Negotiations appear to have broken down
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when the Orjuna representatives insisted on the inclusion of officials from the
Yugoslavian War Ministry in Belgrade. As the German Consul General to Innsbruck
noted, one could assess the importance of the negotiations solely based on the fact that
the Orjuna leaders were negotiating with Pembauer, rather than Steidle or Pabst. Given
the fact that Yugoslavian troops had once tried to annex sections of southern Carinthia, it
is not surprising that the province’s governor and supporter of the Heimwehr movement
at that time, Vinzenz Schumy, was opposed to any sort of negotiations with Yugoslavian
elements.657
There was indeed legitimate concern over the potential of an Italian-Yugoslavian
conflict over Albania in the spring of 1927. The efforts of Heimwehr leaders to establish
contingency plans involving German paramilitary organizations, particularly in Bavaria,
was a concern for the German Foreign Office, which followed these developments
closely, discouraging Bavarian officials and paramilitary leaders from embroiling
themselves in the foreign affairs of Austria and, potentially, other European states. As it
were, the threat of an Italian-Yugoslavian conflict was settled by the League of Nations
and the matter was soon forgotten. The cynical Consul General to Innsbruck, Hans von
Saller, contended that Steidle and Pabst overemphasized the potential threat facing
Austria in a Yugoslav-Italian war “because it is believed that it is easier to get material
support from outside in this way,” as opposed to placing their requests for arms and
equipment in the context of escalating tensions with the Social Democrats.658 Saller
knew, however, that the Heimwehren were in bad financial condition at the outset of
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1927, which was why they were reaching out to their Bavarian counterparts; Heimwehr
documents confirm the organization’s poor financial shape.659 The Tyrolean Heimatwehr
was so poor it could only afford to pay for a section of the organization to attend the
soldiers’ monument dedication ceremony in Brixlegg (Tyrol) on August 8, 1926.660
Despite receiving money from Austrian bankers and industrialists, the Heimwehren
remained insufficiently funded, which can be attributed, once more, to its identity as a
volunteer organization.
Dr. Ignaz Seipel, Catholic priest, leader of the Christian Social Party, and twice
Chancellor of Austria, publicly supported parliamentary democracy in the beginning, but
was ideologically inclined toward the authoritarian, Catholic social thought. Over the
course of his second term as Austria’s Chancellor, his disenchantment with the selfinterested, partisanship of parliamentary democracy became increasingly clear. The
release of the controversial Social Democratic Party’s Linzer Programm, on November 3,
1926, and the rioting and burning of the Justice Ministry in Vienna by Social Democratic
workers on July 15, 1927, however, proved decisive in eroding the façade of support for
what he would term a “sham democracy.”661 Steidle, who later explained to Hungarian
Minister President, István Bethlen, that as President of the Austrian Federal Council
(Bundesrat), he spent a good deal of time in Vienna and frequently spoke with Seipel
about preparations for an inevitable government change in Austria.662 His turn toward an
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authoritarian solution, historians have argued, became evident with his open support of
the Heimwehr movement, whose rhetoric had become increasingly anti-democratic.
Indeed, in the Heimwehren, he saw a force that could be utilized to destroy the Social
Democratic Party, despite resistance within his own party, stating that “true
democracy”—as opposed to the republic’s parliamentary democracy—was “one of the
strongest driving forces of the Heimwehr movement.”663 However, Seipel’s support for
the Heimwehren—as chapter four demonstrated—had been ongoing, from 1920 onward,
as his aversion to the republic grew. The only difference between Seipel’s support for the
Heimwehr movement in 1920 and 1928, is the fact that he made it public.
Seipel’s efforts to establish closer relations with Fascist Italy in his second term as
Chancellor was, in this context, not surprising. Mussolini had successfully crushed Social
Democratic opposition in Italy and, as one Austrian Social Democratic newspaper
pointed out, “it is certain that all anti-Marxists in Austria see their ideal in Mussolini.”
The article continued, sarcastically, adding that if they could elect a king, “the ‘Duce’
would have long since moved into the Vienna Hofburg. Mussolini and Seipel hand in
hand!”664 Similarly, Steidle, as the Bundesführer of the Heimwehr movement, was
christened by the Social Democratic press as the “Tyrolean Mussolini,” and “little
Mussolini.”665 Beyond a shared aversion of Marxism, there were several more explicit
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indications that Seipel sought to improve relations with Italy. In an interview given to an
American journalist, the Chancellor said of Mussolini:
I have known Mussolini since 1923. He is a great man. Austria sees him with great
sympathy, particularly because he triumphed over Bolshevism. Mussolini is not just a
man of violence, he is a man of ideals.666

Furthermore, in October 1926 Seipel sent Mussolini, through the Austrian embassy in
Rome, a copy of a recently published compendium of his speeches, inscribing it to “His
Excellency, the head of the Italian government and renewer of Italy, as a reminder of
lasting friendship.”667 Despite the fact that Seipel’s friendly gestures received widespread
negative attention in the Austrian press, they were signposts of a desire for closer
relations between the far-right elements of the Christian Social Party and Fascist Italy.
U.S. and German diplomatic reports indicated that the Heimwehren had also reached out
to Fascist Italy. In 1925 Styrian governor, Anton Rintelen, through Camillo Castiglioni,
an Italian entrepreneur living in Vienna at the time, sought—to no avail—financial and
material support from Fascist Italy.668 In a February 4, 1927 memo, German Consul
General, Hans von Saller indicated to the German Foreign Office in Berlin, that Steidle
had been engaged in “exhaustive negotiations” with Italians to secure financial assistance
for the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, contrary to the wishes of the President (Friedrich)
Reitlinger of the Tyrolean Industrial Assocation, who was a major donor to the Tyrolean
formation. In Saller’s view, Steidle was “foolish” and his endeavor was bound to “end
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with great disgrace.”669 Despite the fact that German ambassador in Rome, Constantin
von Neurath, indicated in October 1927, that Italian money and arms were going to
Austria for the purpose of undertaking a change of government, there seems to be no
tangible evidence that this ever took place, as the Heimwehr movement’s financial
situation remained quite poor.670
To be sure, the generally accepted notion that the Italian and Hungarian
governments had the “idea to use the Heimwehren to achieve a right-wing take-over in
Austria was mentioned by the Hungarians for the first time in conversations between
Bethlen and Mussolini in Milan in April 1928: a right-wing Austria would form a bridge
between fascist Italy and revisionist Hungary,” is simply not the case.671 The fact that
Rintelen and Steidle, on separate occasions, had actively engaged official Italian channels
at least as early as 1925 and had long maintained contact with representatives of the
Hungarian government, signifies that the idea of supporting the Heimwehr movement to
implement a new system of government was not a new idea, nor does it indicate that the
Heimwehren were passively acted upon by opportunistic Italian and Hungarian
governments—quite the opposite. Moreover, as the previous chapter detailed, the
Hungarian government had supplied Heimwehr formations with substantial sums of
money for just this aim in 1920-1. Indeed, by April 1928, a Heimwehr putsch of the
Austrian republic had been germinating for quite some time.

669
TNA: GFM 33/2585/6080, E451007-8. Graf von Zech agreed with Saller that Steidle’s
attempts to secure aid from Italy would go nowhere. See TNA: GFM 33/2585/6080, E451011.
670
Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 53; TNA: GFM 33/2585/6080, E451007-8;
TLA: Landesleitung der SSV (Tirol), VI/1, fol. 127, 118-19.
671
Carsten, Fascist Movements, 114. Carsten draws on Kerekes here.

287

While Kerekes contends that “Italy was not able to achieve any success on the
official diplomatic path,” Chancellor Seipel’s overtures to Mussolini in the latter half of
1926 certainly indicated that he was quite open to improving relations between the two
countries.672 The lack of success to which Kerekes refers was, no doubt, connected to
Seipel’s criticism of discriminatory Italian policies in South Tyrol, which prompted
Mussolini to recall Italy’s ambassador to Austria for nearly the first half of 1928.673 In
addition to the condition that the Heimwehr movement would initiate a new system of
government in Austria, the new government would censure any discursive discussion of
the South Tyrol question.674 Both illustrate the extent to which the question of South
Tyrol obstructed the development of Austrian and Italian relations, but also underpinned
Mussolini’s support of the Heimwehren.
When Bethlen met with Mussolini in April 1928, and proposed their joint
“österreichischen Aktion,” he had been contacted by Steidle and Pabst, who had
requested the support of the Hungarian government in the form of 300,000 schillings and
arms the previous August, as their ranks were greatly expanding in the months following
their successful quashing of Social Democratic strikes and demonstrations in July
1927.675 Moreover, Steidle outlined in a letter to Bethlen in May 1928, the Heimwehr
movement’s reorganization to aggressively “force the so-called bourgeois parties to alter
the half-Bolshevik constitution that came into being under the pressure of the red streets
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of Vienna, regardless of the resistance or events unleashed thereby.”676 To be sure, Steidle
and Pabst were using the Hungarians and Italians as much as the Hungarians and Italians
were using them.
This picture runs contrary to the prevailing notion among histories of the First
Republic and the Heimwehr movement have interpreted its cooperation with Mussolini as
having been one-sided; the Heimwehren were merely an “Italian foreign legion.”677 The
continuity of this narrative reflects the creep of Social Democratic propaganda on a
receptive audience of scholars more than it does the result of historical analysis and
interpretation. The source of this narrative can be tracked to the Social Democrats’
discovery that the Heimwehren had been receiving financial support from Mussolini in
January 1932. Social Democratic newspaper such as the Salzburger Wacht declared,
referring to the Heimwehren, that “the Austro-fascists are in the pay of Mussolini,” while
headline of the article that appeared in Die Unzufriedene read, “The Austrian Heimwehr
in the Service of Mussolini!”678 To be sure, the reason Mussolini and Horthy supported
the Heimwehren was that their action would lead to a similarly authoritarian-style
government that would work in harmony with their own. Equally as certain was the fact
that this was also what Steidle and Pfrimer—the movement’s two federal leaders—
wanted as well; both had made their disdain for the frivolous posturing of partisan
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politics clear at every opportunity. The assertion that the Heimwehr movement was an
instrument of foreign influence is true only in so far as it coincided with its own agenda.
For Italy’s part, Mussolini’s arrangement with the Heimwehren, finalized in July
1928, was but a single agreement in wider Italian foreign policy geared toward
weakening French influence in the Balkans, which was exercised primarily through the
“Little Entente,” comprised of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania. Italian
relations with Yugoslavia had been particularly rocky, as both states attempted to lay
claim to what was Habsburg Dalmatia and Albania after World War I. In September 1926,
Italy and Romania signed a friendship agreement, two months later a treaty with Albania
was signed, followed by a friendship pact with Hungary in April 1927, and, finally, a
treaty with Greece in November 1928.679 Furthermore, Mussolini had established a close
relationship with Bulgaria—a vanquished ally to the Central Powers who lost territory to
members of the Little Entente at the Paris Peace Conference—which was reinforced with
the marriage of Princess Joanna of Savoy to the Bulgarian King, Boris III in 1930.680
Mussolini’s efforts to weaken French influence in Central Europe continued with
consistent criticism of France for not allowing Germany to rearm itself on the “basis of
equality with other nations.”681 Shortly after the Nazi’s seizure of power in the spring of
1933, Hitler ordered that the Propaganda Ministry curb discursive press about the
“Italianization” of South Tyrol, which the Führer had hoped would be sufficient to ease
Mussolini’s opposition to Anschluss. To Hitler’s chagrin, it did not appease Mussolini’s
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heretofore staunch opposition to the unification of Germany and Austria. As one
contemporary observer pointed out, the whole reason Italy went to war with AustriaHungary in the first place was to get rid of its hereditary enemy (and annex as much of its
territories as the Allies were willing to concede) that had loomed large over its northern
borders; too allow Germany to annex Austria would simply replace one Goliath with
another, still greater Goliath, effectively neutralizing the main benefit of the Great War.682
Ironically, of all of the major powers of Europe, including Great Britain, only Italy
demonstrated the willingness to stand up to Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy prior to
1939. In the wake of Engelbert Dollfuss’s assassination by Austrian Nazis on July 25,
1934, Mussolini ordered Italian Army divisions to the Austrian border, should German
troops cross over into Austria.
Hungarian foreign policy and its long-time connections with the Heimwehr
movement made it a natural accomplice in this plot. Its designs for restoring its lost
territories naturally put it odds with the Little Entente, all of whom gained as a result.
This also placed Hungarian foreign policy aims in opposition to that of the French, the
primary benefactor of the Little Entente. An alliance with Italy, despite their opposition in
the Great War, helped solidify the Hungarian position in this new Central European
setting. The establishment of a like-minded, authoritarian regime in Austria, which it
would play a part in installing, would further fortify Hungarian interests in Central
Europe. At the same time, it would weaken the grip of the French and Little Entente, who
exercised influence in Austria in the form of promised economic aid and the threat of
military intervention should monarchist elements attempt to restore the Habsburg
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dynasty.683 Furthermore, Bethlen’s good relations with Steidle and Pabst and his
persuasiveness with Mussolini was key in the development of this plan.
At Bethlen and Mussolini’s meeting in April 1928, it was agreed that Bethlen
would mediate between Mussolini and the Heimwehr leadership. The Minister President
was, by that point in time, very familiar with and trusted by Steidle and Pabst. Also, with
Hungary functioning as the ‘go-between’, it masked the fact that the Heimwehr
movement was receiving funds from Italy, for which there remained much resentment
among the general Austrian population over its annexation of South Tyrol in 1919. The
silence of contemporary sources indicates some degree of success of this strategy, as
there was virtually no indication that the Heimwehren were receiving money or weapons
from Italy. Even Social Democratic newspapers, which consistently proved themselves
adept at exposing the Heimwehr’s illicit activities surrounding the theft and
transportation of arms, among its other clandestine operations, were silent until late June
1929 when they accused the Heimwehren of receiving money and support from Italy and
Hungary.684 The well-informed, well-connected, and knowledgeable observer, C.A.
Macartney, pointed to the same ‘unproven rumors’ that Pfrimer’s Styrian outfit had
received money from Italy and that in 1927, Styria had “made a treaty with Italy in case
of an Italian-Yugoslav war.”685 The German Foreign Office also speculated that the
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Heimwehren were receiving money from Italy, though it had no definitive proof. Eduard
Hoffmann wrote to Bernhard von Bülow in September 1929, astonished that “the Italian
ambassador here had the imprudence to say in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Italy
welcomed the development of the Heimwehr,” but offered nothing else in the way of
concrete evidence.686
In the weeks after their meeting, the Hungarian delegation in Vienna began
facilitating a dialog between Bethlen and Steidle.687 Hungarian envoy, General Béla
Jánky, contacted Steidle requesting an outline of the financial and military needs of the
Heimwehren, which Steidle supplied on May 23, 1928. Bethlen and Steidle met in early
June to discuss Steidle’s requirements, which Bethlen had also forwarded to the
Hungarian embassy in Rome, who in turn relayed it Italian Foreign Minister Dino
Grandi.688 In the meantime, Jánky met not only with Steidle’s military commander,
Feldmarschalleutant a.D. Kletus von Pichler, on June 11, but also held a separate meeting
the following day with several other key Heimwehr leaders in Vienna, Lower Austria, and
Styria, securing their full, military cooperation in the planned putsch.689 Days later,
Grandi informed the Hungarian envoy, András Hory, that the Italian government agreed
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to meet needs of the Heimwehren on the condition that once the new government is
established in Austria, it would cease claims to South Tyrol.690 After some negotiation on
the wording of the written declaration agreeing to forgo efforts to regain South Tyrol,
Bethlen confirmed with Rome that he had the signed declaration on August 1, 1928, and
on August 23, Banca d’Italia released the equivalent to 1,620,000.00 lira—roughly the
equivalent of 606, 741 Austrian schillings—to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry in the
form of two checks. The checks were delivered the embassy in Vienna, where they were
exchanged into Austrian schillings and personally delivered to Steidle by General
Jánky.691
According to the detailed breakout Steidle supplied to Jánky, the money was to be
allocated to five areas, extending from the autumn of 1928 to the general election in
November 1930. During this time, the Heimwehren would “raise the political
temperature” against the Social Democrats and their party army, the Republikanischer
Schutzbund, or “Republican Defense League,” through provocative propaganda,
violence, and intimidation on the way to the 1930 election.692 Italian funding would be
used first and foremost to the provinces for “organizational purposes” such as smaller
rallies (Aufmärsche) with 643,016.59 schillings allocated for these purposes. The amount
of 224,186.72 schillings were allocated for the purchase of needed equipment, while
another 241,540,04 schillings were estimated to be needed to fund large-scale Heimwehr
rallies such as that planned for the Vienna suburb of Wiener Neustadt on October 7, 1928.
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This rally would mark the first of its “fight for the freedom of the streets” (Der Kampf
um die Freiheit der Strasse) and expected nearly 20,000 Heimwehr members. Over this
period of time, Heimwehr leaders planned several provocative demonstrations in Social
Democratic strongholds like Wiener Neustadt, in the hope to prompt a violent response
from the Social Democrats and give them, Seipel, and Minister of Defense, Carl Vaugoin,
the pretext to destroy the Social Democratic Party and install a new, more authoritarian
system of government. Another 321,113.50 schillings were estimated to be needed for the
print and propaganda. Lastly, Steidle projected that another 63,462.72 schillings would be
needed for the next general election in 1930.693
Even though Steidle’s original breakout clearly illustrated the reality that
achieving their shared aims might take some time, their Italian and Hungarian allies were
disappointed by the failure of the rally in Wiener Neustadt to goad a violent response
from the Social Democrats, which they hoped the Heimwehren would parley into a coup
d’état. Their disappointment, however, does not illustrate a failure of the Heimwehren, as
has been the prevailing notion in the literature.694 Rather it speaks more to the failure of
the Italians to understand the situation in Austria. As Hungarian envoy to Rome, Andor
Wodianer, tried to explain to a skeptical Dino Grandi
…the situation in Austria was different from that of the Fascists in Italy. While liberals
had shown themselves to be decidedly too weak to slow down Communist propaganda,
the Fascists' action had found the approval of almost all bourgeois society, and Seipel had
so far succeeded in restraining the movements from the left. It is, therefore, to a certain
extent, understandable that Steidle, as far as possible, is to be provoked. I could not
convince Mr. Grandi completely, but he concluded the conversation with the remark that
at the moment there was nothing to do but to hope that the matter would soon be better.695
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Seipel, who gave his sanction of the rally and of action by the Heimwehren, should the
Social Democrats respond with violence, secured and agreement from Heimwehr leaders
that neither they nor their men would initiate violence. The Chancellor did much to
defuse the situation, “compelling” both sides to agree to demonstrate at different times of
the day and to accept an overabundance of army and police forces on-hand to cordon off
the Heimwehren from the Schutzbund. Seipel had also encouraged the Heimwehr
leadership to reduce the men they were planning on bringing, to which Steidle
acquiesced. Edmondson notes, “Seipel hoped to realize that political goal by his own
political maneuvering and by the threat of force.”696 As such, Seipel was simply
unwilling to commit to Wiener Neustadt being the turning point for realizing their shared
aim of destroying the Social Democratic Party and, ultimately, remaking the Austrian
government.697
At the same time, Pabst, who not surprisingly figured centrally in orchestrating
the event, should have foreseen the real potential that their plans to provoke a violent
response from the Schutzbund would not take place. Moreover, why would the
Heimwehr leadership have demanded that the government forces present guard their
gathering during the program of events, effectively preventing “Marxist attacks or other
hindrances”?698 If the true desire is to provoke a suitably belligerent response from the
opposition, would it not have been more favorable to allow for as many opportunities for
such “attacks and hindrances” as possible in the hope that they develop into the chance to
violently suppress the Social Democrats? Moreover, why would Steidle have agreed to
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reduce the number of Heimwehr men participating in the rally? Did Heimwehr leaders
expect the Schutzbund to be so aghast at their invasion that the requisite attack was
assured? What becomes increasingly evident when one looks at the lengthy, if not
prophetic, document of planned Heimwehr events Steidle provided Italian officials,
coupled with the extensive security preparations made around the Aufmarsch in Wiener
Neustadt, is that the event never intended to be the flashpoint that their Italian patrons had
envisaged.699 Instead it was, as Steidle had made clear, a single event in a lengthier plan
to demonstrate the movement’s growing strength in the run up to the 1930 general
election. This is not to say that preparations were not made to take advantage of the
situation, should hostilities erupt, but rather that the event was never intended to be the
flashpoint Mussolini had envisioned. From this standpoint, the harmony between Seipel’s
vision of implementing an authoritarian government via legal channels and armed
intimidation, and the plan Steidle laid out for his Italian backers, is quite clear.
As it were, Steidle justifiably declared the rally a victory for the Heimwehren,
citing that the federal government stood firmly beside it, having defended its right to
demonstrate in the face of strong Social Democratic resistance.700 The numerous letters
Steidle received also praised his leadership and the Heimwehr’s “victory of Christian
power and of the ‘Right.’”701 Seipel, at the same time, parlayed the strong Heimwehr
stand into Social Democratic concessions on rent control, a hotly contested issue on
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which they had, to that point in time, stood resolute.702 With Seipel’s encouragement and
Italian money, the Heimwehren continued staging large rallies and parades where Steidle
and Pfrimer sustained their aggressive attacks on the Social Democrats and on the
republic into the winter of 1928. With the toxic political discourse cultivated by the
Heimwehren, the political situation inside Austria worsened, while unemployment figures
climbed to quarter of a million by the spring of 1929.
In March 1929, Bethlen and Grandi met in Budapest to discuss the situation of the
Heimwehr movement and the political conditions inside Austria and agreed that a
decisive action by the Heimwehren could tip the republic to its breaking point. As the
Heimwehr movement steadily expanded, so too did its financial needs. Steidle explained
that it needed another 970,000 Schillings to help the provincial organizations keep pace
with their growing ranks. Upon Bethlen’s advice, Grandi made half of the 970,000
Schillings available immediately, but withheld the remainder until the autumn, at which
time they would once more reevaluate their continued cooperation.703 In early April, the
Heimwehren received a lucky break in the fact that Seipel resigned the Chancellorship.
Though Seipel had proven a consistent supporter of the Heimwehr movement and
confidant to Steidle, he had opposed transforming the government by putsch and was a
much more formidable politician. Moreover, Seipel’s long-time support of the movement
and relationship with Steidle, no doubt created an uncomfortable situation on both sides.
By the end of June 1929, with Seipel out of the way, Steidle would unleashed the full
weight of the Heimwehren and its resources on a blistering campaign of brinksmanship.
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The matter of supplying the Heimwehren with the requested arms and equipment would
prove to be an unexpected source of consternation. The first shipments of weapons and
supplies were to be delivered to its Lower Austrian formations and those in the eastern
section of Upper Austria, some 5,000 rifles accompanied by 1,000,000 rounds of
ammunition, and 40 machine guns with 4 belts each.704 Pabst’s deputy, Oberstleutnant
a.D. Jaromir Diakow, was tasked with overseeing the shipments with the Hungarian
embassies in Vienna and Rome. On September 22, 1928, Diakow left for Rome to pick
up the first shipment. It is not entirely clear what transpired while Diakow was in Rome
and on his return trip on September 25, but in a correspondence from Bethlen to Steidle,
it was clear that he had made “a very unfavorable impression” on Italian officials, to the
point that Grandi made clear that they would not have any future dealings with Diakow,
requesting that he send another, more trustworthy representative for future
transactions.705
Steidle wisely charged Pabst with this critical task and in a subsequent
communication Steidle finalized his request to Italy for 18,000 rifles with bayonets, 300
rounds of ammunition for each, and 190 machine guns.706 It was agreed that Pabst would
arrive in Rome on June 17, 1929 to take possession of the next shipment of weapons and
equipment. Upon arriving in Rome and discussing the logistics of the weapons transport
with the Hungarian envoy in Rome, András Hóry, Pabst realized the significant risk of
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transporting a large shipment of arms across the border. Instead, they agreed that a
request should be made of the Italians of between 500,000 to 600,000 lira in lieu of
weapons and that they place the originally promised arms in a weapons depot near the
Austrian-Italian border, where the arms could be retrieved “without any danger
immediately after the beginning of the ‘Aktion’.”707 Mussolini, frustrated with the
“hesitation” of the Heimwehr leaders, reluctantly agreed to release the funds and to
deposit the promised weapons, but with the caveat that they would be required to provide
a written statement declaring that he would undertake “decisive Action to modify the
Austrian state constitution” by March 15, 1930. On August 24, 1929, Mussolini was
handed the statement signed by Steidle, Pfrimer, and Pabst.708
In the weeks following their written promise to Il Duce, Austrian Defense
Minister, Carl Vaugoin, who had been kept up-to-date by Steidle and Pabst on the
developments with Italy and Hungary, discussed plans for a joint action between the
Austrian army and the Heimwehr with Hungarian military attaché Dr. Daniel Fábry. The
plan was to seize the Rathaus (City Hall) in Vienna, while the Lower Austrian Heimwehr
would block Schutzbund forces in Wiener Neustadt from coming to the aid of the
Viennese units. The borders would be sealed in specific locations to prevent the
intervention of the Reichsbanner in Germany, specifically at Hainburg an der Donau on
the Lower Austrian border with Czechoslovakia. According to Fábry’s report to
Hungarian Foreign Minister Lajos Walkó, the scheme was to unfold out of a planned
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demonstration in Vienna on September 29, 1929.709 Moreover, the Heimwehr’s
propaganda printed in conservative newspapers read as an ultimatum to the Steeruwitz
government, eliciting concern from foreign governments crucial Austria’s economic
stability.710 On September 21, the Heimwehr held a rally in Vienna where some 10,000
members gathered at the Heldenplatz (Place of Heros) where Steidle excoriated the
failures of the “Reds,” in addition to the planned September 29 “March on Vienna.”
Amid fears that the Heimwehren would initiate a civil war with the Social Democrats,
Steeruwitz stepped down.711
Forcing Steeruwitz to resign the Chancellorship won the Heimwehren
“considerable prestige” and is indicative of the influence the movement carried in
Austrian politics at its pinnacle. Vinzenz Schumy would later write that the Heimwehr
leadership would look to Steeruwitz’s successor, Johann Schober, “as the man who would
change the structure of Austria and bring the Heimwehren to a position of power or even
predominance.” However, as Upper Austrian Heimwehr member, and future architect of
corporatist Austria, Odo Neutstädter-Stürmer, explained several years later, the
Heimwehren were strong enough at that time to have carried out any constitutional
change they desired, but made the mistake of putting their confidence in Schober and
elevating him to the Chancellor.712 Schober had cooperated with the Heimwehr in past
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schemes in his capacity as Federal Chief of Police, in addition to putting down the Social
Democrat-incited riots in July 1927. These instances of cooperation, and other
expressions of sympathy for their aims, naturally gave Heimwehr leaders the impression
that Schober maintained a similar vision for Austria’s future.
Immediately after his appointment as Chancellor, Schober held a lengthy meeting
with the leaders of the Heimwehr movement. Steidle laid out their overarching
objective—the “final liberation of the Austrian people from the rule of the Social
Democrats,” which could only be achieved peaceably through constitutional reform. In
particular, the Heimwehren had long been campaigning for reforms that gave increased
power for the presidency, a parliament based on estates, not political parties, and the
revocation of Vienna’s status as its own province. For Schober’s part, he requested that
Steidle utilize his connections in the Hungarian and Italian governments to help Austria
secure the League of Nations loan. On both matters, Schober and the Heimwehr leaders
were in agreement. Steidle subsequently approached the Italian ambassador in Vienna,
Giacinto Auriti, requesting Mussolini’s approval for the loan. Steidle added, however,
that if Il Duce did approve of loan, he should do so on the condition that Schober
oversees the successful reform of Austria’s constitution.713
Two simultaneous developments would rob the Heimwehren of the momentum
the movement had built up toward achieving the constitutional reform they desired. First,
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Mussolini changed direction with Schober’s appointment as Chancellor. He believed that
Schober could achieve the change in course he had hoped to achieve with the
Heimwehren. As such, he encouraged Steidle to support Schober. Second, the
relationship between Schober and the Heimwehr leadership quickly turned adversarial.
Schober found out about Steidle’s recommendation to the Italians that they make their
support for Austria’s League of Nations loan conditional on Schober’s passage of their
desired reforms to the constitution.714 At the same time, Pfrimer’s thinly veiled threat to
‘implement the constitutional reform that we seek or else,’ did little to maintain good
will, no doubt.715 Moreover, the constitutional reforms Schober ultimately put to
parliament were passed unanimously, as they were watered-down compromises he had
made with the Social Democrats. Not only were none of the reforms passed those
demanded by Heimwehr leaders, Schober had compromised, both of which were
intolerable to Steidle and Pfrimer.
It was a very public and humiliating defeat for the leadership of the Heimwehr
movement that was only compounded by the fact that their Italian benefactors now
supported the Chancellor, concluding that further financial support of the Heimwehren
unnecessary.716 In fact, Mussolini agreed to provide Schober with a requested 20,000
rifles and 500 machine guns to help buttress his position against a potential Heimwehr
coup d’état. Bethlen and Mussolini conveyed once more to Steidle that their sympathies
toward the Heimwehren were unchanged, but saw no reason for maneuverings against the
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Schober government for which they were confident would position Austria in an
agreeable orientation toward Italy and Hungary. Should the situation change, however,
they would be ready to once again offer their support to the Heimwehren.717
Steidle and Pfrimer remained bitter and continued holding anti-government rallies
in February and March 1930. Their continued opposition prompted Schober to request
that Urban and Baron von Erhardt, the President and Vice-President of Hauptverband der
Industrie Österreich, withhold their regular subsidies to the Heimwehren as well.718 With
the movement’s two major sources of funding cut, it effectively paralyzed the
Heimwehren. In early December 1929, both Steidle and Pfrimer had offered to resign
their positions as leaders of the confederation. Only after persistent appeals did Pabst
convince the two to remain as the heads of the Heimwehr movement.719 Adding insult to
injury, Schober followed through on his threats to have Pabst—a Reich German émigré—
deported. In early June, 1930 Pabst was arrested and deported to Italy; despite claiming
that he no intentions of continuing his activity in the Heimwehr movement, he remained
an important figure in mediating compromises between the Heimwehr leadership and
brokering Italian and German aid for the Heimwehren.720 What is more, Schober played a
central role in Starhemberg’s meteoric rise in through the ranks of the Heimwehr
movement; in the course of a year, the prince rose from a section leader in Upper Austria
to challenging its federal leadership. Replacing its present, obstinate leadership with a
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young, charismatic, impressionable, and more moderate alternative was Schober’s aim in
supporting Starhemberg.721 Despite the perceived failure of Steidle, Primer, and Pabst to
achieve its goal of constitutional reform, it had been the weight of the Heimwehr
movement and the pressure it exerted on the Steeruwitz government that brought Schober
to power and delivered to Mussolini the man that both he and they believed would bring
about the constitutional changes that would reorder Austrian society. After all, Bethlen
and Mussolini understood that the Heimwehren would, by themselves, not be able to
implement the changes necessary for a successful, sustainable right-wing government.722
The relationship between the Heimwehren and Mussolini in 1928-30 was but a
brief indication of the much larger and more direct role he would play in aiding the
movement under Starhemberg. While a student at the University of Innsbruck,
Starhemberg was active in the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, undertaking various duties
surrounding the procurement of weapons through “theft” and smuggling arms across the
Austro-Bavarian border.723 After this brief stint, it would not be until 1929 that
Starhemberg would reemerge as a section leader in the Upper Austrian Heimwehr, raising
and personally funding a rifle battalion of some 2,000 men. According to his memoir,
Starhemberg, in separate conversations with Hitler and Bethlen, both suggested he meet
with Mussolini and try to establish an alliance with him. Starhemberg, as a selfproclaimed “prominent member of the Heimatschutz” in the spring of 1930, would have
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surely been aware of the fact that the movement had already established an alliance with
the Hungarian and Italian governments.724 As such, his presentation of it as a pathbreaking maneuver is dubious and represents a recurring pattern of self-aggrandizement
and whitewashing of his motives and ideals, making caution necessary in utilizing his
memoirs. While Hitler and Bethlen may have indeed encouraged Starhemberg to meet
with Mussolini, it was through a letter Il Duce sent to his mother, Princess Fanny
Starhemberg, that their meeting was arranged.725 Schober arranged for Starhemberg to
meet Italian Foreign Minister Dino Grandi to meet with Starhemberg in early June 1930.
At this meeting, Grandi informed Starhemberg of Italy’s “wasted financial ‘sacrifices’”
for the Heimwehren to that point in time. Schober’s intention for arranging this meeting
was to seize upon energetic support the young Starhemberg was receiving within the
ranks of the movement to upend Steidle and Pfrimer.726
In July 1930 Starhemberg met with Mussolini. According to his account of their
discussion, Mussolini reaffirmed Austria’s importance to Italian foreign policy, stating
that “[a]n independent Austria is essential to the maintenance of order and peace in
Europe. For that reason it is absolutely imperative for Europe that Austria should be
developed and made strong, and, if you get vigorously to work, you can count on my full
support.”727 Subsequently, by his own admission, the meeting energized Starhemberg
who began immediately upon his return, consolidating his support base in preparation for
his challenge for the leadership of the Heimwehr movement; Starhemberg was of course

724

Starhemberg, Between Hitler and Mussolini, 21.
Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 288. See footnote 32.
726
Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 103; Kerekes Abenddämmerung einer
Demokratie, 74-6.
727
Starhemberg, Between Hitler and Mussolini, 24.
725

306

strongest in Upper Austria, but also enjoyed a great deal of support in Lower Austria and
Vienna, in particular. At the September 5, 1930 leadership meeting Schladming (Styria),
Starhemberg charged Steidle and Pfrimer with “incapacity and feebleness of purpose.” To
his surprise, the two leaders did not challenge his indictment, but resigned. In the
electoral process that followed, Starhemberg was voted Bundesführer, but by only a
“small majority.” His narrow election was a clear indication of the lack of unity and
purpose of mind among the movement’s provincial leaders.728
Shortly after being elected Bundesführer, Starhemberg was invited to Hungary to
meet the Hungarian Minister of Defense at that time, Gyula Gömbös. By Starhemberg’s
account of their meeting, a principal topic of discussion was procuring arms. As it were,
both the Heimwehren and the Hungarian government encountered difficulties in
obtaining small arms, the latter, against protocols of the Treaty of Trianon, was secretly
rearming and rebuilding the Hungarian army. Gömbös explained that after the war Italy
had confiscated some 100,000 rifles and machine guns while occupying Austria. Their
plan was to persuade Mussolini to release those rifles—which according to their
estimations, would have had only limited stores of ammunition due the different caliber
from Italian rifles—to the Heimwehren and to Hungary whereupon they would split their
windfall.729
Procuring arms was only one part of Starhemberg’s discussion with Gömbös.
While in Hungary Starhemberg was informed of the collapse of his benefactor’s
government, with the resignation of his cabinet on September 25, 1930. In his place,
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stepped Chairman of the Christian Social Party, Carl Vaugoin. Vaugoin was a long-trusted
supporter of the Heimwehren and asked Starhemberg to serve as Minister of the Interior.
Additionally, he also appointed Dr. Franz Hueber, head of the Salzburger Heimatwehr to
be his Minister of Justice. Fortune, it appeared, had turned in favor of the Heimwehren; it
had prominent members and a trusted friend in the highest seats of power in the land.
Starhemberg’s position, as Minister of the Interior, was especially important for
successfully carrying out a coup d’état, as he tasked with maintaining order within
Austria and had authority over the police and gendarmerie. He joined the Vaugoin
government with the intent to do just that. Gömbös, unsurprisingly, supported his
intended putsch, and encouraged Bethlen to do the same. On October 16, 1930
Starhemberg informed the Hungarian envoy, Jenö Biró, that the Heimwehren intended to
seize power on October 26. Pfrimer’s Styrian Heimatschutz would undertake the
operation as planned by General a.D. Otto Ellison. Rumors quickly spread, however,
about the ill-kept secret putsch and Seipel, Bethlen, and Mussolini all prevailed upon
Starhemberg to shelve the planned putsch.730 While the historiographic view of aborted
Heimwehren putsch plans have consistently painted the movement as an almost comical
portrait of dithering ineptitude, it was more often than not, the vacillation of its allies and
patrons that—one hand supported the idea of a putsch, but on other, feared the
uncertainties that accompanied the reality of a putsch—that was the picture of fear and
indecision.
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Be that as it may, Starhemberg and the Heimwehren had the November (1930)
general election to attend to, which Mussolini and Bethlen had placed an undue faith. The
election campaign of the Heimatblock, the movement’s political party, was funded
largely by Italian money. Italian Foreign Minister, Dino Grandi, explained to
Starhemberg that some of the money allocated to the election, as well as funds earmarked
for other areas, should be used to pay for their campaign. In the meantime, Mussolini sent
another large contribution to the campaign.731 In addition to funding the campaign,
Mussolini also counseled Starhemberg, advising him not to
leave the field free to the National Socialists. An election offers the best scope for
political militancy, and political militancy is what is needed. Therefore, do not miss the
opportunity, but take up the fight against the Nazis.732

As such the Heimatblock entered the election campaign, in some provinces in association
with the Christian Social Party and independently in others. This decision was not
received well by Chancellor Vaugoin—who had been appointed Chancellor after the
collapse of the Schober government—as he believed that Heimwehr candidates should
run under the banner of the mainstream parties. Starhemberg, however, believed that
running as a Christian Social or German People’s Party candidate would leave the door
open to the Nazis to serve as the sole representative of the anti-parliamentary radicalright, which both Seipel and Mussolini agreed—the Heimwehr candidates would run on
an independent ticket.733 As detailed in chapter four, the results of the election gave the
Heimatblock eight seats in parliament.
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“Again, the Italian and Hungarian governments had been deceived by the
Heimwehr,” Kerekes explains. Though election results were disappointing, the fact
remained that the orientation of Austria was pivotal to Italian and Hungarian foreign
policy and still required “the greatest of attention.”734 The year that followed did nothing
but reiterate the continued need for their “österreichischen Aktion,” as Pfrimer’s Styrian
Heimatschutz, in particular, drew closer to the Austrian Nazi Party. The Nazis were also
gaining influence within Austrian industrial circles as well as in local elections, winning
15 seats in the Viennese Diet, for example. In June 1932 Starhemberg flew to Italy to ask
for financial support, weapons, and diplomatic support from Mussolini. “If you are still
interested in the independence of Austria, then help us,” Starhemberg pleaded.735 To be
sure, as Kerekes notes, “The prospect of not having the jovial Austrian customs officials
at the Brenner, but Hitler's ever-determined Brownshirts, would be, in the eyes of the
Italian Bersaglieri, unpleasant.”736 The growing strength of the Austrian Nazi Party was
not just a grave concern for Mussolini, but also for the leadership of the Heimwehr
movement and the newly appointed Dollfuss government.
Mussolini agreed to support the Heimwehren once more; “Europe needs Austria.
Italy needs Austria,” he reportedly said. According to Kerekes, he promised Starhemberg
15,000 rifles and between 200-250 machine guns, though this does not match the figure
of 100,000 Austrian rifles Starhemberg purportedly agreed to split with Gömbös. By
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Starhemberg’s account, he mentioned to Mussolini that Gömbös was to receive 50,000
rifles, implying that that Heimwehren would receive the other 50,000 rifles. As it were, in
the first week of January 1933, forty truckloads of rifles and machineguns—which had
been preceded by ten truckloads of “hardware” in last days of December 1932—arrived
at Austrian arms factory Hirtenberg for reconditioning, after which they were distributed
to the Heimwehren and to the Hungarians.737 It is unclear how many were sent to Steyr
for reconditioning. Ever-vigilant Social Democratic workers made this transaction
quickly known, which exposed Hungarian rearmament—a violation of the Treaty of
Trianon. In doing so, it broadcast the dealings of Austria, Hungary, and Italy to the Little
Entente and their French patrons. The “Hirtenberg Affair,” as it came to be known,
despite its widespread attention ultimately came to nothing, as it was soon forgotten with
Hitler’s inauguration as Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933 and Dollfuss’s
March 4, 1933 declaration of the Bundesrat’s “self-elimination.” Some of the arms were
smuggled into Hungary in the spring, while the remainder—84,000 rifles and 980
machine guns—were split evenly between the Heimwehren and the Hungarians.738
The close relationship Starhemberg forged with Mussolini paved the way for Italian
support of Dollfuss’s government. In August 1933, they met for the first time in Rome. In
addition to the money and arms Mussolini had provided the Heimwehren, he also aided
Dollfuss with international diplomatic support, helping the Bundeskanzler gain approval
for a temporary increase in law enforcement and defense forces to combat the Nazi terror
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campaign in Austria during the summer of 1933.739 Mussolini also worked with Dollfuss
and Gömbös to establish several political and economic agreements between Italy,
Austria, and Hungary the following spring. Politically, the three agreed “to pursue a
common policy directed to promote effective collaboration among European States,
particularly among Italy, Austria and Hungary. For this purpose the three governments
will proceed to common consultation whenever any one of them considers it desirable.”
Economically, Italy and Austria agreed to purchase a set amount of wheat from Hungary
above the market rate in one arrangement. In another, Hungary and Italy agreed to lower
tariffs on imports from Austrian manufacturers. Italy also agreed to open the ports of
Trieste and Fiume to Austria and Hungary, which they agreed to use as their primary
ports for foreign trade. In short, they established a customs union amongst themselves,
mutually conceding tariffs amongst themselves.740
In addition to this economic pact, to which Dollfuss ‘capitulated’, Mussolini
agreed to help the Bundeskanzler in his efforts to secretly increase the size and rearm the
Austrian army, while agreeing to “regulate the flow of subsidies to the Heimwehr” as a
means of keeping Fey and Starhemberg and, thus, the Heimwehren, “in line.”741 Though
Mussolini had greater confidence in Fey, who demonstrated himself to be more
aggressive and single-minded, he called Starhemberg to Rome in April 1934 and
confirmed his (financial) support for Starhemberg as the undisputed leader of the
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Heimwehr movement so long as he kept the Heimwehren reigned in and aligned with the
Dollfuss government. Upon his return to Austria, Starhemberg’s position was further
buttressed by his appointment as vice-chancellor, replacing Fey. In aligning himself
clearly with Starhemberg, Dollfuss had effectively ended any debate over who was the
top Heimwehr leader in Austria.742
On July 25, 1934 Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss was assassinated in an abortive
coup d’état; a small group of Austria Nazis infiltrated the chancellery building.
Accompanying the events in the chancellery, armed Nazi groups in Styria, Carinthia, and
Upper Austria rebelled against the government. After several days of fighting and
bloodshed, the army and the Heimwehren put had crushed the Nazi putsch. While the
putsch was thwarted, they had succeeded in killing their most steadfast opponent in
Chancellor Dollfuss. In one last show of support for Austria, Mussolini mobilized Italian
troops on the Italy’s borders with Tyrol and Carinthia, should Hitler make further
attempts to takeover Austria by force.743 Close Italian support of Austria effectively died
with Dollfuss. Italy’s subsequent war with Ethiopia not only diverted Mussolini’s
attention from Austria, but increasingly isolated Italy diplomatically, which pushed him
closer to Hitler, ultimately giving way to his consent to the annexation of Austria.

The Heimatwehr, the Stahlhelm, and the Nazis
The failed Hitler-Ludendorff putsch in November 1923 effectively ended
meaningful cooperation between Munich-based paramilitary organizations—particularly
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Ludendorff’s own network of patrons and Bund Bayern und Reich—and the Austrian
Heimwehren. This break proved to be only temporary. While the Tyrolean Heimatwehr
might have not made contact with the VVVD in Berlin, as German Foreign Office
diplomats posited, they were most certainly in communication with VVVB members.744
In the summer of 1926, Pabst reached out once more to Forstrat Dr. Georg Escherich, —
former head of the Einwohnerwehr, to whom the Tyrolean Heimatwehr, among other
Heimwehr organizations, had owed their allegiance—who remained closely connected to
members of what had collectively become known as the Vereinigte Vaterländische
Verbände Bayerns (VVVB), or the United Patriotic Associations of Bavaria, a
confederation of independent defense and political organizations, which was part of the
larger Vereinigte Vaterländische Verbände Deutschland (VVVD), or the United Patriotic
Associations of Germany.745
In December 1926, Escherich set up two meetings to take place on January 15-16,
1927 at the Hotel Deutscher Kaiser in Munich. The first, on Saturday, January 15, was to
be limited to the “closest circle,” which included himself, Steidle, Pabst, Bavarian noble,
Baron von Voithenberg, and the staff leader of the Bavarian Stahlhelm, Oberstleutnant
Julius Ritter von Reichert. The second meeting was scheduled for the following day and
was to include representatives from Bund Isengau, Bund Chiemgau, Bund Oberland,
Schwabenbanner – Würtemberg, Reichsflagge – Nürnberg, and Bund Bayern und
Reich.746 These meetings effectively revived active collaboration between the
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Heimwehren with German paramilitary organizations that would continue into the early
1930s.
The underlying reason behind these meetings was two-fold. First, Heimwehr
leaders sought to obtain support from the Bavarian paramilitary organizations in the event
that civil war broke out in Austria. In wake of the Linzer Programm, Heimwehr leaders,
while vociferously condemning the Social Democrats’ new party platform, began
reorganizing their organizations to reflect their “expanded” mission to actively combat
the threats posed by Marxism.747 Furthermore, rumblings from Vienna indicated that
Social Democrats were negotiating military support from the German Reichsbanner
Schwarz-Rot-Geld—the pro-Weimar, republican paramilitary organization—in the event
of civil war, underscored the Heimatwehr’s initial outreach to The Stahlhelm, Bund der
Frontsoldaten and the other VVVB organizations. In particular, the Heimatwehr
leadership sought an agreement in which the Stahlhelm would move to check a
Reichsbanner advance on Vienna. According to one memo to the Foreign Office in
Berlin, the Bavarian Stahlhelm’s response was noncommittal.748 The overwhelming
attitude of German officials was averse to any Reich defense organizations becoming
embroiled in Austrian affairs, which they feared would rouse international suspicions of
German designs for Anschluss. Moreover, German Foreign Office delegates were leery of
leadership of the newly confederated “Alpenländische Heimatwehr.”749 Steidle and Pabst,
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according to Hans von Saller, the German Consul General in Innsbruck, were reckless in
their schemes, lacking “political vision.”750 Continued French occupation of the
Rhineland, however, was the main reason officials discouraged such activities. The
second reason was to seek further material and financial assistance from their Bavarian
counterparts. As the previous chapter documented, the main source of arms and
equipment to the Heimwehr movement in the early 1920s came from Bavarian
organizations—the Einwohnerwehr and its predecessor, Bund Bayern und Reich, which
had since fallen from its place atop Bavaria’s paramilitary community. Moreover,
Bavarian aristocrats, for a time, had been sizable donors to the Heimwehren. Bavaria had
been the land of milk and honey for the Heimwehr movement before and it was the hope
of their leaders that it would be once again.
While the Heimwehren sought financial and material support through both its
Bavarian counterparts as well as from the Hungarian and Italian governments, its
leadership maintained quite a different relationship to its neighboring Bavarian
organizations. For obvious reasons, its relationship with Hungarian and Italian officials
was necessarily discrete and quite limited, which generally prevented the establishment
of close relations, save for, perhaps, the case of Hungarian Minister President István
Bethlen, for example, who forged a quite close relationship with Steidle and Pabst over
an extended period of time. Though comparatively limited in the monetary and material
support that came from neighboring Bavarian organizations, Heimwehr leaders
established much closer working relationships than was possible with their Italian and
Hungarian patrons for several reasons. First, both the Heimwehren and their Bavarian
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counterparts were only quasi-official paramilitary organizations, so there was a basis for
empathy and camaraderie in their similar positions vis-à-vis state and local authorities.
Second, they maintained similar anti-Marxist, anti-democratic orientations. Third, many
of those individuals in regular contact across organizations were former officers and
veterans of the Great War, so there was also the shared experience of soldiering that
bonded these men. Fourth, they maintained a shared cultural and historical experience,
which contributed greatly, of course, to the fact that they shared a reasonably similar
system of values, customs, and organizational structures. In sum, these likenesses
provided a useful platform for the exchange of ideas, which fostered close collaboration.
While Heimwehr leaders were in contact with various member organizations of
the VVVB, the one with whom it would maintain the closest and most meaningful
connection was Der Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten. The Stahlhelm was the largest
right-wing paramilitary organization in Germany, headquartered in Magdeburg (Saxony)
and led, similarly to the Heimwehr movement, by two federal leaders—Franz Seldte and
Theodor Duesterberg. Though contacts were established with the Stahlhelm’s Bavarian
formation at least as early as January 1927, open cooperation between the two groups did
not begin until later that year. The thorny issue of the Bundesleitung (federal leadership)
of the Stahlhelm recognizing the establishment of local groups in Kufstein (Tyrol) and in
Graz (Styria), was an issue that first had to be navigated.751 Much better funded and
organized, recognition of Stahlhelm groups Kufstein and Graz by its federal office in
Magdeburg represented an intrusion and threat to the Heimwehr movement as the
hegemonic paramilitary organization in Austria. In particular, the Tyrolean Heimatwehr
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had a storm trooper formation in Kufstein that Steidle and Pabst feared would suffer from
the presence a local Stahlhelm group.752 While “discrete” efforts were made by Gauführer
(Section Leader), Ludwig Psenner, to “win” the leadership of the new Stahlhelm group in
Kufstein, for the Heimatwehr, Pabst and his counterpart in the Bavarian Stahlhelm, von
Reichert, proposed that, with the blessing of the federal leadership of both organizations,
the Heimatwehr would administer these local groups. In general, Pabst sought to establish
an “Arbeitgemeinschaft,” or “working group” with the Stahlhelm.753
Such collaboration would have to remain “unofficial,” however, as in September
1927 the League of Nations—which Wäninger cynically referred to as the “Entente”—
had called on Chancellor Seipel to dissolve the Heimwehren as a condition for financial
assistance. Steidle and Pabst had been assured by Seipel that he would reject those calls,
but they understood that they need not draw further attention onto the Heimwehren, while
other options were proposed. Nevertheless, there was a mutual interest in establishing
closer cooperation between the Bavarian Stahlhelm and the Heimwehr movement. On
September 2, 1927 Pabst and Major Carl Ritter von Wäninger, Stahlhelm leader in
Munich, and thus over Bavaria, met in Innsbruck to discuss a formal groundwork for
“unofficial” relations between the Heimwehren and the Stahlhelm. It was agreed that the
“formation of local Stahlhelm groups hurts the unity of the Heimwehren and
consideration should be given to the position of Austria and the upcoming events and
must be necessarily maintained. I have promised that such foundings on our side will be
omitted and will not be acknowledged.” Moreover, as Wäninger indicated to the federal
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office in Magdeburg, “In addition to the most active connection, a lively exchange of
ideas between the Austrian Heimatwehr and the Stahlhelm over the political situations
relevant to both in this working community. It is also intended to send representatives to
each other’s leadership meetings.” Wäninger also suggested that the Bavarian Stahlhelm
manage this relationship and function as the singular channel of communication between
the federal Stahlhelm office and the Heimwehren in this “working group.”754
Bavaria also continued to be a source of arms, ammunition, and military
equipment. The Stahlhelm and its associate organization, Bund Chiemgau, appear to have
been a principal supplier of arms and equipment to the Heimwehren.755 These
transactions continued, in spite the German Foreign Office’s repeated calls for the
Bavarian government to tighten up on paramilitary organizations who continued to
supply the Heimwehren with arms, ammunition, and equipment. The involvement of
private German paramilitary organizations, which usually entailed the complicity of local
officials on some level and, potentially, even provincial officials, was tantamount to
Germany being involved in Austrian affairs.756 In either case, drawing further
international scrutiny would be detrimental to Germany, as well as Austria.
Likewise, German nobles also contributed money to the Heimwehr movement. In
this regard, former Einwohnerwehr leader and mentor to Steidle, Georg Escherich, played
a key role due to his close connections with the declassed Bavarian nobility, which was
not limited to business interactions. For example, in August 1927 Escherich informed
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Steidle that he was unable to attend the upcoming Heimatwehr’s Jugendtag (youth day)
in Wörgl (Tyrol), as he was going to hunting with His Royal Highness Prince Leopold of
Bavaria.757 Thus, he connected Steidle to aristocrats like Baron von Voithenberg and
Count Rudolf von Marogna-Redwitz—executed in July 1944 as one of the central figures
in the attempt to assassinate Hitler—who was a supporter of the VVVB and the
Heimatwehr.758
The Heimwehr’s close connections to Bavarian Landesleitung of The Stahlhelm
led to closer relations with its federal leadership. In early January 1929 newspaper tycoon
and influential figure in the German Nationalist Party, Alfred Hugenberg, invited Pabst to
come to Berlin and speak to a small group about the development and objectives of the
Austrian Heimwehren. Among this closed session were the federal leaders of The
Stahlhelm, Franz Seldte and Theodor Duesterberg. Both would have most certainly
known Pabst or known of him through the many contacts he maintained in German
paramilitary circles. Upon hearing about their collaboration with the Hungarian and
Italian governments, Seldte and Duesterberg expressed interest in establishing contact
with Bethlen and Mussolini and requested that Pabst facilitate the connection. In addition
to agreeing to connect Seldte and Duesterberg to Rome via Budapest, Pabst also secured
monetary support from Hugenberg.759
Shortly after Pabst returned to Innsbruck, he penned a letter to Bethlen explaining
Seldte and Duesterberg’s desire for an active cooperation with the Hungarian and Italian
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governments, where “conservative and paramilitary circles…and anti-Marxist elements
have seized the leadership of the state.” Steidle continued, assuaging concerns over
resistance to situation in South Tyrol, explaining that Seldte and Duesterberg viewed
Hungary and Italy to be natural allies in their “common aims;” Steidle proposed a “White
International.”760 The “lukewarm response” from Bethlen and Mussolini to the idea of a
White International was indicative of their leeriness toward establishing any sort of
climate in which pan-German sentiment might be fostered.761 Nevertheless, Bethlen and
Mussolini agreed to establishing closer links to the Stahlhelm, advising Hugenberg,
Seldte, and Duesterberg in the 1930 general election in Germany.
Broadly speaking, Bethlen’s lack of enthusiasm, in particular, was illustrative of
the perpetual predicament in which Heimwehr leaders found themselves. Too close of an
alignment with German nationalist circles would frustrate pro-Austrian independence
circles, while they feared collaborating too closely with pro-Austrian independence
elements would similarly prompt the retraction of German nationalists. This conundrum
can be attributed to three specific causes: the Heimwehren generated none of its own
revenue and was entirely reliant funding from external sources, it continued to maintain
an open-ended membership policy, and the scatter-shot method its leadership employed
to recruit patrons. As a result, the movement was forever boxed-in and limited in the
action it could take without alienating one important revenue stream or another.
Consequently, it was an indication of the strength of the Social Democratic Party and its
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paramilitary Schutzbund, against which Heimwehr leaders saw maintaining widespread
support from all anti-Marxist circles to be of the utmost importance. In this way, it
forsook one aim—effecting the constitutional change—for another—functioning as a
unifying anti-Marxist front.
Another demonstration of this conundrum occurred around joint rallys of the
Heimwehren and The Stahlhelm. These joint rallies, shooting competitions, memorial
ceremonies, flag dedication ceremonies, and other public events were expressions of
solidarity and cooperation between the Heimwehren and their Bavarian counterparts.762
In the May 23, 1929 edition of the communist newspaper, Die Rote Fahne announced
that the Tyrolean Heimatwehr planned to host a delegation of the the Stahlhelm at
memorial celebration of Andreas Hofer, on Berg Isel, Innsbruck following a massive
Stahlhelm rally to be held in Munich on June 1-2.763 When Bethlen received word of the
joint rally, he expressly forbid it; the pan-Germanist implications, he feared, would cloud
the Hungarian-Italian “Aktion” and infuriate Mussolini whose motivations for funding
the Heimwehr movement were diametrically opposed to fostering pan-Germanist
sentiment.764 Thus, in the June 4 edition of the Tyrolean Allgemeiner Anzieger, Steidle
denied that any such event had been planned, claiming the report was no doubt
“consciously malicious libel” on the part of the Reichsbanner leader, Otto Hörsing.765
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The Tyrolean Allgemeiner Anzieger reported three days later, however, that “A troop of
the Reich German Stahlhelm from the Greater Berlin group” just happened to arrive in
the town of Kitzbühel where they were warmly greeted by the local Heimatwehr
group.766 This situation, too, illustrates the value Steidle and Pabst placed on attaining
and maintaining anti-Marxist support across all geopolitical boundaries—however
tenuous the balance—over achieving constitutional reform, which it stood a better chance
of attaining through a concerted effort in tandem with their Italian benefactors.
As it were, their collaboration with the Stahlhelm and other German defense
formations continued. Joint events such as the “Frontsoldatentag” in Weis (Upper
Austria), which took place on September 13-15, 1929. To Bethlen and Mussolini’s point,
the event was markedly pan-Germanist in tone, encapsulated in the conclusions of Upper
Austrian Frontkämpfervereinigung (Front Fighters Association) leader, “May the flames
of enthusiasm blaze in all your hearts, into a great, holy fire which will be blown away in
the wind of the storm, all the impurity and the non-peoples will emerge from this, and our
free, great Fatherland - All - Germany!”767 To the dismay of the German and Austrian
governments, no doubt, the close relations between the Heimwehren and the Stahlhelm
was well-known to the French government by the end of 1929. French Social Democrat,
Alexander Bracke, complained that the activities of the Heimwehr movement was “not an
internal Austrian matter,” adding that “one their leaders, Herr Pabst, is not even an
Austrian and that Heimatwehr is in closest of contact with the German Stahlhelm, which
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supports them not just morally, but also with money and weapons.”768 Indeed, its desire
to maintain a broad support base frequently put the movement at odds with its patrons,
but demonstrated conflicting facets of the its collective composition. Edmondson
contends:
the Heimwehr marched to the beat of two, and at times three, different drums. The most
regular ones were beat by Ignaz Seipel and István Bethlen, whose tempo much of the
time was the same; then at crucial moments their rhythm was disturbed by Mussolini’s
big boom and by the discordant notes coming from the west.769

There was a fourth, disparate drummer, however, in pan-Germanism. German
nationalism was a constant presence that added yet another beat that made it impossible
for the movement to maintain a crisp, uncomplicated rhythm. While this drummer
generally stayed in time with the Seipel-Bethlen beat when the Heimwehren were
focused on their Social Democratic nemesis, the increasing traction of National Socialism
in Germany would bring about an adversary that could disrupt its complicated tempo.
At the outset of the 1930s, German nationalism in the ranks of the Heimwehren
would become increasingly vociferous with the ascent of the Nazi Party in Germany.
According to Starhemberg, Nazi Party members “bribed” Heimwehr leaders to demand
the establishment of a coalition with the Nazis.770 In the 1930 German federal election,
the Nazi Party increased its presence in the Reichstag from 12 seats to 107, putting it
behind only the German Social Democratic Party. This extraordinary increase had ripple
effects in Austria. While the Austrian Nazi Party was only able to garner three percent of
the total votes cast in the general election of 1930, the municipal elections in 1931 saw a
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marked increase in those percentages. In Eisenstadt (Burgenland), they received 9.1
percent of the total votes cast, while 25.9 percent of the votes cast in Klagenfurt
(Carinthia) were for the Austrian Nazi Party.771 The corresponding uptick was also
demonstrated in Austrian municipal elections the following year. Despite Starhemberg’s
contentions to the contrary, these gains can no doubt be attributed to the arrival of
German Nazi, Theodor Habicht, in July 1931. Hitler appointed Habicht to oversee the
Austrian Nazi Party and authorized him to speak on his behalf, which finally gave the
Austrian party the cachet and financial backing it had previously lacked.
Along with reorganizing the Austrian Nazi Party, Habicht set about seeking an
alliance with the Heimwehren. Most receptive to his overtures were, of course, Pfrimer
and his Styrian organization. On October 31, 1931, the Styrian Heimatschutz held a joint
rally with Austrian Nazis. Despite the fact that Austrian Nazi Party, to that point, had no
electoral successes to speak of, Habicht’s terms of alliance were that the Heimwehr had
to recognize Hitler as their leader and to fight against any and all forces that opposed
Anschluss. Pfrimer’s staff chief Hanns Rauter, pointed out that both their Landesleiter
(Pfrimer) and Steidle wanted Anschluss and that their Bundesführer, Starhemberg,
needed to join the coalition of the German nationalist leaders. Sufficiently pleased,
Habicht concluded that the “National Socialist Party and Heimatschutz will fight
shoulder to shoulder against this system and for the great Third German Reich.”772 The
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Nazi Gauleiter of Vienna, Alfred Frauenfeld, followed Habicht’s program, calling for an
alliance with Heimwehren.773
The alliance to which Rauter spoke was that of the Harzburg Front, an alliance
between the Nazis, the German National People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei or
DNVP), and the Stahlhelm. By 1931, Pabst, in particular, had well-established
connections with Seldte, Duesterberg, and Hugenberg, and who had been a patron of the
Heimwehr movement. Through the Harzburg Front, the DNVP and the Stahlhelm would
move increasingly closer to the Nazis as the gained more traction in German politics. In
February 1933, Pabst invited Seldte and Duesterberg to Vienna to discuss the parameters
of continued close relations between the Stahlhelm and the Heimwehren. Pabst, believed
it would behoove both the Heimwehren and the Stahlhelm to establish good relations
with the Nazis and benefit from Hitler’s appointment as chancellor.774 Seldte clearly
shared the same opinion, as in April 1933, Seldte became a Nazi Party member and
declared that the Stahlhelm was at Hitler’s disposal.
Rauter, among others, pressed Starhemberg negotiate an alliance with the Nazis.
As it were, Starhemberg had already refused what would be his most handsome offer
from Gregor Strasser, in which the Führer was
prepared to recognize the Heimatwehr as the only Austrian defense force. Accordingly,
all defense and sport organizations of the NSDAP (in Austria) will be incorporated in
your organization under your sole leadership. For the settlement of political questions a
supreme council of leadership will be set up, drawn from the Heimatwehr and the
NSDAP. You will be the president of this council and will be assisted by representatives
from the National Socialist camp, in all political questions you will be bound by the
assent of the council or their representatives. In the event of a victory of the National
Socialist revolution in Germany, Adolf Hitler would recognize you as his deputy in
Austria. As regards to the material side of the arrangement, considerable financial
resources would be made available; a subsidy of approximately 500,000 schillings a
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month is suggested for defraying the expenses of the defense movement. For the joint
electoral front, 2,000,000 schillings would immediately be placed at your disposal, of
which 500,000 would be for your personal use. In return you will create a national front
composed of NSDAP and Heimwehr and will acknowledge Adolf Hitler as the supreme
head of this movement.775

Whether or not these were the actual terms Strasser offered is not clear; there remains a
possibility that Starhemberg exaggerated the extent of this “utmost accommodation” to
distance himself from the Nazis, with whom he was connected in the early 1920s.776 To
assuage the growing pro-Nazi segments within the Heimwehren, he agreed to meet with
Habicht in January 1932. The meeting went nowhere. Starhemberg, by his account, “felt
antagonistic to both men (Habicht and Andreas Bolek) and thought the whole interview a
needless formality, from which I expected no result.” After Habicht refused to abandon
his mission in Austria and allow the Austrian Nazi Party to be absorbed by the
Heimwehren, Starhemberg ended the meeting.777
Starhemberg’s meetings with Strasser, Habicht, and, later, in Berlin with Röhm
and Himmler, and finally, with Hitler, in April 1932, all ended in failure. The sticking
point seems to have been the demand that Starhemberg subordinate himself and the
Heimwehren to Hitler and the Nazis, though according to a letter Habicht sent to Hitler,
Starhemberg was open to joining the Nazi Party, but wanted several of its Austrian
leaders removed.778 As Edmondson notes, “Starhemberg could have went either way” at
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this stage, and “[h]is concern was more practical than ideological.”779 On one hand, he
had Mussolini, Gömbös, and an alliance with the Christian Social governments in
Austria, and on the other he had Hitler and the Nazi Party who was making significant
gains in Germany. The fact that he would have the backing of established governments in
Austria, Hungary, and Italy was decisive; despite the advances National Socialism was
making in Germany, they did not command the authority and resources potentially
available to the Heimwehren from the governments already in power in Italy and
Hungary; in the end he would throw his lot in with the former, pitting the Heimwehren
against the Nazis. The Heimwehr/Vaterländische Front conflict with the Nazis would
frame the existence of the Austrian Ständesstaat (corporatist state) until the Anschluss in
March 1938. It will also serve as a useful construct to frame the conclusion of the study,
as it will accentuate the unique characteristics of the Heimwehr movement in
juxtaposition to that of the National Socialists.

Conclusions
In order to understand the political activities and decision-making of Heimwehr
leaders, it is necessary to examine the movement’s interaction with the governments and
movements in neighboring states. The crux of the matter returns, once again, to the fact
that Heimwehr leaders understood the movement to be a part of Austria’s ancient
tradition of volunteer defense formations. As such, its members could not be, in keeping
with traditional protocol, required to pay fees to start or join local Heimwehr groups.
Thus, the movement did not generate any of its own income and was entirely reliant on
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the donations of private patrons and subsidies of the provincial governments. Their
principal reasons for establishing the connections with German defense organizations and
the Hungarian and Italian governments, among others, was twofold. First, they sought
financial and material support to help the Heimwehr movement keep pace with its grown
membership. The industrial associations that were the largest donors inside Austria
contributed enough to satisfy the pressure of Christian Social officials who favored the
movement, but not enough to enable its provincial organizations to expand, which they
did, especially after smashing the Social Democratic revolt and general strike in July
1927. Second, Steidle, Pabst, and Pfrimer sought to create an external support base to
allow them to function with greater freedom inside Austria by loosening the shackles to
their domestic patrons.
The active search outside Austria’s borders was provoked by the challenge laid
out in the Linzer Programm, the product of the Social Democratic Party congress in the
autumn 1926, which threatened civil war in the event of a Heimwehr putsch. This
challenge aroused a more active opposition to the Social Democrats and its paramilitary
Schutzbund. The transition from a policy of “self-defense” to one of “self-help”
prompted Heimwehr leaders to set about reorganizing their formations to be more
politically aggressive and to be more combat ready. As such, more money and more arms
were necessary, neither of which were in great supply inside Austria.
It has long been the prevailing notion in the secondary literature that the
Heimwehr movement was an instrument of foreign fascist influence in Austria. This was
only true insofar as it aligned with the designs of the Heimwehr leadership and their allies
inside Austria. It had been Steidle and Pabst who had sought the financial and material
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support from Hungary and Italy before Bethlen had recommended that Mussolini aid the
Heimwehren to help bring about a more Italian-friendly, right-wing, authoritarian
government in Austria in April 1928. These were designs were in line with the aims of
Heimwehr leaders as well as that of Chancellor Seipel, who was committed, however, to
bring it about through legal channels and not a coup d’état. Thus, even in its collusion
with Hungarian and Italian interests, the Heimwehr movement was not out of sync with
the right-wing of the Christian Social Party. Furthermore, the limits of Italian influence
on the Heimwehren was illustrated in their disregard of Mussolini’s suggestion that
Steidle and Pfrimer back Schober, who had turned on them once in power; they
continued their protest of the Austrian government and campaign for reform unabated.
Schober, without protest from Mussolini, worked to weaken the Heimwehr
movement in Austria, dealing them a humiliating political setback by ignoring the
demands they made for constitutional reform after they had essentially put him into
office. Schober, then, preceded to remove the driving force behind the Heimwehr
movement, if but temporarily, by having Pabst deported to Italy in June 1930. What is
more, he tapped a young prince, Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg, to challenge Steidle and
Pfrimer for supremacy over the movement. Armed with intelligence from Mussolini and
Hungarian diplomats, Starhemberg confronted Steidle and Pfrimer, accusing them of
being weak-willed and no longer fit to lead the Heimwehren; clearly demoralized from
their setbacks, they stepped aside without a fight.
Under Starhemberg’s nominal leadership, the Heimwehr movement maintained
its close alignment with the radical right-wing of the Christian Social Party, but faced an
even greater foe than the Social Democrats. The Nazi Party’s electoral success in
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Germany had a ripple effect in Austria. Hitler had sent one of his deputies, Theodor
Habicht, and large sums of money to clean up and organize the Austrian National
Socialist Party in the summer of 1931. Habicht’s leadership and party funds—while
being subsidized by big business, the Nazi Party also charged membership dues, which
meant that it was a much better-funded organization than the Heimwehr movement—paid
immediate dividends as the Nazis showed marked improvement in provincial and local
elections in 1931 and 1932. Habicht also embarked on a campaign to weaken the
Heimwehr movement by appealing to provincial leaders to press Starhemberg to establish
a united fighting front with the Nazis, against Austria’s mainstream political parties.
While he made no progress with Starhemberg, he proved successful in provoking dissent
and division with provincial organizations and causing a considerable number of
defections from the Heimwehren.
In the summer of 1932, Starhemberg successfully appealed to Mussolini to once
more provide arms and money to the Heimwehren, to combat the National Socialist
invasion, which Il Duce desperately wanted to prevent. The failure of several more
appeals by the upper echelons of the National Socialist Party—including Hitler himself—
to persuade Starhemberg to align the Heimwehr movement with the Nazis and the
commitment of most of the prominent Heimwehr leaders to the Dollfuss government,
meant that, by the end of 1933, the political battle lines were drawn between the
Heimwehr and the Nazis.
Interestingly, Steidle and Pabst’s efforts to reconnect with their Bavarian
counterparts would also led back to the Nazis. In the summer of 1926, Steidle had
reconnected with Georg Escherich, to whom the Heimwehren had once owed their fealty
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as leader of the defunct Einwohnerwehr. Despite the group’s dissolution, Escherich
remained an influential member of the defense community in Bavaria. He set up a
meeting with the leaders of the various defense groups in Bavaria that comprised the
Vereinigte Vaterländische Verbände Bayern (VVVB). Most prominent among these
organizations was The Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten, which was the largest rightwing paramilitary organization in Germany at that time. Steidle and Pabst, in particular,
would establish a close working relationship with leadership of the Bavarian Stahlhelm
Major Carl Wäninger and staff chief, Julius von Reichert.
Their collaboration with the Bavarian Stahlhelm would eventually connect Steidle
and Pabst to its federal leaders, Franz Seldte and Theodor Duesterberg. Stahlhelm
supporter, Newspaper magnate, and influential member of the Deutschnationale
Volkspartei (DNVP), Alfred Hugenberg, invited Pabst to come to Berlin in January 1929
and speak to a small audience about the developments within and activities of the
Austrian Heimwehr movement. Pabst’s revelation that the Heimwehren were being
funded by Mussolini by way of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, proved of great interest
to Seldte, Duesterberg, as well as Hugenberg. As such, they asked Pabst to assist them in
establishing closer relations with Hungarian and Italian officials. Sufficiently impressed
with the Heimwehr movement in Austria, Hugenberg would offer a subvention of his
own. Shortly thereafter, Steidle wrote to Bethlen, explaining the desire of Seldte and
Duesterberg to connect with Hungary and Italy, proposing a “White International”
alliance between the Stahlhelm, the Heimwehren, the governments of Hungary and Italy.
Sufficiently pleased with this idea, Mussolini agreed to advise Seldte and Duesterberg—
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running as a part of the Hugenberg-Papen-Seldte “Kampfront Schwarz, Weiß, Rot” ticket
in the forthcoming 1930 presidential election in Germany.
Through the close relationship between Hugenberg and Seldte and Duesterberg,
the Stahlhelm became essentially the paramilitary wing of the DNVP, joining the
Harzburg Front, alongside the Nazi Party. Pabst, himself a German of völkische national
outlook, sought to maintain close contact between the Heimwehr movement and
Stahlhelm in the hopes that they might benefit from a Nazi ascent to power in Germany.
By mid-1933, the Stahlhelm, as an independent defense organization, ceased to exist and
would ultimately be collapsed into the SA. While Dollfuss and the leaders of the
Heimwehr movement attempted to strike various compromises with the Nazis that would
give the party a say in Austrian affairs, while allowing it to remain independent. A
resolution to the violent political struggle that would emerge between the two sides
proved elusive. The fight for Austria would last from 1933 to 1938, as the Nazis, who
quickly amassed broad support of among the Austrian population, chipped away at the
Fatherland Front that Dollfuss established, in many respects, as an Austrian alternative to
the Nazi Party.
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CONCLUSION
Scholarly interest in the Heimwehr movement over the course of the 80 years
since its dissolution has been disappointingly limited. Disappointing because the
movement offers a window into many complex subjects like national identity, the
militarization of politics and society, the impact of total war on a people, the impact of
military defeat in total war on a people, the relationship between militarism and religion,
fascism as an analytical construct, as well as political revolution and counter-revolution
on a national and transnational level, among others. Of the studies that are available,
early interpretations suffer from political biases that continued to be perpetuated for in
the historiography for decades. In such studies, the movement became the scape-goat for
the fall of the republic, depicted as an instrument of foreign influence driving Austria to
wrack and ruin. In the aftermath of the Second World War, this allowed Austrian
politicians to escape blame for their part in the death of Austrian democracy. For that
matter, the common narrative of the Heimwehr movement erroneously depicts it as a
typical anti-clerical, pan-German “fascist” movement that emerged in the wake of the
Great War.
It has been the aim of this study to contribute to the body of literature on the
Heimwehr movement by challenging these notions. By highlighting important pre-war
continuities evident in the values, rituals, ideals, and support base of the Heimwehr
movement, this work has illustrated that the Heimwehr movement cannot be understood
by simply examining interwar Austria without consideration of the Habsburg past. Its
organization and culture was inspired by the rituals and values of a long legacy of Alpine
civic militarism, as chapter one demonstrated. As the patriotic-minded, voluntary
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defenders of the mainstream provincial right, the Heimwehr movement was firmly
grounded in the traditions of provincial Alpine society, particularly in the Austrian states
of Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Salzburg, Carinthia, and Styria. Especially formative was the legacy
of civic militarism and war volunteerism in these provinces, perhaps best embodied by
the Standschützen militia units of Tyrol and Vorarlberg and their provincial defense
system (Landesverteidigung) that had long protected their borders from foreign invasion.
These institutions originated from the provinces’ numerous local shooting ranges and the
sport shooting clubs that formed around those ranges. In the early eighteenth century,
shooting club volunteers formed sharp shooter regiments who fought off French invaders
in the summer of 1703 during the War of Spanish Succession. Thus, the roots of
provincial militarism could be traced to a thriving gun culture, which developed around
hunting and sport-shooting. The Tiroler Heimatwehr recognized these influences in a
variety of manners, chiefly through the staging of provincial shooting contests in Tyrol
and Vorarlberg--the first since the outbreak of the Great War--and the veneration of
hunting as a rite of passage into manhood and requisite for military service, which it
viewed as the picture of patriotism.
Over the centuries, as Habsburg authorities sought to bring Tyrol and Vorarlberg
into the imperial military hierarchy, provincial militarism was increasingly colored by
Habsburg military culture. This transpired primarily through imperial subsidies to build
new shooting ranges and maintain existing ranges, as well as of private veterans’
associations. These subsidies were not without a price, however. In exchange for these
subsidies, veterans and shooting club members agreed to muster as war-time volunteer
rifle companies. This was an important step in that it formalized provincial militarism and
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brought it closer into the dynastic orbit. By the start of the Great War, the Standschützen
were no longer “volunteers,” but were rather emergency reserve forces comprised of old
men beyond the age for military service, and adolescents who were not old enough yet to
be conscripted. Nevertheless, their call to duty in 1915 to defend Tyrol’s southern borders
against the new Italian enemy gave the Standschützen a new lease on life as fodder for
ideological consumption. Though a motley crew, they displayed the best virtues of
Tyrolean civic militarism and, in the framework of its broader tradition of war
volunteerism and patriotism, served as the basis for the Tiroler Heimatwehr and its
understanding of duty and patriotism, as was evident it is regular commemoration of
Andreas Hofer and his Standschützen, the personification of Tyrolean civic militarism.
At the same time, it is necessary to acknowledge that the “culture of defeat”
emerging in central Europe following the Great War provided fertile ground for it to take
root and grow. What made the Heimwehr movement a modern movement was simply
these political realities into which it was born. The defeat of the Central Powers in the
Great War crushed central Europe militarily, economically, politically, socially, and
culturally. Despite being culturally rooted in the traditions of Alpine civic militarism,
chapter two illustrated that the founding of the Heimwehren was not simply an Austrian
development, but was the product of the transnational cooperation among counterrevolutionary circles in Germany, Austria, and Hungary. Driven principally by what they
believed to be the degenerative effects of the social democratic revolutions in 1918 and
spread of communist revolution into central Europe, anti-Marxist circles in Germany and
Hungary collaborated with their Austrian counterparts and, in many cases, provincial
governments to fund, arm, equip, reorganize, and train the remnants of the local militias
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that had been mustered in the last days of the Great War. These groups were the
foundation of the Heimwehr movement. Local groups were organized under wider
provincial umbrellas which owed their allegiance to Bavarian Einwohnerwehr head,
Georg Escherich.
This cooperative reflected the reactionary circles of the Central Powers attempting
to regain their footing and restore “order” to their worlds turned upside-down. The new
republican constitutions enabled the social democratic parties to challenge traditional
power bases with greater parity than ever before. The Heimwehr movement represented a
weapon through which those power bases could defend their besieged places of
prominence. The wider trend of paramilitary organizations emerging across the German
and Austrian landscape is a testament to this development, while at the same time
indicating the severe restrictions the Allies meted out at the Paris Peace Conference,
which resulted in insufficient numbers of police and gendarmerie to keep the peace in
times of emergency. As a “patriotic” movement of renewal, the Heimwehren, like the
countless other paramilitary organizations that emerged in Germany and Austria, sought
to restore the dignity and pride to the German cultural nation. As such, they saw the “halb
Marxistische” constitutions and partisan corruption of the republics created in November
1918 as principal obstacles in the way of their endeavor. The anti-Marxist,
“Ordnungsblock” this triumvirate forged in the aftermath of World War I would
foreshadow the direction of the future governments of central Europe.
This examination has also shown that the Heimwehr movement was grounded in
Alpine tradition in virtually every respect. Even the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr drew
heavily from these same traditions of civic militarism associated with shooting clubs and
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sharp-shooter companies, as chapter three established. The influence of Tyrolean
Standschützen was especially influential on the organization and culture of the Heimwehr
movement in several ways. For example, members elected their immediate superiors,
from local groups electing their leader to provincial leaders electing the Bundesführer.
The very same shooting ranges that had served as the basis for the Landesverteiding of
imperial Tyrol, served as a basis of mobilization and training for Heimatwehr groups.
Schützen rituals such as parades, flag dedications, and shooting competitions, were also
carried on by the Heimwehren. Similarly, they maintained a generally unrestricted
membership criteria like their Standschützen forerunner. The voluntary character of the
Heimatwehr, which it likened to its Standschützen predecessors, prevented it charging its
members association fees; unlike its predecessors, however, it did not enjoy the same
degree of support from local, state, and imperial coffers, placing the Heimwehr
movement in virtually a perpetual search for funding.
This chapter also argued that the deeply entrenched tenets of Catholic social
thought were influential in two principal areas of the Heimwehr movement. First, through
its activities and propaganda the movement illustrated a traditional outlook on gender
roles and paralleled those expressed in Pope Leo XIII’s Papal Encyclical, Rerum
Novarum, which explained that the proper role of women was in the home, rearing
children. This view was similarly articulated in Heimwehr newspapers; mothers were the
first line of indoctrination of the national youth. Moreover, the activism of its women’s
auxiliaries proved consistent with this outlook. They advocated not only the xenophobic
ideals propagated by the Heimwehren, calling for mothers to protect their children from
the corrupting influence foreign fads and Jewish intellectualism. Instead, children should
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be taught traditional German songs, dances, literature, and music and instilled with
Catholic values.
Conversely, the militarism of the Heimwehr movement was innately connected
with traditional Catholic notions of masculinity. As heads of their households protecting
the home and hearth from danger was the duty of the father/husband. As such, they were
taught as young boys to use firearms recreationally for hunting and in sport shooting
contests; these were precursors to prepare them for military service, once of age. The
Heimwehr similarly began youth programs that taught their members not only how to
shoot military rifles but also how to maintain them, throw hand grenades, navigating with
maps, terrain exercises, marches, and other military exercises. The increasingly
aggressive militarization of youths, exhibited in the Heimwehr groups, was a result of the
loss of compulsory military service as a feature of Austrian society via the Treaty of Saint
Germain.780 Without compulsory military service, Austrian youths would not receive the
military training that many conservative circles believed was vital to instilling virtues like
loyalty, discipline, duty, honor, courage, service, and sacrifice.
Catholic social thought also exercised great influence on the broader worldview
of most Heimwehr leaders. This can most readily be seen in the parallels demonstrated in
the Korneuburg Oath, Heimwehr rhetoric, and propaganda with the Papal Encyclicals
Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno, particularly in its aversion to the Marxist idea
of class conflict, the atomization of society inherent to classical liberalism, the frivolous
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partisanship of parliamentary democracy, and the greed and corruption that had become
part and parcel of free market capitalism. Furthermore, the theories of Austrian Catholic
social thinkers such as Adam Müller and Karl von Vogelsang were also apparent in the
writings of Othmar Spann, his students, as well as Heimwehr ideologue, Odo NeustädterStürmer, for whom the May (1934) Constitution is attributed. The authoritarian,
corporatist direction taken by the Heimwehren reflected the confluence of these elements,
which only found further reassurance in the movement’s close connections to the Fascist
Italian government. Claims that Seipel introduced Heimwehr leaders to the idea of a
corporatist state in 1928 are mistaken, as archival evidence indicates that this introduction
occurred years earlier.781
Lastly, chapter three also explained that the close ties between the Heimwehr
movement and the Catholic Church was perhaps most evident in the events it staged.
Presided over by sympathetic clergy, these events were indicative of the similarly close
relationship the Heimwehr movement cultivated with Catholic officials, just as their
Schützen forerunners had enjoyed prior to the Great War. This was an intrinsic element
of all Heimwehr gatherings (war memorial dedications, shooting competitions, rallies,
and flag consecration ceremonies), most typically in the form of Sunday field Mass
service.782 While they served their primary religious purpose, clerics used the pulpits to
remind the ranks of the movement that they were defenders of Church and religion from
Marxism. Beyond the field Mass, Catholic priests proved effective propagandists for the
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Heimwehren, preaching the movement’s virtues to their parishioners, supporting the
movement politically through the Christian Social Party, and illicitly through allowing
the Heimwehren to use their churches as weapons caches.
Indeed, as chapter four determined, Church clerics were just one of several
historically influential social groups that supported the Heimwehr movement. The
disenfranchised nobility, provincial officials, as well as Austrian industrialists and
bankers overwhelmingly supported the Heimwehr movement. The thoroughly traditional
outlook of its leadership meshed well with that of the clergy and nobility who sought to
protect their long-held positions atop Austrian society, while state and local officials—
who themselves frequently held leadership positions within the local and provincial
Heimwehr organizations—utilized the Heimwehren not only as auxiliary police forces to
maintain “peace and order” but also to intimidate and suppress local Social Democrats.
Beyond minor violent altercations between Heimwehr men and Social Democrats or
Schutzbund men, the principal way the Heimwehren bottled-up local Social Democrats
was by undermining labor strikes. Its emergency technical assistance formations were
frequently able to restore, at least to a limited extent, the services halted by striking
Social Democratic labor unions. To take it a step further, the Heimwehren began
organizing their own independent (from any one political party) labor unions and in
provinces such as Styria and managed to establish agreements with the industrialists to
lay off Social Democratic workers and hire only men who were members of their union.
In doing so, they weakened the power of the Social Democrats’ most potent political
weapon.
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Financially, Austrian industrialists, bankers, and nobles were the major domestic
patrons of the Heimwehr movement, contributing monthly stipends to the provincial
organizations. Despite federal and international calls for the Heimwehren to be disarmed
and disbanded, provincial governments held firm in protecting the groups, emphasizing
their quasi-official roles as emergency police detachments. Staunch Heimwehr defenders
on the Christian Social right such as Chancellors Ignaz Seipel, Carl Vaugoin, and
Engelbert Dollfuss, had no interest in dissolving the Heimwehren. The powers granted to
the provincial governments would have made it quite difficult for the federal government
to have legally taken on the task even if it had wanted (which it did not after the 1920
election placed the Christian Social and Greater German People’s Party firmly in control
of the federal government). The rise in support and participation of Austrian aristocrats in
the late 1920s further insulated the Heimwehr movement, offering, through their money,
titles—despite being legally annulled—and familial legacies from the Habsburg
Monarchy, prestige and legitimacy. This development reiterated the fact that the
Heimwehr movement was no fringe, populist enterprise like the Nazi Party or
Mussolini’s fascist party; it was organized and supported from the outset by state and
local officials and remained—even in its most disruptive moments—an association that
worked in lock-step with the right-wing of the major bourgeois parties throughout its
existence. As one Social Democratic newspaper lamented in a 1929 article, the Christian
Social Party shouldered the blame for instigating the Great War in 1914 and were, fifteen
years later, as the “makers of the Heimwehr,” fomenting civil war.783

783

Laurenz Genner, “Vor Fünfzehn Jahren—und heute!” Die Unzufriedene, July 27, 1929, 2.
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As chapter five documented, in order to confront the perceived threat posed by
“Linzer Programm,” published in the autumn of 1926 and vowing to institute a
“dictatorship of the proletariat” should the bourgeois parties attempt to overthrow the
constitution, the Heimwehren, in Steidle’s words, had to transition from a passive “selfdefense” confederation to an active “self-help” movement. Put differently, the movement
needed to take a more active part in Austrian public life, pressing their bourgeois party
patrons. As such, Steidle and Pabst had to look beyond Austria’s borders for military and
financial support for this transition. Pabst had successfully established a close working
relationship with the Stahlhelm, while Steidle reached out to Hungarian Minister
President István Bethlen, who eventually connected Steidle with Italian Prime Minister,
Benito Mussolini. Mussolini agreed to fund Steidle’s endeavor to press the bourgeois
parties to push through constitutional reforms empowering the executive. By August
1928, flush with Italian funds, the Heimwehr movement staged a series of rallies and
corresponding propaganda campaign that chided the bourgeois parties for placing
partisan interests above those of Austria, of cowardice for failing to mount a staunch
opposition against the 1918 revolution, and for negotiating with the Social Democrats
thereafter.
Furthermore, this investigation has established that, while the Heimwehr
movement indeed sought to destroy social democracy in Austria, it was not merely the
tool of fascist Italy as historians have erroneously argued. Both sides were in general
agreeance as to the desired outcome of this campaign. Mussolini naturally exercised the
final word regarding what activities Italy would fund and not fund, but Steidle, Pabst,
Pfrimer, Seipel, and Vaugoin, among others, executed the plan Steidle had laid out with
343

crystal clarity. For that matter, Seipel exercised far more influence over the plan than did
Mussolini or Bethlen. With Seipel’s “unexpected” resignation in April 1929, the
chancellorship fell into the lap of moderate Christian Social politician, Ernst von
Steeruwitz, who Steidle and Pfrimer did not trust to take a strong position against the
Social Democrats. They ratcheted up the pressure, spreading rumors of a coup d’état to
be kicked off under the guise of a large Heimwehr rally in Vienna, set for September 29,
1929. Steeruwitz resigned. The Heimwehren pushed out the chancellor they did not trust
and chose the next Chancellor, Johann Schober. This would prove to be a humiliating
setback as Schober had no plans to work with Steidle and Pfrimer. In fact, he worked to
systematically undermine the Heimwehr movement, helping to topple the two as federal
leaders of the movement, and deporting Pabst to Italy. In their place, with the input of
Mussolini, he helped position Ernst Rüdiger Prince von Starhemberg as the new
Bundesführer, which created a great deal of dissention among the provincial leadership of
the movement, most especially between he and head of the Vienna Heimwehr, Major
a.D. Emil Fey. Their rivalry would weaken the Heimwehren and the Ständestaat
throughout it struggle with the Nazis over the fate of Austria.784
The original intent behind this study was to take a deeper look at the
organizational culture of the Heimwehr movement, using the Tyrolean Heimatwehr as a

784

In particular, Julius Raab, leader of the Lower Austrian Heimwehr leader and future Chancellor
of Austria after World War II, took the boldest stand against the Korneuburg program (after having initially
agreed to the oath) in 1930. Exiting the federal association, Raab created division in the local and regional
organizations of in Lower Austria. This opened the door for Starhemberg, as the newly elected
Bundesführer, to create a competing group in Lower Austria. This development did not sit well with Fey,
who had already began mobilizing his own, anti-Starhemberg faction, which included Steidle, among other
provincial leaders. Pfrimer, among others, sided with Starhemberg, compelled by the latter’s Nazi past and
ephemeral outbursts of German nationalism. Prior to these developments, however, the Heimwehr
leadership worked in a generally cooperative fashion, with Pfrimer and the Styrian Heimatschutz being the
only consistent outlier.
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case study. As the research progressed it became clear that more fundamental gaps in the
literature needed to be addressed first. It became the aim of this investigation to bridge
the gap between political studies, which represent the clear majority of the literature, and
social and cultural lines of inquiry. Thus, this study has attempted to lay a stepping stone
away from the political narrative of the movement toward understanding the cultural
influences at work within and around the Heimwehren. Given that the leadership of the
Tyrolean Heimatwehr played such a prominent role in the movement throughout much of
its existence, it remained a worthwhile approach to use the Tyrolean organization as a
window into the wider confederation. Nevertheless, the regional nature of the movement
leaves many potential stones unturned that could further refine or recast interpretations of
the Heimwehr movement.
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APPENDIX A – Organizational Hierarchy of the Tiroler Heimatwehr

With no existing membership records, the information available regarding
Ortsgruppen varies, though references are typically limited to the groups’ elected
leadership and initial member numbers. This appendix contains information pertaining
to the organizational structure and hierarchy, gleaned primarily from the
organizational records of the Tiroler Heimatwehr (1920 – 1929). The baseline for this
appendix is, however, comes from the organizational files from 1921.785 Where
possible changes in positions and dates are included where possible. The unpublished
dissertation of Verena Lösch was most helpful in establishing dates for later
alterations to the organizational structure of the Tiroler Heimatwehr and its hierarchy.
Below is a snapshot of the provincial leadership of the Tiroler Heimatwehr as of
December 1921:786

Landesführer
Dr. Richard Steidle

Landesleiter,
Technical Emergency
Assitance
Ing. Franz Innerhofer

Deputy Landesführer
Dr. Franz
Schweinitzhaupt

785

State Treasurer
Franz Fischer

TLA: Landesleitung der SSV Tirol, I/1, fol. 410, 284-8.
Schweinitzhaupt was replaced by Großdeutschen Volkspartei Rep. Dr. Friedrich Schmidt in
July 1922; Schmidt was replaced by Ekkehert Pesendorfer in June 1923. Fischer appears to have been
replaced by Ing. Richard Lazzer at some point after December 1921 and before October 1923; Lazzer was
replaced by Julius Kinz in October 1923.
786
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The Staff serving the Landesleitung in December 1921 was as follows:787
1) Chief of Staff: Major (Ret.) Hans von Voith788
2) Chief of Staff: Oberstleutnant (Obstlt) Johann Oberndorfer
Registrar and Personnel Officer: Obstlt (Ret.) Josef Schröder
Bursar: Obstlt (Ret.) Artur Schuschnigg
Artillery Officer: Obstlt (Ret.) Haubold
Leader of Technical Emergency Assistance: Ing. Richard Lazzer
Officer of Technical Emergency Assistance: Major (Ret.) Erich Rodler
Armory Ward: Guido Jenisch
Railways: Dr. Felber
Weapons Maintenance: Gunsmith Gasser
Press Officer: Dr. Walter Leonardi.
***
Existing organizational documents list the leadership of these regions was as follows:
1) Region Reutte Leadership789
a. Region Leader: School Superintendent Josef Knittel790

787
The composition of the Landesleitung and its staff—aside from Steidle—underwent numerous
changes over the course of the 1920s and 1930s.
788
Oberleutnant Gasteiger served as the first Stabsleiter and was replaced by Hauptmann Herbert
von Obwurzer; “As a result of internal disputes” Obwurzer was ousted and departed for the Upper Austrian
Heimwehr and was replaced by Major Hans von Voith by September 1921; Voith was replaced by
Waldemar Pabst (aka Walter Peters) in May 1922. See Peter Broucek: „Obwurzer, Herbert von,“
Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950, Band 7 (Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Wien 1978), 202.
789
Region (Gau) Reutte existed as a separate area until 1927 and when it was collapsed into
Region (Gau) Middle and Western Tyrol.
790
At some point before 1928, church painter, Hermann Praxmair, replaced Josef Knittel. See
Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 49-50.
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b. Deputy Region Leader/Treasurer: G. Riesler791
2) Region Middle and Western Tyrol Leadership:
a. Region Leader: Hans Oettl (Bürgermeister, Steinach am Brenner)
b. District Innsbruck-Land
i. District Leader: Hans (Johann) Oettl (Bürgermeister of Steinach
am Brenner)792
c. District Imst
i. District Leader: Franz Kepp793
d. District Hall in Tirol
i. District Leader: Josef Schiesser794
1. For the city of Hall, in 1924, its local leadership looked as
follows:795
a. Leader: School Director, Josef Egg
i. Deputy: Innkeeper, Hermann Bartl
ii. Adjutant: Martin Berger
iii. Ordnance Service: City Treasurer Dr. Ernst
Verdross
At some point before 1928, Josef Ahorn replaced Riesler. See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der
Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 49-50.
792
Innkeeper Franz Schreiring replaced Hans Oettl as the leader of District Innsbruck-Land at
some point prior to 1928. Schreiring’s deputy, in 1928, was artist, Andreas Einberger. See Lösch, “Die
Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51.
793
School Director, Philipp Barth, is listed as the District Leader of Imst in 1925, apparently
replacing Kepp. Barth’s deputy was a Shopkeeper named Leopold Pischl.
794
Johann Parth appears to have replaced Schiesser as District Leader. An Innkeeper Franz
Tiefenthaler is listed as Parth’s deputy. See See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51.
795
TLA: Landesleitung der SSV Tirol (Heimatwehr) IV/1, fol.777, 196; Apparently there was a
miscount in the local group elections and suspected rigging of votes: "The previous sub-leaders remained
provisionally to their posts. The present situation is quiet difficult…It is the desire to include only those
people in the local group to which one can rely completely in all respects," 208.
791
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iv. Storm Troop Company Commander: Karl
Corazza
v. Similar to the organization of Innsbruck,
Hall was divided into six sections:
1. Section I: Dr. Max Staufer
2. Section II: Cavalry Captain Herold
3. Section III: Josef Ebenbichler
4. Section IV: “Gruppe der
Gewerbetreibenden”
5. Section V: Josef Kofler
6. Section VI: Eduard Ebenbischler
e. District Landeck796
i. District Leader: Director Josef Jöchler
f. District Wippthal797
i. District Leader: Hans (Johann) Oettl
g. City Captaincy Innsbruck
i. City Captain: Ing. Otto Vesely
ii. Deputy City Captain: Shopkeeper Paul Schneider

The information presented here for District Landeck is drawn from Lösch, “Die Geschichte der
Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51, who states that the information represents the organization in 1928. Jöchler’s
deputy was Innkeeper, Karl Kusche.
797
Hans (Johann) Oettl served both as the Region leader and the district leader of the District
Wippthal, which appears to have been created after 1921 and before 1928. Count Anton von WörtzSprengenstein served as Oettl’s Deputy District Leader. See See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler
Heimatwehr,” 35-51.
796
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1. Section I Captain: Engineer Bruno Larsen798
a. Section I Storm Troop Leader: Ernst Presepevisi
2. Section II Captain: Paul Schneider799
a. Section II Storm Troop Leader: Alfred Neuhaus
3. Section III Captain: Engineer Auer800
a. Section III Storm Troop Leader: Dr. Hämmerle
4. Section IV Captain: Mathias Leitner
a. Section IV Storm Troop Leader: Karl Papseh
5. Section V Captain: Epp801
a. Section V Storm Troop Leader: Johann Danninger
6. Section VI Captain: Albert Harpf802
7. Section VII Captain: Rasim803
a. Section VII Storm Troop Leader: Jun. Zösmayr
8. Machine Gun Detachment Leader: Dr. Walter Leonardi
h. Region Middle and Western Tyrol Representative: Artur Speckbacher

798

Bruno Larsen was promoted to Deputy City Captain by 1925. Section I Captain was taken over
by Director Hohenauer. Hohenauer’s deputy was a Major Larcher. See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler
Heimatwehr,” 35-51.
799
Scheider was replaced as Section II Captain by an Oberstleutenent Reiter, whose deputy was
Hermann Greil. See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51.
800
An Oberst Matz replaced Auer as the Section III Captain. Matz’s deputy’s last name was Lill,
according to See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 51.
801
According to See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 51, Epp is apparently
replaced by Ignaz Platter, whose deputy was a Direktor Schuster.
802
The information about the Section VI Captain comes from See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der
Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 51, and is based on information as of 1925 (not 1921 as is the rest of the names).
Also, Harpf’s deputy was a Hauptmann Kratz.
803
Innsbruck was divided into six sub-sections as of 1925, which indicates a realignment of the
section boarders and the apparent consolidation of Section VII.
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i. Region Middle and Western Tyrol Representative/Armory Ward: Guido
Jenisch
j. Region Middle and Western Tyrol Administrator: Dr. Schaufler
k. Region Middle and Western Tyrol Administrator: Alois Holzer
l. Region Middle and Western Tyrol Office and Registry Leader: Ferdinand
Thaler
3) Region Unterinntal Leadership
a. Region Leader: State Rep. Andreas Thaler
b. Deputy Region Leader: State Rep. Theodor Scheffauer
c. District Kufstein804
i. District Leader: State Rep. Andeas Thaler805
ii. Deputy District Leader: Former Mayor Josef Egger
iii. Deputy District Leader: Shopkeeper Anton Huber
1. City Captaincy Kufstein
a. City Captain: Master Tinsmith Berkmann
2. Protection Community Leader Brixlegg: Shopkeeper Anton
Huber
a. Deputy Protection Community Leader: Property
Owner Johann Leitner

804

Protection Community Leaders or their deputies (Schutzgemeinschaftführer) for the following
communities had yet to be elected: Langkampfen, Thiersee, Untere Schranne, and Schweich. By 1928,
District Kufstein had been split between District Kufstein and District Rattenberg (under the direction of
Georg Kögl and his deputies Property Owner Johann Leitner—listed above as Brixlegg Deputy Protection
Community Leader—and, Farmer and deputy Major of Reith, Josef Rieser.
805
As of 1928, the District Leader of Kufstein was Police Inspector Johann Galehr. His deputy
was Property Owner Stefan Feuersinger (listed above as the Protection Community Söll Leader).
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b. Deputy Protection Community Leader: Josef Kögl
3. Protection Community Leader Kramsach: Property Owner
Sepp Emberger
4. Protection Community Leader Kundl: Teacher Arnold
5. Protection Community Leader Söll: Property Owner Stefan
Feuersinger
a. Deputy Protection Community Leader: Property
Owner Andreas Guggenberger
6. Protection Community Leader Wildschönau: State Rep.
Andreas Thaler
d. District Kitzbühel
i. District Leader: Property Owner Hans Karl806
ii. Deputy District Leader: Kitzbühel Mayor Hans Hirnsberger
iii. Deputy District Leader: Hopfgarten Mayor Hans Jessacher
1. Protection Community Leader Hopfgarten: Mayor Hans
Jessacher
2. Protection Community Leader Kitzbühel: Mayor Hans
Hirnsberger
3. Protection Community Leader St. Johann: Property Owner
Hans Karl

806

Hans Karl and Hans Hirnsberger appear to have shifted roles by 1928, with Hirnsberger as
District Kitzbühel’s leader and Karl as his deputy along with Jessacher. As close observation of the
Tyrolean Heimatwehr’s leadership shows, this degree of continuity in the same leadership positions was
rare. See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51.
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4. Protection Community Leader Fieberbrunn: Peasant
League Section Chief Feidl
e. District Schwaz
i. District Leader: State Rep. Theodor Scheffauer807
ii. Deputy District Leader: Property Owner Alois Graus808
1. Protection Community Leader Schwaz: State Rep. Theodor
Scheffauer
2. Protection Community Leader Vomp: Head Teacher Hans
Geiger
3. Protection Community Leader Rotholz: Property Owner
Alois Graus
4. Protection Community Leader Achenkirchen: Property
Owner Schrattenthaler
5. Protection Community Leader Zillertal: “wird erst
organisiert”809
f. Region Unterinntal Leader of Technical Emergency Assistance: Works
Inspector Überreiter
g. Region Unterinntal Treasurer: Dr. Wippern
h. Region Unterinntal Press Lawyer Staff: Dr. Pickert

807

Innkeeper Alois Schaller appears to have replaced Scheffauer at some point prior to 1928. See
See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51.
808
Graus appears to have been replaced as Deputy District Leader by Co-Deputy District Leaders
Romed Angerer, who was Deputy Mayor of Schwaz at the time and, Forester, Hans Fleckel.
809
By 1928, the Protection Community Zillerthal (Schutzgemeinschaft Zillerthal) had become its
own district. Its leader was Dr. Karl Kreidel. Kreidel’s deputies were Shoemaker, Franz Sandhofer, and
Farmer, Josef Egger. See See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51.

353

i. Region Unterinntal Representative: Col. (Ret.) Ludwig Psenner
j. Region Unterinntal Administrator: Lt. (Ret.) Heinrich Mast
k. Region Unterinntal Typist: Col. (Ret.) Karl Binder
4) Region East Tyrol810*
a. Region East Leader: Politician Gottfried Hassler
b. District Lienz
i. Section Leader Sillian: Webhofer
ii. Section Leader Matrei: Mühlstatter
iii. Section Leader Nikolsdorf: Gottfried Hassler
c. Region East Tyrol Representative: Property Owner Jakob Obersteiner
* The East Tyrolean Heimatwehr, by the Spring of 1928, was divided into three
districts:811
1. District Sillian
a. Local Group (Ortsgruppe)Untertilliach
i. Local Leader: Sebastian Innwinkl
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Johann Prünster
b. Local Group Obertilliach
i. Local Leader: Josef Obmascher

810
Mayors of the city of Lienz, Franz Henggi and Theodor Hibler also played a role in the
leadership of the East Tyrolean Heimatwehr organization, though it is not clear what specific positions they
held. It is likely, however, they served in the role of deputy leader(s). See Lösch, “Die Geschichte der
Tiroler Heimatwehr,” 35-51. By 1928, the East Tyrolean Heimatwehr looked dramatically different in
terms of organizational structure.
811
TLA: Landesleitung der SSV (Tirol), VII/1, fol. 2090, 529-31. There is an additional local
group for the community of Strassen that had not been allocated to a district as of that time; its elected
leader was Josef Ortner, his deputy was master carpenter Ludwig Mayer and the Secretary was Alois
Aichner.
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c. Local Group Kartitsch
i. Local Leader: Master Bricklayer Johann Walder
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Blacksmith Leonhard Klammer
d. Local Group Abfaltersbach
i. Local Leader: Jakob Duregger
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Franz Webhofer
e. Local Group Sillian
i. Local Leader: Shopkeeper Webhofer
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Inspector Paul Amhof
f. Local Group Sillianberg
i. Local Leader: Josef Senfter
g. Local Group Panzendorf
h. Local Group Ausservillgraten
i. Local Leader: Anton Leiter
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Josef Perfler
iii. Secretary: Friedl Bachmann
i. Local Group Innervillgraten
i. Local Leader: Kassian Lanser
j. Local Group Anras
i. Local Leader: Josef Oberhofer
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Hermann Lercher
2. District Lienz
a. Local Group Assling
355

i. Local Leader Bichl: Josef Mairer
ii. Local Leader Thal: Josef Lukasser
iii. Secretary: Bürgermeister Johann Libiseller
b. Local Group Lavant
i. Local Leader: Anton Klocker
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Bürgermeister Josef Brunner
c. Local Group Tristach
i. Local Leader: Andreas Buntschuh
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Johann Felder
iii. Secretary: Johann Klocker
d. Local Group Dölsach812
e. Local Group Nikolsdorf
i. Local Leader - Nikolsdorf: Gotthard Winkler
ii. Deputy Local Leader - Nikolsdorf: Hans Brunner
iii. Local Leader - Langberg: Josef Rossbacher
iv. Local Leader – Norsach: Franz Plautz
v. Secretary: Sylverter Stranganz
f. Local Group Leisach
i. Local Leader: Josef Hanser
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Peter Senfter
g. Local Group Thurn

812

As it is laid out in the document, it is not clear who was elected to what position, the names are
simply listed in the following order: Stefan Buchacher, Johann Eichholzer, Peter Gasser, and Peter Mairl.
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i. Local Leader: Anton Bacher
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Paul Unterweger
h. Local Group Gaimberg
i. Local Leader: Luis Kollnig
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Josef Hintersteiner
i. Local Group Oberlienz813
j. Local Group Ainet
i. Local Leader: Florian Forcher
ii. Co-Deputy Local Leader: Gottfried Oberhauser
iii. Co-Deputy Local Leader: Bürgermeister Thomas Pedarnig
k. Local Group Schlaiten
i. Local Leader: Florian Pedarnig
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Matthias Steiner
l. Local Group St. Johann
i. Local Leader: Josef Oblasser
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Andreas Vergeiner
m. Local Group Bannberg
i. Local Leader: Alois Salcher
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Josef Weiler
iii. Secretary: Principal Franz Ude
3. District Iselthal

813

It is not clear who was elected to what position aside from Principal Gutwenger who was
elected as the group’s administrator. The other names were listed in the following order: Josef
Ruggenthaler, Leo Neumaier, and Principal Johann Polt.
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a. Local Group St. Jakob
i. Local Leader: Georg Schreiber
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Peter Ladstätter
b. Local Group St. Veit
i. Local Leader: Police Inspector Hafele
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Josef Ortner
iii. Secretary: Head Teacher Josef Mallaun
c. Local Group Hopfgarten
i. Local Leader: Hyazinth Blassnigg
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Chauffeur Anton Blassnigg
d. Local Group Kals
i. Local Leader: Peter Payer
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Stefan Schneider
e. Local Group Matrei
i. Local Leader: Peter Brugger
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Josef Presslaber
f. Local Group Praegraten
i. Local Leader: Urban Kratzer
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Johann Steiner
g. Local Group Virgen
i. Local Leader: Police Inspector Josef Fleckinger
ii. Deputy Local Leader: Josef Dichtl

358

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources:
Archival
Tiroler Landesarchiv, Innsbruck, Austria
Verbände und Parteien, Selbstschutzverbände (SSV), Landesleitung
I/2 Sammelakt Landesregierung, 1921-1922
I/6 Sammelakt Landesschießen, 1. Bestandfeier, 1921
I/7 Sammelakt HW-Schießen, 1922
I/8 Sammelakt Jugendorganisation, 1921
IV/1 Bez. Organisation – Versammlung-Ausbildung, 1925
IV/6 Bez. Jugend, 1925
V/1 Bez. Organisation – Versammlung, 1926
VI/1 Bez. Organisation, 1927
VI/11 Bez. Radio, 1927
VI/13 Bez. Jugend, 1927
VI/14 Bez. HW-Zeitung, 1927
VI/17 Bez. Allgemein, 1927
VII/1 Bez. Organisation, 1928
VII/5 Bez. Schießstand, 1928
Verbände und Parteien, Selbstschutzverbände (SSV), Bundesleitung
XII/1 Bez. Organisation, 1928
XII/3 Bez. Aufmarsch Wiener-Neudstadt, 1928
XII/11 Bez. Personal Bund, 1928
XIII/1 Bez. Organisation, 1929
XIII/2 Bez. Führersitzungen, 1929
XIII/7 Bez. Finanzen, 1929
XIII/14 Bez. Zeitungen, 1929
XIII/15 Bez. Presse, 1929
XIII/19 Bez. Nachrichtenblätter der Bundesleitung der Alpenländische
Selbstshutzverbände (Nr. 1 (Sept. 1927) – Nr.16 (Dez. 1928)
The National Archives of the UK, Kew
German Foreign Ministry Archives, Political Department II: Austria: Relations
with Germany - Tyrol Anschluss, 1920 Nov-1921 Oct, K925 (K232443K232720)
German Foreign Ministry Archives, Secret Files 1920-1936: Austria: Home
Defence [Heimwehr], 1927 Jan-1933 Feb, 6080 (E450973-E451075)
359

Newspapers
Allgemeiner Tiroler Anzeiger (Tiroler Anzeiger after 1922)
Alpenländische Heimatwehr
Arbeiter-Zeitung
Arbeiterwille
Das Kleine Blatt
Der Bauernbündler
Der Morgen
Deutsches Volksblatt
Die Rote Fahne
Die Unzufriedene
Innsbrucker Nachrichten
Neue Freie Presse
Neues Wiener Journal
Neues Wiener Tagblatt
Österreich Volkszeitung und Grenzpost
Österreichische Land-Zeitung
Reichspost
Salzburger Chronik
Salzburger Volksblatt
Salzburger Wacht
Tagblatt
Tages-Post
Tiroler Heimatwehr-Blätter
Tiroler Schützen-Zeitung
Volks- und Schützen-Zeitung
Volksfreund
Volkspost
Volkszeitung
Vorarlberger Tagblatt
Vorarlberger Volksblatt
Vorlarberger Wacht
Welt Blatt
Ybbstal Zeitung

Official Histories
Kaiserlich-Königlich Hof- und Staatsdruckerei. Der Feldzug der Österreichischen Armee
in Italien im Jahre 1848. Wien: 1852.
k.k. Generalstabs-Bureau für Kriegsgeschichte. Österreichs Kämpf im Jahre 1866, Band
V. Wien: Waldheim, 1869.
360

k.k. Generalstabs-Bureau für Kriegsgeschichte. Der Krieg in Italien 1859, Erster Band.
Wien: C. Gerold’s Sohn, 1872.
k.k. Generalstabs-Bureau für Kriegsgeschichte. Der Krieg in Italien 1859, Zweiter Band.
Wien: C. Gerold’s Sohn, 1874.
k.k. Generalstabs-Bureau für Kriegsgeschichte. Der Krieg in Italien 1859, Dritten Band.
Wien: C. Gerold’s Sohn, 1876.
Österreichischen Militärischen Zeitschrift. Rückblicke auf den Krieg in Italien 1859.
Wien: R. v. Waldheim, 1873.
Österreichen Bundesministirium für Heereswesen, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg,
1914-1918, 7 Vols. Wien: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen,
1931-8.
Government and Legal Documents
Beschlüsse des Tiroler Nationalrates vom 26. Oktober bis 16. Dezember 1918. Innsbruck:
Buchdruckerei Tyrolia, 1918. Last modified 2011, http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgicontent/alex?aid=spt&datum=1918&size=45.
“Das neue Landesverteidigungs-Gesetz für Tirol samt der neue Schießstandsordnung und
Verordnung über die Begünstigen der Standschützen.” Austrian Literature Online.
Last modified January 1, 2005, http://www.literature.at/viewer.alo?objid=13834.
“Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, Together with
the Protocol and Declarations Annexed Thereto, Signed at Saint Germain-enLaye, September 10, 1919,” UK Treaties Online. Accessed April 2, 2017,
http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1919/TS0011.pdf.
Published Primary Sources
Anonymous. Der Feldzug von 1859 in Italien bearbeitet von einem preußischen Offizier,
Teil I – Die Armeen – Die Kriegsereignisse bis zum Schlusse des Treffens von
Palestro am 31. Mai 1859. Thorn: Ernst Lambeck, 1863.
Anonymous. "Notes on the Setting in Austria." Advocate of Peace Through Justice 84
(October, 1922): 349-353.
Ausschusses des historischen Vereines für Steiermark. Der Steiermarkischen SchützenFreiwilligen-Bataillone und ihre Leistungen in den Jahren 1848 und 1849. Graz:
1857.
361

Bardolff, Karl Freiherr von. Soldat im alten Österreich: Erinnerungen aus mein Leben.
Wien: Diederichs, 1938.
Bartholdy, Jakob L.S. Der Krieg der Tiroler Landleute im Jahre 1809. Berlin: Julius
Eduard Hitzig, 1814.
Becker, Wilhelm G. Andreas Hofer und der Freiheitskampf in Tyrol 1809. Leipzig: B. G.
Teubner, 1841.
Bizony, Ladislaus. 133 Tage ungarnischer Bolshevismus. Wien: Waldheim-Eberle, 1919.
British Broadcasting Corporation. “U.S. gun control: What is the NRA and why is it so
powerful?” Accessed June 12, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada35261394.
Brown, Philip Marshall. "Self-Determination in Europe." The American Journal of
International Law 14 (1920): 235-9.
Der Akademischen Schützengilde. Die Fahnenweihe der Akademischen Schützengilde an
der k.k. Universität in Innsbruck am 1. und 2. Juli 1901. Innsbruck: Verlag der
akademischen Schützengilde, 1901.
Derrécagaix, Victor Bernard. Nos campagnes au Tyrol. Paris, 1910.
Dollfuß, Engelbert. Dollfuß an Österreich. Eines Mannes Wort und Ziel. edited by
Edmund Weber. Wien: Reinhold-Verlag, 1935.
Gilm, Hermann von. Tiroler Schützen-Leben. Festgabe zur Feier der fünfhundertjährigen
Vereinigung Tirols mit dem österreichischen Herrscherhause. Wagner:
Innsbruck, 1863.
H.L. “Herr Dollfuss and the Nazis. II.” Bulletin of International News 10 (Sept. 1933):
3-10.
Heimatschutz in Österreich. Wien: Verlag Zoller, 1934.
Hoen, Maximillian Ritter von, Alois Veltzé, et al. Krieg 1809, II Band: Nach den
Feldakten und anderen authentischen Quellen. Wien: L.W. Seidel & Sohn, 1908.
Hormayr, Josef von. Das Land Tyrol und der Tyrolerkrieg von 1809. Geschichte Andreas
Hofer‘s Sandwirths aus Passyr, Oberführers der Tyroler im Kriege von 1809.
Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1845.
Hötzendorf, Franz Graf Conrad von. Aus meiner dienstzeit, 1906-1918. Wien: Rikola
Verlag, 1921.
362

Huchler, Rudolf. Das Standschützen-Bataillon Dornbirn im Weltkriege. Vorarlberg:
Buchdruckerei Gesellschaft-Dornbirn, 1927.
Jászi, Oskar. "Dismembered Hungary and Peace in Central Europe." Foreign Affairs 2
(Dec. 1923): 270-81.
Jewish Publication Society of America. American Jewish Yearbook, 1920-21.
Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1920.
Johnson, G.E.W. "Mussolini Muscles In." The North American Review 238 (August,
1934): 118-27.
Kanzler, Rudolf. Bayerns Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus: Geschichte bayrischen
Einwohnerwehr. München: Parcus, 1931.
Kelz, Karl. Die Standschutzen des Gerichtsbezirkes Feldkirch im Weltkrieg. 1934.
Kerchnawe, Hugo. Der Zusammenbruch der Österreich-Ungarn Wehrmacht im Herbst
1918: Dargestellt nach Akten des Armee-Ober-Kommandos und anderen
amtlichen Quellen. München: J.F. Lehmanns, 1921.
Krauss, Alfred. Die Ursachen unserer Niederlage: Erinnerung und Urteile aus dem
Weltkrieg. München: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1921.
Laschan, Viktor. Erlebnisse der ersten freiwilligen Scharf-Schützen-Kompagnie
Innsbruck-Sonnenburg, 1866. Innsbruck: Vereins-Buckdrukerei, 1867.
Leo XIII. “Rerum Novarum.” The Holy See. Accessed May 21, 2017,
http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_lxiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum.html.
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The Manifesto of the Communist Party. Marxists
Internet Archive. Accessed September 29, 2016.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/.
Macartney, C.A. “Hungary since 1918.” The Slavonic and East European Review 7
(March 1929): 577-94.
_____________. “The Armed Formations in Austria.” Journal of the Royal Institute of
International Affairs 8 (November, 1929): 617-32.
Münz, Sigmund. "Austria's Relations with Germany and Italy." Foreign Affairs 1 (June,
1923): 59-70.
363

Neubourg, Fr. “Germany as It Is Today.” The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 108, America’s Relation to the European Situation
(July, 1923): 1-9.
Pasha, Rifat Gozdović. Am Col di Lana: Erinnerungen aus dem Kriegsjahr 1915.
Stuttgart: K. Thienemanns Verlag, 1916.
Pichler, Adolf. Aus dem Wälsch-Tirolishen Kriege. Wein: Josef Keck & Sohn, 1849.
Pius XI. “Quadragesimo Anno.” The Holy See. Accessed May 26, 2017,
http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_pxi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.pdf.
Rangger, Lorenz. Kriegserlebnisse des Bauermannes und Patrioten Lorenz Rangger,
gennant Stubacher, von Völs bei Innsbruck, in den Jahren 1796 bis 1814. P.
Ferdinand von Scala, ed. Innsbruck, 1902.
Rapp, Josef. Tirol im Jahre 1809. Innsbruck: F. Rauch, 1852.
Rintelen, Anton. Erinnerungen an Österreichs Weg. Munich, 1941.
Rohrer, Joseph. Uiber die Tiroler. Ein Beytrag zur Oesterreichischen Völkerkunde. Wien:
Dollischen Buchhandlung, 1796.
Sailer, Karl Hans, ed. Geheimer Briefwechsel Mussolini-Dollfuss. Wien: Verlag der
Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1949.
Schallhammer, Anton Ritter von. Biographie des Tiroler heldenpriesters Joachim
Haspinger. Salzburg: Mayrischen Buchhandlung, 1856.
____________. Geschichte des k.k. hauptscheißstandes zu Salzburg und des
Schützenwesens im herzogtum Salzburg vom Mittelalter bis auf unsere Tage.
Salzburg: Mayrischen Buchhandlung, 1859.
Schmid, Ferdinand. Das heeresrecht der Österreichish-Ungarnischen Monarchie. Wien:
F. Tempsky, 1908.
Schoenhals, Karl Freiherr von. Erinnerungen eines oesterreichischen Verteranen aus
dem Italienischen Kriege der Jahre 1848 und 1849. Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta Verlag,
1852.
Schuschnigg, Kurt. My Austria. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1938.
Seipel, Ignaz. Seipels Reden in Österreich und anderwärts: Eine Auswahl zu seinem 50.
Geburtstag, edited by Josef Gessl. Vienna: Heros-Verlag, 1926.
364

Starhemberg, Ernst Rüdiger Prince von. Between Hitler and Mussolini: Memoirs of Ernst
Rüdiger Prince Starhemberg. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942.
Statistik Austria. “Bevölkerung.” Statistik.at. Accessed June 12, 2016.
http://statcube.at/statistik.at/ext/statcube/jsf/tableView/tableView.xhtml.
Steed, H. Wickham. “Italy, Yugoslavia, and Albania.” Journal of the Royal Institute of
International Affairs 6 (May, 1927): 170-178.
Streeruwitz, Ernst von. Springflut über Österreich. Wien-Leipzig, 1937.
Steidle, Richard. Von Wiener-Neustadt bis Gmunden: Reden des 1.Bundesführers der
österreichischen Selbstschutzverbände. Innsbruck: Alpenländische Heimatwehr,
1929.
Steinacher, Hans. Sieg in deutscher Nacht: Ein Buch vom Kärntner Freiheitskampf.
Wien: Wiener Verlag, 1943.
Tarr, Ralph S. and Frank M. McMurry. New Geographies. Second Book. New York, NY:
MacMillan, 1920.
Twain, Mark. “Stirring Times in Austria,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine, March
1898.
U.S. Department of Defense. “Department of Defense (DoD) Releases Fiscal Year 2017
President’s Budget Proposal.” Accessed June 12, 2016.
http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-ReleaseView/Article/652687/department-of-defense-dod-releases-fiscal-year-2017presidents-budget-proposal.
U.S. Census Bureau. “U.S. Population Clock.” Accessed June 12, 2016.
http://www.census.gov/popclock/?eml=gd&intcmp=home_pop&utm_medium=e
mail&utm_source=govdelivery.
Zernatto, Guido. Der Wahrheit über Oesterreich. New York: Longmans, 1938.

Secondary Literature:
Aarons, Mark and John Loftus. Unholy Trinity: The Vatican, The Nazis, and The Swiss
Banks. New York: St. Martins, 1998.
365

Barker, Thomas Mack. The Slovenes of Carinthia: A National Minority Problem. New
York: League of OSA, 1960.
Beer, Siegfried. “Selectively Perceived Legacies of World War I: The Little-Known
Halstead Mission in Austria, 1919.” In From Empire to Republic: Post-World
War I Austria, Contemporary Austrian Studies 19. Edited by Günter Bischof,
Fritz Plasser and Peter Berger, 110-122. New Orleans, LA: University of New
Orleans Press, 2010.
Bloxham, Donald. The Final Solution: A Genocide. London: Oxford University Pres,
2009.
Bodo, Bela. “Hungarian Aristocracy and the White Terror.” Journal of Contemporary
History 45 (October 2010): 703-24.
Boyer, John. “Boundaries and Transitions in Modern Austrian History.” In From Empire
to Republic: Post-World War I Austria, edited by Günter Bischof, Fritz Plasser,
and Peter Berger, 13-23. New Orleans: University of New Orleans Press, 2010.
Brandaur, Isabelle. Menschmaterial Soldat: Alltagsleben an der Dolomitenfront im
Ersten Weltkrieg 1915-1917. Innsbruck: Golf Verlag, 2007.
Brandis, Jakob Andreas von. Die Geschichte der Landeshauptleute von Tirol. Innsbruck:
Wagner, 1850.
Brandtner, Marina. Diskursverweigerung und Gewalt. Dimensionen der Radikalisierung
des politischen Klimas in der obersteierischen Industrieregion 1927-1934.
Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2011.
Bronner, Stephen Eric. Modernism at the Barricades: Aesthetics, Politics, Utopia. New
York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
Brook-Shepherd, Gordon. Dollfuss. London: Macmillan, 1961.
Broucek, Peter. “Obwurzer, Herbert von,” Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon
1815–1950, Band 7, 202. Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Wien, 1978.
Bruckmüller, Ernst. The Austrian Nation: Cultural Consciousness and Socio-political
Processes. Riverside, CA: Ariadne Press, 2003.
_______________. “Patriotic and National Myths: National Consciousness and
Elementary School Education in Imperial Austria.” In The Limits of Loyalty:
Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late
Habsburg Monarchy, edited by Laurence Cole and Daniel Unowsky, 11-35. New
York: Berghahn Books, 2007.
366

Buckey, Evan Burr. Hitler’s Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Carsten, Francis Ludwig. Revolution in Central Europe. London, 1972.
_____________. Fascist Movements in Austria. Beverly Hills: SAGE
Publications, 1977.
_____________. The First Austrian Republic, 1918-1938: A Study based on British and
Austrian Documents. Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing, 1986.
Cassels, Alan. “Mussolini and German Nationalism, 1922-1925.” The Journal of Modern
History 35 (June 1963): 137-157.
Cole, Laurence. Für Gott, Kaiser, und Vaterland: Nationale Identität der
deutschsprachigen Bevölkerung Tirols, 1860-1914. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag,
2000.
____________. “Nation, Anti-Enlightenment, and Religious Revival in Austria: Tyrol in
the 1790s.” The Historical Journal 43 (June, 2000): 475-497.
____________. “The Construction of German Identity in Tirol, c. 1848-1945.” In
Regionale Bewegungen und Regionalismen in europäischen Zwischenräum seit
der Mitte des 19.Jahrhunderts, edited by Philipp Ther, Holm Sundhaussen, et al,
19-42. Marburg: Verlag Herder-Insitut, 2003.
____________. “Military Veterans and Popular Patriotism in Imperial Austria, 18701914.” In The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and
State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy. Edited by Laurence Cole and
Daniel Unowsky, 36-61. New York: Berghahn Books, 2007.
____________. Military Culture & Popular Patriotism in Late Imperial Austria. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014.
Curran, Charles E. “Catholic Social Teaching.” The Good Society 10 (2001): 1, 4-6.
de Caprariis, Luca. "'Fascism for Export'? The Rise and Eclipse of the Fasci Italiani
all'Estero," Journal of Contemporary History 35 (April 2000): 151-83.
Deak, John. “Dismantling Empire: Ignaz Seipel and Austria’s Financial Crisis, 19221925.” In From Empire to Republic: Post-World War I Austria, Contemporary
Austrian Studies 19. Edited by Günter Bischof, Fritz Plasser and Peter Berger,
123-141. New Orleans, LA: University of New Orleans, 2010.
_________. “Austria in the 1920s.” In Austrian Studies Today, Contemporary Austrian
367

Studies 25. Edited by Günter Bischof and Ferdinand Karlhofer, 205-214. New
Orleans, LA: University of New Orleans, 2016.
Deschner, Karlheinz. God and the Fascists: The Vatican Alliance with Mussolini,
Franco, Hitler, and Pavelic. New York: Prometheus Books, 2013.
Diamant, Alfred. “Austrian Catholics and the First Republic, 1918-1934: A Study in
Anti-Democratic Thought.” The Western Political Quarterly 10 (September
1957): 603-633.
Edmonston, C. Earl. The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics 1918-1936. Athens, GA:
University of Georgia Press, 1978.
Eyck, F. Gunter. Loyal Rebels: Andreas Hofer and the Tyrolean Uprising of 1809. New
York: American University Press, 1986.
Fahlenbock, Michaela. “Das “Libell der Rüstung Halben” Ein Ergebnis des Innsbrucker
Auschusslandtags 1518.” Tiroler Landesarchiv. Last modified 2013.
https://www.tirol.gv.at/fileadmin/themen/kunstkultur/landesarchiv/downloads/Ruestungslibell__1518.pdf.
Fankhauser, Hubert. Freiwillige an Kärntens Grenzen: Die Regimentsgeschichte der k.k.
Kärntener Freiwillige Schützen 1915 bis 1918. Graz: Vehling, 2008.
Feldman, Gerald D. Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933-1945. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Fraydenegg-Monzello, Andreas. Volkstaat und Ständeordung: Die Wirkschaftspolitik der
steierischen Heimwehren, 1927-1933. Wien: Böhlau, 2015.
Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz. New
York: Basic Books, 1973.
Gerwarth, Robert. “The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in
Germany, Austrian, and Hungary after the Great War,” Past & Present 200
(August, 2008): 175-209.
Gerwarth, Robert and John Horne. “Vectors of Violence: Paramilitarism in Europe after
the Great War, 1917-1923.” The Journal of Modern History 83 (September 2011):
489-512.
Götsch, Alois. Die Vorarlberger Heimwehr: Zwischen Bolshewistenfurcht und NSTerror. Feldkirch: Rheticus Gesellschaft, 1993.
Griffen, Roger. The Nature of Fascism. London: Routledge, 1991.
368

Gulick, Charles. Austria: From Habsburg to Hitler, 2 vols. (Berkley: University of
California Press, 1948).
Hartungen, Christoph von. “Die Tiroler und Vorarlberger Standschützen—Mythos und
Realität.” In Tirol und der Erste Weltkrieg, edited by Klaus Eisterer and Rolf
Steininger, 61-104. Innsbruck: Österreich StudienVerlag, 1995.
Hastings, Derek. Catholicism and the Roots of Nazism: Religious Identity and National
Socialism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Herwig, Holger H. The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918.
London: Arnold, 1997.
Hirn, Josef. Tirols Erhebung im Jahre 1809. Innsbruck: Heinrich Scwiek, 1909.
Hochman, Erin R. Imaging A Greater Germany: Republican Nationalism and the Idea of
Anschluss. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016.
Hofmann, Josef. Der Pfrimer-Putsch. Der steirischen Heimwehrprozeß des Jahres 1931.
Wien: Stiasny Verlag, 1965.
Hye, Franz-Heinz von. Die Tiroler Schützen und ihre Geschichte. Bozen, 2001.
James, Leighton S. "For the Fatherland? The Motivations of Austrian and Prussian
Volunteers during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars." In War Volunteering
in Modern Times: From the French Revolution to the Second World War, edited
by Christine G. Krüger and Sonja Levsen, 40-58. London: Palgrave, 2010.
Jedlicka, Ludwig. Ein Heer im Schatten der Parteien. Die militärische Lage Österreichs
1918-1938. Graz: Hermann Böhlaus, 1955.
_____________. “The Austrian Heimwehr.” Journal of Contemporary History 1 (1966):
127-44.
Joly, Wolfgang. Standschützen: die Tiroler und Vorarlberger k.k. StandschützenFormationen im Ersten Weltkrieg: Organisation und Einsatz. Innsbruck: Wagner,
1998.
Kellogg, Michael. The Russian Roots of Nazism: White Émigrés and the Making of
National Socialism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Kerekes, Lajos. “Der Weiß Allianz: Bayern-österreichisch-ungarnische Projekte gegen
die Regierung Renner in Jahre 1920.” Österreichische Osthefte 7 (1965): 353366.
369

____________. “Akten zu den geheimen Verbindungen zwischen der Bethlen-Regierung
und der österreichischen Heimwehrbewegung.” Acta Historica Academiae
Scientiarum Hungaricae 11 (1965): 299-339.
____________. Abenddämmerung einer Demokratie: Mussolini, Gömbös und die
Heimwehr. Wien: Europa Verlag, 1966.
Kertzer, David I. The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of
Fascism in Europe. New York: Random House, 2015.
Kirk, Tim. “Fascism and Austrofascism.” The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A
Reassessment, Contemporary Austrian Studies 11. Edited by Günter Bischof,
Anton Pelinka, and Alexander Lassner, 10-31. New Orleans, LA: University of
New Orleans Press, 2003.
________. “Dictatorship, Fascism and the Demise of Austrian Democracy.” Austrian
Studies Today, Contemporary Austrian Studies 25. Edited by Günter Bischof and
Ferdinand Karlhofer, 111-126. New Orleans, LA: University of New Orleans
Press, 2016.
Kitchen, Martin. The Coming of Austrian Fascism. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1980.
Kornhauser, William. The Politics of Mass Society. New York: Free Press, 1959.
Lackey, Scott W. The Rebirth of the Habsburg Army: Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the
General Staff. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995.
Large, David Clay. The Politics of Law and Order: A History of the Bavarian
Einwohnerwehr, 1918-1921. Philadelphia, PA: The American Philosophical
Society, 1980.
Lauridsen, John T. Nazism and the Radical Right in Austria, 1918-1934, trans. Michael
Wolfe. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2007.
Langes, Gunther. Die Front in Fels und Eis: Der Weltkreig, 1914-1918 im Hochgebirge.
Bozen: Verlagsanstalt Athesia, 1979.
Maderthaner, Wolfgang. “Utopian Perspectives and Political Restraint: The Austrian
Revolution in the Context of Central European Conflicts.” In From Empire to
Republic: Post-World War I Austria, edited by Günter Bischof, Fritz Plasser, and
Peter Berger, 52-66. New Orleans: University of New Orleans Press, 2010).

370

Melancon, Michael. “Revolutionary Culture in the Early Soviet Republic: Communist
Executive Committees versus the Cheka, Fall 1918,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte
Osteuropas 57 (2009): 1-22.
Mills, Cathy and Larena Hoeber. “Exploring Organizational Culture Through Artifacts in
a Community Figure Skating Club.” Journal of Sport Management 27 (2013):
482-496.
Mörl, Anton von. Standschützen verteidigen Tirol, 1915-1918. Innsbruck:
Universitätsverlag Wagner, 1958.
Nemes, D. “’Die österreichische Aktion’ der Bethlen-Regierung.” Acta Historica
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 11 (1965): 187-259.
Parkinson, F., ed. Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism, Yesterday & Today. Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 1989.
Pauley, Bruce F. Hahnenschwanz und Hakenkreuz. Steirischer Heimatschutz und
österreichischer Nationalsozialismus 1918-1934. Wien: Europa Verlag, 1972.
_____________. “Fascism and the Führerprinzip: The Austrian Example.” Central
European History 12 (Sept. 1979): 272-96.
_____________. Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian National
Socialism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981.
_____________. From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-Semitism.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.
Paxton, Robert O. “The Five Phases of Fascism.” The Journal of Modern History 70
(March 1998): 1-23.
Payne, Stanley G. A History of Fascism, 1914-1945. Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1995.
Pyrah, Robert. “Enacting Encyclicals? Cultural Politics and ‘Clerical Fascism’ in Austria,
1933-1938.” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8 (June, 2007): 36982.
Rafaeli, A. and M. Worline, “Symbols in organizational culture.” In Handbook of
organizational culture & climate, edited by N. Ashkansay, C. Wilderom, and M.
Peterson, 71-84. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000.
Rape, Ludger. Die österreichischen Heimwehren und die bayerische Rechte 1920-1923.
Wien: Europa Verlag, 1977.
371

___________. “Die Vorarlberger Heimwehr und die bayerische Richte 1920-1923.” In
Nachfräge. Zur neueren Vorarlberger Landesgeschichte, edited by Meinrad
Pichler, 74-95. Bregenz: Fink’s Verlag, 1983.
Rath, R. John. “Authoritarian Austria,” In Native Fascism in the Successor States, 19181945. edited by Peter F. Sugar, 24-43. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1971.
Rauchensteiner, Manfried. Der Tod Des Doppeladlers: Österreich-Ungarn und der Erste
Weltkrieg. Graz: Styria Verlag, 1993.
Rebtisch, Wolfgang. Tirol—Land in Waffen. Soldaten und bewaffnete Verbände 1918 bis
1938. Innsbruck: Universitätverlag Wagner, 2009.
Reiche, Eric G. The Development of the SA in Nurnberg, 1922-1934. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Ritter, Harry. “Austria and the Struggle for German Identity.” German Studies Review 15
(Winter 1992): 111-129.
Rothenberg, Gunter E. The Army of Francis Joseph. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue
University Press, 1976.
Sahlins, Peter. Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyranees. Berkley:
University of California Press, 1989.
Sakmyster, Thomas L. “Army Officers and Foreign Policy in Interwar Hungary, 191841.” Journal of Contemporary History 10 (January 1975): 19-40.
Sandkühler, Hans Jörg and Rafael de la Varga, eds. Austromarxismus. Texte zu Ideologie
und Klassenkampf. Frankfurt: Europäische Verlaganstalt, 1970.
Schein, Edgar H. Organizational Culture and Leadership. Third Edition. San Francisco,
CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004.
Schennach, Martin P. Ritter, Landsknecht, Aufgebot: Quellen zum Tyrolean Kriegswesen
14.-17. Jahrhundert. Innsbruck: Tiroler Landesarchiv, 2004.
________________. “Zum Tiroler Landlibell von 1511.” Tiroler Landesarchiv. Accessed
June 23, 2015. https://www.tirol.gv.at/fileadmin/themen/kunstkultur/landesarchiv/downloads/TirolerLandlibell-1511.PDF.
________________. “Das Gutachten Hans Khüenings über die Tiroler Landmiliz vom
Juni 1633.” Tiroler Landesarchiv. https://www.tirol.gv.at/fileadmin/themen/kunstkultur/landesarchiv/downloads/tiroler-aufgebote.PDF.
372

Schindler, John R. Isonzo: The Forgotten Sacrifice of the Great War. Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2001.
Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and
Recovery. New York: Picador, 2001.
Schober, Richard. “Aufstieg und Fall der Tiroler Heimawehr (1928-1936).” Tiroler
Heimat 61 (1997): 171-213.
Schönherr, David von, ed. Franz Schweyger's Chronik der Stadt Hall, 1303-1572.
Innsbruck: Wagner Universität Buchhandlung, 1867.
Stone, Norman. The Eastern Front, 1914-1917. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1975.
Sweet, Paul R. “Democracy and Counter-Revolution in Austria.” The Journal of Modern
History 22 (March, 1950): 52-58.
Thorpe, Julie. “Austrofascism: Revisiting the ‘Authoritarian State’ 40 Years On.”
Journal of Contemporary History 45 (April 2010): 315-343.
__________. Pan-Germanism and the Austro-Fascist State, 1933-1938. Manchester, UK:
Manchester University Press, 2011.
Timms, Edward. “National Memory and the “Austrian Idea” from Metternich to
Waldheim.” Modern Language Review 86 (Oct. 1991): 898-910.
Tipton, Frank. A History of Modern Germany Since 1815. Berkley: University of
California Press, 2003.
Tiroler Landesarchiv. “Standschützen,” Archivglossar – S. Accessed April 23, 2015,
https://www.tirol.gv.at/kunst-kultur/landesarchiv/glossar/archivglossar-s/.
Tunstall, Graydon A. Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915.
Lawrence, Kansas University Press, 2010.
Überegger, Oswald. “Kinder im Krieg. Das Schicksal des 14jährige Kartitisher
Standschützen Josef Egger.” Tiroler Landesarchiv. Last modified 2004.
https://www.tirol.gv.at/fileadmin/themen/kunstkultur/landesarchiv/downloads/kinderimkrieg.PDF.
_______________. Erinnerungskriege: Der Erste Weltkrieg, Österreich und die Tiroler
Kriegserinnerung in der Zwischenkriegszeit. Innsbruck: Universitätverlag
Wagner, 2011.
Viazzo, Pier Paolo. Upland Communities: Environment, population, and social structure
373

in the Alps since the sixteenth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989.
Waite, Robert G.L. The Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar
Germany, 1918-1923. New York, NY: Norton, 1969.
Wasserman, Janek. Black Vienna: The Radical Right in the Red City, 1918-1938. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
_______________. “Österreichische Aktion: Monarchism, Authoritarianism, and the
Unity of the Austrian Conservative Ideological Field during the First Republic.”
Central European History 47 (2014): 76-104.
Wawro, Geoffrey. The Austro-Prussian War: Austria’s War with Prussia and Italy in
1866. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Wiltschegg, Walter. Die Heimwehr: Eine unwiderstehliche Volksbewegung? Wien:
Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1985.
Winkler, Friedrich August. Germany: The Long Road West, 1789-1933. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2006.
Winter, Jay. Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural
History. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Kindle edition.
Zaisberger, Friederike, Fritz Hörmann, eds. Frieden-Schützen 1809-2009:
Franzosenkriege im Dreiländereck, Bayern, Salzburg, Tirol, 1792-1816.
Salzburg: Struberschützen Golling, Werfen, 2009.
___________________. Salzburgs Schützen und Bürgergarden: Landesverteidigung und
Brauchtum. Salzburg: Landesverband Salzburger Volkskultur, 1996.

Theses and Dissertations
Götzl, Georg. "Die Agitation und Propaganda der Heimwehrbegwegung gegen das
Parliamentarisch-Demokratische System der Ersten Österreichischen Republik in
den Jahren 1927-1933." PhD diss., University of Vienna, 1987.
Houlihan, Patrick J. “Clergy in the Trenches: Catholic Military Chaplains of Germany
and Austria-Hungary during the First World War.” PhD diss., University of
Chicago, 2011.
374

Koepp, Roy G. “Conservative Radicals: The Einwohnerwehr, Bund Bayern und Reich,
and the limits of Paramilitary Politics in Bavaria, 1918-1928.” PhD diss.,
University of Nebraska, 2010.
Kondert, Reinhart. “The Rise and Early History of the Austrian Heimwehr.” PhD diss.,
Rice University, 1972.
Lösch, Verena. “Die Geschichte der Tiroler Heimatwehr von ihren Anfängen bis zum
Korneuburger Eid (1920 - 1930).” PhD diss., University of Innsbruck, 1986.
Mason, Kevin. “Building an Unwanted Nation: The Anglo-American Partnership and
Austrian Proponents of a Separate Nationhood, 1918-1934.” PhD diss., University
of North Carolina, 2007.
Messner, Günther. “Landeshauptmann Franz Stumpf und seine Sicherheitdoktrin.” PhD
diss. University of Innsbruck, 2014.
Schneeberger, Franziska. “Sozialstruktur der Heimwehr in Österreich. Eine vergleichendpolitische sozialgeschichte der Heimwehrbewegung.” PhD diss., University of
Salzburg, 1988.
Steinmar, Jürgen. “Der Priesterpolitiker Ignaz Seipel und der Heilige Stuhl. Ein Konflikt
der Loyaltät?” PhD diss., University of Vienna, 2012.
Stoneman, Mark R. “The Bavarian Army and French Civilians in the War of 1870-71.”
MA thesis, Universität Augsburg, 1994.

375

